DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Amber Hall

Security is a leadership problem

Josselin Feist

27:33 · Recording

Watch on YouTube ↗Open recording viewerOriginal programme entry
Download plain textDownload timestamped JSON

Source: YouTube automatic caption track · Exported 2026-11-16. Timestamps link to the source video. Cue end times were not supplied.

Transcript

0:01Okay. Hi everyone. Um, welcome to this

0:03presentation, security is a leadership

0:05problem. So, first thing first, who am

0:07I? My name is Jocelyn Feist. I'm a

0:09security researcher and I've been in the

0:11blockchain space for almost nine years

0:12now.

0:14Through the years, I had the chance to

0:15work with many protocol, DeFi, layer

0:17one, layer two. Um, and I have worked

0:20with protocol with various stage of

0:22development, various maturity.

0:24This presentation is a personal take

0:26based on some of the observation I have

0:27made through the years.

0:29Oh.

0:30Sorry.

0:32So, when I started my career as a

0:34security researcher, my main focus was

0:36to find bugs. My kind of thinking was

0:39that if I can find all the bug in the

0:40code base, my job will be basically

0:42done. Security is a technical problem,

0:44so I need to find technical solution.

0:46Over the years, I've realized that many

0:48bugs stem from incorrect design

0:51decision, architecture decision, or

0:54shortfall in the testing practices. So,

0:56I ended up focusing a bit more into

0:58helping protocol and developer to think

1:00about their design and the long-term

1:02security.

1:03Uh, that helped, but over time, I've

1:06realized that this is not enough.

1:08Even if you find improvement you have to

1:10make in the design, even if you find

1:12shortcoming in the testing, someone has

1:14to make a decision. Someone has to

1:16decide, are we going to allocate

1:17resource? Are we going to change the

1:19product? Are we going to change the

1:20timeline? And this made me realize that

1:23security is not just a technical

1:25problem. And this is sometimes a bit

1:27difficult because as engineer, we focus

1:29on technical problem. But at the end of

1:31the day, uh, a lot of the decision are

1:33going to be made by the leader of the

1:34protocol, and as a result, security is

1:36not just a technical problem, it's also

1:38a leadership problem.

1:41We knew it was a weak point, but we

1:44thought it was okay. That quote stuck

1:46with me. I have heard it many time from

1:49different team with little variation

1:51after an incident.

1:53When you were looking back, when when

1:54the team was looking back why an

1:56incident happened, they realized that it

1:58was not something completely obscure

2:00that happened. It was something that

2:01they knew about, but thought it will be

2:03okay. That could be a low severity issue

2:06that was acknowledged and never

2:07revisited. That could be a situation

2:10where the smart contract were actually

2:11robust and and were in a good point, but

2:13the team never considered operational

2:15security and as a result, that's why the

2:17attacker

2:19led to exploit.

2:21We have in the team we we have in the

2:23industry really good and strong

2:25technical team. They care about

2:26security, they spend a lot of time, but

2:28sometime they still fail because at the

2:30end of the day someone has to make a

2:32decision, someone someone has to decide

2:34are we going to go live or are we going

2:36to spend more time looking for issue.

2:39And this is a leadership decision. Now I

2:41know you might have heard similar take

2:43in the past and I know leadership can

2:45sound like a bit of a disconnected

2:48topic, but I so know firsthand that many

2:51protocol leader in the space do not

2:53consider security as their

2:54responsibility.

2:56As a result and as we are going to to

2:57see through this talk, most of the time

3:00issue are never revisited, risk are

3:02never revisited, exposure can scale

3:04faster than the confidence in the

3:06system. There is no security ownership

3:08within the protocol team and more than

3:11often perception of security becomes

3:13more important than the security itself.

3:17So who here has deployed a protocol

3:20within the past let's say 12 months and

3:23could point me to the list of non-issue

3:25on the list of risk accepted and would

3:28be able to tell me when they have been

3:30revisited.

3:31Probably only okay, only a few people,

3:34right?

3:36In reality, you are going to make

3:38trade-off, you have to make decision.

3:41And you know, when you need to go live,

3:42you're going to accept some of the risk.

3:45But in reality, once you accept a risk

3:47even temporarily, most of the time they

3:49become permanent.

