DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 1 / Amber Hall

What the Block Explorer Misses

Julia Hardy

12:54 · Recording

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Transcript

0:00Okay. Thank you everyone. Um, I'm Julia,

0:03here with Zero Shadow, and I'm going to

0:05be talking about yeah, money laundering

0:08insights and how we can use that to

0:10contain active exploits.

0:22Um, okay. So, um, when a exploit

0:25happens, I think a lot of times people

0:27will hopefully look at the attack

0:29vector, um, and and try to learn from

0:32that, but really focus on the very first

0:34address where funds might have been um,

0:38deposited into, and then that's the end

0:40of their journey. Um, maybe for some of

0:42the larger exploits, some people will,

0:45for example, follow movements to Bitcoin

0:48for across storage chain for something

0:50like the Bybit exploit. But um, what's

0:53unique about Zero Shadow is that we are

0:54looking at every single address that a

0:57threat actor uses from the very first

1:00deposit, uh, the very first stolen funds

1:02address all the way through to the last

1:04address where we see a suspected cash

1:07out.

1:08And that means that we have a really

1:10holistic view of how certain threat

1:13actors are moving their stolen funds.

1:19And the the insight that I get from a

1:21lot of people when I talk about freezing

1:24and recovery, um, along with security is

1:28why should we be focusing on the

1:29laundering side? By then it's too late.

1:32Uh, we should really be just doing

1:33preventative work to try to stop any

1:36kind of um, incidents from occurring.

1:40And while that is definitely important,

1:43I think that the first or the year so

1:46far has really shown us that it can be a

1:49matter of when and not if for certain

1:52protocols to to be hacked, and that

1:55knowing who your adversary is can be

1:57really important to um, actually have a

2:00containment when that exploit occurs. Um

2:03when we look at the first half of the

2:04year, we had

2:05calculated 1.8 billion dollars stolen up

2:09until October and then of course the

2:11past weekend has happened and that

2:13number is now up quite a bit.

2:16Um we've also seen that a lot of these

2:18exploits are happening because of

2:20operational security. So off-chain um

2:23even maybe dependency related if you

2:25think about things like the Axie client

2:28exploit earlier or vulnerability earlier

2:30this year, some of the different wallet

2:32exploits that have been happening where

2:34it's really not just contained to your

2:36specific protocol.

2:40And Zero Shadow launched a new product

2:43this year, the Threat Intel platform. We

2:45have basically taken all of our stolen

2:47funds addresses and we're trying to

2:49better deliver them to the services that

2:51can block funds.

2:53Um and what that's created is a really

2:55big data set of all these different

2:58hacks that we look at, all the different

3:00threat actors that we look at, every

3:02single address associated with those

3:04movements, and we can run analytics on

3:07those um addresses and start to find

3:09some really unique insights.

3:12So what does the data show us?

3:15Um I looked at a few different groups

3:16here. The first one, Trader Trader from

3:19North Korea. This is the really big most

3:22sophisticated exploits. This is most

3:25recently Binance um across a number of

3:27different exploits. And um this this

3:30first stat here is how quickly the

3:33initial funds are actually moved out of

3:36the first address where they are taken.

3:39And this is not swaps or anything. This

3:41is just um actually sending emptying out

3:44that wallet and sending the funds

3:46forward. And you can see that the

3:48ability to react to those initial funds

3:50is

3:51less than 30 minutes. Um a little bit

3:54longer for some of the Bitcoin side, but

3:57um but generally you're really just

3:59looking at a a a very fast emptying of

4:03those wallets, moving funds forward to

4:05new addresses. And so, if you're really

4:07just focusing on that initial

4:09containment, you have a very small

4:10window to try to act.

4:13But what's interesting is that we see

4:15that there's a longer window when the

4:18funds have been maybe spread out across

4:2020 addresses. We're calling these the

4:22staging wallets before they actually

4:25start to do the rapid fire laundering.

4:28Um and why does this occur? This occurs

4:31because North Korea is actually handing

4:33the keys over to Chinese money

4:34launderers to to continue with the

4:37laundering. So this is them preparing,

4:40coordinating with those launderers,

4:41making sure that they can actually

4:43continue with this activity.

4:45Um and we're seeing that this time of

4:47staging is decreasing over time. So it

4:49used to be it used to be more like 6

4:52months. Then you look at last year, more

4:55like 6 days of this pause between the

4:58initial theft and the rapid fire

4:59laundering.

5:01Um now we're looking at more like 3

5:02days, even smaller. So

5:06why is this window important? Most

5:08important, I think, for um anyone who

5:11experiences an exploit to realize I have

5:14only a few days to make sure I have law

5:15enforcement prepared. I have all the

5:18different services that I want to um

5:20know about these addresses prepared,

5:22maybe a security firm, any of those kind

5:25of steps. This is your big window before

5:27the rapid laundering to do so.

5:31And then when we look at just the

5:33downstream laundering, so the the

5:36movement towards the cash out,

5:38most addresses are only holding a

5:40balance for about 5 minutes. And so um

5:43in in Bybit, for example, we saw 13,000

5:46addresses used. And so again, this is

5:49just this idea that you really need the

5:51real-time information if you want to try

5:53to

5:54intercept these funds at any time.

5:58Um and we were actually able to do that.

