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DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Amber Hall

Are MPC wallets ready for the post quantum age?

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0:00Per so good afternoon everyone. I'm Yun

0:02from Fortify and today we'll be talking

0:04about whether your MPC wallets are

0:06actually ready for the postcoh. So to

0:09starters we are fortify by paxos. We do

0:12NPC wallets that for in institutional

0:16usages where NPC is at our core that

0:19then keys are split and never

0:21reconstructed to sign. Uh disclaimer

0:23this talk was meant to be a a joint talk

0:26with my CEO Dimma but he wasn't able to

0:28attend. So today we will discuss why the

0:31heck should we care about quantum

0:32computing? What's the actual quantum

0:34thread and what are the new signatures

0:36that we're considering? what the

0:38blockchain are planning to do and how

0:40does postquantum look in the NPC world

0:42and well if it's not ready what can we

0:44actually do cool so why the heck should

0:47I care now to be honest it's quite

0:49simple quantum attacks are getting quite

0:51closer now like large companies such as

0:54Google are targeting 2029 to migrate to

0:56fully postquantum schemes and ECDA is

0:59going to be dupregated by 2023 by 230

1:02sorry so it's quite around us around the

1:06corner to be honest And moreover,

1:08research and standardization of new

1:10schemes actually take time, especially

1:12the MPC schemes that really comely come

1:14after only the signing schemes. And

1:17moreover, the chain migrations also take

1:19time. So, we need to start early. But

1:21what actually happens once we have a

1:23quantum computer? First and foremost,

1:25almost all public key cryptography is

1:27going to be broken. Using Shor's

1:29algorithm, we given a public key, you

1:31could simply take a look at it and say,

1:33well, I can break that and find the

1:34private key quite instantly. So that

1:37means that all our ECDSA, EDSA and other

1:40elliptic curves or even RSA is going to

1:42be broken. And on the other hand,

1:44there's also the symmetric keys such as

1:46SHA and AES. They're going to be

1:48weakened,

1:49which means that we need larger keys,

1:51but we can still use them. So the major

1:54blockchains are using skins that are

1:56going to be broken. Then we need to

1:57replace them. But what are we going to

1:59replace them with? Well, there are many

2:01options er such as Magnus actually said

2:05there are many schemes such as hashbased

2:07signature which we can use specifically

2:09SLHDSA and there are the latest ones

2:11such as MLDDSA and Falcon which these

2:14schemes are the most

2:16used schemes to be honest the most

2:18looked at because they are the N

2:19standards there are other schemes which

2:21we won't discuss and there are other

2:23schemes which were really leading in the

2:26candidates of the N standardization and

2:27they were simply broking along the Okay,

2:30so you can think of it as it's quite

2:32hard to actually think of and invent new

2:34schemes and new cryptographic

2:35mathematics. So I won't discuss the

2:38hashbased signature a lot again thanks

2:40to Magnus which helped me a lot here

2:41this time but in very short terms you

2:44have a hash value you have a secret key

2:46you simply hash it a number of times say

2:48hey this is my signature and then you

2:50give it to some verifier which hashes

2:51the remaining number of times compare it

2:54to your public and says well you're okay

2:55that signature is fine on top of that

2:58you build more sophisticated scheme such

3:00as SLHDA which I I like to think of it

3:03as a tree signing the root of other

3:05three. Now a very important point here

3:08is that it's considered a conservative

3:10option. Why? Well, we are relying on

3:13hash hash schemes which we know and love

3:15and use every day. And moreover, as you

3:18can notice, I never said which hash

3:19function we actually are using. So if

3:21the hash is broken, simply change the

3:23hash function. But you don't need to

3:24change the scheme. Now it's not all

3:27perfect. It has its own weaknesses such

3:29as being slow and also it has large

3:32signatures. like it's almost 100 times

3:34larger than SDSA.

3:37On the other hand, we have the latises

3:39which is the new cool method on the

3:41field of cryptography. What's lises?

3:43Very complicated. In short bases, it's

3:46simply think of it as linear algebra.

3:48You have your basis vector. It's long

3:50and skewed and angly. And then your goal

3:52is to find a very small vector that

3:54simply is hard to find giving those

3:56bases. In the picture here, we see that

3:58it's 2D. Actually, it's a thousand

4:00dimension. So, it's quite hard. And

4:02there are the most two interested

4:05schemes which are MLDDSA and Falcon.

4:07LDSA relies on noisy linear equations

4:09and Falcon relies on structured latises.

