DSS 2026 / Day 1 / Amber Hall
2FA won't save you: dead TOTP and stolen sessions
Pablo Sabbatella
Source: YouTube automatic caption track · Exported 2026-11-16. Timestamps link to the source video. Cue end times were not supplied.
Transcript
0:01Hey, hello everyone. How are you?
0:04So, today we're going to talk about many
0:06things. We have many slides.
0:08Uh,
0:09but we're going to start with 2FA. First
0:11question, how many of you saw my
0:13presentation at Dark Mode in February
0:17about this or similar to this? Not so
0:19many. Great.
0:21So let's start with this.
0:28Uh,
0:29very briefly about me. If you don't know
0:31me, I'm the founder of OpSec. I'm a
0:34member of Security Alliance. I'm a
0:36signer in Arbitrum, Optimism, Polygon,
0:39and ENS Security Councils. We froze a
0:42lot of money from Kim Jong-un two days
0:45ago.
0:46And uh,
0:47I'm also the host for the Blockchain
0:50Security Series podcast that will come
0:52back in a few months.
0:54So let's start talking a bit about 2FA
0:57and then we'll see why this is super
0:59super important in our industry today.
1:02We
1:03like when we start talking about 2FA,
1:05the most basic basic thing is mobile
1:08phone numbers, right? So um, what
1:11happens if we use mobile phone uh, for
1:142FA? Basically we know SIM swap attacks,
1:17right? Someone is able to go to the
1:19telephone company, impersonate us and
1:21get our uh,
1:23phone number and access all of our
1:25codes, hacking our accounts.
1:27Second method to hack our phones, I
1:30don't know if you know it, the voicemail
1:32attack.
1:33All telephone companies around the world
1:35have an special phone number where you
1:37can call to listen to your voicemail and
1:40the PIN to to listen to your voicemails,
1:42you know what it is? The last four
1:44digits of your phone number, right? So
1:48basically anyone here can listen to
1:50anyone's voicemail. So instead of
1:52choosing, hey, I want to receive the
1:53code via SMS, you receive it through a
1:56call. It's recorded into a voicemail
1:58because they do it 4 a.m. while while
2:00you're sleeping and your Telegram
2:03account is gone, WhatsApp account is
2:04gone, Google, banks, etc.
2:08Third way
2:09to intercept SMS codes. Every time a
2:12company sends you an SMS, for example,
2:15uh
2:15Apple, they do it through a company
2:17called Twilio, most of them.
2:20This company uses lots of
2:22intermediaries, right? Tier one, tier
2:24two, and tier three companies. These
2:26companies have a zero obsec and usually
2:29their servers are
2:31with five or six different threat actors
2:34groups that are seen all the SMS going
2:37in plain text, right?
2:38So what we see with this is that
2:40basically two-FA with phones is a joke,
2:43right? So what do we learn from this?
2:46Very easy. Never use your phone number
2:48anywhere for two-FA.
2:50You remove your phone number from any
2:52platform where you can
2:54and for the few places where you have to
2:56use it, Apple ID, Signal, Telegram, some
2:59banks, you have to use a private phone
3:01number that nobody knows that belongs to
3:04you or from companies like a Funny that
3:07make it
3:08uh
3:09very very difficult to SIM swap, right?
3:12What's the best way in my opinion? Just
3:14ask a friend to get a phone number under
3:16their name, use it, and don't share it
3:18with anyone. Know that your phone number
3:21will be taken over. It's super easy and
3:25cheap to do it.
3:27So
3:29uh two-FA with SMS is so the next
3:32step is TOTP, right? Time-based one-time
3:36password. We know all these apps, OATH,
3:38Google Authenticator, Microsoft
3:39Authenticator.
3:41What's the issue with these apps?
3:43Starting with Google Authenticator,
3:44first of all, they offer backups in the
3:47cloud, right? Those backups are not
3:49encrypted.
3:51So when they hack your Gmail account,
3:53what which will happen, they will have
3:55access to your codes, right? But that
3:58not that's not the only issue that you
4:00have to check.
