DSS 2026 — What the Block Explorer Misses Julia Hardy Source video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mXqFtKWadIs Automatic captions — not human-reviewed. Complete spoken-audio coverage is unverified. Source language tag: en (English). Source export SHA256: 87413dbed1c77599db1442f6c1a3a08fd7eb3f59b76b63f2e44d54b4f9713943 [0:00] Okay. Thank you everyone. Um, I'm Julia, [0:03] here with Zero Shadow, and I'm going to [0:05] be talking about yeah, money laundering [0:08] insights and how we can use that to [0:10] contain active exploits. [0:22] Um, okay. So, um, when a exploit [0:25] happens, I think a lot of times people [0:27] will hopefully look at the attack [0:29] vector, um, and and try to learn from [0:32] that, but really focus on the very first [0:34] address where funds might have been um, [0:38] deposited into, and then that's the end [0:40] of their journey. Um, maybe for some of [0:42] the larger exploits, some people will, [0:45] for example, follow movements to Bitcoin [0:48] for across storage chain for something [0:50] like the Bybit exploit. But um, what's [0:53] unique about Zero Shadow is that we are [0:54] looking at every single address that a [0:57] threat actor uses from the very first [1:00] deposit, uh, the very first stolen funds [1:02] address all the way through to the last [1:04] address where we see a suspected cash [1:07] out. [1:08] And that means that we have a really [1:10] holistic view of how certain threat [1:13] actors are moving their stolen funds. [1:19] And the the insight that I get from a [1:21] lot of people when I talk about freezing [1:24] and recovery, um, along with security is [1:28] why should we be focusing on the [1:29] laundering side? By then it's too late. [1:32] Uh, we should really be just doing [1:33] preventative work to try to stop any [1:36] kind of um, incidents from occurring. [1:40] And while that is definitely important, [1:43] I think that the first or the year so [1:46] far has really shown us that it can be a [1:49] matter of when and not if for certain [1:52] protocols to to be hacked, and that [1:55] knowing who your adversary is can be [1:57] really important to um, actually have a [2:00] containment when that exploit occurs. Um [2:03] when we look at the first half of the [2:04] year, we had [2:05] calculated 1.8 billion dollars stolen up [2:09] until October and then of course the [2:11] past weekend has happened and that [2:13] number is now up quite a bit. [2:16] Um we've also seen that a lot of these [2:18] exploits are happening because of [2:20] operational security. So off-chain um [2:23] even maybe dependency related if you [2:25] think about things like the Axie client [2:28] exploit earlier or vulnerability earlier [2:30] this year, some of the different wallet [2:32] exploits that have been happening where [2:34] it's really not just contained to your [2:36] specific protocol. [2:40] And Zero Shadow launched a new product [2:43] this year, the Threat Intel platform. We [2:45] have basically taken all of our stolen [2:47] funds addresses and we're trying to [2:49] better deliver them to the services that [2:51] can block funds. [2:53] Um and what that's created is a really [2:55] big data set of all these different [2:58] hacks that we look at, all the different [3:00] threat actors that we look at, every [3:02] single address associated with those [3:04] movements, and we can run analytics on [3:07] those um addresses and start to find [3:09] some really unique insights. [3:12] So what does the data show us? [3:15] Um I looked at a few different groups [3:16] here. The first one, Trader Trader from [3:19] North Korea. This is the really big most [3:22] sophisticated exploits. This is most [3:25] recently Binance um across a number of [3:27] different exploits. And um this this [3:30] first stat here is how quickly the [3:33] initial funds are actually moved out of [3:36] the first address where they are taken. [3:39] And this is not swaps or anything. This [3:41] is just um actually sending emptying out [3:44] that wallet and sending the funds [3:46] forward. And you can see that the [3:48] ability to react to those initial funds [3:50] is [3:51] less than 30 minutes. Um a little bit [3:54] longer for some of the Bitcoin side, but [3:57] um but generally you're really just [3:59] looking at a a a very fast emptying of [4:03] those wallets, moving funds forward to [4:05] new