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  "title": "Your Multisig Can Correctly Approve the Wrong Transaction",
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      "text": "Yeah. Hi everyone. So my name is Bintock"
    },
    {
      "index": 1,
      "start_seconds": 9,
      "source_timestamp": "0:09",
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      "text": "and I'm the co-founder of OK Contract"
    },
    {
      "index": 2,
      "start_seconds": 12,
      "source_timestamp": "0:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Labs. And today I'm going to present uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 3,
      "start_seconds": 17,
      "source_timestamp": "0:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something which I believe is very"
    },
    {
      "index": 4,
      "start_seconds": 18,
      "source_timestamp": "0:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "important in security is about your"
    },
    {
      "index": 5,
      "start_seconds": 22,
      "source_timestamp": "0:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "multisync can correctly approve the"
    },
    {
      "index": 6,
      "start_seconds": 24,
      "source_timestamp": "0:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "wrong transactions and indeed this"
    },
    {
      "index": 7,
      "start_seconds": 28,
      "source_timestamp": "0:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "happened all the time. Uh and uh so I'll"
    },
    {
      "index": 8,
      "start_seconds": 33,
      "source_timestamp": "0:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "present this next. So first uh let's"
    },
    {
      "index": 9,
      "start_seconds": 36,
      "source_timestamp": "0:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "look at the buy bit attack which we all"
    },
    {
      "index": 10,
      "start_seconds": 38,
      "source_timestamp": "0:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "know about the AON signers accepted a"
    },
    {
      "index": 11,
      "start_seconds": 41,
      "source_timestamp": "0:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "major change of authority. It's"
    },
    {
      "index": 12,
      "start_seconds": 44,
      "source_timestamp": "0:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "operation one on the safe which"
    },
    {
      "index": 13,
      "start_seconds": 46,
      "source_timestamp": "0:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically changes the the the structure"
    },
    {
      "index": 14,
      "start_seconds": 49,
      "source_timestamp": "0:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of the administration of the safe and in"
    },
    {
      "index": 15,
      "start_seconds": 52,
      "source_timestamp": "0:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the end uh thanks to a very controlled"
    },
    {
      "index": 16,
      "start_seconds": 57,
      "source_timestamp": "0:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "attack because of a compromised AWS"
    },
    {
      "index": 17,
      "start_seconds": 60,
      "source_timestamp": "1:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "account. They managed to deploy an"
    },
    {
      "index": 18,
      "start_seconds": 63,
      "source_timestamp": "1:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "original fake front end on the original"
    },
    {
      "index": 19,
      "start_seconds": 66,
      "source_timestamp": "1:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "safe domain and trick by bet into"
    },
    {
      "index": 20,
      "start_seconds": 69,
      "source_timestamp": "1:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "delegating the authority of their funds"
    },
    {
      "index": 21,
      "start_seconds": 72,
      "source_timestamp": "1:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to the attackers. And here's the money"
    },
    {
      "index": 22,
      "start_seconds": 75,
      "source_timestamp": "1:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is gone. And so the the I'll talk about"
    },
    {
      "index": 23,
      "start_seconds": 78,
      "source_timestamp": "1:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this screenshot here. Uh it's a map of"
    },
    {
      "index": 24,
      "start_seconds": 81,
      "source_timestamp": "1:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "all the incidents in crypto that we've"
    },
    {
      "index": 25,
      "start_seconds": 83,
      "source_timestamp": "1:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "built."
