DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Amber Hall

Top hacks since Devcon 7 - what did we learn?

Matthias Egli

30:53 · Recording

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0:01Thank you. So welcome everyone.

0:04Um let's see. Yes. So this is the first

0:08talk of today. I'm happy to give

0:10this one to start of the day giving a

0:13rundown of the top hacks we had since

0:17like last Devcon, which actually is a

0:19long time ago. So it's a really huge

0:22list.

0:23Let's see how far we get.

0:25Quickly

0:27about myself. So I'm Matthias. I'm from

0:29Chain Security. We are one of the audit

0:32companies reviewing a lot of the

0:34different mostly complex DeFi projects.

0:38We also do a lot of research

0:40and and also like to present it.

0:42So

0:44among those things you might have had a

0:46talk yesterday on like smart contract

0:49quirks

0:50by Lotaire.

0:52There is another one right after by

0:54Doris

0:56also on tricky things around Solidity

0:58and Dirty Bytes.

1:01There is

1:02one at Devcon by Dominic and then

1:06I see this

1:08animations don't work. There is one

1:11at the end like kind of closing this day

1:14on

1:16a new kind of vulnerability found which

1:20gets elevated by Glamsterdam. So this is

1:23something I can highly recommend all of

1:24you to check out on.

1:27There there will be a bunch of talks on

1:28this on Devcon too, but the first talk

1:31will be here this evening by Janis.

1:35But let's get started.

1:37So

1:38the first hack

1:41I want to talk about is Bitget.

1:44Bitget

1:46is a centralized exchange

1:48and

1:50they got

1:51compromised for 388 million.

1:56So

1:58how did this

1:59The attackers here, they

2:03compromised

2:05initially a security appliance

2:09in their

2:11investigative report which was published

2:13it's just mentioned as product A.

2:16So we don't know exactly

2:18what kind of security appliance it is.

2:21There was also mention of a management

2:23software

2:24referred to as project B

2:27where we also don't know exactly what it

2:28is.

2:31But what happened here is that these

2:36initial compromises allowed the attacker

2:37to move towards the signing

2:40infrastructure of the hot wallets.

2:43And

2:45at that point of course

2:47you don't need a human to make an error

2:49anymore because you can make the system

2:52sign off on those transactions which you

2:55want to do. So

2:58the

3:00story here is that like what what did we

3:04learn basically from Bitget at this

3:07stage right? So the private keys were

3:10very well protected inside an HSM and so

3:13on right? So

3:14industry best practice you could say but

3:18the additional protection software they

3:20put in place to prevent hacks was

3:23actually in this case the one which

3:25allowed the attackers initially to

3:27enter.

3:29We can only speculate on why didn't they

3:33say which software they used? Was it

3:37some NDA and they couldn't say it's that

3:39and that vendor

3:41or was it something where

3:44they say like yeah it's

3:46it might compromise others if they'd

3:48known that the system is vulnerable.

3:52So sadly from some of these attacks we

3:55don't learn enough to really be able to

3:57protect others.

3:59The main thing we can take away is

4:02any

4:04piece of software, any component you put

4:06in your stack

4:08on the way to signing is potentially one

4:12which is vulnerable including your EDR,

4:17including your like web application

4:21firewall, stuff like this, right? So um

4:26in this case

4:29what else can we do to limit the damage,

4:31right? It's like limiting

4:33the

4:35single transaction damage, right?

4:37Basically, how much is in a hot wallet?

4:39Because in these cases, sometimes you

4:42have circuit breakers in place but then

4:45the question is how much damage is

4:47already done?

4:48Um

4:50what was special also here, it took

4:53really quite some time until they

4:55realized that their hot wallet signing

4:58infrastructure is the problem because

5:01suddenly things move, right? And you

5:02don't know

5:04has someone the keys? Is something else

5:06compromised? What's going on, right? And

5:08it took them quite some time actually

5:10to shut down their hot wallet

5:14uh signing infrastructure. So also this

5:16is like for emergency

5:18actions that you realize, okay, what

5:22what do you need to do to pause your

5:25system holistically? They very quickly

5:27paused actually withdrawals and deposits

5:31as the usual place where they were

5:33expecting to get hacked, but not the

5:35internal system which signed off on hot

5:37wallet uh um

5:39transactions.