addresses. And so, if you're really [4:07] just focusing on that initial [4:09] containment, you have a very small [4:10] window to try to act. [4:13] But what's interesting is that we see [4:15] that there's a longer window when the [4:18] funds have been maybe spread out across [4:20] 20 addresses. We're calling these the [4:22] staging wallets before they actually [4:25] start to do the rapid fire laundering. [4:28] Um and why does this occur? This occurs [4:31] because North Korea is actually handing [4:33] the keys over to Chinese money [4:34] launderers to to continue with the [4:37] laundering. So this is them preparing, [4:40] coordinating with those launderers, [4:41] making sure that they can actually [4:43] continue with this activity. [4:45] Um and we're seeing that this time of [4:47] staging is decreasing over time. So it [4:49] used to be it used to be more like 6 [4:52] months. Then you look at last year, more [4:55] like 6 days of this pause between the [4:58] initial theft and the rapid fire [4:59] laundering. [5:01] Um now we're looking at more like 3 [5:02] days, even smaller. So [5:06] why is this window important? Most [5:08] important, I think, for um anyone who [5:11] experiences an exploit to realize I have [5:14] only a few days to make sure I have law [5:15] enforcement prepared. I have all the [5:18] different services that I want to um [5:20] know about these addresses prepared, [5:22] maybe a security firm, any of those kind [5:25] of steps. This is your big window before [5:27] the rapid laundering to do so. [5:31] And then when we look at just the [5:33] downstream laundering, so the the [5:36] movement towards the cash out, [5:38] most addresses are only holding a [5:40] balance for about 5 minutes. And so um [5:43] in in Bybit, for example, we saw 13,000 [5:46] addresses used. And so again, this is [5:49] just this idea that you really need the [5:51] real-time information if you want to try [5:53] to [5:54] intercept these funds at any time. [5:58] Um and we were actually able to do that. [6:01] Um so this is from the Caltal KelpTel [6:05] exploit that we saw funds were [6:07] originally going to Thorchain and [6:10] then the launderers were looking for [6:13] more rapid bridging opportunity, so they [6:15] switched to other bridges that were [6:18] ingesting the addresses that we were [6:20] sending to them and we were able to [6:22] intercept $700,000 worth of funds. And [6:25] this graph here on the right-hand side, [6:28] this is all the different services that [6:30] were getting hits off of these [6:32] addresses. So the launderers trying to [6:35] repeatedly send these funds in and [6:37] getting rejected and trying again. [6:42] And so shifting gears here to other [6:44] North Korea groups. This on the screen [6:47] here is the Drift exploit. So the the [6:50] specific actors here is Apple Juice. [6:54] But who are this actor if you're not as [6:56] familiar? [6:57] Basically these are not as obvious hacks [7:01] from [7:03] the the specific vector that are used, [7:05] but they're always using the same [7:07] malware. [7:08] Or if you've heard of something like [7:10] Dangerous Password where this is the [7:12] Zoom call where the audio doesn't work, [7:14] these are not as sophisticated of actors [7:17] within North Korea, but they're still [7:19] doing pretty complex exploits. [7:25] So when we look at the fund movements [7:28] for laundering for Apple Juice, we see [7:30] that the initial theft addresses are [7:33] emptied pretty quickly, not quite as [7:35] quickly for from the trader-trader side, [7:37] but still [7:39] between 30 minutes to 3 hours those [7:42] funds are really emptied out. And again, [7:44] you really need to be thinking more [7:45] downstream if you're thinking about [7:47] disruption. [7:50] But what's interesting here is that we [7:52] see that the funds will be parked for a [7:54] really long time just sitting at [7:57] externally owned accounts before they [7:59] move to the next stage of laundering. [8:02] So for two different cases here I [8:03] anonymized them, but we're looking at [8:06] 10 to 11 months, 4 to seven months where [8:09] funds are just sitting in in wallets. [8:10] They haven't been moved. [8:12] The reason that we see this [8:15] is is partially a reevaluation of [8:18] strategy. [8:19] And that's really allowed us to have a [8:21] lot of time to understand exactly what [8:24] we