DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall

Your Multisig Can Correctly Approve the Wrong Transaction

Henri Binsztok

14:33 · Recording

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Transcript

0:05Yeah. Hi everyone. So my name is Bintock

0:09and I'm the co-founder of OK Contract

0:12Labs. And today I'm going to present uh

0:17something which I believe is very

0:18important in security is about your

0:22multisync can correctly approve the

0:24wrong transactions and indeed this

0:28happened all the time. Uh and uh so I'll

0:33present this next. So first uh let's

0:36look at the buy bit attack which we all

0:38know about the AON signers accepted a

0:41major change of authority. It's

0:44operation one on the safe which

0:46basically changes the the the structure

0:49of the administration of the safe and in

0:52the end uh thanks to a very controlled

0:57attack because of a compromised AWS

1:00account. They managed to deploy an

1:03original fake front end on the original

1:06safe domain and trick by bet into

1:09delegating the authority of their funds

1:12to the attackers. And here's the money

1:15is gone. And so the the I'll talk about

1:18this screenshot here. Uh it's a map of

1:21all the incidents in crypto that we've

1:23built.

1:24Second thing uh happened last week and

1:27almost nobody noticed because it

1:29happened on the same day as the Binance

1:32attack and it was uh a third-party

1:36marketing provider which was injecting

1:39some JavaScript in Poly Market front end

1:42that basically compromised the front end

1:44and made some signers trick into signing

1:47things. But the thing is it was only a

1:50few millions stolen and this uh wasn't

1:54noticed on the on the same day as the

1:56Binance attack. And there are some

1:58precedents and if you look at for

2:00instance the the map of incident where

2:02basically you you you directly inject

2:05some dependency into the front end. uh

2:08this happened to Kybers swap before and

2:12uh using for instance a Google tag

2:14manager uh to inject uh things and then

2:17of course there's the the biggest uh of

2:20all now how a developer laptop

2:23compromise plus other things because it

2:26also compromised some of the signers

2:28infrastructure to sign the delegated 772

2:32authorizations. So basically this led to

2:38uh a a major drain where basically the

2:41the signers lose control of the

2:44authority and don't know exactly what

2:46they're signing and this kind of risk

2:49extends way beyond contract bugs and we

2:53have in our onchain risk map which is at

2:56map.contract.com

2:57you can scan the the QR code which is

3:00behind me. Uh we have uh noticed um and

3:04and modeled uh in threat modeling more

3:07than 1,800

3:09incidents and if you look at them they

3:12are way more than contract bugs like

3:13transaction deception 70 governance

3:17upgrades 68 uh 53 account authorization

3:21and 51 supply chain attacks on software.

3:26So the question is what can you do uh

3:30versus these threats and we have

3:33researched uh a new solution which is

3:35called chain wall and the goal of chain

3:38wall is to have a non-chain security

3:41model which checks every transaction

3:44that is run in smart accounts and

3:47basically create named actions and use

3:50those named actions uh like scripts if

3:54you want uh on strict onchain policies

3:57to construct what uh the account can do.

4:00So how does it work? You have an onchain

4:04registry which create users, policies,

4:07contracts, action scripts. They are very

4:10important and the accounts themselves.

4:13All these changes are governed with time

4:16locks and a very controllable approval

4:19workflow. And when you want to use them,

4:22basically every operator, API, agent,

4:26whoever wants to transact on your

4:28accounts makes a request and that

4:30request has to go through interact which

4:34is a contract which acts as a boundary

4:37and is verifying basically that the

4:41operation matches the policies and then

4:45inside the protected account we have

4:48written an engine called miniscript.

4:50which is a scriptable onchain runtime

4:53which will run the predefined action

4:56making sure that what you approve is the

4:59exact semantics of what gets executed

5:03and then you can finally call the the

5:05target contracts any D5 protocol sending

5:09tokens etc etc

5:13so how does it look in practice the core

5:15of it is the onchain scripting engine

5:19And we have created two language a

5:21higher level language which is the one

5:24where you write the interaction in and

5:26minuscript which is the onchain uh

5:29execution language. And so for this

5:33language uh which we call lambdascript

5:35this is the higher level language. So

5:37here for instance you say okay you

5:38define USDC as the token circle USDC in

5:42your registry. Then you define morph

5:45blue as the a contract that you name as

5:47well in your registry. And then you'll

5:49say okay we're going to approve USDC to

5:53moro blue. We're going for blueue.reay

5:56with the following parameters and some

5:58of them are arguments that you uh enable

6:01your your your script to do. And then in

6:04the end don't forget to uh revoke the

6:07approval uh that you just did. And all

6:10this execution is onchain in a single in

6:13transaction. So basically this is

6:15entirely atomic which is of course a

6:18very interesting property and you you

6:21wonder why so many defi websites in

6:24particular uh enforce separate

6:26transaction for what are single uh

6:28execution flows. Uh and one thing is

6:32very important is the same scripting

6:35language applies both to the interaction

6:38like the catalog of scripts that you

6:40execute in your general instance but

6:43also the policies the policy rules. So

6:47basically you can write very

6:49customizable policies. For instance if

6:52the amount is below let's say 5k you

6:56require only one signer. Between 5K and

6:5950K you require two signers and above

7:0250K you require three signers or

7:04whatever you want like monthly limits,

7:07budget etc etc. Everything is possible.