5:42Now, this was some time ago already um

5:46but of course, we are here also because

5:49of a very recent one which is very

5:51similar, which is the Binance hack.

5:54So Binance as I guess all of you know

5:57sitting in here was compromised just

6:00four days ago by now

6:02um and for for a record-breaking

6:05um

6:07of more than six billion

6:11USD equivalent. Half of that money was

6:15recoverable by freezing the stable coins

6:18USDT and USDC mostly and a few other

6:21real world assets.

6:24First a big disclaimer, right? I mean

6:26what I'm presenting here is

6:28based on the few things we already know.

6:32Binance communicates of what's going on,

6:34focuses currently on enabling

6:37withdrawals again and and has seen a lot

6:40of

6:41like action in this regard. So

6:44luckily

6:46we could say it's one of the very rich

6:48exchanges which can

6:50as it looks like afford to

6:54use its treasury to compensate for this

6:56loss.

6:58So what happened here, what we know

7:00already

7:01a laptop allegedly, right? But this is

7:04really like preliminary information,

7:06right? And this is something I I want

7:07you

7:09to know that while Binance said this

7:11it's in the middle of an investigation.

7:14We will get to know if they share a lot

7:17more and all of this might be wrong

7:19after they realized what really

7:21happened, right? So but what they said

7:23so far is DevOps laptop got compromised.

7:26They saw some other compromises across

7:28their network. In the end

7:30a service container as they describe it

7:33was compromised this way which was

7:35allowed to sign

7:38and

7:40usually the way this works is that you

7:41have some container which has some

7:44privileged access to the HSM which is

7:46trusted, usually some certificates on it

7:48which can talk to the HSM, right? And if

7:50you get access to that container you can

7:51sign

7:53the the HSM trusts you to sign.

7:57What then happened next is we saw around

7:59like

8:01for past eight the first outflows.

8:04Actually Ripple was one of the first

8:06chains they emptied 15 minutes later

8:09roughly the very big transactions

8:11against Bitcoin and Ethereum happened

8:15here

8:18for Ethereum for Binance 14 their big

8:22hot wallet they replaced the

8:26wallet with a like

8:29smart wallet. I'll quickly go into that

8:31afterwards. They swept that across all

8:34the tokens

8:36and then actually the sweeper stayed

8:37active for three more hours and kept

8:41sweeping because there were incoming

8:43transactions actually during that time

8:44which then obviously also got drained

8:48and

8:49some of them were also like refilling

8:52because an automated system saw that the

8:54wallet the hot wallet was empty so it

8:56needed to be refilled, right?

9:02What did we learn here,

9:04right? So

9:06first I'd say we didn't really

9:08we will learn from this, right? This is

9:11not something where we can say we did

9:13learn anything yet. It's just happening.

9:16It's a very recent incident, okay? It's

9:18one of the largest right hacks

9:21ever perhaps I mean you probably can say

9:23it's the largest hack ever, right? Which

9:25really was able to pull off. There is

9:27that one the one that got away which is

9:29also very interesting case but this one

9:34I think will have impact beyond

9:39our bubble, right? This is one where

9:43people notice Bitget was very big of

9:45course it was very big but

9:48Bybit we will talk about soon too very

9:51big hack, right? But no one knew Bybit

9:53but Binance is almost equivalent with

9:56like centralized exchanges

10:00for

10:01for cryptocurrencies, right? So we can

10:04expect really to see some like

10:08real world impact. Regulation is one of

10:11the big things,

10:14Contagion through the ecosystem seems to

10:17be very limited currently, right? But

10:20it's one of these puzzle pieces like

10:22which fell to some degree. Binance

10:24doesn't now have

10:26the ability to react as freely anymore

10:29because they need to invest all that

10:31money to recompensate users. So

10:34one of our buffers is gone with that,

10:36right?