4:02The also the issue that uh we have is
4:05the Google ecosystem, right? We use
4:07Gmail for our emails. We use Chrome for
4:11our passwords. That's also synchronized
4:12with our Google account.
4:14We use Google Authenticator for our 2FA
4:17also synchronized with our Google
4:19account. If you have Android, you have
4:20your passkey synchronized with your
4:22Google account. So what happens? You
4:25have your passwords, you have your 2FAs,
4:28you have uh you have your emails and
4:30your passkeys synchronized your Google
4:32account. Your Google account gets
4:33compromised, you lose absolutely
4:35everything and you are not going to get
4:38your Google account back.
4:41Another very very bad idea is and this
4:44is done by approximately 30% of people
4:47in crypto, storing 2FA codes, right?
4:50Inside password managers. So you have
4:52one password, Apple passwords, etc. And
4:55you have your passwords and the 2FA
4:57together. It's not the 2FA anymore.
5:01What's the issue? The There are more
5:03important issue with TOTP codes and I
5:05will show it easier here. Let's say that
5:08you receive this
5:10to your phishing.
5:11You click on the link, it asks for the
5:13password, you put the password, it says
5:15it's wrong, you put it again, you are
5:17logged in and it asks for the 2FA,
5:19right?
5:21So after it asks for the 2FA,
5:24you enter the 2FA.
5:26The codes that are generated by these
5:28apps, Google Authenticator, the
5:29Microsoft Authenticator, etc. are not
5:31phishing resistant and we have to know
5:34all of you have to know that eventually
5:36you are going to click on a phishing
5:38link and you are going to enter your
5:39credentials, right? So these codes are
5:41not phishing resistant. We cannot uh
5:45consider to keep using them anymore.
5:49So what's the thing to do regarding
5:51this? Hardware authentication, right?
5:53You all know about this. I am all the
5:55time talking about these little products
5:57in X.
5:59Yubikeys, they can be used in computers,
6:02in phones. You have to know that at
6:04least you should have two, and if you
6:06are here, you should have three, right?
6:08One, this one, very small, always
6:11connected to your laptop.
6:13These are one always in your keychain,
6:16and the third one backed up at home,
6:18right? As they cannot be backed up, you
6:21should
6:22configure
6:24all of them in every platform where you
6:26sign up, right?
6:29But these devices could be lost, right?
6:32So what we do, and you'll have the
6:35slides here because I will publish them,
6:37is that we will configure them so that
6:40the pin is always mandatory, right? So
6:42if one day I lose my YubiKey, it cannot
6:45be used by anyone because it it requires
6:47a pin
6:48like this, right? So you touch it, you
6:51put the pin, you touch it again, you are
6:52logged in.
6:54How do you do to have the pin as
6:58mandatory? You open the terminal, you
7:01run Yubico. Here you have the the exact
7:04commands that you have to do.
7:05This is a very bad user experience from
7:08Yubico, but we cannot expect too much
7:10from them
7:11aside from making good hardware.
7:13Um and this way the pin will always be
7:18required to you, okay?
7:21So what's the other very good thing
7:23about these devices is that the login is
7:26much faster than with Google
7:28Authenticator, for example, right? You
7:30have to unlock the phone, open the app,
7:33put your fingerprint, look for the code,
7:35copy the code, enter the code. It's lots
7:37of steps. With these ones, you touch it,
7:39you put the pin, you touch it again, you
7:41are logged in.
7:44Now, something important about YubiKeys.
7:46YubiKeys have many interfaces, right?
7:49You have the OTP that is that long code
7:52that you'll see uh when you touch it,
7:55and those codes are fishable.
7:58You have a FIDO2 that is basically to
8:00have like a passkey inside the YubiKey,
8:03which is not fishable. You have FIDO2
8:06two, which is not fishable. And you have
8:08OAuth or TOTP that is basically to
8:11generate these codes inside YubiKeys,
8:13but are also fishable, right?
8:16So when you configure them with Yubico
8:18Manager, you can just disable the um
8:23the ones that are not safe and just keep
8:26FIDO U2F and FIDO two.
