DSS 2026 — Your Multisig Can Correctly Approve the Wrong Transaction Henri Binsztok Source video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvXPYyINICo Automatic captions — not human-reviewed. Complete spoken-audio coverage is unverified. Source language tag: en (English). Source export SHA256: f783794d9e201f4c1a9297d9c8b22f1020e458e97d6ce7061f47db79b8107998 [0:05] Yeah. Hi everyone. So my name is Bintock [0:09] and I'm the co-founder of OK Contract [0:12] Labs. And today I'm going to present uh [0:17] something which I believe is very [0:18] important in security is about your [0:22] multisync can correctly approve the [0:24] wrong transactions and indeed this [0:28] happened all the time. Uh and uh so I'll [0:33] present this next. So first uh let's [0:36] look at the buy bit attack which we all [0:38] know about the AON signers accepted a [0:41] major change of authority. It's [0:44] operation one on the safe which [0:46] basically changes the the the structure [0:49] of the administration of the safe and in [0:52] the end uh thanks to a very controlled [0:57] attack because of a compromised AWS [1:00] account. They managed to deploy an [1:03] original fake front end on the original [1:06] safe domain and trick by bet into [1:09] delegating the authority of their funds [1:12] to the attackers. And here's the money [1:15] is gone. And so the the I'll talk about [1:18] this screenshot here. Uh it's a map of [1:21] all the incidents in crypto that we've [1:23] built. [1:24] Second thing uh happened last week and [1:27] almost nobody noticed because it [1:29] happened on the same day as the Binance [1:32] attack and it was uh a third-party [1:36] marketing provider which was injecting [1:39] some JavaScript in Poly Market front end [1:42] that basically compromised the front end [1:44] and made some signers trick into signing [1:47] things. But the thing is it was only a [1:50] few millions stolen and this uh wasn't [1:54] noticed on the on the same day as the [1:56] Binance attack. And there are some [1:58] precedents and if you look at for [2:00] instance the the map of incident where [2:02] basically you you you directly inject [2:05] some dependency into the front end. uh [2:08] this happened to Kybers swap before and [2:12] uh using for instance a Google tag [2:14] manager uh to inject uh things and then [2:17] of course there's the the biggest uh of [2:20] all now how a developer laptop [2:23] compromise plus other things because it [2:26] also compromised some of the signers [2:28] infrastructure to sign the delegated 772 [2:32] authorizations. So basically this led to [2:38] uh a a major drain where basically the [2:41] the signers lose control of the [2:44] authority and don't know exactly what [2:46] they're signing and this kind of risk [2:49] extends way beyond contract bugs and we [2:53] have in our onchain risk map which is at [2:56] map.contract.com [2:57] you can scan the the QR code which is [3:00] behind me. Uh we have uh noticed um and [3:04] and modeled uh in threat modeling more [3:07] than 1,800 [3:09] incidents and if you look at them they [3:12] are way more than contract bugs like [3:13] transaction deception 70 governance [3:17] upgrades 68 uh 53 account authorization [3:21] and 51 supply chain attacks on software. [3:26] So the question is what can you do uh [3:30] versus these threats and we have [3:33] researched uh a new solution which is [3:35] called chain wall and the goal of chain [3:38] wall is to have a non-chain security [3:41] model which checks every transaction [3:44] that is run in smart accounts and [3:47] basically create named actions and use [3:50] those named actions uh like scripts if [3:54] you want uh on strict onchain policies [3:57] to construct what uh the account can do. [4:00] So how does it work? You have an onchain [4:04] registry which create users, policies, [4:07] contracts, action scripts. They are very [4:10] important and the accounts themselves. [4:13] All these changes are governed with time [4:16] locks and a very controllable approval [4:19] workflow. And when you want to use them, [4:22] basically every operator, API, agent, [4:26] whoever wants to transact on your [4:28] accounts makes a request and that [4:30] request has to go through interact which [4:34] is a contract which acts as a boundary [4:37] and is verifying