DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall
Your Multisig Can Correctly Approve the Wrong Transaction
Henri Binsztok
Source: YouTube automatic caption track · Exported 2026-11-16. Timestamps link to the source video. Cue end times were not supplied.
Transcript
0:05Yeah. Hi everyone. So my name is Bintock
0:09and I'm the co-founder of OK Contract
0:12Labs. And today I'm going to present uh
0:17something which I believe is very
0:18important in security is about your
0:22multisync can correctly approve the
0:24wrong transactions and indeed this
0:28happened all the time. Uh and uh so I'll
0:33present this next. So first uh let's
0:36look at the buy bit attack which we all
0:38know about the AON signers accepted a
0:41major change of authority. It's
0:44operation one on the safe which
0:46basically changes the the the structure
0:49of the administration of the safe and in
0:52the end uh thanks to a very controlled
0:57attack because of a compromised AWS
1:00account. They managed to deploy an
1:03original fake front end on the original
1:06safe domain and trick by bet into
1:09delegating the authority of their funds
1:12to the attackers. And here's the money
1:15is gone. And so the the I'll talk about
1:18this screenshot here. Uh it's a map of
1:21all the incidents in crypto that we've
1:23built.
1:24Second thing uh happened last week and
1:27almost nobody noticed because it
1:29happened on the same day as the Binance
1:32attack and it was uh a third-party
1:36marketing provider which was injecting
1:39some JavaScript in Poly Market front end
1:42that basically compromised the front end
1:44and made some signers trick into signing
1:47things. But the thing is it was only a
1:50few millions stolen and this uh wasn't
1:54noticed on the on the same day as the
1:56Binance attack. And there are some
1:58precedents and if you look at for
2:00instance the the map of incident where
2:02basically you you you directly inject
2:05some dependency into the front end. uh
2:08this happened to Kybers swap before and
2:12uh using for instance a Google tag
2:14manager uh to inject uh things and then
2:17of course there's the the biggest uh of
2:20all now how a developer laptop
2:23compromise plus other things because it
2:26also compromised some of the signers
2:28infrastructure to sign the delegated 772
2:32authorizations. So basically this led to
2:38uh a a major drain where basically the
2:41the signers lose control of the
2:44authority and don't know exactly what
2:46they're signing and this kind of risk
2:49extends way beyond contract bugs and we
2:53have in our onchain risk map which is at
2:56map.contract.com
2:57you can scan the the QR code which is
3:00behind me. Uh we have uh noticed um and
3:04and modeled uh in threat modeling more
3:07than 1,800
3:09incidents and if you look at them they
3:12are way more than contract bugs like
3:13transaction deception 70 governance
3:17upgrades 68 uh 53 account authorization
3:21and 51 supply chain attacks on software.
3:26So the question is what can you do uh
3:30versus these threats and we have
3:33researched uh a new solution which is
3:35called chain wall and the goal of chain
3:38wall is to have a non-chain security
3:41model which checks every transaction
3:44that is run in smart accounts and
3:47basically create named actions and use
3:50those named actions uh like scripts if
3:54you want uh on strict onchain policies
3:57to construct what uh the account can do.
4:00So how does it work? You have an onchain
4:04registry which create users, policies,
4:07contracts, action scripts. They are very
4:10important and the accounts themselves.
4:13All these changes are governed with time
4:16locks and a very controllable approval
4:19workflow. And when you want to use them,
4:22basically every operator, API, agent,
4:26whoever wants to transact on your
4:28accounts makes a request and that
4:30request has to go through interact which
4:34is a contract which acts as a boundary
4:37and is verifying basically that the
4:41operation matches the policies and then
4:45inside the protected account we have
4:48written an engine called miniscript.
4:50which is a scriptable onchain runtime
4:53which will run the predefined action
4:56making sure that what you approve is the
4:59exact semantics of what gets executed
5:03and then you can finally call the the
5:05target contracts any D5 protocol sending
5:09tokens etc etc
5:13so how does it look in practice the core
5:15of it is the onchain scripting engine
5:19And we have created two language a
5:21higher level language which is the one
5:24where you write the interaction in and
5:26minuscript which is the onchain uh
5:29execution language. And so for this
5:33language uh which we call lambdascript
5:35this is the higher level language. So
5:37here for instance you say okay you
5:38define USDC as the token circle USDC in
5:42your registry. Then you define morph
5:45blue as the a contract that you name as
5:47well in your registry. And then you'll
5:49say okay we're going to approve USDC to
5:53moro blue. We're going for blueue.reay
5:56with the following parameters and some
5:58of them are arguments that you uh enable
6:01your your your script to do. And then in
6:04the end don't forget to uh revoke the
6:07approval uh that you just did. And all
6:10this execution is onchain in a single in
6:13transaction. So basically this is
6:15entirely atomic which is of course a
6:18very interesting property and you you
6:21wonder why so many defi websites in
6:24particular uh enforce separate
6:26transaction for what are single uh
6:28execution flows. Uh and one thing is
6:32very important is the same scripting
6:35language applies both to the interaction
6:38like the catalog of scripts that you
6:40execute in your general instance but
6:43also the policies the policy rules. So
6:47basically you can write very
6:49customizable policies. For instance if
6:52the amount is below let's say 5k you
6:56require only one signer. Between 5K and
6:5950K you require two signers and above
7:0250K you require three signers or
7:04whatever you want like monthly limits,
7:07budget etc etc. Everything is possible.
