DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall

Automated Flashloan Attack Discovery

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0:00Um if you can hear me the first thing

0:01you'll notice is that my name is Martin

0:03Ion Martin and I go back a long way. Um

0:06we both did our PhD at the University of

0:08Wateroo. We are both auditors at

0:09Quonstant and then we both co-ounded

0:10Zirket. So I know Martin very well and

0:12this content very well. But due to some

0:14travel disruptions, he's not here. So

0:16I'm presenting on his behalf. If you

0:17have any questions, I'm happy to take

0:19them and refer them to Martin or answer

0:21them directly. Uh but without further

0:23ado, let's get into it. Um so I'm going

0:25to talk to you about automated flash

0:27flow and attack discovery. This is

0:28something that we've been very

0:29interested as auditors for years. Um,

0:32and we're going to give some updates on

0:34some tooling that we have developed. So,

0:37we'll go through the background. We'll

0:38give some updates on what we did, why

0:39we're giving this talk today, and then

0:42what we would like to see next in this

0:44particular area of um security. So,

0:47first, what is a flash loan? Probably

0:50everyone in this room does know what it

0:51is, but I do have to go through and tell

0:53you what it is. Essentially, they are

0:55unc uncolateralized loans that you can

0:57um take out over the duration of a

0:59single block. Usually a lot of liquidity

1:02uh usually you can get as much as you

1:04want. It's only bounded by what's

1:05available and as long as you pay it back

1:07within the same block, everything looks

1:09really good from the contract you're

1:10borrowing it from and you don't have to

1:12pay a lot of interest. In fact, pretty

1:14much none because it's the same time.

1:16So, uh these have been really

1:17problematic in this space. In 2023,

1:20um when this particular tooling was

1:22started, there were over $300 million

1:25lost um to attacks of this type. And

1:27this is a particularly challenging uh

1:29class of bugs to find because really

1:31it's not always a bug. A flash zone is

1:33not necessarily a bug on its own. Some

1:34people argue there are positive use

1:36cases. I've yet to find a lot that I

1:38love. Um but the challenge of finding

1:40them is that they're actually between

1:41protocols. So typically one protocol

1:43lends and then that excessive amount of

1:46um length of asset negatively affects um

1:49assets in another protocol that protocol

1:52you know does something with its own

1:53pricing uh and then gives the attacker

1:56some upside and then the original

1:58capital is returned and everything works

2:00out. But because of this difficulty,

2:02auditing any single protocol or

2:05reviewing any single protocol is very

2:07very um unlikely to find that bug or at

2:10least um you have to know what to look

2:12for and you have to be very familiar

2:13with flash loss. So because you're

2:15looking at multiple protocols, these

2:16things are particularly challenging and

2:17so we think it's something we need to

2:18actually care about a lot. To do that um

2:21some tooling was built. So in 2023 um

2:24Jeff and others at the University of

2:25Toronto, Jeff worked at Quan for a while

2:27uh built a tool called Flash and Flash

2:29was actually pretty effective at finding

2:32these types of attacks on deployed uh D5

2:35protocols in the Ethereum ecosystem. So

2:37what we wanted to do is actually see if

2:39we can update this because some reasons

2:40I'll get to in a second. But first, how

2:43does it work? Very quickly, um this is,

2:45you know, a long paper published at

2:47Dixie. So I can't present it all in 15

2:48minutes, let alone as part of the

2:50background work. But essentially what

2:51you're going to do is you're going to

2:52treat the flash loan as a optimization

2:55problem and then you're going to use um

2:57counter examples to refine the system.

2:58So you're going to sample things that

3:00you can do on various D5 protocols on a

3:02real fork of D5 protocols. You're going

3:04to try to like you know mock the VM so

3:06that you can make calls from that as

3:07appropriate or just actually get the um

3:09flash loan itself working. And then

3:11you're going to approximate some profit

3:14measure. You're going to search for an

3:15action sequence that let lets you get to

3:18that approximate value. So, you know,

3:19various loans, various deposits, various

3:21withdrawals, depends on the assets

3:23involved, depends on the um supporting

3:25infrastructure you can do. And then if

3:27you can do that and you verify that

3:28you've made some money, then you sort of

3:29report, hey, I may have found a flash

3:31loan. This is a real problem. Let's go

3:33take a look. Um, but basically what

3:36we're looking for in these types of

3:37sequences are things that are price

3:38manipulation or oracle manipulations and

3:40exchange rate manipulations. So, we're

3:42not necessarily um looking for other

3:44things. Now, if we find something else,

3:46that's cool. But typically out of out of

3:48scope are things where you have only a

3:50limited number of uh actions you can

3:52take. Uh logic bugs like re-entry. This

3:54is not the type of bug we're finding.