4:12Where are these? Well, that's not

4:13important for our talk today. And

4:15there's a very interesting here point

4:17here which is these math are actually

4:19quite debated. Like if you ask the

4:21German federal office, they will say

4:23well it's nice, it's cool, but please

4:25use it in a hybrid form. Please use some

4:27kind of ECD say currently because we are

4:29unsure that it's actually safe. or even

4:31there are people in the industry that

4:33simply say well please avoid structured

4:35mathematical assumptions entirely. I

4:37think it says something a bit or two

4:39about these schemes and also it has its

4:42own weaknesses such as being large in

4:44public keys but it also has new

4:46strengths which is being fast and being

4:48small in signature size. Cool. Now let's

4:51take a step back and look at the point

4:52of view of a blockchain. Well, what's

4:54important for them? There are three main

4:56points. First is the hardness which I

4:58find the most interesting as a

4:59cryptographer. And there is also

5:01signature size which and key size also

5:03which is quite important for them

5:05considering that we want small

5:06signatures and keys. And there's also

5:08the aggregation points. So what each

5:11blockchain is considering? Well, it's

5:13quite diverse to be honest. They are the

5:15ones that are considering hashbased

5:16because of its conservativeness such as

5:18arc essentially which I really like

5:20because you can now use pre-ompiles of

5:22SLHDSA specifically and their mainet

5:25which is quite nice and there's bitcoins

5:27which in simply are considering a forked

5:30of SLHDSA

5:31similar to sphinx minus essentially

5:35which reduces the size signature sizes

5:38and also make it faster. On the other

5:40hand, there are ones which are

5:41considering the fingering, sorry,

5:44favoring the size such as Salana and

5:46Tron and Ethereum. As Magnus again said,

5:49they are quite generic. They're saying,

5:51well, use what the heck you ever you

5:52want. You can use Falcon, MLDDSA, ECDA,

5:55sorry, SLHDSA. Eventually, currently,

5:58you can actually use it in Ethereum, but

6:00eventually it will be native with

6:02pre-ompiles with EIP8141.

6:04And for the consensus, they are

6:06considering mostly the hashbased again

6:08for its conservativeness.

6:10Now let's even take a step back. What

6:12are what is going to happen with NPC

6:14wallets? Well, a bit about NPC wallets.

6:16For those who don't know, NPC is simply

6:18the idea of having multiple parties

6:20perform a computation where your inputs

6:23are simply private. Think of it as a

6:26multiple parties which know which want

6:27to know who is richer to be honest like

6:29it can be any math problems that you

6:31want to solve. And in specifically in

6:33the signing world of crypto, it's the

6:36idea of having number of parties which

6:37each hold a share of the key of the

6:40private key and eventually they need to

6:42communicate together perform some kind

6:43of protocol computation eventually to

6:46create a new standardized a new standard

6:48signature which is invincible on chain

6:50compared to some something like multisig

6:52which you know how much people actually

6:54were used to sign that signature. And

6:56the primary bottleneck here is actually

6:58the communication. The math here, how

7:00much it takes to create a signature or

7:03to do the computation relies heavily on

7:05how many rounds do I need to send to the

7:07other people. How many packets do I need

7:09to send them? Because you're doing a

7:10joint computation. You don't simply send

7:12a message and then boom, the secondary

7:14is ready. So there are three main groups

7:17of computation of steps essentially.

7:19There are the linear steps which are

7:20simply local operations that you do.

7:23They're quite cheap. They're local

7:24operations. you don't need to send

7:25anything to the network. On the other

7:27hand, there are some things like multip

7:29multiplying secrets. These require

7:31simply a round or two based on the

7:32scheme of MPC that you're using. And

7:34then there's the interesting ones, the

7:36nonlinear operations such as hashings

7:38which require a lot of communication

7:40rounds to do. Essentially, you would

7:42need a lot of communication rounds

7:43sending to each other waiting for the

7:45response until to be able to perform

7:47that signing. And the important point

7:49here is today's signatures they are

7:51using mostly linear operations. So they

7:53are quite interactive to be honest. But

7:55the postquantum schemes well there are a

7:57different story. They are more nonlinear

8:00rounds and they require a lot of more

8:03nonlinear operations to do so. So you

8:06can assume that's going to be quite

8:08slow. How slow? Well, that's exactly

8:10what we wanted to see. And we decided to

8:13take a look of what would happen if now

8:15there was a quantum computer. What how

8:17how would we actually do and perform

8:20with these? So we took the most

8:22important known protocols in the MPC

8:24world considering the postquantum war

8:27and benchmarked them benchmarked them on

8:29the two-party signing. We considered two

8:31different deployment models. First the

8:33same region which we have two servers

8:35sitting next to each other which high

8:37with high bandwidth network and on the

8:39other hand you have the phone and cloud

8:40similar to how we do at Fortify which we

8:42have an enclave and a mobile which

8:43communicate and here your bandwidth is

8:46quite more constrained and we time two

8:49things. First the offline the offline

8:51phase which is simply preparation of

8:53your message that you're going to sign.

8:56You can do this before you need you know

8:57what message you're going to sign which

8:59in case of blockchain what is your

9:01transaction that you're going to sign

9:02and the only phase that once you have

9:04your transaction that you want to sign

9:05how much time would you need until you

9:07sign it. So now we're going to go over

9:10the most important protocols and see how

9:13it actually deployed. So starting with

9:14MLDDSA there is the myth world protocol.