6:01Um so this is from the Caltal KelpTel

6:05exploit that we saw funds were

6:07originally going to Thorchain and

6:10then the launderers were looking for

6:13more rapid bridging opportunity, so they

6:15switched to other bridges that were

6:18ingesting the addresses that we were

6:20sending to them and we were able to

6:22intercept $700,000 worth of funds. And

6:25this graph here on the right-hand side,

6:28this is all the different services that

6:30were getting hits off of these

6:32addresses. So the launderers trying to

6:35repeatedly send these funds in and

6:37getting rejected and trying again.

6:42And so shifting gears here to other

6:44North Korea groups. This on the screen

6:47here is the Drift exploit. So the the

6:50specific actors here is Apple Juice.

6:54But who are this actor if you're not as

6:56familiar?

6:57Basically these are not as obvious hacks

7:01from

7:03the the specific vector that are used,

7:05but they're always using the same

7:07malware.

7:08Or if you've heard of something like

7:10Dangerous Password where this is the

7:12Zoom call where the audio doesn't work,

7:14these are not as sophisticated of actors

7:17within North Korea, but they're still

7:19doing pretty complex exploits.

7:25So when we look at the fund movements

7:28for laundering for Apple Juice, we see

7:30that the initial theft addresses are

7:33emptied pretty quickly, not quite as

7:35quickly for from the trader-trader side,

7:37but still

7:39between 30 minutes to 3 hours those

7:42funds are really emptied out. And again,

7:44you really need to be thinking more

7:45downstream if you're thinking about

7:47disruption.

7:50But what's interesting here is that we

7:52see that the funds will be parked for a

7:54really long time just sitting at

7:57externally owned accounts before they

7:59move to the next stage of laundering.

8:02So for two different cases here I

8:03anonymized them, but we're looking at

8:0610 to 11 months, 4 to seven months where

8:09funds are just sitting in in wallets.

8:10They haven't been moved.

8:12The reason that we see this

8:15is is partially a reevaluation of

8:18strategy.

8:19And that's really allowed us to have a

8:21lot of time to understand exactly what

8:24we need to be prepared for. So where do

8:26we expect these funds to move to? What

8:28mixers? What lending protocols? Get

8:31everything in order so that you can have

8:33really good results with disruption when

8:35that the time comes for those movements.

8:40Also we are able to see with the data

8:42that 86 to 91% of the time that the

8:45funds are being moved is between 9:00

8:48a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Korea time. And so

8:50unlike with the trader trader funds

8:53where we see pretty much 24/7 movement

8:55and that's very much being automated

8:58with launders. This is North Koreans

9:01moving their own funds, working a

9:03working day and then taking a break to

9:05go to sleep.

9:07And so it's a very different style of

9:08laundering and again gives you a little

9:10more time to to act.

9:15And then just looking a slightly

9:17different type of actor, the non-nation

9:20state actors.

9:22We took a look at

9:24a couple of thefts that we've been

9:25seeing from the com. If you've heard of

9:29the com before, you've probably heard

9:31about these teenagers, early 20s kids

9:35who are a lot of times

9:37calling you up pretending to be

9:40Coinbase security and you need to move

9:43your funds to secure them and you lose

9:45all your funds. We're actually seeing

9:46that that's not the only kind of attack

9:49that they do.

9:51Something like drainer as a service has

9:53definitely been a past

9:56exploit vector, but we're now seeing

9:58actually just taking advantage of of any

10:01kind of vulnerability that they can see

10:03and even doing some more smart contract

10:06based exploits.

10:08And when we looked at a few different

10:10cases that we know are the same group of

10:14actors within the com, what's

10:16interesting with the data is that

10:18the majority of the funds are ending up

10:21going to bridges as one of the first

10:23destinations

10:25as a laundering path. And so this is a

10:28really key area to concentrate on as a

10:31victim of of a skid theft is to make

10:35sure that the bridges know that these

10:37are the potential addresses of source of

10:41funds that you need to be blocking and

10:43freezing if you can intercept them.

10:50Also as another

10:52non-nation state actor, there's been a

10:54lot more rent attacks this year, a lot

10:56more in the news of the UK best based

10:59rent attacks.

11:00With these actors, we see that the

11:03movement of funds can be 4 hours about

11:06between each address. So again, a much

11:08slower rate of laundering. And there's

11:10also heavy co-mingling across victims,

11:12which means the same address is being

11:14used for multiple victims over and over.

11:16So if that address is on a block list

11:19one time, it might have a good result in

11:22the future for another victim. And so

11:23that's even more opportunity to try to

11:26disrupt.

11:31And we did have a recent success with

11:34disrupting a rent attack.

11:36So the victim had posted they had lost

11:39$800,000

11:41on Twitter. Within 30 minutes, those

11:44funds had gone through the threat intel

11:47and been distributed out and ultimately

11:50about 90% of those funds were frozen.

11:52And so there's a lot more of that

11:54coordination

11:56possible, not just with this actor, but

11:58in general by being really quick with

12:01the delivery of these addresses.

12:10And and is hopefully uh the takeaway

12:12that you got here today is that data can

12:14really help contain your exploit. The

12:16common denominator across all these

12:18different actors is that time is of the

12:20essence. And if you're thinking about

12:22how do I prepare for my exploit, the

12:25common questions that I hear time and

12:27time again are how do I make sure that

12:28services know about my stolen funds? How

12:31do I move forward? What are my next

12:33steps? What are my recovery chances? And

12:36I think the data is really the common

12:38denominator here to make sure that

12:40that's possible.

12:43So thank you so much. Here are the

12:45socials for myself and Zero Shadow if

12:47you want to

12:48um follow us and uh yeah, thank you.

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