8:30So
8:32OTP codes.
8:33Maybe it happened to you that you
8:35touched the YubiKey by mistake and you
8:37see all that string. Well, those are the
8:40famous OTP codes.
8:42The problem with them is that these ones
8:44are not only
8:46very easy to fish, but the same code, if
8:50you if you have registered your YubiKey
8:52with this in three different websites,
8:54one website can steal it and it can be
8:56replayed in another website, right? They
8:58are super super unsafe. So we do not
9:03recommend this at all.
9:05Um
9:08so then you have OAuth or OTP codes,
9:11right?
9:12This is can you can you like
9:15put it so that it's
9:18yeah. Okay, thank you.
9:21With with these codes, what you do is to
9:23basically configure the traditional
9:26Google Authenticator or OAuth codes, but
9:28inside YubiKeys, right? So this is not
9:31phishing resistant, but at least they
9:33will not be able to steal it from the
9:35cloud, right?
9:36So you can configure it like this and
9:39then you generate the codes inside
9:40there. But let's go to the more
9:42interesting ones. FIDO U2F, right?
9:47So FIDO U2F is the first one from Yubico
9:49that
9:51is phishing resistant, right? Because it
9:53checks who is requesting this code. So
9:56the day that you get into a phishing
9:57website and you enter your credentials
10:00and the two-factor is required, this
10:02will not this will not work, so you'll
10:05you will be protected, right?
10:07What's the issue with this? That no pin
10:09is needed by default, right? So we have
10:12codes that are fishing resistant, but no
10:14pin needed, so if your YubiKey is
10:15stolen, it's useless.
10:18But as we were seeing, it's always
10:21checking that the website that is
10:23requesting the code is the real website.
10:25If it's not a real website, it will not
10:27send the code.
10:30So then we had passkeys, right? A good
10:33idea, but implemented like like
10:36always.
10:37So passkeys are 10x better than
10:39passwords, right? They cannot be fished.
10:42They should not be able to be shared.
10:45They cannot be repeated.
10:47They should not be stolen from the
10:49user's device.
10:51And definitely they cannot be stolen
10:52from the service where you signed up,
10:54right? Because if you signed up to
10:55Coinbase and you put the password in
10:57Coinbase, then Coinbase gets hacked,
11:00your password is in the dark web, right?
11:02It it doesn't happen with this.
11:05So how does it work? In every service
11:07where you sign up, there's a private key
11:10and public key generated in the secure
11:12enclave of your device. The public key
11:14is stored by the website or the platform
11:16and the private key in your secure in
11:18your secure enclave. Every time you want
11:21to log in, you do a biometric. This is
11:23this unencrypts the private key from
11:26your secure enclave. It signs a message
11:28and the platform identifies you, right?
11:32So
11:33then
11:35again, passkeys were designed to be
11:37stored where? In secure enclaves, right?
11:39But the industry had a great idea of
11:42synchronizing them, right? with your
11:44iCloud,
11:46your Google account, or your password
11:47manager, right? So this is now in the
11:51cloud and hacking an an iCloud account,
11:53a Google account, or a password manager,
11:56depending on your opsec, it could be
11:58pretty easy. So
12:00it's not a good idea anymore.
12:02As we can see here, Apple wants to save
12:05your passkeys.
12:07One Password also likes saving your
12:09passkeys.
12:11And after all, why shouldn't we keep it,
12:14right?
12:15So,
12:16what's the other issue with this type of
12:18passkeys? Many platforms, like X
12:22and Google treat passkeys as both the
12:25first and second factor, right? And this
12:27is super super dangerous.
12:29So, if you check in your Google account,
12:32you will
12:34if you check in your Google account, you
12:35will see that you have an option called
12:37skip password when possible. You should
12:39always disable that
12:41because if not, that means that someone
12:43gets access to your iCloud account, they
12:45have your passkey
12:47and with that they access your account
12:49with nothing nothing else.
12:52So,
12:56uh
12:59there we go.
