DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Amber Hall

Fund-Flow Modeling by Solving Large Linear Algebra Systems

Yannis Smaragdakis

17:52 · Recording

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0:00Thank you very much.

0:02Okay.

0:03So

0:05fund flow modeling by solving large

0:07linear algebra systems. And if that

0:09title didn't turn you off, I don't know

0:11what will cuz like it's about as boring

0:14as it can be, right? Large linear

0:16algebra systems. What's what's this all

0:18about? It's actually going to be real

0:20fun.

0:21But the the slides are a bit heavy, so

0:24I'll try to depart a bit from the slides

0:26and try to give you

0:28a bit of an intuitive understanding of

0:30what I'm proposing here. And we can

0:33discuss whether you agree that this is

0:35interesting. I think it's pretty

0:36interesting. It's been my pet project

0:40for a very large part of the past year,

0:42let's say. And the the the result is

0:45deployed on our site. So if you go to

0:48app.dedup.com, you you can see the

0:50results of this algorithm running every

0:52two weeks. And I will tell you what are

0:55the drawbacks and what alternative

0:57algorithms we have for the same problem.

0:58But what's the problem first of all?

1:01So

1:02fund flow.

1:04Every time there's a hack,

1:06everyone asks, where did the money go?

1:09There was recently a certain hack you

1:11may have heard in the past three days.

1:13And everyone is asking, where did the

1:14money go? And they will be asking that

1:16for years to come.

1:18And everyone, meaning exchanges,

1:20investigators, regulators, everyone

1:23wants to know who got funded from the

1:26proceeds of the hack. And the standard

1:28answer is to do taint analysis. And

1:31there's a whole bunch of algorithms

1:33there. And I'm not sure if I can point

1:35at the screen. There's poison. Poison

1:38means

1:39you you get poisoned by some tainted

1:41funds. You transfer the poison to

1:43everyone else. You are marked forever.

1:45Or haircut. You proportionally assign

1:49what portion of your funds is tainted,

1:51etc., etc.

1:52I'm not going to go into all the

1:54alternative algorithms that everyone is

1:56using to to do fund flow. But the main

1:58point is is that everyone else is doing

2:02fund transfer tracking. So you need to

2:05know when money changes hands. You need

2:08to know when there are transfers.

2:11what's the problem with that? It's that

2:14we don't really know all the time how

2:16money changes hands in DeFi.

2:19Uh so in DeFi value can move without

2:23transfers and that's the principle of

2:25money laundering. That's how people

2:27launder money after they get money that

2:30they shouldn't have gotten.

2:32Okay, so examples and this is not an

2:35exhaustive list, but and and you may

2:37have seen many of these. You can deposit

2:39something on behalf of someone else.

2:40Let's say I'm a hacker H and I want to

2:43give value to some other party C. I want

2:47to

2:47give value to C, but not do a token

2:50transfer to C directly. So what

2:53technique can I use? Of course, I can

2:55deposit with any DeFi protocol on their

2:57behalf. That's the most stupid thing.

3:00I can deposit and get an NFT that looks

3:03valueless.

3:05So it looks like I got nothing in

3:06return. I just deposited to a well-known

3:09protocol which is not tainted by itself.

3:11The the well-known protocol is innocent.

3:15And but I got an NFT that's value zero

3:17that has value zero and then I pass it

3:20on. So I passed value zero.

3:22So the other person should not be

3:23tainted, but the other person can now

3:25withdraw from the main protocol.

3:28I can do all sorts of hiding off-chain.

3:31I can have an off-chain order and some

3:35innocent party can jump in and fill that

3:38order

3:39and indirectly the proceeds go to C, the

3:43party that I want to benefit.

3:45So C gets the funds, but I'm never doing

3:49a transaction with C. I'm signing I'm

3:52signing an off-chain order.

3:54And there's lots more.

3:57I can do value injection.

