DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 1 / Pearl Hall

How to Model Cryptoeconomic Attacks and Adversaries in DeFi

Abhimanyu Nag

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Transcript

0:02Hey everyone.

0:03Full house. Nice to see that.

0:06Uh

0:07So, I'm Abhimanyu. Thank you so much for

0:10coming to my talk. I'm talking about

0:12cryptoeconomic attacks and adversaries

0:14in DeFi.

0:16This is going to be a more foundational

0:18talk than some of the others.

0:21This isn't, you know, solely, strictly

0:24based on the MEV

0:26literature that you all have seen or are

0:28used to. And this is coming more from

0:30the econ CS side from anything else.

0:32I'm also my tax fellow at the University

0:34of Alberta.

0:35Would love to talk about it later.

0:39So,

0:40the main primitive that we're going to

0:42be talking about here is going to be

0:46auctions and how DeFi auctions have been

0:49set up and how you can manipulate them.

0:53There are a lot of examples of auctions

0:55that you've seen in DeFi till now.

0:57There's liquidation auctions,

1:00trading auctions, which I mean as

1:01intent-based auctions like cow swap, so

1:03on and so forth. And there's also block

1:05space auctions, which is

1:07the normal

1:09block space

1:11allocation and payments that are

1:13required by block producers.

1:15So, fundamentally, an auction specifies

1:18who can bid,

1:20who receives what, and who pays. And the

1:23main adversarial attack that I'm going

1:25to be looking at for auctions today is

1:26going to be sibyls where how can one

1:30economic actor or a bidder or an agent

1:32in a system is able to manipulate an

1:34auction by spawning

1:37multiple other identities.

1:39So,

1:41fundamentally, an auction has an

1:43allocation rule and a payment rule.

1:45And as as a very nice finite example, we

1:49have two bidders, Alice and Bob.

1:52So, Alice values a good at VA.

1:55And so she bids BA

1:58to be able to get a chance

2:00gain that good. Similarly, you have Bob

2:03who values that same good at VB bids VB

2:06I guess. And the auction

2:09specifies that exact function

2:12which would basically be a probability

2:14of

2:16whether or not Alice or Bob will win the

2:18auction for that good and how much

2:20they'll have to pay for it.

2:22There's a very simple example of a

2:23single item auction which is going to be

2:25specifically what I deal with today

2:28which is going to be the second price

2:29auction. So there's bids which are 10 7

2:33and 4. I bid for a single good at 10 7

2:36and 4. You see that the highest bidder

2:39who bids 10 they end up paying the

2:40second highest bid which is seven.

2:44There are different DeFi auctions as I

2:46talked about them. I'll just reiterate

2:48the months. You've seen them for Maker

2:50DAO which are collateral auctions which

2:52is the significant example of a Dutch

2:55auction where the collateral price

2:57declines with time and purchases they

2:59settle instantly. You have intent based

3:01auctions on cow protocol where solvers

3:03compete to propose settlements and then

3:06on the more fundamental blocks place

3:08level you see flash bots right and their

3:10MV boost.

3:11There are some adversarial questions

3:13that will probably detract us from what

3:15we I want to talk about today and I'm I

3:17have limited time apparently so I'll go

3:19over something more specific.

3:22So an attack can exploit either code or

3:24economics. That's the way I see it. Code

3:27attacks are

3:28all of you are probably way better at

3:30that than I am.

3:31And so today I'm going to be

3:32specifically looking at economic

3:34attacks.

3:35Some of the examples of economic attacks

3:37right now are as I said sibyls

3:40which is one person spawning multiple

3:42agents. At the same time there's

3:43collusion attacks where it's all of the

3:46agents in the system collude with each

3:48other. There's a really subtle

3:48difference with sibyls.

3:50It's basically that these these are

3:51separate identities right.

3:53So the very basic model of an attacker

3:56is that exact action which maximizes

3:59their utility

4:01given the information constraints that

4:02have, and you also minimize the cost

4:06that you need to actually conduct the

4:08attack.

4:11Right now, some specific assumptions

4:14[snorts] that we're going to be making

4:15for auctions is going to be that it's

4:18truthful, where if you remember from our

4:20example, there's VA and BA.

4:24Truthfulness implies that VA is going to

4:25be BA no matter what because that's the

4:27highest utility

4:29for the agent.

