DSS 2026 — 2FA won't save you: dead TOTP and stolen sessions Pablo Sabbatella Source video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=idHJqnHwsAU Automatic captions — not human-reviewed. Complete spoken-audio coverage is unverified. Source language tag: en (English). Source export SHA256: a1563518824238031b15cc145c61ff9d67574b22f8fca395b46d9c375be613a5 [0:01] Hey, hello everyone. How are you? [0:04] So, today we're going to talk about many [0:06] things. We have many slides. [0:08] Uh, [0:09] but we're going to start with 2FA. First [0:11] question, how many of you saw my [0:13] presentation at Dark Mode in February [0:17] about this or similar to this? Not so [0:19] many. Great. [0:21] So let's start with this. [0:28] Uh, [0:29] very briefly about me. If you don't know [0:31] me, I'm the founder of OpSec. I'm a [0:34] member of Security Alliance. I'm a [0:36] signer in Arbitrum, Optimism, Polygon, [0:39] and ENS Security Councils. We froze a [0:42] lot of money from Kim Jong-un two days [0:45] ago. [0:46] And uh, [0:47] I'm also the host for the Blockchain [0:50] Security Series podcast that will come [0:52] back in a few months. [0:54] So let's start talking a bit about 2FA [0:57] and then we'll see why this is super [0:59] super important in our industry today. [1:02] We [1:03] like when we start talking about 2FA, [1:05] the most basic basic thing is mobile [1:08] phone numbers, right? So um, what [1:11] happens if we use mobile phone uh, for [1:14] 2FA? Basically we know SIM swap attacks, [1:17] right? Someone is able to go to the [1:19] telephone company, impersonate us and [1:21] get our uh, [1:23] phone number and access all of our [1:25] codes, hacking our accounts. [1:27] Second method to hack our phones, I [1:30] don't know if you know it, the voicemail [1:32] attack. [1:33] All telephone companies around the world [1:35] have an special phone number where you [1:37] can call to listen to your voicemail and [1:40] the PIN to to listen to your voicemails, [1:42] you know what it is? The last four [1:44] digits of your phone number, right? So [1:48] basically anyone here can listen to [1:50] anyone's voicemail. So instead of [1:52] choosing, hey, I want to receive the [1:53] code via SMS, you receive it through a [1:56] call. It's recorded into a voicemail [1:58] because they do it 4 a.m. while while [2:00] you're sleeping and your Telegram [2:03] account is gone, WhatsApp account is [2:04] gone, Google, banks, etc. [2:08] Third way [2:09] to intercept SMS codes. Every time a [2:12] company sends you an SMS, for example, [2:15] uh [2:15] Apple, they do it through a company [2:17] called Twilio, most of them. [2:20] This company uses lots of [2:22] intermediaries, right? Tier one, tier [2:24] two, and tier three companies. These [2:26] companies have a zero obsec and usually [2:29] their servers are [2:31] with five or six different threat actors [2:34] groups that are seen all the SMS going [2:37] in plain text, right? [2:38] So what we see with this is that [2:40] basically two-FA with phones is a joke, [2:43] right? So what do we learn from this? [2:46] Very easy. Never use your phone number [2:48] anywhere for two-FA. [2:50] You remove your phone number from any [2:52] platform where you can [2:54] and for the few places where you have to [2:56] use it, Apple ID, Signal, Telegram, some [2:59] banks, you have to use a private phone [3:01] number that nobody knows that belongs to [3:04] you or from companies like a Funny that [3:07] make it [3:08] uh [3:09] very very difficult to SIM swap, right? [3:12] What's the best way in my opinion? Just [3:14] ask a friend to get a phone number under [3:16] their name, use it, and don't share it [3:18] with anyone. Know that your phone number [3:21] will be taken over. It's super easy and [3:25] cheap to do it. [3:27] So [3:29] uh two-FA with SMS is so the next [3:32] step is TOTP, right? Time-based one-time [3:36] password. We know all these apps, OATH, [3:38] Google Authenticator, Microsoft [3:39] Authenticator. [3:41] What's the issue with these apps? [3:43] Starting with Google Authenticator, [3:44] first of all, they offer backups in the [3:47] cloud, right? Those backups are not [3:49] encrypted. [3:51] So when they hack your Gmail account, [3:53] what which will happen, they will have [3:55] access to your codes, right? But that [3:58] not that's not the only issue that you [4:00] have to check. [4:02] The also the issue that uh we have is [4:05] the Google ecosystem, right? We use [4:07] Gmail for our emails. We use Chrome for [4:11] our passwords. That's also synchronized [4:12] with our Google account. [4:14] We use Google Authenticator for our 2FA [4:17] also synchronized with our Google [4:19] account. If you have Android, you have [4:20] your passkey synchronized with your [4:22] Google account. So what happens? You [4:25] have your passwords, you have your 2FAs, [4:28] you have uh you have your emails and [4:30] your passkeys synchronized your Google [4:32] account. Your Google account gets [4:33] compromised, you lose absolutely [4:35] everything and you are not going to get [4:38] your Google account back. [4:41] Another very very bad idea is and this [4:44] is done by approximately 30% of people [4:47] in crypto, storing 2FA codes, right? [4:50] Inside password managers. So you have [4:52] one password, Apple passwords, etc. And [4:55] you have your passwords and the 2FA [4:57] together. It's not the 2FA anymore. [5:01] What's the issue? The There are more [5:03] important issue with TOTP codes and I [5:05] will show it easier here. Let's say that [5:08] you receive this [5:10] to your phishing. [5:11] You click on the link, it asks for the [5:13] password, you put the password, it says [5:15] it's wrong, you put it again, you are [5:17] logged in and it asks for the 2FA, [5:19] right? [5:21] So after it asks for the 2FA, [5:24] you enter the 2FA. [5:26] The codes that are generated by these [5:28] apps, Google Authenticator, the [5:29] Microsoft Authenticator, etc. are not [5:31] phishing resistant and we have to know [5:34] all of you have to know that eventually [5:36] you are going to click on a phishing [5:38] link and you are going to enter your [5:39] credentials, right? So these codes are [5:41] not phishing resistant. We cannot uh [5:45] consider to keep using them anymore. [5:49] So what's the thing to do regarding [5:51] this? Hardware authentication, right? [5:53] You all know about this. I am all the [5:55] time talking about these little products [5:57] in X. [5:59] Yubikeys, they can be used in computers, [6:02] in phones. You have to know that at [6:04] least you should have two, and if you [6:06] are here, you should have three, right? [6:08] One, this one, very small, always [6:11] connected to your laptop. [6:13] These are one always in your keychain, [6:16] and the third one backed up at home, [6:18] right? As they cannot be backed up, you [6:21] should [6:22] configure [6:24] all of them in every platform where you [6:26] sign up, right? [6:29] But these devices could be lost, right? [6:32] So what we do, and you'll have the [6:35] slides here because I will publish them, [6:37] is that we will configure them so that [6:40] the pin is always mandatory, right? So [6:42] if one day I lose my YubiKey, it cannot [6:45] be used by anyone because it it requires [6:47] a pin [6:48] like this, right? So you touch it, you [6:51] put the pin, you touch it again, you are [6:52] logged in. [6:54] How do you do to have the pin as [6:58] mandatory? You open the terminal, you [7:01] run Yubico. Here you have the the exact [7:04] commands that you have to do. [7:05] This is a very bad user experience from [7:08] Yubico, but we cannot expect too much [7:10] from them [7:11] aside from making good hardware. [7:13] Um and this way the pin will always be [7:18] required to you, okay? [7:21] So what's the other very good thing [7:23] about these devices is that the login is [7:26] much faster than with Google [7:28] Authenticator, for example, right? You [7:30] have to unlock the phone, open the app, [7:33] put your fingerprint, look for the code, [7:35] copy the code, enter the code. It's lots [7:37] of steps. With these ones, you touch it, [7:39] you put the pin, you touch it again, you [7:41] are logged in. [7:44] Now, something important about YubiKeys. [7:46] YubiKeys have many interfaces, right? [7:49] You have the OTP that is that long code [7:52] that you'll see uh when you touch it, [7:55] and those codes are fishable. [7:58] You have a FIDO2 that is basically to [8:00] have like a passkey inside the YubiKey, [8:03] which is not fishable. You have FIDO2 [8:06] two, which is not fishable. And you have [8:08] OAuth or TOTP that is basically to [8:11] generate these codes inside YubiKeys, [8:13] but are also fishable, right? [8:16] So when you configure them with Yubico [8:18] Manager, you can just disable the um [8:23] the ones that are not safe and just keep [8:26] FIDO U2F and FIDO two. [8:30] So [8:32] OTP codes. [8:33] Maybe it happened to you that you [8:35] touched the YubiKey by mistake and you [8:37] see all that string. Well, those are the [8:40] famous OTP codes. [8:42] The problem