    },
    {
      "index": 26,
      "start_seconds": 84,
      "source_timestamp": "1:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Second thing uh happened last week and"
    },
    {
      "index": 27,
      "start_seconds": 87,
      "source_timestamp": "1:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "almost nobody noticed because it"
    },
    {
      "index": 28,
      "start_seconds": 89,
      "source_timestamp": "1:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "happened on the same day as the Binance"
    },
    {
      "index": 29,
      "start_seconds": 92,
      "source_timestamp": "1:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "attack and it was uh a third-party"
    },
    {
      "index": 30,
      "start_seconds": 96,
      "source_timestamp": "1:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "marketing provider which was injecting"
    },
    {
      "index": 31,
      "start_seconds": 99,
      "source_timestamp": "1:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "some JavaScript in Poly Market front end"
    },
    {
      "index": 32,
      "start_seconds": 102,
      "source_timestamp": "1:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that basically compromised the front end"
    },
    {
      "index": 33,
      "start_seconds": 104,
      "source_timestamp": "1:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and made some signers trick into signing"
    },
    {
      "index": 34,
      "start_seconds": 107,
      "source_timestamp": "1:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "things. But the thing is it was only a"
    },
    {
      "index": 35,
      "start_seconds": 110,
      "source_timestamp": "1:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "few millions stolen and this uh wasn't"
    },
    {
      "index": 36,
      "start_seconds": 114,
      "source_timestamp": "1:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "noticed on the on the same day as the"
    },
    {
      "index": 37,
      "start_seconds": 116,
      "source_timestamp": "1:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Binance attack. And there are some"
    },
    {
      "index": 38,
      "start_seconds": 118,
      "source_timestamp": "1:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "precedents and if you look at for"
    },
    {
      "index": 39,
      "start_seconds": 120,
      "source_timestamp": "2:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "instance the the map of incident where"
    },
    {
      "index": 40,
      "start_seconds": 122,
      "source_timestamp": "2:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically you you you directly inject"
    },
    {
      "index": 41,
      "start_seconds": 125,
      "source_timestamp": "2:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "some dependency into the front end. uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 42,
      "start_seconds": 128,
      "source_timestamp": "2:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this happened to Kybers swap before and"
    },
    {
      "index": 43,
      "start_seconds": 132,
      "source_timestamp": "2:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh using for instance a Google tag"
    },
    {
      "index": 44,
      "start_seconds": 134,
      "source_timestamp": "2:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "manager uh to inject uh things and then"
    },
    {
      "index": 45,
      "start_seconds": 137,
      "source_timestamp": "2:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of course there's the the biggest uh of"
    },
    {
      "index": 46,
      "start_seconds": 140,
      "source_timestamp": "2:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "all now how a developer laptop"
    },
    {
      "index": 47,
      "start_seconds": 143,
      "source_timestamp": "2:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "compromise plus other things because it"
    },
    {
      "index": 48,
      "start_seconds": 146,
      "source_timestamp": "2:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "also compromised some of the signers"
    },
    {
      "index": 49,
      "start_seconds": 148,
      "source_timestamp": "2:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "infrastructure to sign the delegated 772"
    },
    {
      "index": 50,
      "start_seconds": 152,
      "source_timestamp": "2:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "authorizations. So basically this led to"
    },
    {
      "index": 51,
      "start_seconds": 158,
      "source_timestamp": "2:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh a a major drain where basically the"
    },
    {
      "index": 52,
      "start_seconds": 161,
      "source_timestamp": "2:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the signers lose control of the"
    },
    {
      "index": 53,
      "start_seconds": 164,
      "source_timestamp": "2:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "authority and don't know exactly what"
    },
    {
      "index": 54,
      "start_seconds": 166,
      "source_timestamp": "2:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "they're signing and this kind of risk"
    },
    {
      "index": 55,
      "start_seconds": 169,
      "source_timestamp": "2:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "extends way beyond contract bugs and we"
    },
    {
      "index": 56,
      "start_seconds": 173,
      "source_timestamp": "2:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "have in our onchain risk map which is at"
    },
    {
      "index": 57,
      "start_seconds": 176,
      "source_timestamp": "2:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "map.contract.com"
    },
    {
      "index": 58,
      "start_seconds": 177,
      "source_timestamp": "2:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you can scan the the QR code which is"
    },
    {
      "index": 59,
      "start_seconds": 180,
      "source_timestamp": "3:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "behind me. Uh we have uh noticed um and"
    },
    {
      "index": 60,
      "start_seconds": 184,
      "source_timestamp": "3:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and modeled uh in threat modeling more"
    },
    {
      "index": 61,
      "start_seconds": 187,
      "source_timestamp": "3:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "than 1,800"
    },
    {
      "index": 62,
      "start_seconds": 189,
      "source_timestamp": "3:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "incidents and if you look at them they"
    },
    {
      "index": 63,
      "start_seconds": 192,
      "source_timestamp": "3:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "are way more than contract bugs like"
    },
    {
      "index": 64,
      "start_seconds": 193,
      "source_timestamp": "3:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "transaction deception 70 governance"
    },
    {
      "index": 65,
      "start_seconds": 197,
      "source_timestamp": "3:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "upgrades 68 uh 53 account authorization"
    },
    {
      "index": 66,
      "start_seconds": 201,
      "source_timestamp": "3:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and 51 supply chain attacks on software."