3:52And the problem is not necessarily that

3:54you make a trade-off, the problem is

3:55that you never revisit them. However,

3:58your protocol will evolve. You will have

4:00new integration, you will have new

4:01asset, you will have new components. And

4:04if you don' spend more time trying to

4:06think about how to re-evaluate and

4:08re-assess the risk, something that was a

4:11minor risk can quietly become a

4:12permanent risk within your system.

4:16So this is where as a leader you need to

4:20periodically re-evaluate and and your

4:22risk and allocate resources for that.

4:24This is a boring task. No one likes to

4:26do that. And if you do it, you know, you

4:29won't be able to tell your investor that

4:30you have made progress. You won't be

4:32able to generate revenue. You won't be

4:33able to kind of like, you know, show

4:35your user that you have like a new

4:36report to publish. And most of the time

4:39when you are going to re-evaluate your

4:41non-risk, no decision will be made

4:43because the trade-off that you have made

4:44might be still true today.

4:47So this is a bit uncomfortable, but it

4:49is why this is a leadership decision.

4:52Next time you deploy a protocol, you can

4:54tell your engineer, we are going to

4:56deploy next week, but in six months from

4:58now

4:59we are going to re-evaluate your risk.

5:01This implicitly will tell your

5:03engineering team that they need to

5:05document and own the risk.

5:07And this is how as a leader you can

5:08create a culture in within your company

5:11where the management of risk is

5:12important.

5:17I frequently hear protocol leader tell

5:20me that they don't have the budget for

5:22security.

5:23Now security is not just about paying

5:25for audit. It's also about controlling

5:27your exposure while your confidence in

5:30the system is limited.

5:32Most of the protocol team won't have the

5:34budget to do multiple round of audit,

5:36formal verification, fuzzing, and like

5:38all the different techniques. But they

5:40can decide to not expose immature system

5:43to unlimited loss.

5:46We have seen multiple time in the space

5:48small experiments, small idea that

5:50overnight become a high value target.

5:52And this is a problem if your security

5:54budget and your security confidence in

5:56the system does not allow you to

5:58properly assess your system. You do not

6:00want to be in a situation where your

6:02exposure scale faster than your

6:03confidence in the system.

6:05The good news is that as the protocol

6:08leader, you have a lot of lever that you

6:10might never know you have.

6:12For example, when you are going to

6:13create your first version of the

6:14protocol, you can you can think about

6:16reducing the scope of what you are

6:18building. This means we're moving some

6:20integration, we're moving complex um

6:23complex part of the protocol if you

6:25don't need them for V1.

6:27You can directly limit exposure, you can

6:29control your exposure by having TVL cap,

6:31by having rate limits.

6:33You can have centralization point that

6:35are will going to help you to control

6:37that, for example, pausing mechanism and

6:39this type of things. Now, this decision

6:41and this trade-off are a bit

6:43uncomfortable because they're going to

6:44compete with competitiveness, growth,

6:47revenue generation, but this is why they

6:49are leadership decision.

6:51If you don't do it, no one will do it.

6:53And this is where great leader think

6:56ahead and think about what they're going

6:58to build and how their security budget

7:00will allow them to build what they want

7:02to build.

7:04Now, this can become difficult to

7:06evaluate if you don't have any security

7:09expertise and any security ownership

7:11within your company.

7:13If you look at traditional financial

7:15institute, they have a lot of security

7:17expertise. They have a CISO, they have

7:19an internal structure, they have

7:20security DevOps, they have security

7:22engineer.

7:23If you ask most of the DeFi team today

7:26how they handle their security, they are

7:28going to tell you we are done audit.

7:31Most of the industry has externalized

7:34security expertise to third-party

7:36provider.

7:37That model made sense when the industry

7:39was scaling and expertise was scarce,

7:42but it is not a good model today.

7:44Protocol team, blockchain team, and DeFi

7:46team needs internal security and they

7:48need security ownership.

7:50Now, what I have see sometime happen is

7:53that one engineer on the team become the

7:56owner of security, but that engineer has

7:59no lever. They cannot make decision,

8:01they might identify risk, they might

8:02identify concern, but they have no

8:05ability to change any direction in the

8:07project timeline and in the project

8:09features.

8:10Security, like ownership become mostly

8:12cosmetic. It exists on paper, but

8:14doesn't exist in reality.

8:16This is why you need security ownership

8:19and you need this authority, this

8:21ownership to come with authority.

8:23How to do that? A good model I've seen

8:26work for early stage company is for one

8:28of the founder to own security.