need to be prepared for. So where do [8:26] we expect these funds to move to? What [8:28] mixers? What lending protocols? Get [8:31] everything in order so that you can have [8:33] really good results with disruption when [8:35] that the time comes for those movements. [8:40] Also we are able to see with the data [8:42] that 86 to 91% of the time that the [8:45] funds are being moved is between 9:00 [8:48] a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Korea time. And so [8:50] unlike with the trader trader funds [8:53] where we see pretty much 24/7 movement [8:55] and that's very much being automated [8:58] with launders. This is North Koreans [9:01] moving their own funds, working a [9:03] working day and then taking a break to [9:05] go to sleep. [9:07] And so it's a very different style of [9:08] laundering and again gives you a little [9:10] more time to to act. [9:15] And then just looking a slightly [9:17] different type of actor, the non-nation [9:20] state actors. [9:22] We took a look at [9:24] a couple of thefts that we've been [9:25] seeing from the com. If you've heard of [9:29] the com before, you've probably heard [9:31] about these teenagers, early 20s kids [9:35] who are a lot of times [9:37] calling you up pretending to be [9:40] Coinbase security and you need to move [9:43] your funds to secure them and you lose [9:45] all your funds. We're actually seeing [9:46] that that's not the only kind of attack [9:49] that they do. [9:51] Something like drainer as a service has [9:53] definitely been a past [9:56] exploit vector, but we're now seeing [9:58] actually just taking advantage of of any [10:01] kind of vulnerability that they can see [10:03] and even doing some more smart contract [10:06] based exploits. [10:08] And when we looked at a few different [10:10] cases that we know are the same group of [10:14] actors within the com, what's [10:16] interesting with the data is that [10:18] the majority of the funds are ending up [10:21] going to bridges as one of the first [10:23] destinations [10:25] as a laundering path. And so this is a [10:28] really key area to concentrate on as a [10:31] victim of of a skid theft is to make [10:35] sure that the bridges know that these [10:37] are the potential addresses of source of [10:41] funds that you need to be blocking and [10:43] freezing if you can intercept them. [10:50] Also as another [10:52] non-nation state actor, there's been a [10:54] lot more rent attacks this year, a lot [10:56] more in the news of the UK best based [10:59] rent attacks. [11:00] With these actors, we see that the [11:03] movement of funds can be 4 hours about [11:06] between each address. So again, a much [11:08] slower rate of laundering. And there's [11:10] also heavy co-mingling across victims, [11:12] which means the same address is being [11:14] used for multiple victims over and over. [11:16] So if that address is on a block list [11:19] one time, it might have a good result in [11:22] the future for another victim. And so [11:23] that's even more opportunity to try to [11:26] disrupt. [11:31] And we did have a recent success with [11:34] disrupting a rent attack. [11:36] So the victim had posted they had lost [11:39] $800,000 [11:41] on Twitter. Within 30 minutes, those [11:44] funds had gone through the threat intel [11:47] and been distributed out and ultimately [11:50] about 90% of those funds were frozen. [11:52] And so there's a lot more of that [11:54] coordination [11:56] possible, not just with this actor, but [11:58] in general by being really quick with [12:01] the delivery of these addresses. [12:10] And and is hopefully uh the takeaway [12:12] that you got here today is that data can [12:14] really help contain your exploit. The [12:16] common denominator across all these [12:18] different actors is that time is of the [12:20] essence. And if you're thinking about [12:22] how do I prepare for my exploit, the [12:25] common questions that I hear time and [12:27] time again are how do I make sure that [12:28] services know about my stolen funds? How [12:31] do I move forward? What are my next [12:33] steps? What are my recovery chances? And [12:36] I think the data is really the common [12:38] denominator here to make sure that [12:40] that's possible. [12:43] So thank you so much. Here are the [12:45] socials for myself and Zero Shadow if [12:47] you want to [12:48] um follow us and uh yeah, thank you.