4:31At the same time, civil proofness where

4:32as I said, one actor, they cannot gain

4:34more utility by dividing into several

4:37bits.

4:38And the main point I want to drive is

4:39that if an auction is considered safe

4:41for one specific bid, it might not be

4:43this it might not be safe for multiple

4:45bids at the same time.

4:47So complete civil attack, very very

4:49simple example. Think of a lottery,

4:51right?

4:52You have a prize which is say worth 120

4:54and there is a lottery here where your

4:57probability of getting the item is

4:59proportional to the number of players in

5:01the game.

5:02Say

5:03if it's 120, then the probability of you

5:06getting and if sorry, if there are say n

5:08bidders, your probability of winning is

5:10one by n, right? So let's have a

5:13baseline of three identities.

5:15I have an attacker and I have two honest

5:18people, right, who are bidding alongside

5:19me.

5:21I my way of attacking would be to divide

5:24my one bid into two or maybe, you know,

5:26I don't have to divide that one value. I

5:28can have a value greater than that so on

5:29and so forth. The main thing that you

5:31have to think about is that when there's

5:32one attacker with two identities, it's

5:34my probability of winning the good is

5:36one by three, which is $40 in this case.

5:39Similarly, if my once I deviate and I

5:42divide my bid into two, my actual

5:45probability of winning is one half now,

5:47which is $60. So you see that difference

5:50of $20 there, right?

5:52This will give you some more intuition

5:54where you might think that in order to

5:56make the system or the auction

5:58completely secure, you're going to have

5:59to impose a certain cost which has to be

6:02at least greater than $20 in this case.

6:05So now that you think about it, when you

6:07take it across agents, across people,

6:09attack search is an optimization

6:10problem.

6:11And what we are actually going to be

6:13optimizing is that the utility you get

6:15from being a civil agent versus a

6:17truthful agent, you're basically trying

6:19to maximize that exact portion, which is

6:21delta here as you see it on the screen.

6:25There's several ways to calculate it,

6:26which are grades, normal optimization

6:29techniques that you see in Python.

6:31There's also some constraints here with

6:33gas, deposits, timings. You get the

6:35gist.

6:36The main point right now, as of today,

6:39the second price auction is the only

6:41auction that's proven to be civil proof

6:43for now in the single item case. There's

6:45a lot of literature in the multi item

6:47case as well that's been done by the

6:49wonderful people at Cow Protocol, right?

6:51You should definitely check them out.

6:53We have some more results for

6:56civil proof auctions. Maybe I'll talk

6:58about it later once we publish the

6:59paper.

7:01So one really interesting aspect that I

7:02want to talk about is AI agents as

7:05attackers.

7:07So

7:08AI agents are the way I see it on a pure

7:11economic level, they're not going to be

7:12very different than human beings about

7:13thinking,

7:15about how to manipulate a protocol.

7:18They're going to do the same exact thing

7:19that we do. They're going to read the

7:20rules. They're going to form a

7:21hypothesis about how to actually attack

7:23it. They're going to evaluate how much

7:25it's going to cost them to actually

7:27conduct the attack and they're going to

7:29basically revise their constraints from

7:32feedback, market feedback, people

7:33feedback, so on and so forth.

7:37The next thing that I want to talk about

7:39is a very, very simple

7:41infrastructure

7:42for how you as an agent or like you

7:45having an agent, please don't do this.

7:47Your AWS is is going to hate you. Your

7:49bills are going to be huge. I'm not

7:51going to lie.

7:52But the main thing that I want to talk

7:53about is how

7:56what a basic infrastructure might look

7:58like, right?

8:00So I have been an AWS max here all my

8:02life. I'm sorry if I offend someone here

8:04with that, but I would basically take an

8:08S3 container where I'm going to query

8:11information or data from Dune or

8:14on-chain data. Hopefully you have a node

8:15setup of your own.

8:17You're going to take the on-chain data,

8:18you're going to take all the code, the

8:20hash, the seeds,

8:22and you're going to give it to your

8:23agent. Your agent after pulling it is

8:25going to form a hypothesis, right? It's

8:27going to take the information at a

8:29microscopic level. It's going to skim

8:31through it, figure everything out. It's

8:33going to give you a structured point of

8:35attack.