8:31They will decide how resources are

8:32allocated, how the product timeline is

8:35going to be aggressive. If a refactoring

8:37is needed, they will be able to say we

8:38are not going to go live until A, B and

8:41C is fixed.

8:43Now as you scale, you might be able to

8:45delegate that ownership and that

8:46authority to someone else and to create

8:48a structure for that. But many of the

8:51team that have good security posture

8:53today started with that model, sometimes

8:56even without without realizing it.

8:59So now you're in a situation where you

9:00know your risk and you re-evaluate them.

9:02Your exposure scale at a at a pace where

9:05you can control it and you have security

9:07ownership with clear authority. There is

9:09another aspect where I've seen sometime

9:12leader failing without even realizing it

9:14is how they communicate about security.

9:18Who here have been in a situation where

9:21you see a security report, there is a

9:23high security finding

9:25and the leader of the company or the the

9:28lead of like the protocol team

9:30is pushing back to reduce the severity.

9:33So you report high severity and now you

9:35enter kind of like a back and forth with

9:36the developer team to reduce the

9:37severity to medium or something like

9:39that.

9:40This creates

9:42a focus on the perception of security

9:45and not the security. It's it tells the

9:47engineer that the optics of how the

9:49report will looks like is more is more

9:51important that how the security issue

9:54might have impacted the team.

9:56I have been in a situation where I was

9:57reporting high severity to teams and I

10:00could see that the engineer was stressed

10:02because he was afraid of the consequence

10:04of having a high severity in this

10:06report.

10:07And this create again a situation and an

10:10environment where the perception of

10:12security is more important than the

10:13security itself.

10:15No, mature team behave really

10:17differently. The leaders want the

10:19assumption to be challenged. Where you

10:21do security review and an audit with a

10:23mature team, the engineer will seek

10:25feedback. They will not be defensive

10:27about their code. They will want to you

10:29to challenge the different assumptions

10:31that have been made within the code.

10:33When an engineer

10:36when an engineer see a concern, they are

10:38going to raise it internally. I am not

10:40confident about this component. I think

10:42we should spend more time.

10:44If a refactoring is judged necessary, it

10:47is going to happen. If it needs to delay

10:49a feature or a product launch, it is

10:51going to happen. This means that

10:53security is not just something that is

10:55for optics. It does have impact in the

10:58decision.

11:00I have been this is in a weird situation

11:03where I was reporting what I thought was

11:05a medium severity to a protocol team

11:08and the engineer started to argue with

11:09me about the severity, not to decrease

11:11it but to increase it. So I'm like this

11:14is medium and the engineer is like no

11:15no, this is high.

11:17This can only happen in an environment

11:19where the engineer feels safe to raise

11:22concern and uncertainty instead of

11:24trying to minimize it.

11:26This is why as a leader, the way you

11:28communicate with the team is really

11:29important. Whatever you say is going to

11:32have a large impact within your

11:33engineering team and you want your tone

11:36I want security to favor

11:40raising uncertainty, raising risk

11:42instead of trying to minimize it. So

11:44next time you receive a security report,

11:46if you see a high severity, do not focus

11:49on how we can make it look better for

11:51the end user. Focus on

11:53what can we learn from this from this

11:55finding. For example, ask your team

11:58what do you need? How can I help you? Do

12:01you need more time testing? Do you need

12:02more time thinking of design? What are

12:04the things we can change within our

12:05process for this to not happen instead

12:08of forcing focusing on security? Again,

12:10the optics might have some impact in

12:13your product, but in the long term, the

12:16if you focus more on the perception of

12:17security rather than security, you will

12:19not build an environment where concerns

12:21are properly addressed.

12:25So, it's 2026, we have to talk about AI.

12:29Some people believe AI will solve cyber

12:31security and AI will find all the bugs.

12:34This is not what we are seeing today. AI

12:37does decrease the cost of finding bugs,

12:39but everything we just discuss, risk

12:41management, perception of security,

12:44exposure scaling, um and security

12:47ownership, all of these still matter in

12:49the world where AI help us to find bugs.

12:53For critical code, I see many leader

12:57make the mistake of focusing on the AI,

13:00on how it can scale and make uh engineer

13:03write faster code. The question become

13:06how much can we ship, how fast can we

13:08ship.

