DSS 2026 — The Proof Lied: DeFi's Invisible Circuit Exploits Kalp Shah Source video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tiEHfFHuglg Automatic captions — not human-reviewed. Complete spoken-audio coverage is unverified. Source language tag: en (English). Source export SHA256: 67244805dae1d5e1f952f5ab173717eca19e284065c081d4508612ca4e29b07b [0:01] So have you guide heard about Zcash or [0:04] Zcash vulnerability [0:06] which happened in a Zcash anybody? [0:10] Yo, so basically it's not expert. It's [0:13] 30 million you know wipe out by market. [0:17] So let's you know deep dive into it. [0:21] So [0:22] I'm Kalpsha [0:24] security researcher at QuillAudit and [0:26] have working at [0:28] almost 2.5 years. [0:31] So [0:33] the bug is about the proof verified and [0:35] the constraint is missing in a circuit [0:38] and and that caused the counterfeiting [0:40] bug in a May 2026. [0:43] So the bug is about like [0:46] you know [0:48] the nullifier duplicates [0:51] and also the authorized keys duplicates [0:54] that makes the bug possible. To [0:56] understand that bug we need to [0:58] understand a couple few things like a [1:01] note. Note is a private coin and a value [1:05] that contain the value owner and [1:07] randomness and the nullifier that that [1:10] is like [1:12] the note does not use multiple times [1:14] that make sure that [1:17] that is like a one note and one [1:19] nullifier that make sure and also the [1:22] change of the key that create a [1:24] nullifier different. [1:27] Okay. [1:28] So there is a one concept like a k and n [1:32] k. The k is authorized key and n k is a [1:35] nullifier key. a k [1:38] authorized key basically provide how you [1:41] can spend the money and the n k is a [1:44] nullifier key which we discussed [1:45] earlier. [1:46] So a k and n k create IVK and with the [1:51] multiplier of IVK into the GD which is [1:54] which is a base point [1:56] you can get p k underscore d. [1:59] So this this is [2:01] and which is used to you know like while [2:04] we explaining the [2:06] core part of the bug. [2:08] So this is the several checks is [2:12] for the ZK bug bug. [2:15] All the the checks are in a different [2:18] different contracts and the fourth one [2:20] is about a k and n k which is about the [2:23] private key and the nullifier. [2:26] This is very important that create a [2:28] issue. [2:29] Also this is a vulnerable code [2:32] where the creating a bug and if you see [2:35] the code the assign [2:37] and the you know [2:41] assign k create a bug which is [2:44] if you think think of it like a table [2:47] if [2:48] this is like scalar modular [2:52] burning curve and that create an issue. [2:55] If you see the [2:57] table [2:58] the verifier proves [3:00] the value in the cells but the [3:03] prover cannot prove it. So [3:06] if you see the [3:08] first value of the base which is a [3:11] g_d which we see in earlier slide and [3:15] also the if you see the last two [3:19] cells it's also the three. So there is a [3:22] check that first and last [3:26] you know [3:27] cells are same and there is no check in [3:31] the middle of the row [3:32] that create an issue. [3:34] So what they check [3:36] they put any random value [3:38] and attacker can get p k _d [3:44] exactly that value that they want. So [3:47] think of it it's just a nuance. If you [3:49] think two raised to the 255 [3:54] amount this is a very [3:56] you know humongous amount of the [3:58] possibility of nullifier and authorized [4:01] key you can get. [4:05] So this is the exploit part. This part [4:08] create a fake [4:10] nullifier and the below part get you [4:12] know [4:13] fake AK. So by using that you can create [4:17] multiples nullifier and authorized key. [4:20] To fix that you must be use [4:24] multi copy of [4:26] the original B underscore D rather than [4:29] copying the copy of the other duplicates [4:33] one. [4:34] So [4:36] the catch of the this issue this issue [4:38] is found by the [4:40] Taylor which was you know one of the [4:43] researcher and this issue is just just [4:46] found after the [4:48] launching of Opus 4.8. [4:50] So the the thing is [4:53] thus they use same prompt customized [4:56] prompt to the Opus 4.7. They did not [4:59] find the issue but after the just launch [5:03] Opus 4.8 they find this issues. So the [5:06] main catch of this issue is like you [5:09] have to continuously you know [5:13] added the spikes invariant negative [5:15] tests and formal verification. Meanwhile [5:18] you add your custom prompts and while [5:21] the LLM upgrading their you know [5:25] versions you must you know like try [5:30] audit that and pull make the skills and [5:34] audit that and after the you know [5:37] auditing you without any bias you can [5:41] try that so that you can get the issues. [5:44] Yeah. [5:48] Thank you.