DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 1 / Amber Hall

2FA won't save you: dead TOTP and stolen sessions

Pablo Sabbatella

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Transcript

0:01Hey, hello everyone. How are you?

0:04So, today we're going to talk about many

0:06things. We have many slides.

0:08Uh,

0:09but we're going to start with 2FA. First

0:11question, how many of you saw my

0:13presentation at Dark Mode in February

0:17about this or similar to this? Not so

0:19many. Great.

0:21So let's start with this.

0:28Uh,

0:29very briefly about me. If you don't know

0:31me, I'm the founder of OpSec. I'm a

0:34member of Security Alliance. I'm a

0:36signer in Arbitrum, Optimism, Polygon,

0:39and ENS Security Councils. We froze a

0:42lot of money from Kim Jong-un two days

0:45ago.

0:46And uh,

0:47I'm also the host for the Blockchain

0:50Security Series podcast that will come

0:52back in a few months.

0:54So let's start talking a bit about 2FA

0:57and then we'll see why this is super

0:59super important in our industry today.

1:02We

1:03like when we start talking about 2FA,

1:05the most basic basic thing is mobile

1:08phone numbers, right? So um, what

1:11happens if we use mobile phone uh, for

1:142FA? Basically we know SIM swap attacks,

1:17right? Someone is able to go to the

1:19telephone company, impersonate us and

1:21get our uh,

1:23phone number and access all of our

1:25codes, hacking our accounts.

1:27Second method to hack our phones, I

1:30don't know if you know it, the voicemail

1:32attack.

1:33All telephone companies around the world

1:35have an special phone number where you

1:37can call to listen to your voicemail and

1:40the PIN to to listen to your voicemails,

1:42you know what it is? The last four

1:44digits of your phone number, right? So

1:48basically anyone here can listen to

1:50anyone's voicemail. So instead of

1:52choosing, hey, I want to receive the

1:53code via SMS, you receive it through a

1:56call. It's recorded into a voicemail

1:58because they do it 4 a.m. while while

2:00you're sleeping and your Telegram

2:03account is gone, WhatsApp account is

2:04gone, Google, banks, etc.

2:08Third way

2:09to intercept SMS codes. Every time a

2:12company sends you an SMS, for example,

2:15uh

2:15Apple, they do it through a company

2:17called Twilio, most of them.

2:20This company uses lots of

2:22intermediaries, right? Tier one, tier

2:24two, and tier three companies. These

2:26companies have a zero obsec and usually

2:29their servers are

2:31with five or six different threat actors

2:34groups that are seen all the SMS going

2:37in plain text, right?

2:38So what we see with this is that

2:40basically two-FA with phones is a joke,

2:43right? So what do we learn from this?

2:46Very easy. Never use your phone number

2:48anywhere for two-FA.

2:50You remove your phone number from any

2:52platform where you can

2:54and for the few places where you have to

2:56use it, Apple ID, Signal, Telegram, some

2:59banks, you have to use a private phone

3:01number that nobody knows that belongs to

3:04you or from companies like a Funny that

3:07make it

3:08uh

3:09very very difficult to SIM swap, right?

3:12What's the best way in my opinion? Just

3:14ask a friend to get a phone number under

3:16their name, use it, and don't share it

3:18with anyone. Know that your phone number

3:21will be taken over. It's super easy and

3:25cheap to do it.

3:27So

3:29uh two-FA with SMS is so the next

3:32step is TOTP, right? Time-based one-time

3:36password. We know all these apps, OATH,

3:38Google Authenticator, Microsoft

3:39Authenticator.

3:41What's the issue with these apps?

3:43Starting with Google Authenticator,

3:44first of all, they offer backups in the

3:47cloud, right? Those backups are not

3:49encrypted.

3:51So when they hack your Gmail account,

3:53what which will happen, they will have

3:55access to your codes, right? But that

3:58not that's not the only issue that you

4:00have to check.

4:02The also the issue that uh we have is

4:05the Google ecosystem, right? We use

4:07Gmail for our emails. We use Chrome for

4:11our passwords. That's also synchronized

4:12with our Google account.