13:09Uh and this is a problem because if your

13:12output and the capacity and if the

13:14number of line of code they are

13:15producing out weight your capability to

13:18manage risk and understand how your

13:20protocol growth and like the different

13:22limitation, you are more likely to have

13:24incidents.

13:27Now, as a leader, you can take a

13:29different strategy. You can take a

13:30different optic for critical code.

13:32Instead of focusing on how AI will make

13:35you faster, focus on how can you use

13:37this extra capacity to improve your

13:39security.

13:40This change how you measure the impact

13:42of AI within the company. You can know

13:45focus on okay, are we seeing a decrease

13:48of security findings during review? Are

13:51we using new technique like formal

13:52verification or fuzzing? Do we have more

13:55control over how we manage risk?

13:58Thinking of security

14:00as a first priority in how you integrate

14:01AI might uh might leads to increase

14:04speed and that might become a byproduct

14:06of this focus.

14:08But for critical code, you should focus

14:10first on how to improve your security

14:12before how you can be faster with AI.

14:15And this is again a leadership decision

14:17that will change how in general going to

14:19think and to to shape the code base that

14:21you are producing.

14:23So risk management, exposure scaling,

14:27security ownership, perception of

14:29security versus security itself. All of

14:32that, you know, comes down to how the

14:35leader think about security and do they

14:38consider security as something that

14:39shape decision or do they consider

14:41security as something that is a

14:43verification check at the end of the

14:45protocol development.

14:47And this is difficult sometimes for

14:48founder because they are not trained to

14:50reason this way.

14:51A good um

14:54a good parallel you can think of is

14:55profitability.

14:57As a founder,

14:58you will not think profitability is

15:00something you check at the end. Uh it's

15:02not even if you delegate the execution,

15:04it is still your responsibility.

15:06Profitability is going to shape how you

15:08are building your software, how you how

15:10aggressive you are, which feature you

15:13have, which limitation you are okay to

15:14accept or not. You can think of security

15:17in the same way.

15:19Now to build that mindset,

15:21there are a couple of simple questions

15:22you can ask yourself. The first one, if

15:25our TVL grows from 1 million to 10

15:28million, what additional security

15:30measure do we need?

15:31This means treating TVL growth not just

15:34as a success but as a risk vector.

15:38With a security budget, what level of

15:41complexity and what level of security

15:43can we responsibly support? This means

15:46not trying to retrofit your security

15:48budget to what you have built but you

15:50build something that match your security

15:52budget.

15:54The last two questions are related to

15:56risk management. So after an audit, what

15:59what stay possible and uh what

16:02assumption do we rely on and when do

16:04they stop to be true? So this is about

16:06knowing your risk and being having a

16:07process to reevaluate them over time.

16:13A lot of what we discussed today were

16:15around leader um but I would argue that

16:18anyone within their career can benefit

16:20from thinking of security as um

16:24something which has an impact within

16:25leadership. As an engineer, next time

16:28you look for a position, choose an

16:30environment where security matter, where

16:32the security leader, uh where the leader

16:34of the of the of the company you want to

16:36join consider security as something

16:38important. Ask question, you know, look

16:40for clues. If you care about security

16:43and the leader of the company you work

16:44with don't care about security, you will

16:47be frustrated. So take this as a

16:49consideration.

16:50For investor, here you have an important

16:53play.

16:54You can influence your portfolio company

16:56to think beyond we had an audit. Ask

16:58them question about the security

16:59ownership. Ask them question about how

17:01they manage risk. Um, you have a lot of

17:04power into how how to change their

17:05mindset.

17:07Finally, as a leader, make sure the

17:09security concern are going to allow you

17:11to change scope, timeline, and exposure.

17:15Remember the quote.

17:16We knew it was a weak point, but we

17:18thought it was okay. You do not want to

17:21be the next one to say that. Audit will

17:23find bug, but your leadership will

17:25determine if the condition that created

17:28the issue will improve or not.

17:30Thank you for your attention.

17:32[applause]

17:39Any question?

17:41>> Hey, I'm Fazeen building

17:43My question is what acceptance bar

17:46should leadership accept for a security

17:48fix before it ships?

17:49For example, today is just that proof of

17:52concept fails now. Is that enough?

17:55>> Um, so can you repeat the question?

17:59>> What acceptance bar should leadership

18:01accepts for a security fix before it

18:03ships?

18:04Today today is just that proof of

18:06concept fails now.