10:38We'll learn more what can make this

10:40attack harder.

10:41Very preliminary things here. What did

10:43we see like again,

10:46um,

10:47it took quite some time until, for

10:49example, other hot wallets they they

10:52plugged in something to sweep them to

10:54cold wallets because in this fog of war

10:57you don't really know what's going on.

10:59And if you look into how they swept the

11:01other hot wallets afterwards, you saw

11:03that it's a manual thing. It's like

11:06block after block. It took some time and

11:08so on, right? So so someone reacted here

11:11to some degree, I'd say manually.

11:13Um,

11:14the of course the size of a hot wallet

11:17is something we can discuss. Faster

11:20freezing across, um, the stable coins is

11:23also something we can discuss here,

11:25right? We will learn more. All of this

11:27is very preliminary.

11:31So quickly for you, because this is

11:33actually important, if you ever also get

11:37fished or so, what will happen to your

11:39wallet is you will get a sweeper on your

11:42wallet. This is what happens today. The

11:44same happened to Binance here on their

11:46Ethereum wallet.

11:48It will get it will get replaced with an

11:51EIP 7702,

11:53um, which which is a very efficient way

11:56to to interact with Ethereum, right? So

11:58uh, I want also emphasize it's not like

12:01the fault of 7702 in this case, right?

12:04And and the other hot wallet gets

12:05drained traditionally with normal

12:07transactions.

12:09But if you get hacked, you will get a

12:12A sweeper is

12:14um a relatively simple smart contract.

12:16What it does,

12:18when you send in ETH, it will

12:19immediately send it somewhere else.

12:21Um when you uh

12:24approve um

12:26or if if you have ERC 20s deposited,

12:30um it will allow the attacker to

12:32withdraw them even though you still have

12:35the private keys and the attackers

12:36doesn't, right? So they replace with one

12:39transaction the code to gain control.

12:41You can regain control like Binance did

12:44a few hours later, right? But until you

12:46do,

12:48everything you deposit will be swept

12:50away to the attackers.

12:52Behaving very similar as if your private

12:56key was compromised.

12:59To you, you will not notice. The small

13:01example I have here is kind of almost

13:04self-explanatory code-wise, right? But

13:07um

13:08the real ones we can study also the

13:12sweeper wallets out there. They are

13:16well engineered. Um of course people

13:18just buy them on the black market,

13:20right? So it's not something they need

13:21to develop for themselves, but it's

13:23really this um industry where you

13:26actually even give part of the profits

13:28to those who develop that and so on.

13:32Um

13:35so summarizing the very first attack

13:37vector here is like we have

13:41the

13:43hot wallet infrastructure of centralized

13:46exchanges

13:47and they are being

13:49attacked, very targeted attacks, and

13:51then these

13:53hot wallet infrastructure is being

13:54compromised.

13:57Um

13:58let's talk about an old one by now,

14:01right? But because it was after Defcon,

14:03it's still here. Um

14:05Bybit. Bybit was hacked for uh

14:091,430

14:11million. Um

14:13and this was a case where a supply chain

14:16vulnerability

14:18fundamentally was the issue. So,

14:22and the attacker managed to get to a

14:27developer of Safe,

14:29which was used by Bybit,

14:32managed to compromise that laptop and

14:36get

14:37some AWS keys which allowed them to

14:41deploy a JavaScript version, like a

14:44small change in the JavaScript of the

14:47Safe

14:48centrally hosted

14:50UI, which then in the end caused them

14:55caused Bybit to get hacked. And and the

14:57way this was done like you you had this

15:01Bybit multisig

15:03signing off on a regular transfer which

15:06looked benign, but behind this curtain

15:09what really was signed off was to change

15:12the master copy of that Safe to an

15:13attacker controlled one. And with that

15:17they obviously had control over the this

15:20treasury

15:21and were able to

15:23extract all the money.

15:25So, this is one of the cases.

15:28It's also some time ago where we learned

15:30a lot.

15:31And you will see a lot of projects out

15:34there

15:35which try to help

15:37to validate that when you sign on a Safe

15:41that you have different means to check

15:44what you are doing.