4:14We use Google Authenticator for our 2FA

4:17also synchronized with our Google

4:19account. If you have Android, you have

4:20your passkey synchronized with your

4:22Google account. So what happens? You

4:25have your passwords, you have your 2FAs,

4:28you have uh you have your emails and

4:30your passkeys synchronized your Google

4:32account. Your Google account gets

4:33compromised, you lose absolutely

4:35everything and you are not going to get

4:38your Google account back.

4:41Another very very bad idea is and this

4:44is done by approximately 30% of people

4:47in crypto, storing 2FA codes, right?

4:50Inside password managers. So you have

4:52one password, Apple passwords, etc. And

4:55you have your passwords and the 2FA

4:57together. It's not the 2FA anymore.

5:01What's the issue? The There are more

5:03important issue with TOTP codes and I

5:05will show it easier here. Let's say that

5:08you receive this

5:10to your phishing.

5:11You click on the link, it asks for the

5:13password, you put the password, it says

5:15it's wrong, you put it again, you are

5:17logged in and it asks for the 2FA,

5:19right?

5:21So after it asks for the 2FA,

5:24you enter the 2FA.

5:26The codes that are generated by these

5:28apps, Google Authenticator, the

5:29Microsoft Authenticator, etc. are not

5:31phishing resistant and we have to know

5:34all of you have to know that eventually

5:36you are going to click on a phishing

5:38link and you are going to enter your

5:39credentials, right? So these codes are

5:41not phishing resistant. We cannot uh

5:45consider to keep using them anymore.

5:49So what's the thing to do regarding

5:51this? Hardware authentication, right?

5:53You all know about this. I am all the

5:55time talking about these little products

5:57in X.

5:59Yubikeys, they can be used in computers,

6:02in phones. You have to know that at

6:04least you should have two, and if you

6:06are here, you should have three, right?

6:08One, this one, very small, always

6:11connected to your laptop.

6:13These are one always in your keychain,

6:16and the third one backed up at home,

6:18right? As they cannot be backed up, you

6:21should

6:22configure

6:24all of them in every platform where you

6:26sign up, right?

6:29But these devices could be lost, right?

6:32So what we do, and you'll have the

6:35slides here because I will publish them,

6:37is that we will configure them so that

6:40the pin is always mandatory, right? So

6:42if one day I lose my YubiKey, it cannot

6:45be used by anyone because it it requires

6:47a pin

6:48like this, right? So you touch it, you

6:51put the pin, you touch it again, you are

6:52logged in.

6:54How do you do to have the pin as

6:58mandatory? You open the terminal, you

7:01run Yubico. Here you have the the exact

7:04commands that you have to do.

7:05This is a very bad user experience from

7:08Yubico, but we cannot expect too much

7:10from them

7:11aside from making good hardware.

7:13Um and this way the pin will always be

7:18required to you, okay?

7:21So what's the other very good thing

7:23about these devices is that the login is

7:26much faster than with Google

7:28Authenticator, for example, right? You

7:30have to unlock the phone, open the app,

7:33put your fingerprint, look for the code,

7:35copy the code, enter the code. It's lots

7:37of steps. With these ones, you touch it,

7:39you put the pin, you touch it again, you

7:41are logged in.

7:44Now, something important about YubiKeys.

7:46YubiKeys have many interfaces, right?

7:49You have the OTP that is that long code

7:52that you'll see uh when you touch it,

7:55and those codes are fishable.

7:58You have a FIDO2 that is basically to

8:00have like a passkey inside the YubiKey,

8:03which is not fishable. You have FIDO2

8:06two, which is not fishable. And you have

8:08OAuth or TOTP that is basically to

8:11generate these codes inside YubiKeys,

8:13but are also fishable, right?

8:16So when you configure them with Yubico

8:18Manager, you can just disable the um

8:23the ones that are not safe and just keep

8:26FIDO U2F and FIDO two.

8:30So

8:32OTP codes.