    },
    {
      "index": 67,
      "start_seconds": 206,
      "source_timestamp": "3:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So the question is what can you do uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 68,
      "start_seconds": 210,
      "source_timestamp": "3:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "versus these threats and we have"
    },
    {
      "index": 69,
      "start_seconds": 213,
      "source_timestamp": "3:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "researched uh a new solution which is"
    },
    {
      "index": 70,
      "start_seconds": 215,
      "source_timestamp": "3:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "called chain wall and the goal of chain"
    },
    {
      "index": 71,
      "start_seconds": 218,
      "source_timestamp": "3:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "wall is to have a non-chain security"
    },
    {
      "index": 72,
      "start_seconds": 221,
      "source_timestamp": "3:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "model which checks every transaction"
    },
    {
      "index": 73,
      "start_seconds": 224,
      "source_timestamp": "3:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that is run in smart accounts and"
    },
    {
      "index": 74,
      "start_seconds": 227,
      "source_timestamp": "3:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically create named actions and use"
    },
    {
      "index": 75,
      "start_seconds": 230,
      "source_timestamp": "3:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "those named actions uh like scripts if"
    },
    {
      "index": 76,
      "start_seconds": 234,
      "source_timestamp": "3:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you want uh on strict onchain policies"
    },
    {
      "index": 77,
      "start_seconds": 237,
      "source_timestamp": "3:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to construct what uh the account can do."
    },
    {
      "index": 78,
      "start_seconds": 240,
      "source_timestamp": "4:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So how does it work? You have an onchain"
    },
    {
      "index": 79,
      "start_seconds": 244,
      "source_timestamp": "4:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "registry which create users, policies,"
    },
    {
      "index": 80,
      "start_seconds": 247,
      "source_timestamp": "4:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "contracts, action scripts. They are very"
    },
    {
      "index": 81,
      "start_seconds": 250,
      "source_timestamp": "4:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "important and the accounts themselves."
    },
    {
      "index": 82,
      "start_seconds": 253,
      "source_timestamp": "4:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "All these changes are governed with time"
    },
    {
      "index": 83,
      "start_seconds": 256,
      "source_timestamp": "4:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "locks and a very controllable approval"
    },
    {
      "index": 84,
      "start_seconds": 259,
      "source_timestamp": "4:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "workflow. And when you want to use them,"
    },
    {
      "index": 85,
      "start_seconds": 262,
      "source_timestamp": "4:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically every operator, API, agent,"
    },
    {
      "index": 86,
      "start_seconds": 266,
      "source_timestamp": "4:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "whoever wants to transact on your"
    },
    {
      "index": 87,
      "start_seconds": 268,
      "source_timestamp": "4:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "accounts makes a request and that"
    },
    {
      "index": 88,
      "start_seconds": 270,
      "source_timestamp": "4:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "request has to go through interact which"
    },
    {
      "index": 89,
      "start_seconds": 274,
      "source_timestamp": "4:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is a contract which acts as a boundary"
    },
    {
      "index": 90,
      "start_seconds": 277,
      "source_timestamp": "4:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and is verifying basically that the"
    },
    {
      "index": 91,
      "start_seconds": 281,
      "source_timestamp": "4:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "operation matches the policies and then"
    },
    {
      "index": 92,
      "start_seconds": 285,
      "source_timestamp": "4:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "inside the protected account we have"
    },
    {
      "index": 93,
      "start_seconds": 288,
      "source_timestamp": "4:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "written an engine called miniscript."
    },
    {
      "index": 94,
      "start_seconds": 290,
      "source_timestamp": "4:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "which is a scriptable onchain runtime"
    },
    {
      "index": 95,
      "start_seconds": 293,
      "source_timestamp": "4:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "which will run the predefined action"
    },
    {
      "index": 96,
      "start_seconds": 296,
      "source_timestamp": "4:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "making sure that what you approve is the"
    },
    {
      "index": 97,
      "start_seconds": 299,
      "source_timestamp": "4:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "exact semantics of what gets executed"
    },
    {
      "index": 98,
      "start_seconds": 303,
      "source_timestamp": "5:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and then you can finally call the the"
    },
    {
      "index": 99,
      "start_seconds": 305,
      "source_timestamp": "5:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "target contracts any D5 protocol sending"
    },
    {
      "index": 100,
      "start_seconds": 309,
      "source_timestamp": "5:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "tokens etc etc"
    },
    {
      "index": 101,
      "start_seconds": 313,
      "source_timestamp": "5:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "so how does it look in practice the core"
    },
    {
      "index": 102,
      "start_seconds": 315,
      "source_timestamp": "5:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of it is the onchain scripting engine"
    },
    {
      "index": 103,
      "start_seconds": 319,
      "source_timestamp": "5:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And we have created two language a"
    },
    {
      "index": 104,
      "start_seconds": 321,
      "source_timestamp": "5:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "higher level language which is the one"
    },
    {
      "index": 105,