15:46I talked to

15:48few people here and what what they

15:49actually are often doing now is build

15:51their own thing there, right? I mean

15:54have Claude build their own thing, but

15:58this is something where we really

15:59learned

16:01that wait, let me get to the

16:03learning step that we can improve things

16:08by validating with independent

16:11ways, right? And that that we can

16:13develop that software and it's actually

16:14easier today than ever, right?

16:17So,

16:18learnings remove single point of

16:20failures, be very

16:23holistic about this, think deeply about

16:25where are your single point of failure.

16:27Limit again, limit the damage which can

16:31be done with one transaction, which to

16:33some degree you can also think of a

16:34single point of failure, one

16:35transaction, right? Then

16:38specifically here, provide multiple

16:40front ends. If you provide something

16:42like a service which others rely on,

16:44then ideally you'd give them some

16:46independent way which is harder for

16:49attackers to

16:52compromise at the same time as your main

16:55way.

16:58Then

17:00start to

17:02like

17:03put some pressure on to incentivize

17:06people to prove to you that they did

17:09this, right? So demand custodians to

17:11prove and

17:14we like Bitget, Binance and so on. Of

17:17course they had ISO 27001, of course

17:20they had SOC 2, right?

17:22But of course these things don't focus

17:24on the attack vectors we care about,

17:26right? They are for different measures,

17:29right? So they're still important, it

17:31still makes sense to get them, but it's

17:34far from sufficient.

17:38A lot of this also was actually what we

17:41talked about

17:43two years ago in Mumbai

17:46with like also a list of all the things

17:48you should think about

17:50at a presentation at Devcon and we'll

17:52have a like the same presentation

17:54actually two years again in a few days

17:57at Devcon again together again with

18:00muted from Polygon and with Nick from

18:02Safe.

18:04I'm skipping a few. Drift protocol, a

18:07perp dex was hacked for almost 300

18:10million.

18:11This is much smaller here than in my

18:14version, sorry.

18:16So just very quickly what happened here

18:19like they compromised Sinus

18:21by actually approaching them at a

18:23conference

18:25for half a year pretending to be like a

18:30what was it like a

18:32I think a market maker.

18:35They managed to then by compromising two

18:39keys or basically gaining the the

18:43access to the laptops where where those

18:45two keys were on to become protocol

18:47admins.

18:49They

18:50added fake collateral to this perp decks

18:54and they borrowed against it and and

18:56then they bridged quickly back to

18:58Ethereum.

19:01So this is a little bit similar to one

19:04of the incidents which really

19:07caused

19:08really big problems across the industry,

19:11right? So which is Kelp DAO or layer

19:13zero getting compromised for almost 300

19:16million.

19:18So

19:19roughly half a year ago they got

19:21compromised. The

19:24attack here was

19:26a pretty good one from like

19:30engineering perspective, right? What

19:31they had to do to compromise layer zero

19:34was impressive.

19:36So

19:38first social engineering again as so

19:40often to get

19:44some access to layer zero to to again a

19:47developer machine to the Terraform

19:50project

19:52access the cloud infrastructure,

19:54modified two of layer zero's internal

19:57RPC nodes but just in memory to trust

20:02fake blockchain data, right? Because

20:03layer zero needs to listen to what's

20:05happens on the blockchain and so on and

20:06react to it and then now those ones

20:09reacted to things which weren't real.

20:11But that's actually not enough, right?

20:13Because infrastructure was set up to

20:15need independent third-party validators.

20:18But in this case they DDoS'd the

20:22external party

20:24and then Zero fell back to say, ah, we

20:26still have a trusted one, which is us.

20:28In this case, also, of course, Kelp DAO

20:30had it configured that this was allowed

20:32and so on, but it was a risk back then

20:35which was like many did. It wasn't

20:38highlighted. Afterwards, of course,

20:40finger pointing is always easier and you

20:41should never do this and

20:44we had cases where where like people

20:46looked into this before Kelp DAO, which

20:49we reviewed and where it was

20:51highlighted. So it wasn't totally

20:52unknown that you shouldn't do this,

20:53right? But still it was widely done.