8:33Maybe it happened to you that you

8:35touched the YubiKey by mistake and you

8:37see all that string. Well, those are the

8:40famous OTP codes.

8:42The problem with them is that these ones

8:44are not only

8:46very easy to fish, but the same code, if

8:50you if you have registered your YubiKey

8:52with this in three different websites,

8:54one website can steal it and it can be

8:56replayed in another website, right? They

8:58are super super unsafe. So we do not

9:03recommend this at all.

9:05Um

9:08so then you have OAuth or OTP codes,

9:11right?

9:12This is can you can you like

9:15put it so that it's

9:18yeah. Okay, thank you.

9:21With with these codes, what you do is to

9:23basically configure the traditional

9:26Google Authenticator or OAuth codes, but

9:28inside YubiKeys, right? So this is not

9:31phishing resistant, but at least they

9:33will not be able to steal it from the

9:35cloud, right?

9:36So you can configure it like this and

9:39then you generate the codes inside

9:40there. But let's go to the more

9:42interesting ones. FIDO U2F, right?

9:47So FIDO U2F is the first one from Yubico

9:49that

9:51is phishing resistant, right? Because it

9:53checks who is requesting this code. So

9:56the day that you get into a phishing

9:57website and you enter your credentials

10:00and the two-factor is required, this

10:02will not this will not work, so you'll

10:05you will be protected, right?

10:07What's the issue with this? That no pin

10:09is needed by default, right? So we have

10:12codes that are fishing resistant, but no

10:14pin needed, so if your YubiKey is

10:15stolen, it's useless.

10:18But as we were seeing, it's always

10:21checking that the website that is

10:23requesting the code is the real website.

10:25If it's not a real website, it will not

10:27send the code.

10:30So then we had passkeys, right? A good

10:33idea, but implemented like like

10:36always.

10:37So passkeys are 10x better than

10:39passwords, right? They cannot be fished.

10:42They should not be able to be shared.

10:45They cannot be repeated.

10:47They should not be stolen from the

10:49user's device.

10:51And definitely they cannot be stolen

10:52from the service where you signed up,

10:54right? Because if you signed up to

10:55Coinbase and you put the password in

10:57Coinbase, then Coinbase gets hacked,

11:00your password is in the dark web, right?

11:02It it doesn't happen with this.

11:05So how does it work? In every service

11:07where you sign up, there's a private key

11:10and public key generated in the secure

11:12enclave of your device. The public key

11:14is stored by the website or the platform

11:16and the private key in your secure in

11:18your secure enclave. Every time you want

11:21to log in, you do a biometric. This is

11:23this unencrypts the private key from

11:26your secure enclave. It signs a message

11:28and the platform identifies you, right?

11:32So

11:33then

11:35again, passkeys were designed to be

11:37stored where? In secure enclaves, right?

11:39But the industry had a great idea of

11:42synchronizing them, right? with your

11:44iCloud,

11:46your Google account, or your password

11:47manager, right? So this is now in the

11:51cloud and hacking an an iCloud account,

11:53a Google account, or a password manager,

11:56depending on your opsec, it could be

11:58pretty easy. So

12:00it's not a good idea anymore.

12:02As we can see here, Apple wants to save

12:05your passkeys.

12:07One Password also likes saving your

12:09passkeys.

12:11And after all, why shouldn't we keep it,

12:14right?

12:15So,

12:16what's the other issue with this type of

12:18passkeys? Many platforms, like X

12:22and Google treat passkeys as both the

12:25first and second factor, right? And this

12:27is super super dangerous.

12:29So, if you check in your Google account,

12:32you will

12:34if you check in your Google account, you

12:35will see that you have an option called

12:37skip password when possible. You should

12:39always disable that

12:41because if not, that means that someone

12:43gets access to your iCloud account, they

12:45have your passkey

12:47and with that they access your account

12:49with nothing nothing else.

12:52So,

12:56uh

12:59there we go.

13:00As we said,

13:02passkeys, the ones that are um

13:06that can be synchronized

13:07can be stolen from the can be stolen

13:09from the cloud, but cannot be phished,

13:12right? If we use FIDO U2F, they cannot

13:16be stolen

13:17stolen from the cloud, they cannot be

13:19phished, but they do not enforce a PIN,

13:21right? Which passkeys do.

