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  "title": "Your Protocol Is Audited. Your RPC Isn't.",
  "speakerCredit": "Ofir Eliasi",
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    {
      "index": 0,
      "start_seconds": 1,
      "source_timestamp": "0:01",
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      "text": "Hello everyone. I'm definitely not going"
    },
    {
      "index": 1,
      "start_seconds": 3,
      "source_timestamp": "0:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to make it on five minutes, but I will"
    },
    {
      "index": 2,
      "start_seconds": 5,
      "source_timestamp": "0:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "do my best."
    },
    {
      "index": 3,
      "start_seconds": 6,
      "source_timestamp": "0:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "My message is very clear. Um,"
    },
    {
      "index": 4,
      "start_seconds": 9,
      "source_timestamp": "0:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "watch your RPC."
    },
    {
      "index": 5,
      "start_seconds": 11,
      "source_timestamp": "0:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "We all know when we build a protocol um"
    },
    {
      "index": 6,
      "start_seconds": 13,
      "source_timestamp": "0:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that is uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 7,
      "start_seconds": 15,
      "source_timestamp": "0:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you mostly cover two elements. One"
    },
    {
      "index": 8,
      "start_seconds": 18,
      "source_timestamp": "0:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is the off-chain stack, your wallets,"
    },
    {
      "index": 9,
      "start_seconds": 20,
      "source_timestamp": "0:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "your your uh infra,"
    },
    {
      "index": 10,
      "start_seconds": 22,
      "source_timestamp": "0:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "your servers off-chain and so on. You"
    },
    {
      "index": 11,
      "start_seconds": 25,
      "source_timestamp": "0:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "have standards for that, you have"
    },
    {
      "index": 12,
      "start_seconds": 26,
      "source_timestamp": "0:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "monitoring and everything is like fully"
    },
    {
      "index": 13,
      "start_seconds": 28,
      "source_timestamp": "0:28",
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      "text": "audited."
    },
    {
      "index": 14,
      "start_seconds": 30,
      "source_timestamp": "0:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "On the other side, you have contracts"
    },
    {
      "index": 15,
      "start_seconds": 31,
      "source_timestamp": "0:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that are put we put a lot of effort in"
    },
    {
      "index": 16,
      "start_seconds": 33,
      "source_timestamp": "0:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "order to make uh solid, minimal, and of"
    },
    {
      "index": 17,
      "start_seconds": 36,
      "source_timestamp": "0:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "course well defined and secured. What"
    },
    {
      "index": 18,
      "start_seconds": 39,
      "source_timestamp": "0:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "but what most people are not or most"
    },
    {
      "index": 19,
      "start_seconds": 41,
      "source_timestamp": "0:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "teams are not covering properly"
    },
    {
      "index": 20,
      "start_seconds": 43,
      "source_timestamp": "0:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is the middle between them, is the RPC."
    },
    {
      "index": 21,
      "start_seconds": 46,
      "source_timestamp": "0:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Um, and when I'm when I'm saying RPC,"
    },
    {
      "index": 22,
      "start_seconds": 49,
      "source_timestamp": "0:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "I'm talking about actually"
    },
    {
      "index": 23,
      "start_seconds": 51,
      "source_timestamp": "0:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "what RPC"
    },
    {
      "index": 24,
      "start_seconds": 53,
      "source_timestamp": "0:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "actually uh um"
    },
    {
      "index": 25,
      "start_seconds": 56,
      "source_timestamp": "0:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "connect you"
    },
    {
      "index": 26,
      "start_seconds": 57,
      "source_timestamp": "0:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "as a protocol, as as the users have the"
    },
    {
      "index": 27,
      "start_seconds": 60,
      "source_timestamp": "1:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "ability to uh to get an access"
    },
    {
      "index": 28,
      "start_seconds": 63,
      "source_timestamp": "1:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to your to your contract. So the idea is"
    },
    {
      "index": 29,
      "start_seconds": 65,
      "source_timestamp": "1:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "like the channel through your uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 30,
      "start_seconds": 68,
      "source_timestamp": "1:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "protocol goes through the RPC. What does"
    },
    {
      "index": 31,
      "start_seconds": 70,
      "source_timestamp": "1:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it mean?"