4:00C holds a worthless token and I give it

4:02value. How do I give it value? Through

4:04any combination of liquidity provision

4:08or whatever. I can buy it at an inflated

4:11price. I can

4:13I can enable liquidity in another wide

4:15otherwise worthless pool, whatever. The

4:18point is DeFi lets us create lots of

4:22complex financial mechanisms and all

4:25these financial mechanisms allow value

4:27transfer without a direct token

4:30transfer.

4:32So we all believe this?

4:34Are we okay

4:35with the principle so far? Okay.

4:38So none of this is malicious.

4:41It's very hard to keep up with that.

4:43Obviously not impossible. There are lots

4:45of people who are trying to do it, but

4:47it's very very hard to have a catalog of

4:51all the DeFi protocols and all the

4:52patterns they can use to obscure value

4:55transfer. So what are we trying what are

4:59examples of this kind of valueless

5:01transfer? This is actually in parallel

5:03with the work I was doing. I saw this

5:05paper some seven months ago by people

5:08who were then at Eigen Fi and it said

5:10exactly the same thing. Basically here's

5:13an example of how back a few million

5:17blocks there was 38 million of US 38

5:20million of funds laundered through a

5:23transaction that nobody could track

5:26because it was an off-chain order that

5:27some MEV bot filled in and indirectly

5:31there was value transfer from P to B and

5:34everyone could see the transactions, but

5:36nobody could tell that there was value

5:38transfer there

5:39because there was no direct transfer of

5:42tokens, no direct taint.

5:44So what's the principle that we're

5:46trying to explore here

5:48to exploit here? The principle is what's

5:50in yellow. So this is the entire

5:51presentation.

5:53The principle is we can have an

5:56innocuous DeFi protocol and it can

5:59obscure that I'm passing some value to

6:02someone else.

6:04But if it's an innocuous protocol, what

6:06it will not obscure is that I'm

6:09mentioning that someone else that I'm

6:11passing the value to.

6:12There has to be a transaction where I

6:14participate in

6:16and somehow my address and their address

6:20appear in that same one transaction.

6:24And we have to link that transaction

6:26with others perhaps, but at the very

6:28least, whoever is sending the money, the

6:31who is very supplying the value and

6:33whoever is receiving it, they are named

6:35in one transaction.

6:37Obviously, there's exceptions. The

6:40exceptions are privacy protocols that

6:41obscure the recipient addresses, Tornado

6:44Cash, Railgun. We'll talk about those at

6:46the very end.

6:47But if you take out privacy protocols

6:50and you just keep regular DeFi, which is

6:53used for the

6:54lion's share of money laundering, this

6:56principle holds.

7:00Are we clear? And I want some feedback

7:02because if we haven't followed this,

7:03we're not going to go very far. Are we

7:05clear on what I'm I'm saying here?

7:07Yes.

7:08Excellent. So

7:10I'm trying to link the taint of

7:14co-participants of every transaction,

7:17meaning I'm going to go into all

7:19transactions ever that ever appeared on

7:22chain. I'm going to take the call diet

7:25data for all of them. I'm going to parse

7:27it and find addresses,

7:29send the recipient but anyone who's also

7:31mentioned.

7:32And if they appear anywhere in the same

7:35transaction, I'm going to link all those

7:37addresses in a very large linear system.

7:40And then our problem will be scaling.

7:42Our problem will be solving this very

7:44large linear system. So let's look at a

7:47couple of technical details and then we

7:50can get to the high level again.

7:52So

7:53the model

7:54pretty much says I will give a value to

7:58the taint of every participant, of every

8:02addresses,

8:03of every address. What's the taint? It's

8:05a value that

8:07how to what percentage, let's say, it's

8:10a it's a let's say a fraction that will

8:14give some metric to the taintedness of

8:17an address.

8:19I will take as input the participants of

8:21every transaction, like I said at the

8:22top, and I will take as input some

8:25amounts that will help me with weighing

8:27what transactions are important. And and

8:30then there will be some extra

8:32assumptions here. So I'll start with a

8:34list of known hackers. There are roughly

8:3810,000 addresses that are directly

8:40involved in past hacks so far in

8:42Ethereum. So we start with this

8:44information, and then we we're going to

8:46check how these addresses relate to

8:49every other address that ever

8:51participated in transactions on mainnet.