      "start_seconds": 324,
      "source_timestamp": "5:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "where you write the interaction in and"
    },
    {
      "index": 106,
      "start_seconds": 326,
      "source_timestamp": "5:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "minuscript which is the onchain uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 107,
      "start_seconds": 329,
      "source_timestamp": "5:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "execution language. And so for this"
    },
    {
      "index": 108,
      "start_seconds": 333,
      "source_timestamp": "5:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "language uh which we call lambdascript"
    },
    {
      "index": 109,
      "start_seconds": 335,
      "source_timestamp": "5:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this is the higher level language. So"
    },
    {
      "index": 110,
      "start_seconds": 337,
      "source_timestamp": "5:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "here for instance you say okay you"
    },
    {
      "index": 111,
      "start_seconds": 338,
      "source_timestamp": "5:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "define USDC as the token circle USDC in"
    },
    {
      "index": 112,
      "start_seconds": 342,
      "source_timestamp": "5:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "your registry. Then you define morph"
    },
    {
      "index": 113,
      "start_seconds": 345,
      "source_timestamp": "5:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "blue as the a contract that you name as"
    },
    {
      "index": 114,
      "start_seconds": 347,
      "source_timestamp": "5:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "well in your registry. And then you'll"
    },
    {
      "index": 115,
      "start_seconds": 349,
      "source_timestamp": "5:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "say okay we're going to approve USDC to"
    },
    {
      "index": 116,
      "start_seconds": 353,
      "source_timestamp": "5:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "moro blue. We're going for blueue.reay"
    },
    {
      "index": 117,
      "start_seconds": 356,
      "source_timestamp": "5:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "with the following parameters and some"
    },
    {
      "index": 118,
      "start_seconds": 358,
      "source_timestamp": "5:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of them are arguments that you uh enable"
    },
    {
      "index": 119,
      "start_seconds": 361,
      "source_timestamp": "6:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "your your your script to do. And then in"
    },
    {
      "index": 120,
      "start_seconds": 364,
      "source_timestamp": "6:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the end don't forget to uh revoke the"
    },
    {
      "index": 121,
      "start_seconds": 367,
      "source_timestamp": "6:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "approval uh that you just did. And all"
    },
    {
      "index": 122,
      "start_seconds": 370,
      "source_timestamp": "6:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this execution is onchain in a single in"
    },
    {
      "index": 123,
      "start_seconds": 373,
      "source_timestamp": "6:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "transaction. So basically this is"
    },
    {
      "index": 124,
      "start_seconds": 375,
      "source_timestamp": "6:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "entirely atomic which is of course a"
    },
    {
      "index": 125,
      "start_seconds": 378,
      "source_timestamp": "6:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "very interesting property and you you"
    },
    {
      "index": 126,
      "start_seconds": 381,
      "source_timestamp": "6:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "wonder why so many defi websites in"
    },
    {
      "index": 127,
      "start_seconds": 384,
      "source_timestamp": "6:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "particular uh enforce separate"
    },
    {
      "index": 128,
      "start_seconds": 386,
      "source_timestamp": "6:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "transaction for what are single uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 129,
      "start_seconds": 388,
      "source_timestamp": "6:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "execution flows. Uh and one thing is"
    },
    {
      "index": 130,
      "start_seconds": 392,
      "source_timestamp": "6:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "very important is the same scripting"
    },
    {
      "index": 131,
      "start_seconds": 395,
      "source_timestamp": "6:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "language applies both to the interaction"
    },
    {
      "index": 132,
      "start_seconds": 398,
      "source_timestamp": "6:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "like the catalog of scripts that you"
    },
    {
      "index": 133,
      "start_seconds": 400,
      "source_timestamp": "6:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "execute in your general instance but"
    },
    {
      "index": 134,
      "start_seconds": 403,
      "source_timestamp": "6:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "also the policies the policy rules. So"
    },
    {
      "index": 135,
      "start_seconds": 407,
      "source_timestamp": "6:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically you can write very"
    },
    {
      "index": 136,
      "start_seconds": 409,
      "source_timestamp": "6:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "customizable policies. For instance if"
    },
    {
      "index": 137,
      "start_seconds": 412,
      "source_timestamp": "6:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the amount is below let's say 5k you"
    },
    {
      "index": 138,
      "start_seconds": 416,
      "source_timestamp": "6:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "require only one signer. Between 5K and"
    },
    {
      "index": 139,
      "start_seconds": 419,
      "source_timestamp": "6:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "50K you require two signers and above"
    },
    {
      "index": 140,
      "start_seconds": 422,
      "source_timestamp": "7:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "50K you require three signers or"
    },
    {
      "index": 141,
      "start_seconds": 424,
      "source_timestamp": "7:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "whatever you want like monthly limits,"
    },
    {
      "index": 142,
      "start_seconds": 427,
      "source_timestamp": "7:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "budget etc etc. Everything is possible."