basically that the [4:41] operation matches the policies and then [4:45] inside the protected account we have [4:48] written an engine called miniscript. [4:50] which is a scriptable onchain runtime [4:53] which will run the predefined action [4:56] making sure that what you approve is the [4:59] exact semantics of what gets executed [5:03] and then you can finally call the the [5:05] target contracts any D5 protocol sending [5:09] tokens etc etc [5:13] so how does it look in practice the core [5:15] of it is the onchain scripting engine [5:19] And we have created two language a [5:21] higher level language which is the one [5:24] where you write the interaction in and [5:26] minuscript which is the onchain uh [5:29] execution language. And so for this [5:33] language uh which we call lambdascript [5:35] this is the higher level language. So [5:37] here for instance you say okay you [5:38] define USDC as the token circle USDC in [5:42] your registry. Then you define morph [5:45] blue as the a contract that you name as [5:47] well in your registry. And then you'll [5:49] say okay we're going to approve USDC to [5:53] moro blue. We're going for blueue.reay [5:56] with the following parameters and some [5:58] of them are arguments that you uh enable [6:01] your your your script to do. And then in [6:04] the end don't forget to uh revoke the [6:07] approval uh that you just did. And all [6:10] this execution is onchain in a single in [6:13] transaction. So basically this is [6:15] entirely atomic which is of course a [6:18] very interesting property and you you [6:21] wonder why so many defi websites in [6:24] particular uh enforce separate [6:26] transaction for what are single uh [6:28] execution flows. Uh and one thing is [6:32] very important is the same scripting [6:35] language applies both to the interaction [6:38] like the catalog of scripts that you [6:40] execute in your general instance but [6:43] also the policies the policy rules. So [6:47] basically you can write very [6:49] customizable policies. For instance if [6:52] the amount is below let's say 5k you [6:56] require only one signer. Between 5K and [6:59] 50K you require two signers and above [7:02] 50K you require three signers or [7:04] whatever you want like monthly limits, [7:07] budget etc etc. Everything is possible. [7:11] It's uh it's a or turing complete or [7:15] nearly Turing complete. Uh so basically [7:18] you can protect your stack with uh from [7:23] internal and external threat. Uh one [7:26] thing very important is we formally [7:29] verified many properties of general [7:32] including especially the time blocks to [7:35] strongly make sure that it's not [7:37] possible at all to bypass the time locks [7:41] for managing your chain wall registry. [7:45] And this onchain catalog basically uh [7:49] blocks compromised operator requests or [7:53] decept deceptive transactions request [7:56] including the front ends that are [7:59] compromised supply chain compromised [8:01] because these rules leave onchain and [8:05] they leave onchain with strong time [8:07] locks. So whatever happens even if the [8:10] users uh also sign hostile withdrawal [8:14] request it doesn't matter they won't go [8:17] through because they're not listed in [8:19] what is allowed and we strongly believe [8:22] uh chain roll would have prevented the [8:24] Binance attack would have prevented the [8:26] buy bit attack the poly market attack [8:29] and many others and to tell you the [8:32] truth this is the reason why we've done [8:34] the map we've done the map to do some [8:37] threat modeling. So we could verify that [8:40] our chain wall protocol that is not [8:43] vulnerable to the same kind of attacks. [8:45] You can use chain wall in two ways. The [8:49] first way is to just take the factory [8:52] which we deploy on chain and use it to [8:56] manage asset. You define what are the [8:58] the the accounts, the policies, the [9:01] catalog that you want and you just run [9:03] it and then you configure and execute [9:05] all your operations. But there is [9:07] another thing you can do especially if [9:09] you're a DeFi protocol. You can govern a [9:13] protocol by implementing general as [9:16] contracts into your stack and all the [9:19] privileged operation. All the [9:21] administrative functions on your [9:23] protocol get a