13:00As we said,
13:02passkeys, the ones that are um
13:06that can be synchronized
13:07can be stolen from the can be stolen
13:09from the cloud, but cannot be phished,
13:12right? If we use FIDO U2F, they cannot
13:16be stolen
13:17stolen from the cloud, they cannot be
13:19phished, but they do not enforce a PIN,
13:21right? Which passkeys do.
13:24And the UVC OTP codes, they cannot be
13:26stolen from the cloud, but they can be
13:27phished. So, there's no good solution,
13:29right?
13:33This doesn't seem to be working.
13:35So, what is the solution?
13:42FIDO 2 plus UbiKeys.
13:48Go one more.
13:50So, what is this? It's basically saving
13:53your passkeys inside the UbiKey, right?
13:56In this way, you have phishing
13:57resistance and the codes are not stored
14:00in the cloud, right? And then you have a
14:02PIN that that protects the UbiKey from
14:04any physical attack
14:06and it's required every time you want to
14:08use it, right? Every time you touch it.
14:12Um so, with FIDO 2, with the PIN in
14:15force, right? You combine three factors.
14:18Something that you know, your password,
14:21something that you have, the Yubikey,
14:22and something that you know from the
14:25physical device that is a PIN. So, even
14:27if someone steals it,
14:29it cannot be used.
14:31Let's continue.
14:33If you Something that is also very
14:35important, because the problem with
14:37Yubikeys is that how they are
14:39implemented by different platforms is a
14:41disaster,
14:43is that if you go, for example, to your
14:45Google account and you say, okay, I'm
14:46going to configure this, you would say
14:49you have two options, create a passkey
14:50or use a security key, right? What would
14:53you do? Use a security key, right?
14:54Because you have a security key. No.
14:56You have to choose create a passkey and
14:59then the option use on our device.
15:02Continue.
15:05Then click on USB security key, you put
15:07your PIN, you save it, and that's it.
15:11So, continue. One more, please.
15:14This is how Yubikeys look at Google
15:17Authenticator users, just pathetic.
15:20Continue with one more. So, the
15:23conclusions for this part, right? Mobile
15:25phone number we always we obviously see
15:27that is a no-go route, right?
15:31Cloud-based OTP, they can be stolen from
15:33the cloud, so and they are not phishing
15:35resistant, so useless. Yubikey OTP codes
15:39cannot be stored from the cloud but are
15:40not phishing resistant, useless.
15:43OTP cannot be stolen from the cloud but
15:45are not phishing resistant, also no.
15:48FIDO U2F phishing resistant but that
15:50does not require a PIN. Synchronized
15:52passkeys can be stored from the stolen
15:53from the cloud, so also useless.
15:56And FIDO U2 FIDO 2 in hardware devices
16:00is basically the only way to do 2FA safe
16:04in my opinion.
16:06One very important thing whenever you do
16:08this is that you should always save the
16:11backup codes for your accounts in paper,
16:14right? Or in an encrypted drive, never
16:16in a password manager.
16:18So, with this, we were Go back, please.
16:23We were able to protect our accounts,
16:26right? The login. So now the accounts
16:27are safe, right?
16:30Please, continue.
16:33No way. They are not safe.
16:36What do you think that these hacks have
16:38in common? Binance, Bybit, and Ronin,
16:41and many, many, many more.
16:44What's the common thing here?
16:45It's pretty easy, right?
16:47Continue. It's EPRK.
16:49It's EPRK. Continue. But not only the
16:52EPRK, right? That's not the only thing
16:54in common. Continue with one more.
16:57Nearly nine out of 10 attacks in crypto
17:00start with a very stupid thing, and that
17:03is a developer laptop infected, right?
17:06They start with this. Then someone that
17:08that is far better than the guy that did
17:10the social engineering for this starts
17:12moving laterally, gaining more
17:14privilege, etc., that is more advanced,
17:16but it always starts with the same
17:18thing.
17:20So now we're going to see what happens
17:21when you protect the login, right? So we
17:23protected the login with YubiKeys,
17:25passwords, PIN, YubiKeys, and blah blah
17:27blah blah blah, but the real threat is
17:29here, stolen cookies.
17:31Continue, please.