    },
    {
      "index": 32,
      "start_seconds": 74,
      "source_timestamp": "1:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Um, so RPC access is actually the way to"
    },
    {
      "index": 33,
      "start_seconds": 80,
      "source_timestamp": "1:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "get into the blockchain. We all know"
    },
    {
      "index": 34,
      "start_seconds": 81,
      "source_timestamp": "1:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that that's very clear, but"
    },
    {
      "index": 35,
      "start_seconds": 84,
      "source_timestamp": "1:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the question is like who runs your RPC,"
    },
    {
      "index": 36,
      "start_seconds": 86,
      "source_timestamp": "1:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "who's in charge for that, and what this"
    },
    {
      "index": 37,
      "start_seconds": 89,
      "source_timestamp": "1:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "RPC on his way to the users"
    },
    {
      "index": 38,
      "start_seconds": 92,
      "source_timestamp": "1:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh get. And there are four main ways to"
    },
    {
      "index": 39,
      "start_seconds": 95,
      "source_timestamp": "1:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "cover or like to cheat when it comes to"
    },
    {
      "index": 40,
      "start_seconds": 97,
      "source_timestamp": "1:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "RPC. And of course RPC is a is a data"
    },
    {
      "index": 41,
      "start_seconds": 101,
      "source_timestamp": "1:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "layer, actually provides data when you"
    },
    {
      "index": 42,
      "start_seconds": 103,
      "source_timestamp": "1:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "read it."
    },
    {
      "index": 43,
      "start_seconds": 104,
      "source_timestamp": "1:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And on that case, there are four ways to"
    },
    {
      "index": 44,
      "start_seconds": 106,
      "source_timestamp": "1:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "deal with that."
    },
    {
      "index": 45,
      "start_seconds": 108,
      "source_timestamp": "1:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "One is actually uh to lie. RPC can lie."
    },
    {
      "index": 46,
      "start_seconds": 111,
      "source_timestamp": "1:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Uh it means that it can provide a data"
    },
    {
      "index": 47,
      "start_seconds": 114,
      "source_timestamp": "1:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that is actually uh wrong. It can be"
    },
    {
      "index": 48,
      "start_seconds": 117,
      "source_timestamp": "1:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "like fully to everybody and it can can"
    },
    {
      "index": 49,
      "start_seconds": 120,
      "source_timestamp": "2:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "when targeting specific"
    },
    {
      "index": 50,
      "start_seconds": 122,
      "source_timestamp": "2:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "um"
    },
    {
      "index": 51,
      "start_seconds": 123,
      "source_timestamp": "2:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "consumer. So we saw in the past like"
    },
    {
      "index": 52,
      "start_seconds": 126,
      "source_timestamp": "2:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh uh cases where everybody got the"
    },
    {
      "index": 53,
      "start_seconds": 129,
      "source_timestamp": "2:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "right data, but someone gets exactly"
    },
    {
      "index": 54,
      "start_seconds": 132,
      "source_timestamp": "2:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "what the attacker want to do,"
    },
    {
      "index": 55,
      "start_seconds": 135,
      "source_timestamp": "2:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "want want [snorts] him to have. Other"
    },
    {
      "index": 56,
      "start_seconds": 136,
      "source_timestamp": "2:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "way to deal with the other way to fake"
    },
    {
      "index": 57,
      "start_seconds": 139,
      "source_timestamp": "2:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "or to hack an RPC is to actually like to"
    },
    {
      "index": 58,
      "start_seconds": 142,
      "source_timestamp": "2:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "get some details out of it to have like"
    },
    {
      "index": 59,
      "start_seconds": 144,
      "source_timestamp": "2:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "data that is not confirmed and on that"
    },
    {
      "index": 60,
      "start_seconds": 147,
      "source_timestamp": "2:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "case still have the ability to"
    },
    {
      "index": 61,
      "start_seconds": 149,
      "source_timestamp": "2:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "manipulate."
    },
    {
      "index": 62,
      "start_seconds": 150,
      "source_timestamp": "2:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Omit"
    },
    {
      "index": 63,
      "start_seconds": 151,
      "source_timestamp": "2:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "when again you have the ability to"
    },
    {
      "index": 64,
      "start_seconds": 155,
      "source_timestamp": "2:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to get something"
    },
    {
      "index": 65,
      "start_seconds": 158,
      "source_timestamp": "2:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "out of the the RPC that is actually"
    },
    {
      "index": 66,
      "start_seconds": 160,
      "source_timestamp": "2:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "twisted. And the last one is drop is to"
    },
    {
      "index": 67,
      "start_seconds": 163,
      "source_timestamp": "2:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "actually stop the stop the RPC, fail. It"
    },
    {
      "index": 68,
      "start_seconds": 167,
      "source_timestamp": "2:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "can be a silent failure or can be"
    },
    {
      "index": 69,
      "start_seconds": 171,
      "source_timestamp": "2:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "a failure that is with an error that you"
    },
    {
      "index": 70,
      "start_seconds": 174,
      "source_timestamp": "2:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "get something that is that the user saw"
    },
    {
      "index": 71,
      "start_seconds": 177,
      "source_timestamp": "2:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "as a failure."