13:24And the UVC OTP codes, they cannot be

13:26stolen from the cloud, but they can be

13:27phished. So, there's no good solution,

13:29right?

13:33This doesn't seem to be working.

13:35So, what is the solution?

13:42FIDO 2 plus UbiKeys.

13:48Go one more.

13:50So, what is this? It's basically saving

13:53your passkeys inside the UbiKey, right?

13:56In this way, you have phishing

13:57resistance and the codes are not stored

14:00in the cloud, right? And then you have a

14:02PIN that that protects the UbiKey from

14:04any physical attack

14:06and it's required every time you want to

14:08use it, right? Every time you touch it.

14:12Um so, with FIDO 2, with the PIN in

14:15force, right? You combine three factors.

14:18Something that you know, your password,

14:21something that you have, the Yubikey,

14:22and something that you know from the

14:25physical device that is a PIN. So, even

14:27if someone steals it,

14:29it cannot be used.

14:31Let's continue.

14:33If you Something that is also very

14:35important, because the problem with

14:37Yubikeys is that how they are

14:39implemented by different platforms is a

14:41disaster,

14:43is that if you go, for example, to your

14:45Google account and you say, okay, I'm

14:46going to configure this, you would say

14:49you have two options, create a passkey

14:50or use a security key, right? What would

14:53you do? Use a security key, right?

14:54Because you have a security key. No.

14:56You have to choose create a passkey and

14:59then the option use on our device.

15:02Continue.

15:05Then click on USB security key, you put

15:07your PIN, you save it, and that's it.

15:11So, continue. One more, please.

15:14This is how Yubikeys look at Google

15:17Authenticator users, just pathetic.

15:20Continue with one more. So, the

15:23conclusions for this part, right? Mobile

15:25phone number we always we obviously see

15:27that is a no-go route, right?

15:31Cloud-based OTP, they can be stolen from

15:33the cloud, so and they are not phishing

15:35resistant, so useless. Yubikey OTP codes

15:39cannot be stored from the cloud but are

15:40not phishing resistant, useless.

15:43OTP cannot be stolen from the cloud but

15:45are not phishing resistant, also no.

15:48FIDO U2F phishing resistant but that

15:50does not require a PIN. Synchronized

15:52passkeys can be stored from the stolen

15:53from the cloud, so also useless.

15:56And FIDO U2 FIDO 2 in hardware devices

16:00is basically the only way to do 2FA safe

16:04in my opinion.

16:06One very important thing whenever you do

16:08this is that you should always save the

16:11backup codes for your accounts in paper,

16:14right? Or in an encrypted drive, never

16:16in a password manager.

16:18So, with this, we were Go back, please.

16:23We were able to protect our accounts,

16:26right? The login. So now the accounts

16:27are safe, right?

16:30Please, continue.

16:33No way. They are not safe.

16:36What do you think that these hacks have

16:38in common? Binance, Bybit, and Ronin,

16:41and many, many, many more.

16:44What's the common thing here?

16:45It's pretty easy, right?

16:47Continue. It's EPRK.

16:49It's EPRK. Continue. But not only the

16:52EPRK, right? That's not the only thing

16:54in common. Continue with one more.

16:57Nearly nine out of 10 attacks in crypto

17:00start with a very stupid thing, and that

17:03is a developer laptop infected, right?

17:06They start with this. Then someone that

17:08that is far better than the guy that did

17:10the social engineering for this starts

17:12moving laterally, gaining more

17:14privilege, etc., that is more advanced,

17:16but it always starts with the same

17:18thing.

17:20So now we're going to see what happens

17:21when you protect the login, right? So we

17:23protected the login with YubiKeys,

17:25passwords, PIN, YubiKeys, and blah blah

17:27blah blah blah, but the real threat is

17:29here, stolen cookies.

17:31Continue, please.