20:57Um, they

20:59um forged that uh

21:03bridge transaction basically and then

21:05there were like that attestation and in

21:07the end they were able to mint um

21:09unbacked RSEs.

21:12And the problem with that is that there

21:14was a lot like this was basically

21:16hardcoded one-to-one on Aave and allowed

21:18the attackers to liquidate two ETH by

21:22depositing to Aave and causing um and

21:26and other protocols, but Aave was the

21:27biggest one affected here with the

21:29biggest liquidity, causing

21:31what we now call DeFi United and so on,

21:34right? Requiring really a backstop, many

21:37people chiming in and so on to try to

21:40not have basically Aave having to um

21:45not be able to service like their debt

21:48anymore.

21:50And and we are still paying off that

21:51debt.

21:53Um,

21:56what did we learn here?

21:58There

21:59there were a lot of learnings on this.

22:01Like the obvious one is like have Layer

22:04Zero with multiple independent

22:05forcefully validator, but actually a lot

22:07of people are moving away to different

22:09infrastructures. Also those we'll have

22:10to see how well they hold up.

22:13Um,

22:14try better to isolate developer

22:16environment from production environment.

22:19This is a repeating thing across many of

22:21the incidents we have seen,

22:23but it's technically very hard and from

22:25we come, we build this stuff

22:28as developers and we grew as developers,

22:31right? So we tend to have a lot of

22:33access and power as developers.

22:36While the traditional industry kind of

22:39doesn't trust their devs, right? But but

22:41we are the devs who build this, so

22:42obviously we trust ourselves.

22:45Yeah, put more limits in place, the

22:47bridge outflows

22:50like safety guards of to which degree do

22:53you trust certain systems? We see this

22:56finally happening a little bit more and

22:58more, right? But

23:00the the limits in place in many of the

23:04decentralized exchanges and so on, they

23:06are none. It's like as much liquidity as

23:09there is, it's okay, right? And and that

23:11can be a lot.

23:14Um

23:16yeah, what else is there?

23:18Again, think holistically. All these

23:22pieces you have in your stack can be and

23:24will be attacked and many of these

23:26attacks show

23:27where different pieces have been

23:29attacked. So let's look

23:32quickly after this into some of the

23:34other hacks, right? So here attack

23:37vector was really

23:39the users signing malicious transaction.

23:44Um

23:46ledger ledger itself wasn't hacked, but

23:50what was hacked, right? Was their supply

23:53chain allowing someone

23:56to

23:58like put

24:00inside a ledger

24:02chip which would

24:04capture the seed phrase when it was

24:07generated and shown on the ledger and

24:10and basically phone home, right? Just

24:12send an

24:13a message via cellular network and and

24:16and that's it.

24:18So

24:20this likely happened over quite some

24:22time

24:24and

24:26over a few days then these funds were um

24:29like stolen until people realized what's

24:31really going on.

24:33Um

24:35here

24:36some pictures. Credit goes to Nick from

24:39Safe who provided those of how it looks

24:42like inside the ledger, right? So you

24:44have an additional board which shouldn't

24:47be there. You have this small battery in

24:49there to give it power. You have a a

24:52main board of course where it's

24:53connected to and you have the antenna.

24:55You can actually open your ledger and

24:56it's very easy to see, right? And I

24:58advise like if

25:01it really doesn't hurt to do this.

25:03Um

25:05what did we learn here?

25:08Uh

25:08a little bit tricky. Um I like try to

25:12limit your exposure when buying smart

25:14wallets, right? When buying when buying

25:15hardware wallets. Of course buy them

25:17directly from Ledger is not something I

25:20am here to say yes that is the right way

25:23because I

25:24myself decided not to do this directly

25:26due to their history of losing customer

25:29data when you buy directly from them

25:32which is also annoying, right? So it's a

25:34lot of trade-offs here. Um

25:38a better general trade-off here is try

25:40to have two or three different um

25:45hardware wallets for funds where it

25:47really matters, right? Obviously not for

25:48your like daily operations but for your

25:53savings

25:54having two independent one and a

25:56multi-sig behind it kind of easy

25:59nowadays and definitely advisable.