    },
    {
      "index": 72,
      "start_seconds": 178,
      "source_timestamp": "2:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Okay?"
    },
    {
      "index": 73,
      "start_seconds": 180,
      "source_timestamp": "3:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "But like very very shortly how RPC can"
    },
    {
      "index": 74,
      "start_seconds": 184,
      "source_timestamp": "3:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "be attacked. So we saw again in the past"
    },
    {
      "index": 75,
      "start_seconds": 186,
      "source_timestamp": "3:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "many cases, most of them dealing with"
    },
    {
      "index": 76,
      "start_seconds": 190,
      "source_timestamp": "3:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "getting into the machines assuming that"
    },
    {
      "index": 77,
      "start_seconds": 193,
      "source_timestamp": "3:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you are not the only one that runs your"
    },
    {
      "index": 78,
      "start_seconds": 195,
      "source_timestamp": "3:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "RPC and you have couple and it's it's"
    },
    {
      "index": 79,
      "start_seconds": 198,
      "source_timestamp": "3:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "enough to get into your machine and"
    },
    {
      "index": 80,
      "start_seconds": 200,
      "source_timestamp": "3:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "switch the code and on that case this"
    },
    {
      "index": 81,
      "start_seconds": 202,
      "source_timestamp": "3:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "RPC no longer provides"
    },
    {
      "index": 82,
      "start_seconds": 205,
      "source_timestamp": "3:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "data that is"
    },
    {
      "index": 83,
      "start_seconds": 207,
      "source_timestamp": "3:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that is that is real."
    },
    {
      "index": 84,
      "start_seconds": 209,
      "source_timestamp": "3:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Other way to deal with that, other way"
    },
    {
      "index": 85,
      "start_seconds": 211,
      "source_timestamp": "3:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to do that is also to to DDoS or"
    },
    {
      "index": 86,
      "start_seconds": 214,
      "source_timestamp": "3:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "[snorts] to fake data around in a way"
    },
    {
      "index": 87,
      "start_seconds": 216,
      "source_timestamp": "3:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that the the the quorum is actually"
    },
    {
      "index": 88,
      "start_seconds": 219,
      "source_timestamp": "3:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "getting the the wrong answers. So"
    },
    {
      "index": 89,
      "start_seconds": 224,
      "source_timestamp": "3:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "fast forward"
    },
    {
      "index": 90,
      "start_seconds": 225,
      "source_timestamp": "3:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "what people should be care about when"
    },
    {
      "index": 91,
      "start_seconds": 227,
      "source_timestamp": "3:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "they"
    },
    {
      "index": 92,
      "start_seconds": 228,
      "source_timestamp": "3:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "when they put an RPC and when they build"
    },
    {
      "index": 93,
      "start_seconds": 231,
      "source_timestamp": "3:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "a protocol and and when they read data"
    },
    {
      "index": 94,
      "start_seconds": 233,
      "source_timestamp": "3:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "from that RPC is first is actually what"
    },
    {
      "index": 95,
      "start_seconds": 237,
      "source_timestamp": "3:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "data is being consumed"
    },
    {
      "index": 96,
      "start_seconds": 240,
      "source_timestamp": "4:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and where this data makes an impact"
    },
    {
      "index": 97,
      "start_seconds": 242,
      "source_timestamp": "4:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Because if you're a bridge, for example,"
    },
    {
      "index": 98,
      "start_seconds": 245,
      "source_timestamp": "4:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and you read the data from from chain A"
    },
    {
      "index": 99,
      "start_seconds": 248,
      "source_timestamp": "4:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and that makes you"
    },
    {
      "index": 100,
      "start_seconds": 249,
      "source_timestamp": "4:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "deploy money or to transfer money into"
    },
    {
      "index": 101,
      "start_seconds": 252,
      "source_timestamp": "4:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "chain B, then on that case you"
    },
    {
      "index": 102,
      "start_seconds": 254,
      "source_timestamp": "4:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "definitely need to make sure that you're"
    },
    {
      "index": 103,
      "start_seconds": 255,
      "source_timestamp": "4:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "reading properly."