with them is that these ones [8:44] are not only [8:46] very easy to fish, but the same code, if [8:50] you if you have registered your YubiKey [8:52] with this in three different websites, [8:54] one website can steal it and it can be [8:56] replayed in another website, right? They [8:58] are super super unsafe. So we do not [9:03] recommend this at all. [9:05] Um [9:08] so then you have OAuth or OTP codes, [9:11] right? [9:12] This is can you can you like [9:15] put it so that it's [9:18] yeah. Okay, thank you. [9:21] With with these codes, what you do is to [9:23] basically configure the traditional [9:26] Google Authenticator or OAuth codes, but [9:28] inside YubiKeys, right? So this is not [9:31] phishing resistant, but at least they [9:33] will not be able to steal it from the [9:35] cloud, right? [9:36] So you can configure it like this and [9:39] then you generate the codes inside [9:40] there. But let's go to the more [9:42] interesting ones. FIDO U2F, right? [9:47] So FIDO U2F is the first one from Yubico [9:49] that [9:51] is phishing resistant, right? Because it [9:53] checks who is requesting this code. So [9:56] the day that you get into a phishing [9:57] website and you enter your credentials [10:00] and the two-factor is required, this [10:02] will not this will not work, so you'll [10:05] you will be protected, right? [10:07] What's the issue with this? That no pin [10:09] is needed by default, right? So we have [10:12] codes that are fishing resistant, but no [10:14] pin needed, so if your YubiKey is [10:15] stolen, it's useless. [10:18] But as we were seeing, it's always [10:21] checking that the website that is [10:23] requesting the code is the real website. [10:25] If it's not a real website, it will not [10:27] send the code. [10:30] So then we had passkeys, right? A good [10:33] idea, but implemented like like [10:36] always. [10:37] So passkeys are 10x better than [10:39] passwords, right? They cannot be fished. [10:42] They should not be able to be shared. [10:45] They cannot be repeated. [10:47] They should not be stolen from the [10:49] user's device. [10:51] And definitely they cannot be stolen [10:52] from the service where you signed up, [10:54] right? Because if you signed up to [10:55] Coinbase and you put the password in [10:57] Coinbase, then Coinbase gets hacked, [11:00] your password is in the dark web, right? [11:02] It it doesn't happen with this. [11:05] So how does it work? In every service [11:07] where you sign up, there's a private key [11:10] and public key generated in the secure [11:12] enclave of your device. The public key [11:14] is stored by the website or the platform [11:16] and the private key in your secure in [11:18] your secure enclave. Every time you want [11:21] to log in, you do a biometric. This is [11:23] this unencrypts the private key from [11:26] your secure enclave. It signs a message [11:28] and the platform identifies you, right? [11:32] So [11:33] then [11:35] again, passkeys were designed to be [11:37] stored where? In secure enclaves, right? [11:39] But the industry had a great idea of [11:42] synchronizing them, right? with your [11:44] iCloud, [11:46] your Google account, or your password [11:47] manager, right? So this is now in the [11:51] cloud and hacking an an iCloud account, [11:53] a Google account, or a password manager, [11:56] depending on your opsec, it could be [11:58] pretty easy. So [12:00] it's not a good idea anymore. [12:02] As we can see here, Apple wants to save [12:05] your passkeys. [12:07] One Password also likes saving your [12:09] passkeys. [12:11] And after all, why shouldn't we keep it, [12:14] right? [12:15] So, [12:16] what's the other issue with this type of [12:18] passkeys? Many platforms, like X [12:22] and Google treat passkeys as both the [12:25] first and second factor, right? And this [12:27] is super super dangerous. [12:29] So, if you check in your Google account, [12:32] you will [12:34] if you check in your Google account, you [12:35] will see that you have an option called [12:37] skip password when possible. You should [12:39] always disable that [12:41] because if not, that means that someone [12:43] gets access to your iCloud account, they [12:45] have your passkey [12:47] and with that they access your account [12:49] with nothing nothing else. [12:52] So, [12:56] uh [12:59] there we go. [13:00] As we said, [13:02] passkeys, the ones that are um [13:06] that can be synchronized [13:07] can be stolen from the can be stolen [13:09] from the cloud, but cannot be phished, [13:12] right? If we use FIDO U2F, they cannot [13:16] be