8:54And the simplifying assumptions here is

8:57that any address that has many thousands

8:59of transactions, I'm going to exclude it

9:01just to make the system a little more

9:03scalable. It would most likely end up

9:05being zero tainted anyway or very close

9:08to zero, but it also helps us with

9:10scalability here to just do it upfront.

9:12So any well-known DeFi protocol will go

9:15to zero right away based on this

9:17criterion.

9:18And the

9:21high-level description of the math is

9:23the sentence up there.

9:25An address is as tainted as the average

9:28of its co-participants in each

9:30transaction.

9:31And then the transaction the

9:34transactions are averaged

9:36compared to other transactions on the

9:38same address based on how much value

9:40that address gets.

9:42And if that address is completely

9:44worthless, they get an arbitrary value

9:46of epsilon, same for every one of their

9:48transactions.

9:50So again, what I'm saying up here is you

9:54participate in a transaction with

9:56someone else. Your taint value is

9:58averaged and contributes to their

10:01taint, and their taint value is averaged

10:04and contributes to your taint.

10:06And the this average is also averaged in

10:10proportion to how much the transaction

10:12contributed to your total worth.

10:14So if we actually

10:16do this in math, it comes to a linear

10:19equation that looks like this and I know

10:21it's it's going to be very hard to

10:23parse, but let's it's it's not really

10:26that hard if you spend two minutes

10:28looking at it. So very quickly I'll just

10:30go over it.

10:32This is how much the transaction matters

10:34to address A.

10:36What does that mean? The address A, if

10:38we take the absolute values of every

10:42funds transferred to or from it, sum

10:44over all of those and weigh the

10:47transaction based on how much value that

10:49transaction contributes, that's this

10:51factor. And then everything else is just

10:54averaging over co-participants in the

10:56same transaction.

10:58So

11:00hopefully this scared you enough, but in

11:02intuition it's very simple. We are just

11:05averaging

11:07all participants in a transaction in a

11:09large linear system. It can be

11:11recursive. My taint contributes to

11:13yours, yours contributes to mine

11:16because we participate in the same

11:17transaction and then we solve that

11:19linear

11:20equation, that large linear system to

11:23get a score. This is very much like

11:25PageRank, but over all participants in

11:28all transactions.

11:31Okay, so

11:33large linear system,

11:35very

11:36very standard, but here are some

11:38intuitive features.

11:41The result of this is not a probability,

11:44it's not a fraction of stolen funds.

11:46It's just a metric. So if I get a 0.7,

11:49it doesn't mean anything other than

11:52probably I'm more tainted than someone

11:54who got a 0.6.

11:56I mean there will be a threshold. Let's

11:59say everything above 0.3 is most likely

12:02very involved in some money laundering,

12:06but

12:07it's not an absolute threshold. It's not

12:09a confidence. It's not a percentage.

12:12Second, everything is symmetric. I

12:15funded a hacker is the same as a hacker

12:18funded me.

12:19It's going to give me the same score.

12:21So it's a completely symmetric system

12:24and it goes back in time. So I funded a

12:27hacker 3 million blocks ago, it's still

12:30going to give me a high tainted score

12:32the way this system is being solved.

12:35Okay, so with all this intuitive

12:37understanding of the system,

12:40you can see results from that system

12:43live if you log in right now as a free

12:46user on app.ddub.com

12:48and you find you start from any address

12:50or you actually look at the list that's

12:52called hack fish related.

12:54That's the name of the list here. You

12:57will get graphs like this. You can go

12:59and explore all the way to taint sources

13:01and when you get to 100% I cannot give a

13:03live demo here. These are frozen slides,

13:06but if you go all the way to taint

13:08sources to 100% and you click on that,

13:11you actually get what incident gave us

13:13the confidence originally that this is a

13:15hacker address. But you can also trace

13:17back and say why does this address have

13:20a 74%?