    },
    {
      "index": 104,
      "start_seconds": 257,
      "source_timestamp": "4:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "The awesome data that you could read and"
    },
    {
      "index": 105,
      "start_seconds": 258,
      "source_timestamp": "4:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "like the impact is like meaningful or"
    },
    {
      "index": 106,
      "start_seconds": 260,
      "source_timestamp": "4:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "like minimal, but uh and of course that"
    },
    {
      "index": 107,
      "start_seconds": 263,
      "source_timestamp": "4:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that will be covered differently."
    },
    {
      "index": 108,
      "start_seconds": 265,
      "source_timestamp": "4:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Second, who is reading? You have roles,"
    },
    {
      "index": 109,
      "start_seconds": 267,
      "source_timestamp": "4:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you have titles on the on your system,"
    },
    {
      "index": 110,
      "start_seconds": 268,
      "source_timestamp": "4:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "on your protocol, on your product."
    },
    {
      "index": 111,
      "start_seconds": 271,
      "source_timestamp": "4:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Uh the idea is to defer the ones that"
    },
    {
      "index": 112,
      "start_seconds": 274,
      "source_timestamp": "4:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "actually take actions from the one that"
    },
    {
      "index": 113,
      "start_seconds": 276,
      "source_timestamp": "4:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "like mostly do reading for other"
    },
    {
      "index": 114,
      "start_seconds": 278,
      "source_timestamp": "4:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "purposes that are not that important."
    },
    {
      "index": 115,
      "start_seconds": 281,
      "source_timestamp": "4:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And three"
    },
    {
      "index": 116,
      "start_seconds": 282,
      "source_timestamp": "4:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh and most important is where from do"
    },
    {
      "index": 117,
      "start_seconds": 284,
      "source_timestamp": "4:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you read the data? Is it public RPC? Is"
    },
    {
      "index": 118,
      "start_seconds": 287,
      "source_timestamp": "4:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it your own? Is it as a service RPC or"
    },
    {
      "index": 119,
      "start_seconds": 291,
      "source_timestamp": "4:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something else?"
    },
    {
      "index": 120,
      "start_seconds": 292,
      "source_timestamp": "4:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "The idea is that each one of them"
    },
    {
      "index": 121,
      "start_seconds": 294,
      "source_timestamp": "4:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "probably has its own issues. Running"
    },
    {
      "index": 122,
      "start_seconds": 297,
      "source_timestamp": "4:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "your own definitely uh to protect it can"
    },
    {
      "index": 123,
      "start_seconds": 299,
      "source_timestamp": "4:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "be like a challenge."
    },
    {
      "index": 124,
      "start_seconds": 301,
      "source_timestamp": "5:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And of course"
    },
    {
      "index": 125,
      "start_seconds": 302,
      "source_timestamp": "5:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh trusting others can be also like a"
    },
    {
      "index": 126,
      "start_seconds": 304,
      "source_timestamp": "5:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "different challenge from different"
    },
    {
      "index": 127,
      "start_seconds": 305,
      "source_timestamp": "5:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "aspect, but still uh can be"
    },
    {
      "index": 128,
      "start_seconds": 308,
      "source_timestamp": "5:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh manipulated. And maybe the last thing"
    },
    {
      "index": 129,
      "start_seconds": 311,
      "source_timestamp": "5:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to to mention over here is that RPCs"
    },
    {
      "index": 130,
      "start_seconds": 315,
      "source_timestamp": "5:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "also can be"
    },
    {
      "index": 131,
      "start_seconds": 316,
      "source_timestamp": "5:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh manipulated"
    },
    {
      "index": 132,
      "start_seconds": 318,
      "source_timestamp": "5:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "um in the way on the communication way"
    },
    {
      "index": 133,
      "start_seconds": 320,
      "source_timestamp": "5:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "from the RPC itself to the user on the"
    },
    {
      "index": 134,
      "start_seconds": 322,
      "source_timestamp": "5:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "DNS, on the network channel. and that's"
    },
    {
      "index": 135,
      "start_seconds": 326,
      "source_timestamp": "5:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something that we also need to make sure"
    },
    {
      "index": 136,
      "start_seconds": 328,
      "source_timestamp": "5:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that is covered."
    },
    {
      "index": 137,
      "start_seconds": 331,
      "source_timestamp": "5:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "No time for questions and of course um"
    },
    {
      "index": 138,
      "start_seconds": 335,
      "source_timestamp": "5:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and I guess that's mostly it. Thank you."
    }
  ]
}