stolen [13:17] stolen from the cloud, they cannot be [13:19] phished, but they do not enforce a PIN, [13:21] right? Which passkeys do. [13:24] And the UVC OTP codes, they cannot be [13:26] stolen from the cloud, but they can be [13:27] phished. So, there's no good solution, [13:29] right? [13:33] This doesn't seem to be working. [13:35] So, what is the solution? [13:42] FIDO 2 plus UbiKeys. [13:48] Go one more. [13:50] So, what is this? It's basically saving [13:53] your passkeys inside the UbiKey, right? [13:56] In this way, you have phishing [13:57] resistance and the codes are not stored [14:00] in the cloud, right? And then you have a [14:02] PIN that that protects the UbiKey from [14:04] any physical attack [14:06] and it's required every time you want to [14:08] use it, right? Every time you touch it. [14:12] Um so, with FIDO 2, with the PIN in [14:15] force, right? You combine three factors. [14:18] Something that you know, your password, [14:21] something that you have, the Yubikey, [14:22] and something that you know from the [14:25] physical device that is a PIN. So, even [14:27] if someone steals it, [14:29] it cannot be used. [14:31] Let's continue. [14:33] If you Something that is also very [14:35] important, because the problem with [14:37] Yubikeys is that how they are [14:39] implemented by different platforms is a [14:41] disaster, [14:43] is that if you go, for example, to your [14:45] Google account and you say, okay, I'm [14:46] going to configure this, you would say [14:49] you have two options, create a passkey [14:50] or use a security key, right? What would [14:53] you do? Use a security key, right? [14:54] Because you have a security key. No. [14:56] You have to choose create a passkey and [14:59] then the option use on our device. [15:02] Continue. [15:05] Then click on USB security key, you put [15:07] your PIN, you save it, and that's it. [15:11] So, continue. One more, please. [15:14] This is how Yubikeys look at Google [15:17] Authenticator users, just pathetic. [15:20] Continue with one more. So, the [15:23] conclusions for this part, right? Mobile [15:25] phone number we always we obviously see [15:27] that is a no-go route, right? [15:31] Cloud-based OTP, they can be stolen from [15:33] the cloud, so and they are not phishing [15:35] resistant, so useless. Yubikey OTP codes [15:39] cannot be stored from the cloud but are [15:40] not phishing resistant, useless. [15:43] OTP cannot be stolen from the cloud but [15:45] are not phishing resistant, also no. [15:48] FIDO U2F phishing resistant but that [15:50] does not require a PIN. Synchronized [15:52] passkeys can be stored from the stolen [15:53] from the cloud, so also useless. [15:56] And FIDO U2 FIDO 2 in hardware devices [16:00] is basically the only way to do 2FA safe [16:04] in my opinion. [16:06] One very important thing whenever you do [16:08] this is that you should always save the [16:11] backup codes for your accounts in paper, [16:14] right? Or in an encrypted drive, never [16:16] in a password manager. [16:18] So, with this, we were Go back, please. [16:23] We were able to protect our accounts, [16:26] right? The login. So now the accounts [16:27] are safe, right? [16:30] Please, continue. [16:33] No way. They are not safe. [16:36] What do you think that these hacks have [16:38] in common? Binance, Bybit, and Ronin, [16:41] and many, many, many more. [16:44] What's the common thing here? [16:45] It's pretty easy, right? [16:47] Continue. It's EPRK. [16:49] It's EPRK. Continue. But not only the [16:52] EPRK, right? That's not the only thing [16:54] in common. Continue with one more. [16:57] Nearly nine out of 10 attacks in crypto [17:00] start with a very stupid thing, and that [17:03] is a developer laptop infected, right? [17:06] They start with this. Then someone that [17:08] that is far better than the guy that did [17:10] the social engineering for this starts [17:12] moving laterally, gaining more [17:14] privilege, etc., that is more advanced, [17:16] but it always starts with the same [17:18] thing. [17:20] So now we're going to see what happens [17:21] when you protect the login, right? So we [17:23] protected the login with YubiKeys, [17:25] passwords, PIN, YubiKeys, and blah blah [17:27] blah blah blah, but the real threat is [17:29] here, stolen cookies. [17:31] Continue, please. [17:33] So a cookie is basically like a door [17:36] key, right? Not an ID card. Whenever you [17:39] log into a website, that website [17:42] gives you gives your browser a cookie, [17:45] and every time you want to log in or you [17:48] want to request