17:33So a cookie is basically like a door
17:36key, right? Not an ID card. Whenever you
17:39log into a website, that website
17:42gives you gives your browser a cookie,
17:45and every time you want to log in or you
17:48want to request something,
17:50it sends that cookie, and the website
17:51says, okay, it's you.
17:53Continue.
17:56So what happens?
17:58What always happens? Some developer,
18:00some founder, whatever, downloads some
18:03malware, and this will happen to all of
18:05us. All of us, all of us here, everyone
18:08in this room in the next three years, we
18:10are going to get malware in our devices.
18:13It's inevitable.
18:15That malware will steal the cookie, and
18:17after the cookie is stolen, the cookie
18:19will be imported into the device from
18:22the attacker, and the attacker we will
18:24will basically replay it, and now they
18:26will just open your session, right?
18:30So we basically
18:31the password, MFA, device check, risk
18:34engine, and we have the cookie, and the
18:37guy, the attacker starts here, right?
18:39They start at the finish line. They have
18:41this. All of that doesn't matter.
18:43Continue with one more.
18:46And this is an industry that is growing
18:48a lot. These numbers are from are from
18:50last year, and I bet that this year it
18:52would it will be like at least 3x
18:56this.
18:57Last year there were 50
19:0052 million Stealer log packages, and a
19:03Stealer is basically a type of malware
19:05that gets into your device and steals
19:08passwords, private keys, seed phrases,
19:11cookie sessions, files, whatever.
19:1525 million devices infected,
19:17and 98%
19:19of those packages came with usernames,
19:22passwords, and cookies included, right?
19:25So this is super super dangerous.
19:28In the last decade there were many
19:31attempts to fix this thing of what do we
19:34do with these cookies, and we had HTTP
19:36only, unbound encryption, token binding,
19:39risk heuristics. None of this worked.
19:43So what do we do to make those stolen
19:47cookies useless, right? Because
19:48remember, this will happen to all of us,
19:52included myself.
19:53Continue.
19:56There's basically a new technology
19:58developed by Google and Microsoft,
20:00right, called DBSC. And to explain it
20:03simple, what we do here is you log in
20:05into a website. The website gives you a
20:07cookie.
20:09And now in the secure enclave of your
20:11device there will be generated a private
20:14and public key, right? The public key
20:17will be sent to the website, and the
20:18private key will stay stay in the secure
20:21enclave, right?
20:22So now these
20:24that the website will send you are
20:26short-lived cookies for one minute, five
20:28minutes, ten minutes. And when you want
20:30to renew the cookie, right? The website
20:34will require the secure enclave to sign
20:36again.
20:37This means that if the cookie is stolen,
20:40the attacker will open it and if it if
20:44it went by more than one minute, five
20:46minutes, or ten minutes, whatever, they
20:47will have to sign again and if they do
20:50not have access to the physical device,
20:52they will not be able to do it.
20:55Continue.
20:56Continue with one more because I already
20:58explained this.
21:00So what does this this stop, right?
21:03DBSC.
21:05The replay of the stolen cookie, right?
21:07So if my device
21:09is infected and the cookie is stolen and
21:12then is sold, like the market for stolen
21:15cookies is huge, huge,
21:19that will be stopped, right? Because
21:20they steal it from me, they sell it, and
21:22when they get it, this cookie requires
21:25the signature, it doesn't work, useless.
21:28What it does not protect you from is if
21:31your device is still infected, right?
21:33Because you have the attacker inside the
21:35device and they will be able to keep
21:37signing, right? Or to have access to the
21:39new cookie that is being sent to you.
21:42And it obviously does not protect you
21:44from other stuff that can be stolen from
21:46your device, right?
21:47Private keys, seed phrases, API keys,
21:50etc.
21:52So where are we today with DBSC? In
21:55Chrome in Chrome for Windows, it's
21:57public since April, since Chrome
22:01146.
22:03In macOS, it landed on August 2026.
22:08And now it's owned by default in all
22:11Google accounts and Google Workspace
22:13account, right?