    },
    {
      "index": 143,
      "start_seconds": 431,
      "source_timestamp": "7:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "It's uh it's a or turing complete or"
    },
    {
      "index": 144,
      "start_seconds": 435,
      "source_timestamp": "7:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "nearly Turing complete. Uh so basically"
    },
    {
      "index": 145,
      "start_seconds": 438,
      "source_timestamp": "7:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you can protect your stack with uh from"
    },
    {
      "index": 146,
      "start_seconds": 443,
      "source_timestamp": "7:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "internal and external threat. Uh one"
    },
    {
      "index": 147,
      "start_seconds": 446,
      "source_timestamp": "7:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "thing very important is we formally"
    },
    {
      "index": 148,
      "start_seconds": 449,
      "source_timestamp": "7:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "verified many properties of general"
    },
    {
      "index": 149,
      "start_seconds": 452,
      "source_timestamp": "7:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "including especially the time blocks to"
    },
    {
      "index": 150,
      "start_seconds": 455,
      "source_timestamp": "7:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "strongly make sure that it's not"
    },
    {
      "index": 151,
      "start_seconds": 457,
      "source_timestamp": "7:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "possible at all to bypass the time locks"
    },
    {
      "index": 152,
      "start_seconds": 461,
      "source_timestamp": "7:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "for managing your chain wall registry."
    },
    {
      "index": 153,
      "start_seconds": 465,
      "source_timestamp": "7:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And this onchain catalog basically uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 154,
      "start_seconds": 469,
      "source_timestamp": "7:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "blocks compromised operator requests or"
    },
    {
      "index": 155,
      "start_seconds": 473,
      "source_timestamp": "7:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "decept deceptive transactions request"
    },
    {
      "index": 156,
      "start_seconds": 476,
      "source_timestamp": "7:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "including the front ends that are"
    },
    {
      "index": 157,
      "start_seconds": 479,
      "source_timestamp": "7:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "compromised supply chain compromised"
    },
    {
      "index": 158,
      "start_seconds": 481,
      "source_timestamp": "8:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "because these rules leave onchain and"
    },
    {
      "index": 159,
      "start_seconds": 485,
      "source_timestamp": "8:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "they leave onchain with strong time"
    },
    {
      "index": 160,
      "start_seconds": 487,
      "source_timestamp": "8:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "locks. So whatever happens even if the"
    },
    {
      "index": 161,
      "start_seconds": 490,
      "source_timestamp": "8:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "users uh also sign hostile withdrawal"
    },
    {
      "index": 162,
      "start_seconds": 494,
      "source_timestamp": "8:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "request it doesn't matter they won't go"
    },
    {
      "index": 163,
      "start_seconds": 497,
      "source_timestamp": "8:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "through because they're not listed in"
    },
    {
      "index": 164,
      "start_seconds": 499,
      "source_timestamp": "8:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "what is allowed and we strongly believe"
    },
    {
      "index": 165,
      "start_seconds": 502,
      "source_timestamp": "8:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh chain roll would have prevented the"
    },
    {
      "index": 166,
      "start_seconds": 504,
      "source_timestamp": "8:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Binance attack would have prevented the"
    },
    {
      "index": 167,
      "start_seconds": 506,
      "source_timestamp": "8:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "buy bit attack the poly market attack"
    },
    {
      "index": 168,
      "start_seconds": 509,
      "source_timestamp": "8:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and many others and to tell you the"
    },
    {
      "index": 169,
      "start_seconds": 512,
      "source_timestamp": "8:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "truth this is the reason why we've done"
    },
    {
      "index": 170,
      "start_seconds": 514,
      "source_timestamp": "8:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the map we've done the map to do some"
    },
    {
      "index": 171,
      "start_seconds": 517,
      "source_timestamp": "8:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "threat modeling. So we could verify that"
    },
    {
      "index": 172,
      "start_seconds": 520,
      "source_timestamp": "8:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "our chain wall protocol that is not"
    },
    {
      "index": 173,
      "start_seconds": 523,
      "source_timestamp": "8:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "vulnerable to the same kind of attacks."