something, [17:50] it sends that cookie, and the website [17:51] says, okay, it's you. [17:53] Continue. [17:56] So what happens? [17:58] What always happens? Some developer, [18:00] some founder, whatever, downloads some [18:03] malware, and this will happen to all of [18:05] us. All of us, all of us here, everyone [18:08] in this room in the next three years, we [18:10] are going to get malware in our devices. [18:13] It's inevitable. [18:15] That malware will steal the cookie, and [18:17] after the cookie is stolen, the cookie [18:19] will be imported into the device from [18:22] the attacker, and the attacker we will [18:24] will basically replay it, and now they [18:26] will just open your session, right? [18:30] So we basically [18:31] the password, MFA, device check, risk [18:34] engine, and we have the cookie, and the [18:37] guy, the attacker starts here, right? [18:39] They start at the finish line. They have [18:41] this. All of that doesn't matter. [18:43] Continue with one more. [18:46] And this is an industry that is growing [18:48] a lot. These numbers are from are from [18:50] last year, and I bet that this year it [18:52] would it will be like at least 3x [18:56] this. [18:57] Last year there were 50 [19:00] 52 million Stealer log packages, and a [19:03] Stealer is basically a type of malware [19:05] that gets into your device and steals [19:08] passwords, private keys, seed phrases, [19:11] cookie sessions, files, whatever. [19:15] 25 million devices infected, [19:17] and 98% [19:19] of those packages came with usernames, [19:22] passwords, and cookies included, right? [19:25] So this is super super dangerous. [19:28] In the last decade there were many [19:31] attempts to fix this thing of what do we [19:34] do with these cookies, and we had HTTP [19:36] only, unbound encryption, token binding, [19:39] risk heuristics. None of this worked. [19:43] So what do we do to make those stolen [19:47] cookies useless, right? Because [19:48] remember, this will happen to all of us, [19:52] included myself. [19:53] Continue. [19:56] There's basically a new technology [19:58] developed by Google and Microsoft, [20:00] right, called DBSC. And to explain it [20:03] simple, what we do here is you log in [20:05] into a website. The website gives you a [20:07] cookie. [20:09] And now in the secure enclave of your [20:11] device there will be generated a private [20:14] and public key, right? The public key [20:17] will be sent to the website, and the [20:18] private key will stay stay in the secure [20:21] enclave, right? [20:22] So now these [20:24] that the website will send you are [20:26] short-lived cookies for one minute, five [20:28] minutes, ten minutes. And when you want [20:30] to renew the cookie, right? The website [20:34] will require the secure enclave to sign [20:36] again. [20:37] This means that if the cookie is stolen, [20:40] the attacker will open it and if it if [20:44] it went by more than one minute, five [20:46] minutes, or ten minutes, whatever, they [20:47] will have to sign again and if they do [20:50] not have access to the physical device, [20:52] they will not be able to do it. [20:55] Continue. [20:56] Continue with one more because I already [20:58] explained this. [21:00] So what does this this stop, right? [21:03] DBSC. [21:05] The replay of the stolen cookie, right? [21:07] So if my device [21:09] is infected and the cookie is stolen and [21:12] then is sold, like the market for stolen [21:15] cookies is huge, huge, [21:19] that will be stopped, right? Because [21:20] they steal it from me, they sell it, and [21:22] when they get it, this cookie requires [21:25] the signature, it doesn't work, useless. [21:28] What it does not protect you from is if [21:31] your device is still infected, right? [21:33] Because you have the attacker inside the [21:35] device and they will be able to keep [21:37] signing, right? Or to have access to the [21:39] new cookie that is being sent to you. [21:42] And it obviously does not protect you [21:44] from other stuff that can be stolen from [21:46] your device, right? [21:47] Private keys, seed phrases, API keys, [21:50] etc. [21:52] So where are we today with DBSC? In [21:55] Chrome in Chrome for Windows, it's [21:57] public since April, since Chrome [22:01] 146. [22:03] In macOS, it landed on August 2026. [22:08] And now it's owned by default in all [22:11] Google accounts and Google Workspace [22:13] account, right? [22:14] Okta is [22:15] already doing trials. Firefox declined [22:19] to use it. I don't know why, but let's [22:21] stop using Firefox Firefox. [22:23] Safari is