9:17Quite a nice one. And the problem with

9:19MLDDSA is the idea that even once you

9:22have the signature of your transaction,

9:24you can't simply broadcast it away

9:26immediately. You need to check that it's

9:29it has some kind of requirements that

9:30doesn't leak your information. And the

9:33idea here is that in the NPC state, in

9:36the NPC regime, you need to actually

9:37verify that it's okay to rebroadcast,

9:40but you have other people that you need

9:42to also trust. So you can't trust them.

9:44So what did they do? They essentially

9:45took a different approach was simply

9:48each party would consider his own part

9:50of the signature and say okay it

9:52verifies that it's small enough let's

9:54say and then broadcastes to the other

9:56people to simply build up the signature

9:59which enables it actually to be quite

10:01interactive on each and every different

10:03network and eventually it's quite

10:05practical up to the six parties but you

10:08know most of the deployment modes is

10:09actually enough for and on the other

10:12hand there is threshold falcon threshold

10:14falcon is quite write new protocol and

10:16it's a breakthrough to be honest for

10:19those who know about about Falcon. Well,

10:21Fal Falcon relies on floating points.

10:23Floating points and NBC are they aren't

10:26friends. They hate each other. They

10:27don't work together at all. So, what did

10:29they do? They essentially targeted a

10:31different random sampler. Instead of

10:34Gaussian, they used Klein. What does

10:35that mean? Not that important, but it's

10:37simply that they use integers and they

10:40also target batch signs. The number that

10:42we are seeing here are essentially when

10:43you want to sign a single message and

10:45you can see that it's not quite so

10:47interactive such as MLDDSA but still

10:50quite usable on the server server side

10:52on the mobile and server well not so

10:55much but if you consider bat signing

10:58like let's say I don't know signing 200

11:00signatures at once it can be actually

11:02quite usable mostly on the server server

11:04side and there's a small caveat which

11:07you need a trusted dealer like some kind

11:09of third party which comes and splits

11:10your keys and shares and does all the

11:12first pre-processing state. And now the

11:15fun part begins for me which is SLHDSA.

11:19Up until last two months, there weren't

11:22any MPC protocols at all for SLHDSA and

11:26there was actually a paper which

11:28released which used fully homorphic for

11:31for those who know which required eight

11:33GPUs such as RTX 490 and could sign a

11:37message in 3 minutes. Well, nice, cool,

11:40but not so interactive. And we have been

11:42doing doing our own research to be

11:45honest and as a HD and we were able to

11:47sign in two party mode between a server

11:49and a server or a mobile and a server in

11:51less than a second. And how did we do

11:55that? Well, we're going to publish a

11:57paper later on in a couple of few weeks.

11:59So stay tuned for that. But in short,

12:02some of the key ideas that we did is the

12:04fact that SLDA can be quite paralyzable.

12:07So what happens if you paralyze it with

12:09GPUs and quite heavy optimizations?

12:13Well, you can get some interesting

12:14things. What are the caveats from our

12:16side? Well, we're mostly targeting the

12:18two-party signing although it can be

12:20done also for multiple party and we're

12:22targeting the shape parameter sets for

12:24those who know that hash function and

12:27specifically because it's quite MPC

12:29friendly.

12:31Now let's say that today a a quantum

12:34computer is deployed and a lot of the

12:36other schemes other than the ones that

12:38we log they don't have an APC protocol.

12:40Well can what can you do actually

12:41instead there are many options such as

12:43onchain multiig but then you would make

12:46it visible how many signage you need and

12:48how many verifiers you need or secret

12:50sharing. What if you simply take your

12:52private key and secret share between

12:53number of parties and simply have some

12:55kind of trust in environment signing

12:57that it's okay but you know if your

12:59trusted environment is compromised then

13:00your key is compromised not as NPC which

13:03you need to compromise all the parties

13:05at once there are also snack

13:06aggregations nice but they're quite

13:08heavy and require specific operations on

13:11chains and there are hybrids which I

13:13really like I even like it so much that

13:16we're going to look at a case study what

13:18happens if we actually need to use

13:19hybrids we can do something quite

13:21interesting. You can use the MPC for the

13:23classical side for the ACDSA side and

13:26then you can also use secret sharing

13:28specifically to pro like to secret share

13:31your postquantum key and then use it on

13:33a trusted environment. Then you would

13:35actually need like a way to break let's

13:38you still have the NPC because you need

13:40the classical part to sign with to sign

13:42the classical part like you need the NPC

13:44on the other side for the postquantum

13:46you need the two secret shares. Now

13:48there's the point that it's

13:49reconstructed on the trusted

13:50environment. So if the trusted

13:52environment is compromised, you still

13:54need the hybrid signing unless a quantum

13:57machine actually compromises you, then

13:59you're simply screwed and you can't do

14:01anything. So these are the points that

14:03if we actually consider

14:06more schemes essentially require more

14:08NPC research and the alternatives are

14:11not exactly a replacement. Each one has

14:13its own problems and chains should

14:15actually weigh NPC when they choosing

14:18the scheme because when they're choosing

14:19the schemes they are quite determined

14:22how much the MPC wallet can actually

14:24follow in the postquantum world. Yeah.

14:26Thank you.

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