DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 1 / Amber Hall

Auditing Is Not Bug Hunting: Securing Systems Through Risk Management

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Transcript

0:01Hi, good afternoon.

0:04Um, I'm going to talk today about our

0:06responsibility as auditors and how it

0:09goes beyond just finding bugs.

0:12Um, because when I started working at at

0:15doing the bug hunting and participating

0:17in contest, my goal was to find as many

0:21bugs as I can in order to maximize my

0:23payout. But I didn't have a

0:25responsibility for the system as a

0:26whole. If I lost if I missed a bug, it

0:29was a lost opportunity, not something

0:32that that I should be too much concerned

0:33about.

0:35And then I joined Storra and I started

0:38to do client audits. And now I started

0:40to have a responsibility for the system

0:41as a whole. I had to make sure that I

0:44don't miss any bugs and especially those

0:47who lead to

0:50um who lead to, you know, losses of

0:53millions of dollars.

0:57So how did that change my work? In two

1:00ways. First one is prioritizing. Now in

1:03bug bounties and contests as well, you

1:05have to prioritize by severity in order

1:08to maximize your payout.

1:10But I would argue that this uh severity

1:13is often subjective or theoretical and

1:15doesn't actually represent the actual

1:18potential damage uh of each bug.

1:22And when it comes to um actually

1:26protecting the system, you have to be

1:28dead practical about the potential

1:30damage of each bug.

1:33So usually I classify this into like

1:35minor issues which are not that

1:36significant, then significant issues

1:38which you don't want to miss. But then

1:40there are those uh issues that make it

1:42to the news with millions of dollars

1:44stolen. And this is the kind of stuff

1:46which you really really don't want to

1:47miss.

1:50Now the second way is

1:54by

1:56realizing that there are some ways to

1:57protect the system beyond just finding

1:59bugs and this is by introducing new

2:01hardening mechanism which would protect

2:04the system against some threats which

2:06are not due to onchain bugs. So a recent

2:08example is that Hedron um protocol which

2:13I audited a few months ago

2:15where

2:17they have a prop AMM. Now propriety AMM

2:20unlike a uh decentralized AMM where the

2:23price is determined by an algorithm.

2:25Here the price is determined by a single

2:28owner who owns the liquidity in the pool

2:30and also updates the price through an

2:33oracle service. Now this Oracle service

2:37is um you know it has up to like million

2:41updates per day. So you can't have like

2:43a human approving each update with the

2:45cold wallet. So it's a hot wallet which

2:47is stored on some server and this is

2:49obviously has a potential of getting

2:52compromised.

2:54Now what happens if it's compromised is

2:57an attacker can basically steal all of

3:00the funds in the pool. So they can

3:02basically set a price so that they can

3:03give a very fraction of uh soul for

3:06example for the entire USDC and then

3:08they give a fraction of use set a price

3:10to the other way and give a fraction of

3:12USDC for the remaining soul in the pool

3:15and this way in a single transaction you

3:17can just empty the pool.

3:21So what kind of mechanism did we

3:23introduce in order to defend against

3:25this kind of attack is the draw down

3:28guard. It's basically

3:30uh a mechanism which monitors that value

3:34of the liquidity of the pool and if it

3:36detects that the value is decreasing too

3:38fast then it pauses the pool and doesn't

3:40allow any further swap

3:43because a slow decrease can often happen

3:46naturally due to price changes. Um, but

3:49if we see that it's just moving too

3:51fast, like for example, 2% in 30

3:54seconds, then we should pause the pool

3:56and don't allow any further swap.

4:00Now, this slows down the attacker. It

4:02doesn't allow them to empty the pool in

4:04a single transaction,

4:06but it still allows them to do a slow

4:09drain over a few hours. Even with this

4:11mechanism, they can steal significant

4:14amount of the pool. So the second part

4:17of this mechanism is to monitor the pool

4:20through an external service. Uh a pa a a

4:24bot which has the pause a role which can

4:26only pause the the pool and not unpause

4:29it and in case it detects any invalid

4:31prices then it pauses the pool and the

4:35attacker can't um swap anymore. So those

4:38two mechanism together should

4:40significantly reduce the total amount of

4:43funds that an attacker can steal in case

4:45the uh oracle ro is compromised.

4:50Uh because you have only a few seconds

4:52before before the puzzle bot kicks in

4:54and the amount you can steal is should

4:56be you know depending on the

4:58configuration only a few percent um

5:02before the draw down guard kicks in.

5:06So yeah, so basically this is an example

5:08of how we can this is not a bug in the

5:10system. This is an additional mechanism

5:13uh which we give to the client to

5:16protect their system. And basically yeah

5:19this is this is the reason why the

5:20clients come to us. They come to us not

5:22just to find bugs but to protect the

5:24system and make sure they don't make it

5:26to the news with millions of dollars

5:27stolen. So this is what we should

5:29deliver to them. Thank you.

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