still evaluating. Safari is a [22:26] disaster as a browser for OpSec, so I [22:29] highly recommend you to not use Safari [22:33] ever. [22:34] And now the Web3C [22:37] is creating an standard for this, right? [22:40] Go one more. [22:42] But what's the thing here, right? [22:43] Because remember that in security we [22:45] always know we are never 100% safe. It's [22:48] always about adding layers and layers [22:50] and layers for what? To make it more [22:52] difficult and more expensive to the [22:55] attacker, right? So what's the other [22:57] layer that we have to add here? EDRs. [22:59] And this is a huge problem in our [23:01] industry. [23:02] We have an industry where [23:05] privacy is very important, right? And I [23:07] agree, privacy is important, but I see [23:10] a huge amount of teams that tell me, oh, [23:12] no, no, no, we don't use EDRs. EDRs is a [23:15] problem for privacy because [23:18] they will be seeing what I do in my [23:19] computer and blah blah blah blah blah, [23:20] my privacy, my privacy, my privacy. And [23:22] then they have their computers infected. [23:25] Kim Jong-un has access to to absolutely [23:28] everything, and their privacy, where is [23:30] it? [23:31] So who knows what does it what is an [23:32] EDR? [23:34] Raise your hand. [23:36] Ah, we have an issue. [23:37] So an antivirus is the classical tool [23:40] that [23:41] searches for files that are known [23:44] viruses, right? So we know that this [23:45] file is a virus because of the [23:47] signature. That's it. [23:49] Very very easy to bypass today. [23:53] An EDR, which stands for endpoint [23:55] detection and response, is for example [23:57] CrowdStrike or SentinelOne, but the [23:59] number one is CrowdStrike by far, [24:03] watches behaviors, right? It says, okay, [24:05] there's a new process here that is [24:07] trying to read the memory from this [24:08] other process and connect to this weird [24:11] IP, so it will detect most of this stuff [24:14] and stop it. [24:15] If in this industry we used EDRs, at [24:19] least [24:20] 95% of the attacks that we saw in the [24:23] last two years would not have existed, [24:25] right? [24:26] It's super super [24:28] stupid not to do it. [24:30] So what's a recommendation for small Web [24:32] 3 teams? Every laptop, every laptop, [24:35] unless [24:38] it's a super specific laptop only for [24:41] signing if you are in very big multisigs [24:44] or security councils and you don't have [24:46] anything [24:47] but signing, every laptop should should [24:51] have [24:52] an EDR. [24:53] As I said, the recommend the recommended [24:55] brand is CrowdStrike [24:58] and CrowdStrike is super super cheap and [25:00] you can buy from one license for you, [25:02] right? $150 per year per user, nothing. [25:09] It should be managed not do yourself. [25:11] That means that there should be someone [25:13] watching the alerts, right? [25:16] And then obviously the EDR is not the [25:18] only thing that you should have. You [25:20] should have [25:21] good hygiene, right? Good opsec in your [25:23] device, macOS properly configured, [25:26] separate signing device, [25:30] no obviously please no seed phrases and [25:33] private keys. It seems to be very basic, [25:36] but 25% of people that we audit at [25:39] opsec, 25% [25:42] stores seed phrases where? In password [25:44] managers. And I bet that that 20% of you [25:47] still do it. [25:50] If you have to do one thing this month, [25:52] start using an EDR. [25:54] To install it, it takes you literally 30 [25:56] seconds. You just open the sensor, you [25:59] give it permissions to access your full [26:00] disk and network and that's it. It's [26:03] installed. [26:05] Go one more, please. [26:08] And then so we said we have [26:12] unique passwords, we have YubiKeys [26:14] properly configured, [26:16] um [26:18] we have DBSC, right? To be able to kill [26:22] the cookie if it's stolen [26:24] and we have an EDR to protect your [26:27] device, right? [26:29] In case it's infected because again, if [26:31] it infects you, if you're infected once [26:33] and it's stolen, is one thing. If you [26:34] keep on being infected, if you have [26:36] persistence, that's a great issue. [26:39] In fact, many people The other day I was [26:42] talking to a friend and [26:44] the guy that hacked me for the first [26:46] time when I was 15 years old, he's a [26:48] great friend of me now. [26:51] And he told me [26:53] many people think that they realize that [26:57] like [26:58] how many time goes by between you get [27:00] hacked [27:02] and you realize about