3:56And some very weird singularities like

3:58when things go to zero. So this is sort

3:59of looking for the average case in the

4:01real world um after an audit. So you

4:04don't expect really bad code, you just

4:06expect weird interactions between pieces

4:08of code. And the idea is to find

4:10something where you get profit. And it

4:11does this. It does this reasonably well.

4:14And over the last 3 years, 2023 was was

4:173 years ago, um, Quamp and Martin and

4:21others have started looking at this tool

4:23and using it in some various places. We

4:25want to use it more. We think it's

4:26actually underutilized. We think flash

4:27one tooling is still something that's

4:29not particularly um, up to date and we

4:32wanted to change that. So, what Martin

4:33did uh, was actually take this to the

4:35first DAO security funding round, which

4:37happened over the summer and said, "Hey,

4:39you know, can we raise some money to

4:40modernize this tool?" because prior to

4:42this um update, which is why I'm giving

4:44this talk on's behalf, it would be very

4:47cumbersome to use this tool. It's not

4:49quite as bad as full formal

4:50verification. So, you don't need a whole

4:52bunch of, you know, very specific domain

4:54specific languages to learn, but you do

4:55need to go into the tool and figure out

4:57how it works. But over the last 3 years,

4:59in addition to um hacks being obviously

5:01still problematic, uh we've seen LLMs

5:03become very very popular and doing a

5:05bunch of really cool stuff. And so if

5:06the LLM can do all that stuff for you,

5:09we should make it so that the LM can do

5:11that for you. And so that's what we

5:13wanted to do over the last 3 years. Um

5:15what we wanted to do is basically make

5:17it very very simple to take this tool,

5:19download it from the GitHub repo, and

5:20then make minimal set of configuration

5:22changes to say, hey, I want to look at

5:24this protocol on chain and see if it's

5:27vulnerable to flash context. And so now

5:29all you need to do is define two files,

5:30um this attack.est.sol file and this

5:33manifest manifest.l

5:35and set it up in all the right right

5:36ways and you say, "Okay, I want to

5:37deposit certain assets. I'm looking for

5:39these parameters." And if you tune all

5:40of that, right, the engine's going to do

5:42the work without you having to go edit

5:43that. So, this is actually a bit of a

5:45cleanup and an update from the original

5:48version of the software that probably

5:50would require an auditor or at least a

5:52couple of hours of work to fix. So, now

5:54um as you'll see later, what we can do

5:56is actually get LLM to this very

5:58quickly. More concretely, over the

6:00summer after the funds were raised, what

6:02uh was done was to first make things

6:03reproducible. So, we dockerize things.

6:05We've made Python work a lot better with

6:07up to- date dependencies. Obviously,

6:09software supply chains are still a

6:10concern, but like um you know, things

6:12that were currently state-of-the-art in

6:142023 are no longer the case now. So,

6:16even that would have been a problem for

6:17you. Now, we fixed that. Second, uh we

6:20wanted to be able to use these manifests

6:22and test files rather than uh going into

6:25the engine and making changes very

6:27hands-on in a very messy way. We also

6:30made some bug bug fixes like changing

6:31how decimals are handles. So we can do

6:33this um you know in a better way and as

6:36a result we get better results. Actually

6:37the tool became more accurate. And then

6:40finally um three things that are really

6:41cool. Uh a CLI that's actually really

6:43compatible with LM. I'll still get to

6:45exactly how that works, but essentially

6:47we have some new commands that basically

6:49say, you know, to the LM, if you just

6:51want to collect data, do this. If you

6:52just want to validate something, do

6:53this. It's very simple. Now, um I don't

6:56have time to give you an example over

6:57the next 7 minutes. Anyways, uh but do

6:59take a look. There's a link at the end.