22:14Okta is
22:15already doing trials. Firefox declined
22:19to use it. I don't know why, but let's
22:21stop using Firefox Firefox.
22:23Safari is still evaluating. Safari is a
22:26disaster as a browser for OpSec, so I
22:29highly recommend you to not use Safari
22:33ever.
22:34And now the Web3C
22:37is creating an standard for this, right?
22:40Go one more.
22:42But what's the thing here, right?
22:43Because remember that in security we
22:45always know we are never 100% safe. It's
22:48always about adding layers and layers
22:50and layers for what? To make it more
22:52difficult and more expensive to the
22:55attacker, right? So what's the other
22:57layer that we have to add here? EDRs.
22:59And this is a huge problem in our
23:01industry.
23:02We have an industry where
23:05privacy is very important, right? And I
23:07agree, privacy is important, but I see
23:10a huge amount of teams that tell me, oh,
23:12no, no, no, we don't use EDRs. EDRs is a
23:15problem for privacy because
23:18they will be seeing what I do in my
23:19computer and blah blah blah blah blah,
23:20my privacy, my privacy, my privacy. And
23:22then they have their computers infected.
23:25Kim Jong-un has access to to absolutely
23:28everything, and their privacy, where is
23:30it?
23:31So who knows what does it what is an
23:32EDR?
23:34Raise your hand.
23:36Ah, we have an issue.
23:37So an antivirus is the classical tool
23:40that
23:41searches for files that are known
23:44viruses, right? So we know that this
23:45file is a virus because of the
23:47signature. That's it.
23:49Very very easy to bypass today.
23:53An EDR, which stands for endpoint
23:55detection and response, is for example
23:57CrowdStrike or SentinelOne, but the
23:59number one is CrowdStrike by far,
24:03watches behaviors, right? It says, okay,
24:05there's a new process here that is
24:07trying to read the memory from this
24:08other process and connect to this weird
24:11IP, so it will detect most of this stuff
24:14and stop it.
24:15If in this industry we used EDRs, at
24:19least
24:2095% of the attacks that we saw in the
24:23last two years would not have existed,
24:25right?
24:26It's super super
24:28stupid not to do it.
24:30So what's a recommendation for small Web
24:323 teams? Every laptop, every laptop,
24:35unless
24:38it's a super specific laptop only for
24:41signing if you are in very big multisigs
24:44or security councils and you don't have
24:46anything
24:47but signing, every laptop should should
24:51have
24:52an EDR.
24:53As I said, the recommend the recommended
24:55brand is CrowdStrike
24:58and CrowdStrike is super super cheap and
25:00you can buy from one license for you,
25:02right? $150 per year per user, nothing.
25:09It should be managed not do yourself.
25:11That means that there should be someone
25:13watching the alerts, right?
25:16And then obviously the EDR is not the
25:18only thing that you should have. You
25:20should have
25:21good hygiene, right? Good opsec in your
25:23device, macOS properly configured,
25:26separate signing device,
25:30no obviously please no seed phrases and
25:33private keys. It seems to be very basic,
25:36but 25% of people that we audit at
25:39opsec, 25%
25:42stores seed phrases where? In password
25:44managers. And I bet that that 20% of you
25:47still do it.
25:50If you have to do one thing this month,
25:52start using an EDR.
25:54To install it, it takes you literally 30
25:56seconds. You just open the sensor, you
25:59give it permissions to access your full
26:00disk and network and that's it. It's
26:03installed.
26:05Go one more, please.
26:08And then so we said we have
26:12unique passwords, we have YubiKeys
26:14properly configured,
26:16um
26:18we have DBSC, right? To be able to kill
26:22the cookie if it's stolen
26:24and we have an EDR to protect your
26:27device, right?
26:29In case it's infected because again, if
26:31it infects you, if you're infected once
26:33and it's stolen, is one thing. If you
26:34keep on being infected, if you have
26:36persistence, that's a great issue.
26:39In fact, many people The other day I was
26:42talking to a friend and
26:44the guy that hacked me for the first
26:46time when I was 15 years old, he's a
26:48great friend of me now.