    },
    {
      "index": 174,
      "start_seconds": 525,
      "source_timestamp": "8:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "You can use chain wall in two ways. The"
    },
    {
      "index": 175,
      "start_seconds": 529,
      "source_timestamp": "8:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "first way is to just take the factory"
    },
    {
      "index": 176,
      "start_seconds": 532,
      "source_timestamp": "8:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "which we deploy on chain and use it to"
    },
    {
      "index": 177,
      "start_seconds": 536,
      "source_timestamp": "8:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "manage asset. You define what are the"
    },
    {
      "index": 178,
      "start_seconds": 538,
      "source_timestamp": "8:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the the accounts, the policies, the"
    },
    {
      "index": 179,
      "start_seconds": 541,
      "source_timestamp": "9:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "catalog that you want and you just run"
    },
    {
      "index": 180,
      "start_seconds": 543,
      "source_timestamp": "9:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it and then you configure and execute"
    },
    {
      "index": 181,
      "start_seconds": 545,
      "source_timestamp": "9:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "all your operations. But there is"
    },
    {
      "index": 182,
      "start_seconds": 547,
      "source_timestamp": "9:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "another thing you can do especially if"
    },
    {
      "index": 183,
      "start_seconds": 549,
      "source_timestamp": "9:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you're a DeFi protocol. You can govern a"
    },
    {
      "index": 184,
      "start_seconds": 553,
      "source_timestamp": "9:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "protocol by implementing general as"
    },
    {
      "index": 185,
      "start_seconds": 556,
      "source_timestamp": "9:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "contracts into your stack and all the"
    },
    {
      "index": 186,
      "start_seconds": 559,
      "source_timestamp": "9:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "privileged operation. All the"
    },
    {
      "index": 187,
      "start_seconds": 561,
      "source_timestamp": "9:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "administrative functions on your"
    },
    {
      "index": 188,
      "start_seconds": 563,
      "source_timestamp": "9:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "protocol get a very powerful general"
    },
    {
      "index": 189,
      "start_seconds": 566,
      "source_timestamp": "9:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "instance which can time lock of course"
    },
    {
      "index": 190,
      "start_seconds": 569,
      "source_timestamp": "9:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "enforce multiig and force customizable"
    },
    {
      "index": 191,
      "start_seconds": 572,
      "source_timestamp": "9:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "rules and also these rule evolve like"
    },
    {
      "index": 192,
      "start_seconds": 576,
      "source_timestamp": "9:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "they can be a a heavily time lock living"
    },
    {
      "index": 193,
      "start_seconds": 579,
      "source_timestamp": "9:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "organism without having to redeploy your"
    },
    {
      "index": 194,
      "start_seconds": 582,
      "source_timestamp": "9:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "contracts without having to reodit them."
    },
    {
      "index": 195,
      "start_seconds": 584,
      "source_timestamp": "9:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "You keep your same set of contracts and"
    },
    {
      "index": 196,
      "start_seconds": 589,
      "source_timestamp": "9:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you govern your protocol using chain"
    },
    {
      "index": 197,
      "start_seconds": 591,
      "source_timestamp": "9:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "wall."
    },
    {
      "index": 198,
      "start_seconds": 593,
      "source_timestamp": "9:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Oops, sorry. And"
    },
    {
      "index": 199,
      "start_seconds": 597,
      "source_timestamp": "9:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it looks like this. For instance, let's"
    },
    {
      "index": 200,
      "start_seconds": 599,
      "source_timestamp": "9:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "say that this is a imaginary protocol"
    },
    {
      "index": 201,
      "start_seconds": 602,
      "source_timestamp": "10:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "which is a stable coin. You would for"
    },
    {
      "index": 202,
      "start_seconds": 604,
      "source_timestamp": "10:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "instance create a very simple"
    },
    {
      "index": 203,
      "start_seconds": 606,
      "source_timestamp": "10:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "interaction to mint which is the the uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 204,
      "start_seconds": 610,
      "source_timestamp": "10:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "privileged operation that you heavily"
    },
    {
      "index": 205,
      "start_seconds": 612,
      "source_timestamp": "10:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "want to protect if you're a stable coin."
    },
    {
      "index": 206,
      "start_seconds": 614,
      "source_timestamp": "10:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And basically you say okay you require"
    },
    {
      "index": 207,
      "start_seconds": 617,
      "source_timestamp": "10:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the the policy to be the issuance policy"
    },
    {
      "index": 208,
      "start_seconds": 620,
      "source_timestamp": "10:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that you want. uh you require for"
    },
    {
      "index": 209,
      "start_seconds": 622,
      "source_timestamp": "10:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "instance a controller, you require"
    },
    {
      "index": 210,
      "start_seconds": 624,
      "source_timestamp": "10:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "whatever you want and you say okay we're"
    },
    {
      "index": 211,
      "start_seconds": 625,
      "source_timestamp": "10:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "minting to that address that amount and"
    },
    {
      "index": 212,
      "start_seconds": 629,
      "source_timestamp": "10:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "then you can add a policy which is"
    },
    {
      "index": 213,
      "start_seconds": 631,
      "source_timestamp": "10:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "listing as many requirements as you want"
    },
    {
      "index": 214,
      "start_seconds": 635,
      "source_timestamp": "10:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "like uh monthly limits caps supplies"
    },
    {
      "index": 215,
      "start_seconds": 639,
      "source_timestamp": "10:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "verifying external author authorizations"
    },
    {
      "index": 216,
      "start_seconds": 643,
      "source_timestamp": "10:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and many many other things."