7:11It's uh it's a or turing complete or
7:15nearly Turing complete. Uh so basically
7:18you can protect your stack with uh from
7:23internal and external threat. Uh one
7:26thing very important is we formally
7:29verified many properties of general
7:32including especially the time blocks to
7:35strongly make sure that it's not
7:37possible at all to bypass the time locks
7:41for managing your chain wall registry.
7:45And this onchain catalog basically uh
7:49blocks compromised operator requests or
7:53decept deceptive transactions request
7:56including the front ends that are
7:59compromised supply chain compromised
8:01because these rules leave onchain and
8:05they leave onchain with strong time
8:07locks. So whatever happens even if the
8:10users uh also sign hostile withdrawal
8:14request it doesn't matter they won't go
8:17through because they're not listed in
8:19what is allowed and we strongly believe
8:22uh chain roll would have prevented the
8:24Binance attack would have prevented the
8:26buy bit attack the poly market attack
8:29and many others and to tell you the
8:32truth this is the reason why we've done
8:34the map we've done the map to do some
8:37threat modeling. So we could verify that
8:40our chain wall protocol that is not
8:43vulnerable to the same kind of attacks.
8:45You can use chain wall in two ways. The
8:49first way is to just take the factory
8:52which we deploy on chain and use it to
8:56manage asset. You define what are the
8:58the the accounts, the policies, the
9:01catalog that you want and you just run
9:03it and then you configure and execute
9:05all your operations. But there is
9:07another thing you can do especially if
9:09you're a DeFi protocol. You can govern a
9:13protocol by implementing general as
9:16contracts into your stack and all the
9:19privileged operation. All the
9:21administrative functions on your
9:23protocol get a very powerful general
9:26instance which can time lock of course
9:29enforce multiig and force customizable
9:32rules and also these rule evolve like
9:36they can be a a heavily time lock living
9:39organism without having to redeploy your
9:42contracts without having to reodit them.
9:44You keep your same set of contracts and
9:49you govern your protocol using chain
9:51wall.
9:53Oops, sorry. And
9:57it looks like this. For instance, let's
9:59say that this is a imaginary protocol
10:02which is a stable coin. You would for
10:04instance create a very simple
10:06interaction to mint which is the the uh
10:10privileged operation that you heavily
10:12want to protect if you're a stable coin.
10:14And basically you say okay you require
10:17the the policy to be the issuance policy
10:20that you want. uh you require for
10:22instance a controller, you require
10:24whatever you want and you say okay we're
10:25minting to that address that amount and
10:29then you can add a policy which is
10:31listing as many requirements as you want
10:35like uh monthly limits caps supplies
10:39verifying external author authorizations
10:43and many many other things.
10:46So I am uh well well in advance and um
10:50what I want to do right now is uh so to
10:54the repo is private uh and I'm using
11:01my pass key.
11:04Okay,
11:06it's loading.
11:08Yeah.
11:10Done.
11:12Okay.
11:15And yeah and right now so chain roll is
11:19now public. So yeah thank you. So you
11:24can go to okay contract chain roll and
11:27so you you'll find uh many uh things. So
11:30let me so now it's available in preview.
11:33So let me tell you a few more things. Uh
11:36we have a CLI. So right now the factory
11:40contracts and the CLI are deployed on
11:43arbitum. So if you scan that QR code, it
11:47leads directly to the CLI and where you
11:51can in a very easy way deploy and use uh
11:56and use start using uh chain wall. Uh we
11:59make uh we made a CLI in particular
12:02because it enables to use agents very
12:05easily. So, what you can do is just ask
12:08an agent to do some test. Give it a test
12:11wallet and uh with $10 will be way way
12:15more than enough and just uh configure
12:18everything for you, write the scripts,
12:21set up the policies, etc. Uh we we've
12:24tested it and it works extremely well
12:27and then you can as a human review
12:29everything is properly set up before you
12:31you you send more funds. So you can
12:34generate these policies workflow define
12:37your own time locks and and play with
12:39it. Uh happy to of course have uh any
12:43feedback uh that that you you you uh
12:46could give right now. Just uh a word
12:49about the state. So we did an internal
12:52audit uh from very experienced auditors
12:54in our team uh on the chain wall uh
12:57contracts themselves and uh we also have
13:01an external audit ongoing. So right now
13:04we are close to mid audit and there's
13:08nothing uh critical of course uh we
13:12there's uh a lot of lower uh let's say
13:16uh findings which we will fix and but
13:18don't put any asset at risk and uh we
13:22expect the audit to be completed uh by
13:25next month or next month and a half. Uh
13:29and so now you can go to chain wall the
13:33newly open-sourced uh repository with
13:35the contract you have the CLI and you
13:38can as well follow us on X. uh we will
13:41share a lot of updates on what we're
13:44building uh with general and if some of
13:48you may know it as well we're also the
13:50authors of u a solidity compiler called
13:53okci
13:55uh that vitalik shared uh when we
13:58launched and so we also have a lot of u
14:02news about okci so it's the same ex
14:04account so thanks yeah for following us
14:07and you'll get all the the latest uh
14:09news uh about it and yeah maybe we have
14:1330 second we can take one question
14:17yeah
14:19is there a question okay
14:21>> okay I'll consider that as a no
14:24>> so thanks a lot and yeah p please give
14:26us the the very first stars uh the
14:28repository was just open source now
14:31thank you [applause]
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