13:21Oh,

13:23I have at least two transactions that

13:25give me this confidence. There may be

13:26many more and these two transactions

13:29contribute in the linear system and it's

13:31because this address got linked to that

13:34known hacker.

13:36So go and explore and if you want to ask

13:39me about the Binance hack, obviously,

13:42like I said, this is a huge system.

13:44We solve this every two weeks. In two

13:47weeks, in 15 days from now, you will see

13:49how funds moved from the Binance hack.

13:52But right now we only have for the

13:54Binance hack, we only have internal

13:56systems like this one.

13:59So we have some internal data, but on

14:01the public system you cannot see it just

14:03yet. You will see the results in 15 days

14:06though.

14:07Okay, so

14:10just to give you an idea of the scaling

14:12of this system, it's it's huge. We

14:14actually have to solve it at ranges of 1

14:17million blocks, but very, very quickly

14:20right now on the full chain, just

14:23Ethereum. Let's not even go to base,

14:25Binance, anything with higher

14:27transaction rates.

14:29It right now takes on CPU

14:31like 3 days, 2 and 1/2 days to solve the

14:34thing.

14:35Like just on this range of blocks, it

14:37takes 22 hours on an even faster machine

14:39than our production server. But

14:42if this is to scale, if we find like

14:45really good business cases for that, we

14:47can speed it up quite a bit. So on a on

14:49a really expensive server,

14:51like a $150,000 server with 4 GPUs, we

14:55can actually get it to be more than 25

14:57times faster. So we can solve this in an

14:59hour

15:01if we really if it really made a lot of

15:03sense for us, if we had the right

15:06business value for it. So that's kind of

15:08the exercise on how fast we can get in

15:11solving these systems. But again, this

15:13is a very heavy system. This is a very

15:15large system and it's not something that

15:18one should do casually.

15:20Okay, so it does it give good results?

15:23It gives you really good results.

15:25Informally, you can go and explore and

15:27let us know if you don't like what you

15:29see, but it gives pretty good results.

15:32Just an example from like addresses

15:35that were humanly found tainted from the

15:38Bybit hack by ZachXBT.

15:40Automatically, the first time you run

15:42this system, it finds virtually all of

15:45them. Like

15:47from the 52 addresses, 42 of the 52 have

15:51taint scores of over 0.7. All of them

15:54have some taint score that not zero, but

15:57at least 42 of the 52 automatically are

15:59very highly flagged in the taint scores.

16:03And overall, it flags many thousands of

16:06addresses. Like of course, there are 350

16:09million active Ethereum addresses

16:11historically, so 150k is not that many,

16:15but that's exactly what you expect. How

16:17many addresses are in some way tainted?

16:20That's roughly what you would expect

16:22overall.

16:23Like I said, we also have alternative

16:25models that are taint-based, not so

16:28scalable, but this is our most general

16:31model and it's also publicly exported.

16:33You can play with it. The results are

16:35visible with the caveat that they're

16:37only updated every 15 days, but you can

16:40actually go and run this or not run, see

16:43the results

16:45on our site as a free user.

16:48Okay, so

16:50what's next? There's lots of ways. This

16:53is this is good, interesting an

16:55interesting model I think and there's

16:57lots of ways

16:58where this can be improved. I think the

17:00main one is this.

17:03Can we start the large linear system

17:05with a proportional taint

17:07doing the same thing as a human

17:09investigator will do for a Tornado Cash

17:11or a railgun?

17:13Like can I start with a taint of 0.2 for

17:16that address because I have 0.2 or 20%

17:20confidence

17:22that this address really got out of

17:23Tornado Cash, that deposit that came

17:26from a hack based on sizes or based on

17:29timing or whatever? So can we replicate

17:32what human investigators do and

17:34integrate that information in the linear

17:36system and extrapolate from that? That's

17:39I think the highest promise vector.

17:41So that's all I had, but I think

17:45there may be interesting questions and

17:47we'll let me say a bit more. Thank you

17:49very much.

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