DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 1 / Pearl Hall

Out of scope, out of luck: the components audits keep ignoring

Jan Kalivoda

3:26 · Recording

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Transcript

0:00Okay. Hello everyone.

0:03Uh, we will finish this session by

0:06a little bit thinking about scope and

0:08how to choose it.

0:10I'm Jan

0:12and

0:13I'm co-founder of Egg Free and security

0:16researcher there.

0:18And if you think about Web Three typical

0:22audit, what comes firstly in mind, it's

0:24probably list of Solidity files where

0:28there is a smart contract repository,

0:30you got it sent from the client, you

0:32estimate it, and you audit contracts and

0:34right, that's it.

0:35But

0:37usually it's much bigger.

0:39So

0:41a lot of bugs are originating elsewhere

0:44or can have some

0:46complex behaviors between them.

0:49So

0:50here is the call out that the scope

0:52should be much bigger.

0:55We were doing a research which is

0:57publicly available. You can also catch

0:59me after the talk if you would like to

1:01show it.

1:02And it's basically some data set of

1:05exploits from January to September.

1:08And you can see that contract bugs have

1:10the highest incidences. So it is

1:13correct that we are focusing on them and

1:15we are auditing them, but the value is

1:18also leaking elsewhere.

1:20As you can see,

1:22for example, backend compromise and

1:23other domains.

1:26Moreover,

1:2871% of these exploits were out of scope

1:32while 23% were in scope, which is not a

1:36very low number. But if you

1:39look closer at it,

1:41you will figure out that only 8% of it

1:44are actually recent audits.

1:46So this is basically showing that audits

1:49are kind of useful, but they have also

1:51expiry.

1:54So I want to highlight here that audit

1:57scope is a security decision and just a

1:59formality.

2:01So

2:02the scope should be defined by our

2:04system, by our protocol, your

2:05application, whatever you have, and you

2:07shall follow the value there, map all

2:09your dependencies, build a trust and

2:12threat model.

2:13If you are not familiar how to do it, I

2:15think definitely there will be several

2:17humans and agents which would like to

2:18help you.

2:21And just from our experience, to give

2:22you some example what it can be,

2:25like you are auditing just a Solidity

2:27files, but it costs you almost zero

2:30time

2:31to just run a Git leaks. And you can

2:34find some critical private key exposure

2:38or anything hidden in some of the

2:40commits, which is exactly why Tyco get

2:44hacked if I am correct

2:46in past.

2:47Then there is a lot of other review

2:49areas such as obviously dependencies,

2:52some malicious version which is pinned

2:54or

2:55unfortunately loaded into some

2:58deployment.

2:59Then if you are reviewing also

3:00deployment scripts, you can find some

3:02inconsistencies between actual smart

3:04contract logic and the intentions from

3:06the customer. It can also help you. And

3:08then there is a lot of integrations or

3:10off-chain services where sometimes you

3:13are offloading some validation

3:15to backend and not in the smart

3:17contracts, then definitely you need to

3:19also look at the backend.

3:21And that's basically it, so we can go to

3:23lunch.

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