7:01And we can also define a grammar for

7:03what it means to actually have a flash

7:05on borrows and deposits be inverted and

7:07things like this. And if you donate and

7:09burn, there's different. And finally,

7:11there's performance updates. Um, as

7:13software developers, we're also uh

7:16always excited to get performance

7:17improvements and so we're able to make

7:18it almost two times faster. Um, using

7:21more modern versions of standard

7:23blockchain testing tools, which is also

7:25really cool. So, the work's been update

7:27or yeah, the work's been completed and

7:29the software has been updated to test

7:31that. And maybe this is the impact that

7:33maybe I should have led the slides with,

7:34but um, essentially we were able to run

7:37it against common hacks that we found

7:39and it still performs very well. it

7:41still finds things that um were

7:43problematic. So if we pointed back at

7:45Oiler or Harvest or a damn vulnerable

7:48DeFi uh example or Lazy Summer, the ones

7:50shown on the screen, it will actually

7:52find flash loans that would have uh

7:54resulted in this problem. So these are

7:56all um exploits that have been fixed or

7:58been exploited in the real past or that

8:00you know not something you want to

8:01target now. These are not new exploit

8:03vectors. Um we also created some new

8:05examples for you to see how it works. in

8:07particular, we came up with this fluid

8:09Q1 where you can sort of say that

8:11actually sometimes not all um situations

8:14are going to be flash loans and so it

8:16serves as a way to calibrate your own

8:18testing. But essentially um this slide

8:21shows that the tooling will find flash

8:23loans in real world situations and it'll

8:25come up with the exact sequence of

8:27events that you need to have executed

8:28that attack. Now obviously the tool is

8:30not meant for exploiters, it's meant for

8:32people to guard these systems. So you

8:33see this and you figure out what is need

8:34to change and you go home and change it.

8:36straightforward. Um, as a more concrete

8:39example, we'll take a look at the lazy

8:41summer example. Uh, the exploit that

8:43happened in the real world was 6

8:45something million. It's a lot of money.

8:48Our tool found a flash loan only of 1.4,

8:50but that's still enough for you to say,

8:52"Hey, wait a minute. Maybe someone else

8:53could have had a better flash loan or

8:55there's still a flash loan possibility."

8:57So, while the tool is not absolutely

8:59perfect, obviously didn't match what the

9:00exploiter did, showing a flash loan

9:02vulnerability of 1.4 4 million is still

9:04probably going to be enough for everyone

9:05in this room to to take a look at their

9:06code and say, "Hey, wait a minute. I

9:08should do something about this and maybe

9:10there's something we can do." And so the

9:11way it did it is found a sequence of

9:13deposits and donates and redeems in such

9:14a way that this happened. This is really

9:16cool because it used multiple um vaults

9:19and other systems in in order to do this

9:21and it did it all automatically. So

9:23that's really really cool. Um this is

9:25also the same type of attack that uh

9:27harvest suffered as well. In other

9:30cases, we don't want to show you that it

9:31only works in good ways. if you want to

9:33make sure that it doesn't give you false

9:34positives uh in some settings at least

9:36and so we came up with other work

9:38examples with all this one through a T1

9:40and essentially we came up with some way

9:41that you get an NFT issuance token and

9:44you get some position and then the tool

9:46will basically report that in this case

9:47actually it's not that problematic um

9:49and because this is a very worked

9:51example within the code I'm not going to

9:52go into it it's not something that's

9:53very general most people will understand

9:55but um it does not report many false

9:57positives but in short um of many of the

10:00old of the hacks that have happened

10:02recently

10:02It still actually does a pretty good job

10:04at about half of them, which is great. I

10:06don't think any one tool is going to

10:07solve every single hack. But if we build

10:10a set of tools to put in our toolbox,

10:12one tool will hopefully find the problem

10:13in every protocol if there is one.

10:17And now, um, the idea was basically to

10:20make it very easy to run for LLM so that

10:21you yourself don't need to run this. Um,

10:23here's an exact prompt you can use. It's

10:25going to be on the slides, a link to it

10:27later. Um, but essentially instead of

10:28having to do any manual work with uh the

10:31Smashson codebase, you can now just

10:34import it, have your, you know, catch or

10:36cla or copilot or wherever you say,

10:38"Hey, I want to do this. Find me hacks."