very powerful general [9:26] instance which can time lock of course [9:29] enforce multiig and force customizable [9:32] rules and also these rule evolve like [9:36] they can be a a heavily time lock living [9:39] organism without having to redeploy your [9:42] contracts without having to reodit them. [9:44] You keep your same set of contracts and [9:49] you govern your protocol using chain [9:51] wall. [9:53] Oops, sorry. And [9:57] it looks like this. For instance, let's [9:59] say that this is a imaginary protocol [10:02] which is a stable coin. You would for [10:04] instance create a very simple [10:06] interaction to mint which is the the uh [10:10] privileged operation that you heavily [10:12] want to protect if you're a stable coin. [10:14] And basically you say okay you require [10:17] the the policy to be the issuance policy [10:20] that you want. uh you require for [10:22] instance a controller, you require [10:24] whatever you want and you say okay we're [10:25] minting to that address that amount and [10:29] then you can add a policy which is [10:31] listing as many requirements as you want [10:35] like uh monthly limits caps supplies [10:39] verifying external author authorizations [10:43] and many many other things. [10:46] So I am uh well well in advance and um [10:50] what I want to do right now is uh so to [10:54] the repo is private uh and I'm using [11:01] my pass key. [11:04] Okay, [11:06] it's loading. [11:08] Yeah. [11:10] Done. [11:12] Okay. [11:15] And yeah and right now so chain roll is [11:19] now public. So yeah thank you. So you [11:24] can go to okay contract chain roll and [11:27] so you you'll find uh many uh things. So [11:30] let me so now it's available in preview. [11:33] So let me tell you a few more things. Uh [11:36] we have a CLI. So right now the factory [11:40] contracts and the CLI are deployed on [11:43] arbitum. So if you scan that QR code, it [11:47] leads directly to the CLI and where you [11:51] can in a very easy way deploy and use uh [11:56] and use start using uh chain wall. Uh we [11:59] make uh we made a CLI in particular [12:02] because it enables to use agents very [12:05] easily. So, what you can do is just ask [12:08] an agent to do some test. Give it a test [12:11] wallet and uh with $10 will be way way [12:15] more than enough and just uh configure [12:18] everything for you, write the scripts, [12:21] set up the policies, etc. Uh we we've [12:24] tested it and it works extremely well [12:27] and then you can as a human review [12:29] everything is properly set up before you [12:31] you you send more funds. So you can [12:34] generate these policies workflow define [12:37] your own time locks and and play with [12:39] it. Uh happy to of course have uh any [12:43] feedback uh that that you you you uh [12:46] could give right now. Just uh a word [12:49] about the state. So we did an internal [12:52] audit uh from very experienced auditors [12:54] in our team uh on the chain wall uh [12:57] contracts themselves and uh we also have [13:01] an external audit ongoing. So right now [13:04] we are close to mid audit and there's [13:08] nothing uh critical of course uh we [13:12] there's uh a lot of lower uh let's say [13:16] uh findings which we will fix and but [13:18] don't put any asset at risk and uh we [13:22] expect the audit to be completed uh by [13:25] next month or next month and a half. Uh [13:29] and so now you can go to chain wall the [13:33] newly open-sourced uh repository with [13:35] the contract you have the CLI and you [13:38] can as well follow us on X. uh we will [13:41] share a lot of updates on what we're [13:44] building uh with general and if some of [13:48] you may know it as well we're also the [13:50] authors of u a solidity compiler called [13:53] okci [13:55] uh that vitalik shared uh when we [13:58] launched and so we also have a lot of u [14:02] news about okci so it's the same ex [14:04] account so thanks yeah for following us [14:07] and you'll get all the the latest uh [14:09] news uh about it and yeah maybe we have [14:13] 30 second we can take one question [14:17] yeah [14:19] is there a question okay [14:21] >> okay I'll consider that as a no [14:24] >> so thanks a lot and yeah p please give [14:26] us the the very first stars uh the [14:28] repository was just open source now [14:31] thank you [applause]