DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall

Forging PLONK Proofs Against an Unchecked Verifying-Key Cache (gnark, BN254)

Vijaykumar Singh

10:16 · Recording

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0:00Shall we? Okay. So,

0:03I'm going to talk about forging Planck's

0:05proof against an unchecked verifying

0:07key.

0:08This is the setup in

0:12So,

0:13this work was done by my coworker at

0:16Open Zeppelin,

0:17Vaslin,

0:19aka Vesco.

0:22And yeah, I'm here to present it. All

0:24right? Okay.

0:25So, what is this

0:27this setup about?

0:29Before I go further, these are the

0:31things I'm going to cover very quickly.

0:33So, I'm going to describe the problem

0:35for you.

0:36Then I'm going to go through the three

0:37findings in the

0:39one is

0:40zero cash, crafted cash, both are

0:43both give you a proof forgery, whereas

0:46the the last one is a degenerate base

0:48point, which is a statement forgery. All

0:50right? And then we'll talk about

0:51disclosure and and conclusions.

0:55Okay. So,

0:56I'm going to spend a bunch of time on

0:582.1 and you know, rest we see if we get

1:01time.

1:03All right. So, what is happening here?

1:07So, let's try to build some context.

1:10So, in BN 254 curve, you basically have

1:13KGZ commitment schemes, right?

1:16And

1:17it's a pairing-based

1:19commitment scheme where

1:22the end verification is essentially

1:25[snorts] checking some pairing

1:27equation turns out to be one or not.

1:30So, essentially, if you think about it,

1:32you can see that pairing check

1:35corresponds to

1:37you have

1:39you have E of A one.

1:42So, let me see what what one is. One is

1:44the image. So,

1:46if you recall what pairing is, pairing

1:48is a map from

1:50G1 cross G2 to, you know, FP12 in case

1:53of eight pairings, which is what BN 254

1:55curve uses.

1:57And

1:59so one is generator for G2 group

2:03and

2:04your X is the the toxic waste which is

2:07produced when you you know you do SRS uh

2:10so the initial setup ceremony.

2:12So in the end you you you check

2:15essentially whether this pairing map

2:17holds

2:18uh sorry this pairing equation holds uh

2:20and

2:22if it holds then then you pass the proof

2:24uh if it doesn't then it you know the

2:26full proof fails. Okay so this is a

2:28setup.

2:29Now uh pairings are bilinear maps so

2:32essentially you can uh what you can do

2:34is you can move this X here you get XB

2:36you have A so AXB

2:39uh

2:39should turn out to be so A + XB should

2:42turn out to be identity. Okay

2:44so if A + XB is identity then then

2:46essentially you have the the the the map

2:49will check out all right.

2:51So it all rests on one element really of

2:54G2 uh which is the X uh the toxic waste.

2:57It is unknown to prover it's unknown to

2:59verifier yeah but they they have both of

3:02them have the commitment to X.

3:04Okay

3:05so

3:06so ideally um

3:08so this is a setup

3:10but

3:12unfortunately

3:14quote unquote unfortunately the grow

3:16verifier

3:17instead of basically checking against X

3:20checks against something else which is

3:22the line

3:23in the in the

3:25so let me just clarify what the line is.

3:29Uh so I'll come to the line a moment but

3:31first of all let's see uh what happens

3:33um

3:34so if you recall from the previous slide

3:37we had this uh

3:39equals to identity

3:41right if you go on the next slide

3:43so pairings are are are are are

3:45non-degenerate but if you have EA comma

3:49zero element

3:51of the G2 yeah zero is the identity if

3:54you're thinking about elliptical group

3:55as as an additive group right so if you

3:58do E of A zero then it will always come

4:00out to be one

4:02No matter what.

4:03So, if you look at this map here,

4:07if I had zero and zero here,

4:10it will turn out to be

4:12it will pass, right? Irrespective of A

4:14and B. Doesn't matter what A and B are.

4:16So, can we have that setup?

4:18All right? So, can we have Q zero and Q

4:20one as basically

4:23the additive identity or or the

4:26so-called point at infinity for the

4:27elliptic curve. That is a problem

4:30So now, so the question is, can we have

4:33that?

4:36And the answer is yes. We can have that

4:40because of the following scenario. So

4:41what happens is if you look at the

4:43pairings,

4:44the way pairings are computed for the

4:46GNARK is that you have E of P comma Q.

4:49The Q is fixed. Yeah, that was from the

4:51toxic waste in in the second part.