18:08>> Okay, is the question I want um if you

18:11receive a finding you want to have a

18:13proof of concepts uh

18:16uh okay I'm not sure to understand the

18:20question. Do you mean acceptance having

18:22you want to accept the how do you know

18:24you can accept the fees can ship

18:25basically? Okay, okay. So the question

18:27is when you receive a fix

18:29how confident can you be with respect to

18:31the fix, right?

18:33Okay.

18:34That depend on the complexity of the

18:36finding. If you have a finding and the

18:38fix is pretty straightforward, usually

18:39you can have a pretty good confidence

18:41that the fix will fix it. Now if the

18:43issue stem from something a bit more

18:45complex, you might need to ask your

18:47engineer

18:49do you think our issue might stem from

18:51that? For example, if the fix is just

18:53like

18:55like an access control missing, that's

18:57pretty easy to evaluate. If the fix

18:59require a change in the winding

19:00decision, that might require to you to

19:03allocate a bit more resource. Now as a

19:04founder, if you're a bit unsure about

19:06that, I will ask the engineering team

19:08how they think about it because your

19:09engineer knows the protocol better than

19:11anyone else. You can also ask your

19:13security you know expert that internally

19:15or externally how they think about it.

19:17But asking the engineering team is

19:19probably the first place to to to start

19:21with.

19:25>> Hello.

19:26Great talk. Thank you, Jocelyn. So

19:28question I have is about incidents and

19:31incidents response. I feel like it's one

19:33of the scariest things for leaders and

19:36founders and whatever

19:38especially in our crypto companies to

19:40have an incident, but it feels like it's

19:42inevitable nowadays. And so how do you

19:45how do you make it part of I guess

19:48regular day-to-day in business to handle

19:50an incident, have an incident response

19:52and all that sort of stuff?

19:54>> Okay, that's a really good question.

19:56So yeah, you have to prepare for

19:58incident because it is likely to happen.

19:59For that you can think of it ahead of

20:01time. For example, how you monitor your

20:03code base not as the code base is

20:06written, how we are going to monitor it,

20:07but we are going to build like this new

20:09component from the design phase. How can

20:12we integrate monitoring there? What do

20:13we need to monitor?

20:15You can test your incident response

20:16there like war game and and think like

20:18that. The SEAL which is a Security

20:20Alliance has a framework website which

20:23has a lot of different kind of like

20:25advice on how to do it. So I think not

20:28considering incident as

20:30a last step within your development but

20:33something you integrate from the get-go

20:35will help you and testing it is also

20:37really important because you don't want

20:38to be in a situation where

20:40you think you have good monitoring but

20:42actually you don't. Testing monitoring

20:44is also really difficult because

20:47depending on the setup you have testing

20:49like the tooling you are using might be

20:50tricky so you want to get that ahead of

20:52time. There are a couple of companies

20:54that focus on that that can also help

20:55you you can you know reach out to them.

21:00>> Hello Jocelyn great great talk. So this

21:03question is more from the leadership

21:04side like towards the leadership. So as

21:07we know like the unfortunate reality is

21:09many of the protocols they still follow

21:11the regulations which are already out

21:12there. However the the velocity of the

21:15incidence that we are seeing that is

21:17overriding the regulations that are

21:18already put into place. So while you are

21:21mapping out let's say some incident that

21:22okay a new attack pattern has appeared

21:25you don't have the regulations for it

21:26and people are like that okay because we

21:28don't have the regulations for it maybe

21:29we not we we are not required to plan

21:31for it but you will still have like

21:33incurred losses.

21:35So how as we as a community ensure that

21:37the regulations are also you know they

21:40are like they have a velocity as well

21:42which is matching up the incidents. I

21:43think that is really important.

21:45>> Okay

21:46that's a good question and a difficult

21:47one.

21:49I don't think we should wait for

21:52regulation to tell us what to do.

21:54Regulation might help us to have some

21:56baseline but it is not going to be

21:59enough and you know we have seen that in

22:02other industry when when we start having

22:04like some certification and think like

22:06that

22:07it can backfire because usually baseline

22:11from regulation are not that high and

22:14they create kind of a floor for all the

22:16company to follow but that doesn't push

22:18company to go beyond that and that's why

22:21building a security mindset for a leader

22:24is important because if the leader think

22:25of okay, there is this framework from

22:28like the regulator, we follow it, we are

22:30good, that is not going to be enough and

22:32that's not going to be sufficient. So

22:34they might help a bit, but I would not

22:36focus on them.