7:11It's uh it's a or turing complete or

7:15nearly Turing complete. Uh so basically

7:18you can protect your stack with uh from

7:23internal and external threat. Uh one

7:26thing very important is we formally

7:29verified many properties of general

7:32including especially the time blocks to

7:35strongly make sure that it's not

7:37possible at all to bypass the time locks

7:41for managing your chain wall registry.

7:45And this onchain catalog basically uh

7:49blocks compromised operator requests or

7:53decept deceptive transactions request

7:56including the front ends that are

7:59compromised supply chain compromised

8:01because these rules leave onchain and

8:05they leave onchain with strong time

8:07locks. So whatever happens even if the

8:10users uh also sign hostile withdrawal

8:14request it doesn't matter they won't go

8:17through because they're not listed in

8:19what is allowed and we strongly believe

8:22uh chain roll would have prevented the

8:24Binance attack would have prevented the

8:26buy bit attack the poly market attack

8:29and many others and to tell you the

8:32truth this is the reason why we've done

8:34the map we've done the map to do some

8:37threat modeling. So we could verify that

8:40our chain wall protocol that is not

8:43vulnerable to the same kind of attacks.

8:45You can use chain wall in two ways. The

8:49first way is to just take the factory

8:52which we deploy on chain and use it to

8:56manage asset. You define what are the

8:58the the accounts, the policies, the

9:01catalog that you want and you just run

9:03it and then you configure and execute

9:05all your operations. But there is

9:07another thing you can do especially if

9:09you're a DeFi protocol. You can govern a

9:13protocol by implementing general as

9:16contracts into your stack and all the

9:19privileged operation. All the

9:21administrative functions on your

9:23protocol get a very powerful general

9:26instance which can time lock of course

9:29enforce multiig and force customizable

9:32rules and also these rule evolve like

9:36they can be a a heavily time lock living

9:39organism without having to redeploy your

9:42contracts without having to reodit them.

9:44You keep your same set of contracts and

9:49you govern your protocol using chain

9:51wall.

9:53Oops, sorry. And

9:57it looks like this. For instance, let's

9:59say that this is a imaginary protocol

10:02which is a stable coin. You would for

10:04instance create a very simple

10:06interaction to mint which is the the uh

10:10privileged operation that you heavily

10:12want to protect if you're a stable coin.

10:14And basically you say okay you require

10:17the the policy to be the issuance policy

10:20that you want. uh you require for

10:22instance a controller, you require

10:24whatever you want and you say okay we're

10:25minting to that address that amount and

10:29then you can add a policy which is

10:31listing as many requirements as you want

10:35like uh monthly limits caps supplies

10:39verifying external author authorizations

10:43and many many other things.

10:46So I am uh well well in advance and um

10:50what I want to do right now is uh so to

10:54the repo is private uh and I'm using

11:01my pass key.

11:04Okay,

11:06it's loading.

11:08Yeah.

11:10Done.

11:12Okay.

11:15And yeah and right now so chain roll is

11:19now public. So yeah thank you. So you

11:24can go to okay contract chain roll and

11:27so you you'll find uh many uh things. So

11:30let me so now it's available in preview.

11:33So let me tell you a few more things. Uh

11:36we have a CLI. So right now the factory

11:40contracts and the CLI are deployed on

11:43arbitum. So if you scan that QR code, it

11:47leads directly to the CLI and where you

11:51can in a very easy way deploy and use uh

11:56and use start using uh chain wall. Uh we

11:59make uh we made a CLI in particular

12:02because it enables to use agents very

12:05easily. So, what you can do is just ask

12:08an agent to do some test. Give it a test

12:11wallet and uh with $10 will be way way

12:15more than enough and just uh configure

12:18everything for you, write the scripts,

12:21set up the policies, etc. Uh we we've

12:24tested it and it works extremely well

12:27and then you can as a human review

12:29everything is properly set up before you

12:31you you send more funds. So you can

12:34generate these policies workflow define

12:37your own time locks and and play with

12:39it. Uh happy to of course have uh any

12:43feedback uh that that you you you uh

12:46could give right now. Just uh a word

12:49about the state. So we did an internal

12:52audit uh from very experienced auditors

12:54in our team uh on the chain wall uh

12:57contracts themselves and uh we also have

13:01an external audit ongoing. So right now

13:04we are close to mid audit and there's

13:08nothing uh critical of course uh we

13:12there's uh a lot of lower uh let's say

13:16uh findings which we will fix and but

13:18don't put any asset at risk and uh we

13:22expect the audit to be completed uh by

13:25next month or next month and a half. Uh

13:29and so now you can go to chain wall the

13:33newly open-sourced uh repository with

13:35the contract you have the CLI and you

13:38can as well follow us on X. uh we will

13:41share a lot of updates on what we're

13:44building uh with general and if some of

13:48you may know it as well we're also the

13:50authors of u a solidity compiler called

13:53okci

13:55uh that vitalik shared uh when we

13:58launched and so we also have a lot of u

14:02news about okci so it's the same ex

14:04account so thanks yeah for following us

14:07and you'll get all the the latest uh

14:09news uh about it and yeah maybe we have

14:1330 second we can take one question

14:17yeah

14:19is there a question okay

14:21>> okay I'll consider that as a no

14:24>> so thanks a lot and yeah p please give

14:26us the the very first stars uh the

14:28repository was just open source now

14:31thank you [applause]

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