26:03Um

26:05cold card.

26:08Cold card

26:10similar size estimated a little bit hard

26:13to say how much it was how much it

26:15really was but estimated to be around

26:16100 million too.

26:19This

26:20a long time ago, 2021, right? They

26:24upgraded their firmware to a version

26:28where

26:29like

26:30they refactored they put the random

26:33number generator, which was um the one

26:35to generate the seed into a library.

26:37This was all well written, was all

26:39correct, but the library when it was

26:42actually built was linked to the

26:44software RNG instead of the hardware RNG

26:47of the cold card, causing weak

26:49randomness. And then many years later,

26:52attacker were able to actually brute

26:54force through the 32-bit which this seed

26:58generated to

27:01generate um the wallets, which

27:05ultimately at that point obviously held

27:08funds, right? And then were able to

27:10drain those.

27:11Um

27:14the

27:16thing here is like I mean the RNG inside

27:19a wallet is really

27:24the most most critical thing you can

27:26have. There's almost not and it's very

27:29hard to like

27:31if I think of a random number in my

27:33head, right? Can you prove that it was

27:34random? Of course not. It's also very

27:36hard to prove randomness, right? That's

27:37just like very hard. You can generate a

27:39lot, but

27:40uh you will not find out if the RNG was

27:4332 bits by by any external measure. The

27:45only thing you can do is internally look

27:47into it.

27:49What did we learn here? Um

27:54when you audit this more for the

27:56auditors, right? You need to take care

27:59not only of the code, but of the build

28:01because this was ultimately a build

28:02failure.

28:04Um combine independent sources of

28:06entropy. This would help like many

28:09things of defense in depth for your RNG

28:12would have made this harder.

28:16So attack vector three, we have people

28:19get your seed phrases,

28:21novel ways. We haven't seen these

28:23before, right? These are kind of new

28:25attacks.

28:27I'm skipping over Liquid Network,

28:29another 320 million hack here. TL;DR uh

28:34again a software bug caching um

28:39like LBTC

28:41is is like a yeah Bitcoin derivative and

28:44they minted that they were able to to

28:47circumvent that check but they were

28:49allegedly white hat hackers who returned

28:5280% and kept 20% as a bounty or whatever

28:55right

28:56um which which is not something we

28:59should support.

29:00Um

29:03Cetus

29:05let me see oh I have one minute left um

29:08so Sui's largest DEX was attacked with a

29:11nice vulnerability in that sense it was

29:14again a software bug right in in their

29:16system so um

29:18yeah

29:20um

29:22in a in a library one error right so I

29:25can quick no I will not walk you through

29:27this because ah sometimes it's big

29:29sometimes small okay it's kind of hard

29:31to read here.

29:32Um

29:35I'll skip through this due to time

29:37constraints how how the bug actually

29:40happened um as an example um perhaps the

29:45final vulnerable code you can see here

29:50the takeaway I have actually on this

29:53is like anyone who looks into this from

29:55you guys here to say like hey where's

29:57the error right

29:58you you might know then you will be fast

30:00if you don't know it will really take

30:03a lot of time until you figure out

30:05why this code is really broken.

30:09And a lot I mean

30:11a few minutes I guess for the best ones

30:14perhaps an hour right but uh still

30:16doable still doable

30:19today

30:20on the learnings when I tried now

30:24and I rewatched what um like I wrote

30:28about this before and I gave it to to AI

30:31to where's the bug then immediately it

30:32found the bug and they said I'll give

30:34the cheapest I'll take the weakest AI I

30:37can find still can find the bug

30:39immediately, right? So this one is easy.

30:42Time's up for me.

30:44Um so we'll skip balancer V2 which was

30:47the last one on the list.

30:49Uh yeah, thank you so much.

Source and accuracy details

Source export SHA256: 03c44056cbcd6e5b36c43f1ca33d643dc9dcc161c67540a8f86e817b5c6f7d19