26:51And he told me
26:53many people think that they realize that
26:57like
26:58how many time goes by between you get
27:00hacked
27:02and you realize about that, right? And
27:04many people would would think, okay, I
27:06get hacked and 5 minutes later I get my
27:08MetaMask drained, right? But if you
27:11didn't have money in your MetaMask, 6
27:14months, 8 months, 9 months can go by and
27:16you have no idea about this, right?
27:20So this is also another thing that is
27:22very important, right? Every time an
27:24stealer steals data from your device,
27:27that will be first used by that threat
27:30actor specific to target you and to
27:32steal whatever they need, and then this
27:34will be sold in the dark web, right?
27:37So you should be able to monitor, you
27:40should pay for a service that is
27:42monitoring threat actors groups, and the
27:44moment that you see the domain from your
27:47company, the name of an employee, a
27:49phone number, an email, or whatever that
27:51belongs to someone to someone from your
27:53team, you don't go and rotate passwords.
27:56No, you block completely that person
27:58because you know that that that person
28:00was infected.
28:02The thing that you have with this that
28:03is tricky is that
28:06if you really want to be the first one
28:10in knowing when someone from your team
28:12was infected,
28:13who [snorts] should you buy the data
28:16from? The threat actors themselves,
28:17right? So it's kind of tricky, but
28:20it's the way it is.
28:23So let's go one more.
28:26Four layers, as we said, 5 2 plus UBI
28:29keys to secure the login, right? And
28:31this beats phishing. DBSC secures the
28:35session, right? And the cookie replay,
28:38the data that it's stolen.
28:41Remember that this is what happened to
28:43Bybit, right? The developer from Safe
28:46was infected. They stole the session
28:49from Amazon Web Services, the session
28:51cookie, and then all that happened.
28:55Then
28:56uh
28:56layer number three, the EDR to secure
28:59your device, to catch whatever happens,
29:02and after something happens, you will
29:04have evidence to really understand what
29:06happened.
29:07And fourth, monitoring, right? So at as
29:10soon as something as someone from your
29:13organization was infected, you will be
29:15the first one
29:17to know about it. One more.
29:21So five things to remember.
29:24First,
29:26this cookie theft
29:28uh
29:29is the way to bypass MFA, right? And it
29:31works at a scale. This is super super
29:34fast the way it works. It's not manual.
29:36Like when they steal a cookie from you,
29:38a checker will go and try to to replay
29:41it automatically. When it works, it will
29:44pass it on to a to a manual operator.
29:472FA verifies your login, but it never
29:50sees the session, right? It will not
29:51protect it.
29:53DBSC does not hide the cookies, right?
29:56It will only
30:00stop the cookie, the short-lived cookie
30:03from being renewed.
30:05Then the EDR covers what the DBSC
30:08cannot, right?
30:10So remember put it in every device.
30:13Again, this
30:15if if companies in crypto had to do one
30:17thing in this industry that we have,
30:20that is basically a joke,
30:22would be to insert an EDR. That's it.
30:24Only thing that you do today, insert an
30:26EDR.
30:27And then And then one thing connected to
30:30this, many people tell me no no no,
30:31Pablo, no, I will not fall for a
30:33phishing. I bet that for sure nine out
30:35of 10 people here are convinced that
30:38we'll not fall for phishing, and I'll
30:40tell you, you will fall for phishing,
30:42for sure. I don't know if you saw the
30:44last emails from Google that come from
30:46Google, signed by Google, mail by
30:49Google. Everything is from Google, and
30:50they have malicious code injected.
30:53And their thinking many people say, no,
30:55I will not get my device infected. I do
30:57not download so many stuff. Well, go and
30:59check how many processes you have run
31:01you have running and how many
31:04dependencies those processes have. For
31:06sure, we are all going to be infected.
31:08It's just a matter of time in the next
31:10year or two years, for sure.
31:13And then number five, monitor monitor
31:16your domain so you're the first one to
31:18know when someone was infected and go
31:21very fast and block every access that
31:23this person has.
31:25Is there anything else? I think that no.
31:32Thank you.
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