    },
    {
      "index": 217,
      "start_seconds": 646,
      "source_timestamp": "10:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So I am uh well well in advance and um"
    },
    {
      "index": 218,
      "start_seconds": 650,
      "source_timestamp": "10:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "what I want to do right now is uh so to"
    },
    {
      "index": 219,
      "start_seconds": 654,
      "source_timestamp": "10:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the repo is private uh and I'm using"
    },
    {
      "index": 220,
      "start_seconds": 661,
      "source_timestamp": "11:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "my pass key."
    },
    {
      "index": 221,
      "start_seconds": 664,
      "source_timestamp": "11:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Okay,"
    },
    {
      "index": 222,
      "start_seconds": 666,
      "source_timestamp": "11:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it's loading."
    },
    {
      "index": 223,
      "start_seconds": 668,
      "source_timestamp": "11:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Yeah."
    },
    {
      "index": 224,
      "start_seconds": 670,
      "source_timestamp": "11:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Done."
    },
    {
      "index": 225,
      "start_seconds": 672,
      "source_timestamp": "11:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Okay."
    },
    {
      "index": 226,
      "start_seconds": 675,
      "source_timestamp": "11:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And yeah and right now so chain roll is"
    },
    {
      "index": 227,
      "start_seconds": 679,
      "source_timestamp": "11:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "now public. So yeah thank you. So you"
    },
    {
      "index": 228,
      "start_seconds": 684,
      "source_timestamp": "11:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "can go to okay contract chain roll and"
    },
    {
      "index": 229,
      "start_seconds": 687,
      "source_timestamp": "11:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "so you you'll find uh many uh things. So"
    },
    {
      "index": 230,
      "start_seconds": 690,
      "source_timestamp": "11:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "let me so now it's available in preview."
    },
    {
      "index": 231,
      "start_seconds": 693,
      "source_timestamp": "11:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So let me tell you a few more things. Uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 232,
      "start_seconds": 696,
      "source_timestamp": "11:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "we have a CLI. So right now the factory"
    },
    {
      "index": 233,
      "start_seconds": 700,
      "source_timestamp": "11:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "contracts and the CLI are deployed on"
    },
    {
      "index": 234,
      "start_seconds": 703,
      "source_timestamp": "11:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "arbitum. So if you scan that QR code, it"
    },
    {
      "index": 235,
      "start_seconds": 707,
      "source_timestamp": "11:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "leads directly to the CLI and where you"
    },
    {
      "index": 236,
      "start_seconds": 711,
      "source_timestamp": "11:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "can in a very easy way deploy and use uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 237,
      "start_seconds": 716,
      "source_timestamp": "11:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and use start using uh chain wall. Uh we"
    },
    {
      "index": 238,
      "start_seconds": 719,
      "source_timestamp": "11:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "make uh we made a CLI in particular"
    },
    {
      "index": 239,
      "start_seconds": 722,
      "source_timestamp": "12:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "because it enables to use agents very"
    },
    {
      "index": 240,
      "start_seconds": 725,
      "source_timestamp": "12:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "easily. So, what you can do is just ask"
    },
    {
      "index": 241,
      "start_seconds": 728,
      "source_timestamp": "12:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "an agent to do some test. Give it a test"
    },
    {
      "index": 242,
      "start_seconds": 731,
      "source_timestamp": "12:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "wallet and uh with $10 will be way way"
    },
    {
      "index": 243,
      "start_seconds": 735,
      "source_timestamp": "12:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "more than enough and just uh configure"
    },
    {
      "index": 244,
      "start_seconds": 738,
      "source_timestamp": "12:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "everything for you, write the scripts,"
    },
    {
      "index": 245,
      "start_seconds": 741,
      "source_timestamp": "12:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "set up the policies, etc. Uh we we've"
    },
    {
      "index": 246,
      "start_seconds": 744,
      "source_timestamp": "12:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "tested it and it works extremely well"
    },
    {
      "index": 247,
      "start_seconds": 747,
      "source_timestamp": "12:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and then you can as a human review"
    },
    {
      "index": 248,
      "start_seconds": 749,
      "source_timestamp": "12:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "everything is properly set up before you"
    },
    {
      "index": 249,
      "start_seconds": 751,
      "source_timestamp": "12:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you you send more funds. So you can"
    },
    {
      "index": 250,
      "start_seconds": 754,
      "source_timestamp": "12:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "generate these policies workflow define"
    },
    {
      "index": 251,
      "start_seconds": 757,
      "source_timestamp": "12:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "your own time locks and and play with"
    },
    {
      "index": 252,
      "start_seconds": 759,
      "source_timestamp": "12:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it. Uh happy to of course have uh any"
    },
    {
      "index": 253,
      "start_seconds": 763,
      "source_timestamp": "12:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "feedback uh that that you you you uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 254,