10:40And then it's it's good. The downside is

10:43um because you found profit doesn't mean

10:45it's necessarily a hack, but it should

10:46be taken as a good warning sign that you

10:48need to go look at your codebase and the

10:50interactions that Flashton said you had

10:52and say, "Can you explain what

10:55happened?" And if it's a real problem,

10:56go take some steps to fix it before you

10:58deploy your code. Please find something

11:00live, please report it in a whitehead

11:02manner. Okay, almost out of time, almost

11:05out of slides. What's next? Um, so that

11:08was really good. I think actually

11:09updating the tooling so that anyone can

11:12use it is really nice cuz we actually

11:14want to be accessible. We want security

11:15to be accessible. We think everyone's

11:18responsibility is security in this

11:19ecosystem. And at this conference in

11:21particular, I don't think that's a a

11:23controversial thing to say. U but what's

11:26next? Well, actually, we'd love to test

11:28this more. And we had a bit of a problem

11:30with that. We had the tool. We didn't

11:31know exactly what to find. Um you could

11:34point it at every single DeFi Lama

11:35contract out there and it doesn't it

11:37doesn't find a lot. That's great cuz

11:39actually we didn't want to find anything

11:40on a live DeFi Lama project because then

11:42we'd have to go, you know, talk to them

11:44and secure it and obviously that's

11:45something we do, but uh we didn't want

11:47any of the contracts to be vulnerable.

11:49So, uh, everything worked out really

11:50well, but it was still very difficult to

11:53find, um, things that you should test

11:55pooling. And so, one thing that we want

11:57to talk about for the last few minutes

11:58of this talk is essentially, can we come

12:01up with a directory of value, a system

12:03or an onchain registry that says these

12:05are contracts that are really valuable,

12:06so you can test to link against it. And

12:08actually, what Martin did was put

12:10together an RFP for exactly this on the

12:12next DAW funding round. So if you have

12:14money to burn and you think security is

12:16a an important thing, security

12:18researchers always need a good corpus of

12:19valuable contracts because otherwise

12:21they will cherrypick the ones that they

12:22need to get their paper published, but

12:24that's only going to save those

12:26contracts. We need all of them to be

12:27saved. Um, and so the idea was to put

12:29out an RFP where anyone can submit a

12:32contract saying this is something that's

12:33really valuable to the community. It

12:35should not get hacked. Test your tools

12:36against it. If you find something, go

12:38please, you know, report get a bug

12:40bounty for it if that's possible. So,

12:42this is an active DAO uh funding

12:43proposal that's open right now. Um, if

12:45you're interested, take a look. There's

12:46a link at the end. Come talk to me or

12:48I'm sure there's some people from the

12:49DAO here. There were yesterday, so I'm

12:51sure they're still here. Please, you

12:52know, talk to them. And why we want that

12:55is again because um the tooling we found

12:59on previous exploits worked. We were

13:02able to find them. Maybe not the same

13:04magnitude, but we were able to say flash

13:05loans existed on the previously hacked

13:07versions of code. That was good. also

13:10good, but not necessarily good from a

13:12tooling point of view or tooling

13:14research point of view is that when we

13:15point it on live contracts, it also

13:16reported no bugs. That's good in the

13:18sense that nothing's vulnerable, but

13:20it's bad in the sense we don't know what

13:21to test. We don't know where else is

13:23going to be vulnerable, right? What we

13:25want to be able to do is point at new

13:26contracts that you're currently using

13:28that you think is important and say,

13:29"Hey, is this currently vulnerable? If

13:31so, let's go fix it." So we have a a

13:33good, you know, set of of back testing

13:36that works and we know that the things

13:38that are really really popular are

13:40secure, but there's a middle ground that

13:41surely holds millions of dollars that a

13:43lot of people are going to use and we

13:44need to be able to secure those as well.

13:46So we don't know if our tool is more in

13:48the it's definitely not going to find

13:50something on deployed code or it only

13:51works on back testing because we've

13:52overengineered it in that way which I

13:54don't think is the case. So we need more

13:56data. The one way we can do this is to

13:59get that RFP settled to get a nice

14:01directory of value and then

14:04throw a bunch of LLMs with this tool on

14:06it and say, "Hey, what what actually

14:07went wrong?" You know, what needs to be

14:09changed and is that our tooling that

14:10needs to be changed? Is there types of

14:12um flash that we're not capturing or are

14:14there vulnerable contracts out there

14:15that need to be secured today because

14:17otherwise something will happen. So,

14:18what would settle it is if we get some

14:20exploits that do it and they don't

14:22necessarily come with explanations of

14:24the mechanisms, right? that would make

14:26sure that the tool is finding a general

14:28case and we haven't overengineered for

14:30specific flash loan cases. To do that,

14:31we do need that RFP. Please talk to me

14:34about funding it. With that, I'm out of

14:36time. Anyways, these are the links.

14:37Flash is available in the quant GitHub

14:39and the directory of value is um open

14:42for funding on the Dow right now. So,

14:44thank you very much. Any questions, find

14:45me or email Martin. Thank you.

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