DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall

Quantum-Safe Is Not Just Post-Quantum Signatures

Abhinav Sharma

6:08 · Recording

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Transcript

0:00Perfect.

0:01So,

0:02hello everyone. My name is Abhinav.

0:04I'll be talking something other than AI.

0:08Of course, why not?

0:10I'll be talking about how quantum safe

0:12is not just about post quantum

0:14signatures

0:15and we have five more layers including

0:19that that we need to take care of.

0:21So,

0:23the general reflex around

0:25securing ourself from

0:28post quantum world.

0:30We only take care

0:33of one failure mode which is just that

0:35will swap the signatures with quantum

0:37proof signatures.

0:38But

0:39I want to make sure that there are four

0:41more layers that we could get our

0:43awareness on and what are they and what

0:45we need to take care of.

0:48The modern cryptography relies on one

0:51assumption which is that certain

0:53mathematical problems

0:55are very hard to solve

0:58so that even if we have enormous

1:00computing power

1:01the goal to get the right answer is

1:04practically infeasible.

1:05And

1:06quantum computing challenges this

1:08assumption by saying hey

1:10what if we change the architecture of

1:12the computation itself? So, instead of

1:14representing our information in the bits

1:16of zeros and one what we'll do is we'll

1:19use something called as qubits and this

1:21qubit represents

1:22a simultaneous state

1:25by using a principle called as

1:27superposition. I won't go into the

1:28details due to the lack of time, but

1:31current estimate says that we need

1:32around 1200 logical qubits and around

1:35less than 9 minutes to crack

1:38one private key

1:39and less than 9 days to crack top 1000

1:43Ethereum accounts.

1:46Basically decimation.

1:49There are five layers that we need to

1:50take care of.

1:52The first one is ownership that we all

1:53know which is what?

1:55Cracking your private key. So, each one

1:57of us must have a wallet address that

1:59wallet address is nothing but a public

2:02key.

2:03And quantum computers can break your

2:05private key by using that public key. So

2:07when you're transacting, you're exposing

2:09your public key.

2:11When I'm talking about ownership, I'm

2:12not just talking about these signatures,

2:14but also the admin accounts that are

2:17being used to transact multi-billion

2:20cryptos from one point to another.

2:23And so the fix here will be to focus

2:25more on account abstraction that makes

2:27ownership much more flexible and key

2:30rotation followed by quantum proof

2:32signatures.

2:33The second one will be the code base. So

2:35in order to stay under the gas limit,

2:38smart contracts

2:40give their heavy lifting to something

2:42called as Nates pre-compiles, which is

2:44EC recover, we have BLS 12 pairing and

2:47many more.

2:48These are also dependent on the elliptic

2:51curve cryptography, which means that if

2:53I can break them

2:55or an attacker who has a quantum

2:56computer can break them,

2:58the impact can become that I can just

3:00forge a proof on a rollup, an invalid

3:03proof.

3:04So the fix here will be to use

3:05post-quantum pre-compiles and slowly

3:08move forward to the lattice-based

3:09designs.

3:11Third one, which is the consensus. So

3:13validators are using the BLS key

3:16which are

3:18curve friendly

3:19and

3:20if an attacker can sort of get their

3:23hands on cracking the validator key,

3:26they can forge attestations at a large

3:29scale. We need

3:30two-thirds of the majority and believe

3:32me, this is not about stealing funds. It

3:35is about the network's ability to agree

3:37on what is true.

3:39The fix here will be to harden

3:41the validator key rotation and

3:43post-quantum signature aggregation as it

3:45matures.

3:46Data availability. So

3:48rollups

3:51they upload, for lack of better words,

3:53their data

3:55and these validators do not just extract

3:58it and verify it. They are dependent on

4:00something called as KGZ commitments.

4:02These commitments are essentially the

4:04proof that what is being transported is

4:07actually what we want.

4:10The

4:11quantum attacker can basically forge

4:14these since KZG commitment also uses

4:17elliptic curve cryptography.

4:19If this goes

4:21of the if this breaks, that means I can

4:24forge the proofs that are invalid in

4:25nature

4:26and that means the entire roll up

4:28infrastructure needs to

4:30be quantum safe.

4:33The fifth and I think the

4:36most underestimated one is the privacy.

4:39So all of these protocols that

4:41essentially say that they are

4:42anonymizing the user

4:44it breaks into two parts. First is the

4:46key exchange that is responsible for

4:49sharing the secret between two users. If

4:51this goes down, that means we can

4:54deanonymize a user followed by checking

4:57all of this his old transactions as

4:59well.

5:00The second is the same called as

5:02pedersen commitments which is

5:04essentially

5:06hiding the amount of value that is being

5:08transported.

5:10If that goes down, which means it is not

5:12just about the value that I can get from

5:14this, but I can also force the invalid

5:17proofs which is essentially

5:18counterfeiting

5:20minting money out of thin air.

5:22So

5:24in order to be

5:25in order for us to say that we are

5:27quantum safe

5:29there were five layers that we need to

5:30take care of and believe these are not

5:33just

5:34race against a particular transaction as

5:36some of the things like the KZG

5:38commitments need a trusted setup and one

5:41offline compute can crack that

5:43which means it is not just about race

5:44against time, but we need to have a five

5:47layer checklist as a security researcher

5:50that could focus on auditing the stack

5:53and focus more on the

5:56thinking statement that this is not not

5:58just about

5:59a checkbox but a checklist.

6:02This marks the end of my talk. I hope

6:04you have a great time.

6:05Thank you.

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