22:40>> Um whenever you're dealing with consumer

22:42protection, um

22:45uh for example, like you might care a

22:47lot about your security and making sure

22:48that your systems are not hacked, but

22:50consumers can lose credentials, they can

22:52be tricked into signing into

22:54applications you have no control over.

22:55How should should security leadership

22:58think about protecting consumers even if

23:00it goes kind of beyond the scope of the

23:02organization and how do they how do

23:05should like security leaders try to get

23:06other peoples in the organization to

23:08care about it even if from their

23:10perspective it's going out of their way

23:12to spend resources on things that are

23:14maybe not their immediate problem?

23:16>> Okay. Um

23:18so like the question is about how how

23:21leader can think of

23:22security for the end user which lie into

23:25like the limit of the protocol itself,

23:28right? So if it's if it's like on your

23:30off-chain component like your website

23:32and think that are connected to your

23:33website, I would argue it's still within

23:36your responsibility, right? Now the

23:38issue is where you have like integration

23:40with other protocol and when you have

23:42like

23:42the limit is a bit more gray.

23:45Um this is where coordination among the

23:48industry is important and discussion

23:50among like the different important

23:51player is important because you as a

23:54leader you will be able to secure

23:57or try to secure your protocol. You

23:59won't be able to create and enforce like

24:02some additional mitigation and safeguard

24:04outside of your organization, but you

24:06can try to discuss with a different

24:08partner and with a different provider to

24:10push in them in that direction.

24:12Um if you share common investor with

24:15like other other other company you work

24:18with, you might talk to your investor

24:19and try to have like you know a natural

24:21ground to push some you know mitigation,

24:24some something. So try for for example

24:26to find some natural party that can help

24:29you to push

24:30you know some additional security

24:31measure.

24:45Yeah.

24:46>> say you're

24:47a smaller stage company, you know you're

24:49not an Aave, Morpho, Uniswap

24:52and you want to communicate. You take

24:54security very seriously as you, you know

24:57discussed in this presentation of how

24:59you need to have an ownership mindset

25:01and to be able to you know

25:04take responsibility. We're not just

25:05going to push it on the auditors.

25:07How do you then convey that to the

25:09public if you don't have

25:12you know the resources to get 10 audits,

25:14you know to kind of prove that?

25:16>> Okay, that's a really good question.

25:18How how can you convey that you have a

25:19security mindset

25:21if you cannot pay for you know

25:2410 audits, right?

25:26You you can share some of the things you

25:28are doing like concrete example of what

25:30you are you are doing to do that. For

25:32example,

25:33maybe you use fuzzing, maybe you use

25:35like you know formal formal verification

25:37within your codebase. Maybe you know you

25:39dedicate some resource time from like

25:41your engineer to look for vulnerability

25:44in other codebase or learn from past

25:46exploit. So you have way to communicate

25:48concrete example of what you are doing

25:51to help like the security of your

25:52protocol and you can can communicate

25:54that.

25:55So I will look I will look for concrete

25:57example that can be translated into

25:59something public.

26:02Yeah.

26:06>> [clears throat]

26:15>> Thanks.

26:16With Aave as an example, how do you

26:19consider

26:21I guess

26:22it's

26:23the wider scope of say hacks on

26:27cred protocol that end up in Aave

26:30and and you something that's so far out

26:33of your scope in many ways.

26:35>> Yeah, that's a good question,

26:38because you know, some protocol like

26:39Aave and other,

26:41we are impacted when an incident happens

26:44outside of organization, right?

26:47And this is scary because we can do as

26:49much as we can within organization,

26:51similar to the previous question, but we

26:53cannot control what's happening outside.

26:55So it's really about monitoring, it's

26:57about evaluating who you're interacting

26:59with. So in the case of Aave, we have

27:01like, you know, a risk framework, we

27:02have like a lot of different

27:03consideration and and additional

27:06validation step that we are doing for

27:08the people we interact with and the

27:09assets we're onboarding.

27:11So it's really about like pushing what

27:14you know and trying to one, evaluate who

27:17you're interacting with, and two, if you

27:19have the resource, trying to help them

27:21to scale up their security.

27:29Okay, thank you.

Source and accuracy details

Source export SHA256: 2e8205e1daa14ce3ddfff68c76f91ba5ed000f06dd55fd5f576c0e1bcdf85d26