DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall

Your Protocol Is Audited. Your RPC Isn't.

Ofir Eliasi

5:40 · Recording

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Transcript

0:01Hello everyone. I'm definitely not going

0:03to make it on five minutes, but I will

0:05do my best.

0:06My message is very clear. Um,

0:09watch your RPC.

0:11We all know when we build a protocol um

0:13that is uh

0:15you mostly cover two elements. One

0:18is the off-chain stack, your wallets,

0:20your your uh infra,

0:22your servers off-chain and so on. You

0:25have standards for that, you have

0:26monitoring and everything is like fully

0:28audited.

0:30On the other side, you have contracts

0:31that are put we put a lot of effort in

0:33order to make uh solid, minimal, and of

0:36course well defined and secured. What

0:39but what most people are not or most

0:41teams are not covering properly

0:43is the middle between them, is the RPC.

0:46Um, and when I'm when I'm saying RPC,

0:49I'm talking about actually

0:51what RPC

0:53actually uh um

0:56connect you

0:57as a protocol, as as the users have the

1:00ability to uh to get an access

1:03to your to your contract. So the idea is

1:05like the channel through your uh

1:08protocol goes through the RPC. What does

1:10it mean?

1:14Um, so RPC access is actually the way to

1:20get into the blockchain. We all know

1:21that that's very clear, but

1:24the question is like who runs your RPC,

1:26who's in charge for that, and what this

1:29RPC on his way to the users

1:32uh get. And there are four main ways to

1:35cover or like to cheat when it comes to

1:37RPC. And of course RPC is a is a data

1:41layer, actually provides data when you

1:43read it.

1:44And on that case, there are four ways to

1:46deal with that.

1:48One is actually uh to lie. RPC can lie.

1:51Uh it means that it can provide a data

1:54that is actually uh wrong. It can be

1:57like fully to everybody and it can can

2:00when targeting specific

2:02um

2:03consumer. So we saw in the past like

2:06uh uh cases where everybody got the

2:09right data, but someone gets exactly

2:12what the attacker want to do,

2:15want want [snorts] him to have. Other

2:16way to deal with the other way to fake

2:19or to hack an RPC is to actually like to

2:22get some details out of it to have like

2:24data that is not confirmed and on that

2:27case still have the ability to

2:29manipulate.

2:30Omit

2:31when again you have the ability to

2:35to get something

2:38out of the the RPC that is actually

2:40twisted. And the last one is drop is to

2:43actually stop the stop the RPC, fail. It

2:47can be a silent failure or can be

2:51a failure that is with an error that you

2:54get something that is that the user saw

2:57as a failure.

2:58Okay?

3:00But like very very shortly how RPC can

3:04be attacked. So we saw again in the past

3:06many cases, most of them dealing with

3:10getting into the machines assuming that

3:13you are not the only one that runs your

3:15RPC and you have couple and it's it's

3:18enough to get into your machine and

3:20switch the code and on that case this

3:22RPC no longer provides

3:25data that is

3:27that is that is real.

3:29Other way to deal with that, other way

3:31to do that is also to to DDoS or

3:34[snorts] to fake data around in a way

3:36that the the the quorum is actually

3:39getting the the wrong answers. So

3:44fast forward

3:45what people should be care about when

3:47they

3:48when they put an RPC and when they build

3:51a protocol and and when they read data

3:53from that RPC is first is actually what

3:57data is being consumed

4:00and where this data makes an impact

4:02Because if you're a bridge, for example,

4:05and you read the data from from chain A

4:08and that makes you

4:09deploy money or to transfer money into

4:12chain B, then on that case you

4:14definitely need to make sure that you're

4:15reading properly.

4:17The awesome data that you could read and

4:18like the impact is like meaningful or

4:20like minimal, but uh and of course that

4:23that will be covered differently.

4:25Second, who is reading? You have roles,

4:27you have titles on the on your system,

4:28on your protocol, on your product.

4:31Uh the idea is to defer the ones that

4:34actually take actions from the one that

4:36like mostly do reading for other

4:38purposes that are not that important.

4:41And three

4:42uh and most important is where from do

4:44you read the data? Is it public RPC? Is

4:47it your own? Is it as a service RPC or

4:51something else?

4:52The idea is that each one of them

4:54probably has its own issues. Running

4:57your own definitely uh to protect it can

4:59be like a challenge.

5:01And of course

5:02uh trusting others can be also like a

5:04different challenge from different

5:05aspect, but still uh can be

5:08uh manipulated. And maybe the last thing

5:11to to mention over here is that RPCs

5:15also can be

5:16uh manipulated

5:18um in the way on the communication way

5:20from the RPC itself to the user on the

5:22DNS, on the network channel. and that's

5:26something that we also need to make sure

5:28that is covered.

5:31No time for questions and of course um

5:35and I guess that's mostly it. Thank you.

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