      "start_seconds": 766,
      "source_timestamp": "12:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "could give right now. Just uh a word"
    },
    {
      "index": 255,
      "start_seconds": 769,
      "source_timestamp": "12:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "about the state. So we did an internal"
    },
    {
      "index": 256,
      "start_seconds": 772,
      "source_timestamp": "12:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "audit uh from very experienced auditors"
    },
    {
      "index": 257,
      "start_seconds": 774,
      "source_timestamp": "12:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "in our team uh on the chain wall uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 258,
      "start_seconds": 777,
      "source_timestamp": "12:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "contracts themselves and uh we also have"
    },
    {
      "index": 259,
      "start_seconds": 781,
      "source_timestamp": "13:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "an external audit ongoing. So right now"
    },
    {
      "index": 260,
      "start_seconds": 784,
      "source_timestamp": "13:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "we are close to mid audit and there's"
    },
    {
      "index": 261,
      "start_seconds": 788,
      "source_timestamp": "13:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "nothing uh critical of course uh we"
    },
    {
      "index": 262,
      "start_seconds": 792,
      "source_timestamp": "13:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "there's uh a lot of lower uh let's say"
    },
    {
      "index": 263,
      "start_seconds": 796,
      "source_timestamp": "13:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh findings which we will fix and but"
    },
    {
      "index": 264,
      "start_seconds": 798,
      "source_timestamp": "13:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "don't put any asset at risk and uh we"
    },
    {
      "index": 265,
      "start_seconds": 802,
      "source_timestamp": "13:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "expect the audit to be completed uh by"
    },
    {
      "index": 266,
      "start_seconds": 805,
      "source_timestamp": "13:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "next month or next month and a half. Uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 267,
      "start_seconds": 809,
      "source_timestamp": "13:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and so now you can go to chain wall the"
    },
    {
      "index": 268,
      "start_seconds": 813,
      "source_timestamp": "13:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "newly open-sourced uh repository with"
    },
    {
      "index": 269,
      "start_seconds": 815,
      "source_timestamp": "13:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the contract you have the CLI and you"
    },
    {
      "index": 270,
      "start_seconds": 818,
      "source_timestamp": "13:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "can as well follow us on X. uh we will"
    },
    {
      "index": 271,
      "start_seconds": 821,
      "source_timestamp": "13:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "share a lot of updates on what we're"
    },
    {
      "index": 272,
      "start_seconds": 824,
      "source_timestamp": "13:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "building uh with general and if some of"
    },
    {
      "index": 273,
      "start_seconds": 828,
      "source_timestamp": "13:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you may know it as well we're also the"
    },
    {
      "index": 274,
      "start_seconds": 830,
      "source_timestamp": "13:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "authors of u a solidity compiler called"
    },
    {
      "index": 275,
      "start_seconds": 833,
      "source_timestamp": "13:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "okci"
    },
    {
      "index": 276,
      "start_seconds": 835,
      "source_timestamp": "13:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh that vitalik shared uh when we"
    },
    {
      "index": 277,
      "start_seconds": 838,
      "source_timestamp": "13:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "launched and so we also have a lot of u"
    },
    {
      "index": 278,
      "start_seconds": 842,
      "source_timestamp": "14:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "news about okci so it's the same ex"
    },
    {
      "index": 279,
      "start_seconds": 844,
      "source_timestamp": "14:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "account so thanks yeah for following us"
    },
    {
      "index": 280,
      "start_seconds": 847,
      "source_timestamp": "14:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and you'll get all the the latest uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 281,
      "start_seconds": 849,
      "source_timestamp": "14:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "news uh about it and yeah maybe we have"
    },
    {
      "index": 282,
      "start_seconds": 853,
      "source_timestamp": "14:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "30 second we can take one question"
    },
    {
      "index": 283,
      "start_seconds": 857,
      "source_timestamp": "14:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "yeah"
    },
    {
      "index": 284,
      "start_seconds": 859,
      "source_timestamp": "14:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is there a question okay"
    },
    {
      "index": 285,
      "start_seconds": 861,
      "source_timestamp": "14:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": ">> okay I'll consider that as a no"
    },
    {
      "index": 286,
      "start_seconds": 864,
      "source_timestamp": "14:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": ">> so thanks a lot and yeah p please give"
    },
    {
      "index": 287,
      "start_seconds": 866,
      "source_timestamp": "14:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "us the the very first stars uh the"
    },
    {
      "index": 288,
      "start_seconds": 868,
      "source_timestamp": "14:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "repository was just open source now"
    },
    {
      "index": 289,
      "start_seconds": 871,
      "source_timestamp": "14:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "thank you [applause]"
    }
  ]
}