17:33So a cookie is basically like a door

17:36key, right? Not an ID card. Whenever you

17:39log into a website, that website

17:42gives you gives your browser a cookie,

17:45and every time you want to log in or you

17:48want to request something,

17:50it sends that cookie, and the website

17:51says, okay, it's you.

17:53Continue.

17:56So what happens?

17:58What always happens? Some developer,

18:00some founder, whatever, downloads some

18:03malware, and this will happen to all of

18:05us. All of us, all of us here, everyone

18:08in this room in the next three years, we

18:10are going to get malware in our devices.

18:13It's inevitable.

18:15That malware will steal the cookie, and

18:17after the cookie is stolen, the cookie

18:19will be imported into the device from

18:22the attacker, and the attacker we will

18:24will basically replay it, and now they

18:26will just open your session, right?

18:30So we basically

18:31the password, MFA, device check, risk

18:34engine, and we have the cookie, and the

18:37guy, the attacker starts here, right?

18:39They start at the finish line. They have

18:41this. All of that doesn't matter.

18:43Continue with one more.

18:46And this is an industry that is growing

18:48a lot. These numbers are from are from

18:50last year, and I bet that this year it

18:52would it will be like at least 3x

18:56this.

18:57Last year there were 50

19:0052 million Stealer log packages, and a

19:03Stealer is basically a type of malware

19:05that gets into your device and steals

19:08passwords, private keys, seed phrases,

19:11cookie sessions, files, whatever.

19:1525 million devices infected,

19:17and 98%

19:19of those packages came with usernames,

19:22passwords, and cookies included, right?

19:25So this is super super dangerous.

19:28In the last decade there were many

19:31attempts to fix this thing of what do we

19:34do with these cookies, and we had HTTP

19:36only, unbound encryption, token binding,

19:39risk heuristics. None of this worked.

19:43So what do we do to make those stolen

19:47cookies useless, right? Because

19:48remember, this will happen to all of us,

19:52included myself.

19:53Continue.

19:56There's basically a new technology

19:58developed by Google and Microsoft,

20:00right, called DBSC. And to explain it

20:03simple, what we do here is you log in

20:05into a website. The website gives you a

20:07cookie.

20:09And now in the secure enclave of your

20:11device there will be generated a private

20:14and public key, right? The public key

20:17will be sent to the website, and the

20:18private key will stay stay in the secure

20:21enclave, right?

20:22So now these

20:24that the website will send you are

20:26short-lived cookies for one minute, five

20:28minutes, ten minutes. And when you want

20:30to renew the cookie, right? The website

20:34will require the secure enclave to sign

20:36again.

20:37This means that if the cookie is stolen,

20:40the attacker will open it and if it if

20:44it went by more than one minute, five

20:46minutes, or ten minutes, whatever, they

20:47will have to sign again and if they do

20:50not have access to the physical device,

20:52they will not be able to do it.

20:55Continue.

20:56Continue with one more because I already

20:58explained this.

21:00So what does this this stop, right?

21:03DBSC.

21:05The replay of the stolen cookie, right?

21:07So if my device

21:09is infected and the cookie is stolen and

21:12then is sold, like the market for stolen

21:15cookies is huge, huge,

21:19that will be stopped, right? Because

21:20they steal it from me, they sell it, and

21:22when they get it, this cookie requires

21:25the signature, it doesn't work, useless.

21:28What it does not protect you from is if

21:31your device is still infected, right?

21:33Because you have the attacker inside the

21:35device and they will be able to keep

21:37signing, right? Or to have access to the

21:39new cookie that is being sent to you.

21:42And it obviously does not protect you

21:44from other stuff that can be stolen from

21:46your device, right?

21:47Private keys, seed phrases, API keys,

21:50etc.

21:52So where are we today with DBSC? In

21:55Chrome in Chrome for Windows, it's

21:57public since April, since Chrome

22:01146.

22:03In macOS, it landed on August 2026.

22:08And now it's owned by default in all

22:11Google accounts and Google Workspace

22:13account, right?

22:14Okta is

22:15already doing trials. Firefox declined

22:19to use it. I don't know why, but let's

22:21stop using Firefox Firefox.