4:54So what what what what this

4:58computation of pairing does is that

5:01the it runs a Miller loop.

5:03All right?

5:04So and in the Miller loop, what happens

5:06is

5:08there are already some precomputed lines

5:10which are inside the Miller loop.

5:12Okay? So instead of having using

5:15commitment to X,

5:17yeah, the lines which are already

5:19precomputed are part of your of are part

5:22of your computation. Okay? And this is

5:24where the problem comes in. We'll see

5:25that in a moment.

5:26So Miller loop runs and then, you know,

5:28there's a final exponentiation and then

5:29you get if you get one, you pass. If you

5:32get do not get one, it fails.

5:34So the

5:35so the idea is

5:39the following. So

5:42what

5:45GNARK library does is it says that it's

5:48checking for this pairing

5:50where you have basically A of G two,

5:53which is your toxic waste. But

5:55essentially what it does is

5:57it has a verifier already precomputed.

6:00The lines

6:01precomputed given by the prover.

6:04It does not checks it.

6:06And then

6:07if these lines are not properly

6:09constructed,

6:10then there's the issue. Okay? So let's

6:12look at this

6:14So the idea is that we have

6:17lines, we have precomputed lines and

6:20they are never enforced when they are

6:22used in the proof. All right? So so the

6:25the starting the

6:27the issue is at the

6:29even before the start of the proof. It's

6:31in the setup.

6:33The the lines are precomputed. If the

6:35verifier does not checks it

6:38against it being identity all the time,

6:40you basically have the have the fake

6:41proof passing. So so this is the

6:44first issue.

6:46All right. So that's that.

6:50Okay. So second proof is the following.

6:52Second issue is the following.

6:54Let's go back to our equation again.

6:57We have here

6:59AX so we had A + XB equals to identity.

7:03So earlier the issue was what? The issue

7:05was basically you take

7:07you took X to be commitment X commitment

7:10of X to be identity and

7:12the commitment of one to be identity.

7:15Again, do not confuse it. By here

7:17identity I mean the zero element and

7:18that was a problem.

7:20Now the second case can arise if you

7:23have X as

7:26what you can get still

7:28zero if you had X as

7:30some kind of

7:32minus A + B.

7:34Oh sorry, minus A divide by B. Okay. So

7:36that's the

7:37the source of the second issue

7:40as you can see here.

7:43So the idea is you have a toxic waste.

7:47The commitment here.

7:48So the issue is that the attacker will

7:51what will do is instead of

7:53it will it will take some X prime of its

7:55choice in a way that

7:58eventually you you have you turn out to

8:01be this you have turn out to have this

8:03equation A + X prime B

8:06and then you choose B to be minus A or X

8:08prime and then you you essentially have

8:10what?

8:11Again a proof forgery, right? Okay.

8:14So in both the cases

8:17what was the problem?

8:21So in first case you you you don't want

8:24the zero of the elliptic curve or the

8:27point at the infinity

8:28to be the part of the proof. So you

8:29should check that, right? So

8:38so I'll skip the third one uh but you

8:40can have a look uh

8:42so let's see. So how was the issue

8:44basically uh

8:46so on 7th of

8:48July the issue was

8:50drafted and then disclosed to the um

8:54disclosed to the uh Nark.

8:56Uh it was confirmed and basically you

8:59know

9:00um

9:01and then it was acknowledged but it was

9:03considered to be out of scope of the

9:05trusted model which actually makes sense

9:06because it is before the the prover

9:09verifier game assumes that the the

9:11trusted model is honest on the top

9:14but uh

9:16and then on 28th of August it was

9:19approved for the

9:20public discussion.

9:22Okay, so now why do we call it shadow

9:24boxing?

9:26Well, the idea is that in verifier

9:29you are basically

9:31seeing G two,

9:33right? You're you're looking at X

9:35at the commitment of X

9:36but essentially what hits you is a line,

9:39right? Because you have basically these

9:41computation of lines which are which

9:43could be malicious, right? So so so we

9:46do the validation but against the wrong

9:48object. Yeah. Uh yeah, so that's why the

9:51name is called you know shadow boxing

9:53because you are you're fighting the

9:54wrong opponent. Yeah, the the opponent

9:56actually is a line, right? So this is

9:58the the whole setup of the uh

10:01of the

10:03of the shadow boxing um and

10:07yep, I I think you know what?

10:09I pretty good. I finished earlier.

10:12Thanks, thanks for your attention.

10:15>> [applause]

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