8:37Then in order to solve the deviation, in

8:40order to actually see all the values,

8:42all the bits that it has to do, how much

8:45civil bit do they actually need to

8:47actually manipulate the protocol,

8:48they're going to use

8:50an EC2 worker. That's what I would

8:52presume. That's what I would do

8:53technically, where I would do

8:54computations at

8:56at the millisecond level, I presume.

8:59I I don't think AWS does that. It's

9:01pretty slow.

9:02But on top of that, once those

9:04simulations are complete, you're going

9:05to know the agent at least is going to

9:06know by the end of it exactly what the

9:09deviations are required.

9:10Then there's going to be an independent

9:12replay, which is again like that's big

9:15words for saying back testing where

9:17you're going to take block data, you're

9:19going to see the civil deviations that

9:21would have given you more rewards than a

9:22normal person. Then you can back test

9:25it.

9:26You can see exactly what gain, what

9:29utility you're going to get as an

9:31attacker versus a normal agent. And then

9:33you're going to verify it,

9:35send it back to S3 as logs, right? You

9:38can pull it, you can check it, verify

9:40it, so on.

9:42So I am not going to leave you with just

9:45like you know just that, just a way to

9:47attack the system. I'll also talk about

9:50I'm I just going to want to talk about

9:51how

9:52an sorry, how a protocol designer is

9:55able to figure out a mechanism or learn

9:58a mechanism against an attacker.

10:00For that, I the way I see it, it's going

10:03to be a coupled optimization function.

10:07Big words, but what it actually is is

10:09that you're going to have an inner

10:10problem where you're going to freeze the

10:12mechanism parameters

10:14and you're going to search for Sybil

10:15attacks for any auction. You have an

10:17auction A with payment rule A payment

10:19rule B sorry and you're going to figure

10:21out a way

10:23you're going to put a million Sybil bids

10:26to make as many bidders as possible from

10:28one person and see what your utilities

10:31are in that case

10:35and then you're going to solve the outer

10:36problem where you're going to solve it

10:38for the protocol designer now. The outer

10:40problem is basically I want to increase

10:43I want to maximize my revenue at the

10:45same time minimize

10:46the instances of Sybil's.

10:49What I mean by that is that when you

10:51minimize the inner problem

10:53you're basically figuring out exactly

10:56how

10:57expensive it is for a Sybil attacker to

10:59actually attack the protocol. You're

11:01going to increase that expense sorry

11:03you're going to make that really really

11:04expensive as expensive as you can while

11:06at the same time

11:08improving your revenue maximizing your

11:10revenue at that very instance. What I

11:13mean by that again at the end is that

11:17you're going to end up learning a

11:18mechanism where you know using neural

11:21networks deep learning that's what we

11:22did for our very recent paper

11:25hopefully when when it comes out I'll be

11:27able to talk more about it but what it

11:29actually does is it's able to learn

11:31mechanisms where attackers no matter

11:34what they do do not have any incentive

11:37to attack the auction at least using

11:39Sybil's.

11:41At the end of it I have some final

11:43thoughts I have like three minutes left

11:45as well

11:45that

11:48the full proforma

11:50of actually conducting a Sybil attack or

11:53thinking about attackers in

11:55economic protocols in general is you

11:57have to specify the agents you have to

11:59specify exactly how Sybil bids can be

12:02inputted into the system you have to

12:04compare the utilities between being an

12:05attacker and being a normal agent and

12:08you have to separate when I say evidence

12:10from guarantees what I actually mean is

12:12that separate back-tested variables with

12:15the actual market conditions.

12:17And my final point that I want to drive

12:18with this

12:19small talk, I guess,

12:21not so small now that I think about it,

12:23is that economic security it actually

12:25needs an adversarial model. It doesn't

12:27need like a specific it doesn't need

12:29like a best-case model to be fair.

12:32The worst-case scenarios are always

12:33considered in consensus research. It's

12:36always

12:37considered in even in auction

12:39literature. But I I haven't I'm yet to

12:41see ways in which people are able to

12:44combine those two. And by finally, I

12:47just want to say that I we have figured

12:49out a way to create civil-proof auctions

12:51from the ground up, turn any auction

12:54into a civil-proof one using

12:56wistfulness. So that'd be something I'd

12:59love to talk about.

13:01That's all I had. If you have questions,

13:03please come find me. It was great to

13:04meet you. Thank you so much.

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