that, right? And [27:04] many people would would think, okay, I [27:06] get hacked and 5 minutes later I get my [27:08] MetaMask drained, right? But if you [27:11] didn't have money in your MetaMask, 6 [27:14] months, 8 months, 9 months can go by and [27:16] you have no idea about this, right? [27:20] So this is also another thing that is [27:22] very important, right? Every time an [27:24] stealer steals data from your device, [27:27] that will be first used by that threat [27:30] actor specific to target you and to [27:32] steal whatever they need, and then this [27:34] will be sold in the dark web, right? [27:37] So you should be able to monitor, you [27:40] should pay for a service that is [27:42] monitoring threat actors groups, and the [27:44] moment that you see the domain from your [27:47] company, the name of an employee, a [27:49] phone number, an email, or whatever that [27:51] belongs to someone to someone from your [27:53] team, you don't go and rotate passwords. [27:56] No, you block completely that person [27:58] because you know that that that person [28:00] was infected. [28:02] The thing that you have with this that [28:03] is tricky is that [28:06] if you really want to be the first one [28:10] in knowing when someone from your team [28:12] was infected, [28:13] who [snorts] should you buy the data [28:16] from? The threat actors themselves, [28:17] right? So it's kind of tricky, but [28:20] it's the way it is. [28:23] So let's go one more. [28:26] Four layers, as we said, 5 2 plus UBI [28:29] keys to secure the login, right? And [28:31] this beats phishing. DBSC secures the [28:35] session, right? And the cookie replay, [28:38] the data that it's stolen. [28:41] Remember that this is what happened to [28:43] Bybit, right? The developer from Safe [28:46] was infected. They stole the session [28:49] from Amazon Web Services, the session [28:51] cookie, and then all that happened. [28:55] Then [28:56] uh [28:56] layer number three, the EDR to secure [28:59] your device, to catch whatever happens, [29:02] and after something happens, you will [29:04] have evidence to really understand what [29:06] happened. [29:07] And fourth, monitoring, right? So at as [29:10] soon as something as someone from your [29:13] organization was infected, you will be [29:15] the first one [29:17] to know about it. One more. [29:21] So five things to remember. [29:24] First, [29:26] this cookie theft [29:28] uh [29:29] is the way to bypass MFA, right? And it [29:31] works at a scale. This is super super [29:34] fast the way it works. It's not manual. [29:36] Like when they steal a cookie from you, [29:38] a checker will go and try to to replay [29:41] it automatically. When it works, it will [29:44] pass it on to a to a manual operator. [29:47] 2FA verifies your login, but it never [29:50] sees the session, right? It will not [29:51] protect it. [29:53] DBSC does not hide the cookies, right? [29:56] It will only [30:00] stop the cookie, the short-lived cookie [30:03] from being renewed. [30:05] Then the EDR covers what the DBSC [30:08] cannot, right? [30:10] So remember put it in every device. [30:13] Again, this [30:15] if if companies in crypto had to do one [30:17] thing in this industry that we have, [30:20] that is basically a joke, [30:22] would be to insert an EDR. That's it. [30:24] Only thing that you do today, insert an [30:26] EDR. [30:27] And then And then one thing connected to [30:30] this, many people tell me no no no, [30:31] Pablo, no, I will not fall for a [30:33] phishing. I bet that for sure nine out [30:35] of 10 people here are convinced that [30:38] we'll not fall for phishing, and I'll [30:40] tell you, you will fall for phishing, [30:42] for sure. I don't know if you saw the [30:44] last emails from Google that come from [30:46] Google, signed by Google, mail by [30:49] Google. Everything is from Google, and [30:50] they have malicious code injected. [30:53] And their thinking many people say, no, [30:55] I will not get my device infected. I do [30:57] not download so many stuff. Well, go and [30:59] check how many processes you have run [31:01] you have running and how many [31:04] dependencies those processes have. For [31:06] sure, we are all going to be infected. [31:08] It's just a matter of time in the next [31:10] year or two years, for sure. [31:13] And then number five, monitor monitor [31:16] your domain so you're the first one to [31:18] know when someone was infected and go [31:21] very fast and block every access that [31:23] this person has. [31:25] Is there anything else? I think that no. [31:32] Thank you.