22:23Safari is still evaluating. Safari is a

22:26disaster as a browser for OpSec, so I

22:29highly recommend you to not use Safari

22:33ever.

22:34And now the Web3C

22:37is creating an standard for this, right?

22:40Go one more.

22:42But what's the thing here, right?

22:43Because remember that in security we

22:45always know we are never 100% safe. It's

22:48always about adding layers and layers

22:50and layers for what? To make it more

22:52difficult and more expensive to the

22:55attacker, right? So what's the other

22:57layer that we have to add here? EDRs.

22:59And this is a huge problem in our

23:01industry.

23:02We have an industry where

23:05privacy is very important, right? And I

23:07agree, privacy is important, but I see

23:10a huge amount of teams that tell me, oh,

23:12no, no, no, we don't use EDRs. EDRs is a

23:15problem for privacy because

23:18they will be seeing what I do in my

23:19computer and blah blah blah blah blah,

23:20my privacy, my privacy, my privacy. And

23:22then they have their computers infected.

23:25Kim Jong-un has access to to absolutely

23:28everything, and their privacy, where is

23:30it?

23:31So who knows what does it what is an

23:32EDR?

23:34Raise your hand.

23:36Ah, we have an issue.

23:37So an antivirus is the classical tool

23:40that

23:41searches for files that are known

23:44viruses, right? So we know that this

23:45file is a virus because of the

23:47signature. That's it.

23:49Very very easy to bypass today.

23:53An EDR, which stands for endpoint

23:55detection and response, is for example

23:57CrowdStrike or SentinelOne, but the

23:59number one is CrowdStrike by far,

24:03watches behaviors, right? It says, okay,

24:05there's a new process here that is

24:07trying to read the memory from this

24:08other process and connect to this weird

24:11IP, so it will detect most of this stuff

24:14and stop it.

24:15If in this industry we used EDRs, at

24:19least

24:2095% of the attacks that we saw in the

24:23last two years would not have existed,

24:25right?

24:26It's super super

24:28stupid not to do it.

24:30So what's a recommendation for small Web

24:323 teams? Every laptop, every laptop,

24:35unless

24:38it's a super specific laptop only for

24:41signing if you are in very big multisigs

24:44or security councils and you don't have

24:46anything

24:47but signing, every laptop should should

24:51have

24:52an EDR.

24:53As I said, the recommend the recommended

24:55brand is CrowdStrike

24:58and CrowdStrike is super super cheap and

25:00you can buy from one license for you,

25:02right? $150 per year per user, nothing.

25:09It should be managed not do yourself.

25:11That means that there should be someone

25:13watching the alerts, right?

25:16And then obviously the EDR is not the

25:18only thing that you should have. You

25:20should have

25:21good hygiene, right? Good opsec in your

25:23device, macOS properly configured,

25:26separate signing device,

25:30no obviously please no seed phrases and

25:33private keys. It seems to be very basic,

25:36but 25% of people that we audit at

25:39opsec, 25%

25:42stores seed phrases where? In password

25:44managers. And I bet that that 20% of you

25:47still do it.

25:50If you have to do one thing this month,

25:52start using an EDR.

25:54To install it, it takes you literally 30

25:56seconds. You just open the sensor, you

25:59give it permissions to access your full

26:00disk and network and that's it. It's

26:03installed.

26:05Go one more, please.

26:08And then so we said we have

26:12unique passwords, we have YubiKeys

26:14properly configured,

26:16um

26:18we have DBSC, right? To be able to kill

26:22the cookie if it's stolen

26:24and we have an EDR to protect your

26:27device, right?

26:29In case it's infected because again, if

26:31it infects you, if you're infected once

26:33and it's stolen, is one thing. If you

26:34keep on being infected, if you have

26:36persistence, that's a great issue.

26:39In fact, many people The other day I was

26:42talking to a friend and

26:44the guy that hacked me for the first

26:46time when I was 15 years old, he's a

26:48great friend of me now.

26:51And he told me

26:53many people think that they realize that

26:57like

26:58how many time goes by between you get

27:00hacked

27:02and you realize about that, right? And

27:04many people would would think, okay, I

27:06get hacked and 5 minutes later I get my

27:08MetaMask drained, right? But if you

27:11didn't have money in your MetaMask, 6

27:14months, 8 months, 9 months can go by and

27:16you have no idea about this, right?

27:20So this is also another thing that is

27:22very important, right? Every time an

27:24stealer steals data from your device,

27:27that will be first used by that threat

27:30actor specific to target you and to

27:32steal whatever they need, and then this

27:34will be sold in the dark web, right?

27:37So you should be able to monitor, you

27:40should pay for a service that is

27:42monitoring threat actors groups, and the

27:44moment that you see the domain from your

27:47company, the name of an employee, a

27:49phone number, an email, or whatever that

27:51belongs to someone to someone from your

27:53team, you don't go and rotate passwords.

27:56No, you block completely that person

27:58because you know that that that person

28:00was infected.

28:02The thing that you have with this that

28:03is tricky is that

28:06if you really want to be the first one

28:10in knowing when someone from your team

28:12was infected,

28:13who [snorts] should you buy the data

28:16from? The threat actors themselves,

28:17right? So it's kind of tricky, but

28:20it's the way it is.

28:23So let's go one more.

28:26Four layers, as we said, 5 2 plus UBI

28:29keys to secure the login, right? And

28:31this beats phishing. DBSC secures the

28:35session, right? And the cookie replay,

28:38the data that it's stolen.

28:41Remember that this is what happened to

28:43Bybit, right? The developer from Safe

28:46was infected. They stole the session

28:49from Amazon Web Services, the session

28:51cookie, and then all that happened.

28:55Then

28:56uh

28:56layer number three, the EDR to secure

28:59your device, to catch whatever happens,

29:02and after something happens, you will

29:04have evidence to really understand what

29:06happened.

29:07And fourth, monitoring, right? So at as

29:10soon as something as someone from your

29:13organization was infected, you will be

29:15the first one

29:17to know about it. One more.

29:21So five things to remember.

29:24First,

29:26this cookie theft

29:28uh

29:29is the way to bypass MFA, right? And it

29:31works at a scale. This is super super

29:34fast the way it works. It's not manual.

29:36Like when they steal a cookie from you,

29:38a checker will go and try to to replay

29:41it automatically. When it works, it will

29:44pass it on to a to a manual operator.

29:472FA verifies your login, but it never

29:50sees the session, right? It will not

29:51protect it.

29:53DBSC does not hide the cookies, right?

29:56It will only

30:00stop the cookie, the short-lived cookie

30:03from being renewed.

30:05Then the EDR covers what the DBSC

30:08cannot, right?

30:10So remember put it in every device.

30:13Again, this

30:15if if companies in crypto had to do one

30:17thing in this industry that we have,

30:20that is basically a joke,

30:22would be to insert an EDR. That's it.

30:24Only thing that you do today, insert an

30:26EDR.

30:27And then And then one thing connected to

30:30this, many people tell me no no no,

30:31Pablo, no, I will not fall for a

30:33phishing. I bet that for sure nine out

30:35of 10 people here are convinced that

30:38we'll not fall for phishing, and I'll

30:40tell you, you will fall for phishing,

30:42for sure. I don't know if you saw the

30:44last emails from Google that come from

30:46Google, signed by Google, mail by

30:49Google. Everything is from Google, and

30:50they have malicious code injected.

30:53And their thinking many people say, no,

30:55I will not get my device infected. I do

30:57not download so many stuff. Well, go and

30:59check how many processes you have run

31:01you have running and how many

31:04dependencies those processes have. For

31:06sure, we are all going to be infected.

31:08It's just a matter of time in the next

31:10year or two years, for sure.

31:13And then number five, monitor monitor

31:16your domain so you're the first one to

31:18know when someone was infected and go

31:21very fast and block every access that

31:23this person has.

31:25Is there anything else? I think that no.

31:32Thank you.

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