DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 1 / Amber Hall

The State of DeFi Security - 2026

Peter Kacherginsky

28:23 · Recording

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Transcript

0:00All right.

0:01Welcome, everyone. Namaste, India. It's

0:04so good to have every single one of you.

0:07Welcome to the state of DeFi security.

0:09It's an honor to give the talk now

0:11fourth year in a row where we look back

0:13at the industry and learn.

0:18So in case we haven't met, my name is

0:19Peter Kacherginsky. I'm the editor of

0:21the Blockchain Threat Intelligence

0:23newsletter for the past eight years,

0:25and also a security advisor to some of

0:27the projects out there.

0:30So before we begin, a quick

0:31announcement. In light of everything

0:33that was happening in the past two days,

0:36I decided to put the Blockchain Threat

0:38Intelligence newsletter out out there as

0:41a public good, freely accessible, so you

0:43can subscribe, learn, and hopefully get

0:46the lessons to not get hacked.

0:51So let's begin our story. Usually when

0:53we gather here, we jump into the

0:55statistics and the threat models and all

0:58the case studies, but I want to do

1:00something different today. I want to

1:02tell you a story.

1:04It's a Western.

1:06It has a nasty two gangs operating

1:09there. There are lots of robbed banks,

1:12and some of you are in it as well.

1:22Maybe the slides.

1:25There we go.

1:27So to get to get an idea of how we got

1:29to these pretty tough times, we have to

1:31start at the beginning, the drought.

1:34Our story begins in the winter of

1:362025-2026,

1:38just as we all coming down from the

1:40hangover of the bull market of the past

1:42year.

1:43Bitcoin just hit 60k,

1:45and all of the projects out there are

1:47starting to really tighten their belts.

1:49The budgets are getting cut, especially

1:51security budgets. Audit jobs and

1:54contests and other security work that

1:56used to be a plenty in the past year

1:58really going down.

2:00Suddenly all of the security researchers

2:02out there who used to be really busy and

2:04could make a decent living find

2:06themselves unemployed without a job on a

2:08curb with no future prospects.

2:13Some of the smarter of you switched over

2:15to bounty hunting and that worked for a

2:17little while until

2:18bounty programs, just like the rest of

2:20the world, were overwhelmed by the AI

2:23slop and started introducing

2:25various types of friction, especially

2:28the submission fees.

2:31And just to give you a context of the

2:33world, both inside crypto and outside

2:35crypto, what was happening with the AI

2:38craze invading everyone,

2:40managers and founders realized their

2:43ultimate goal of having employees who

2:46don't sleep, don't eat, don't require

2:49any asks and just work, work, work all

2:52day.

2:53So AI is going to write the code, test

2:56the code, audit the code

2:59and that's how the layoffs begin all

3:03around the world.

3:06And just around that same time when the

3:09whole AI seems to be taking over the

3:11world, the frontier models introduce

3:13excellent models like Opus 46 and GPT

3:1753.

3:18Where a year ago these models could not

3:19even tell a difference between

3:21re-entrancy and price oracles, suddenly

3:24you could get ready-made foundry POCs

3:26that you could just run on the main net

3:28and hack whatever you want to.

3:32And it is in this context where you have

3:34a whole bunch of security researchers

3:36who are well skilled

3:38and now very well equipped out of the

3:41job

3:42in a down market,

3:43what do they do?

3:46Well, a lot of them they left the market

3:48altogether, they moved on to other jobs,

3:50but some of them they burned the whole

3:53town down.

3:54We went from three or four hacks a week

3:57to three or four a day.

4:00The last time we met here in in

4:02Argentina, we had just 24 hacks a month.

4:06By April, as we called bloody April,

4:09we hit 67.

4:11That's more than double.

4:14And how is everyone getting hacked?

4:16Well, guess what? AI is really good at

4:19finding bugs like signature

4:21verification, which wasn't even

4:23registering in the past years.

4:25Seeming inability by projects to

4:28properly verify the message integrity.

4:30They don't know how to check for

4:31nonsense, what should be in it, what

4:33shouldn't be, what can be replaced. And

4:35then we have devastating consensus

4:37failure bugs. Those are the type of bugs

4:39where it attackers figure out a way to

4:41print infinite amount of money from

4:43bridges and chains. And we had that

4:45particular bug class in the past, maybe

4:47one a year. This year we had 10.

4:51And even more were responsibly disclosed

4:53and patched before they were getting

4:55exploited.

4:56Such as the Zcash earlier this year and

4:59the Ripple infinite minting bug just a

5:01month ago.

5:02And of course, the dreaded price oracle

5:04manipulation. We've worked for years to

5:07bring down the risk of this very well

5:09understood and known attack class, but

5:11driven by all these tiny little old

5:13hacks from projects on mostly Binance

5:15Smart Chain,

5:16this shot right back up to the top.

5:20And who is getting hacked? So again,

5:22looking back in November of last year,

5:24those are mostly projects in the sweet

5:26spot between 100k and a million dollars,

5:28making it worthwhile for attackers to

5:30spend time understanding the protocol,

5:32weaponizing their bugs, and so on.

5:35By April and September and it continues,

5:39most of the hacks were under 100k.

5:42Writing exploits, looking for bugs,

5:44weaponizing them,

5:46and executing them became so cheap that

5:49whatever little project out there had

5:51with some TVL is now a worthwhile target

5:54for attackers.

5:58What was unusual

5:59back in April is that it's been a few

6:02months since we heard from our North

6:05friends.

6:06Were they taking a vacation?

6:08Nah. They were just busy casing their

6:11next targets.

6:12Their first target was the Drift

6:13protocol, which unprecedented was

6:16targeted first in person at a conference

6:19just like this one, where they were

6:20approached by someone to build trust and

6:23then later on build a relationship to

6:24send malware. So be very careful who you

6:27interact with at DSS and DEFCON in the

6:29coming days.

6:30And then of course, we have a classic

6:32trader-trader tactic of compromising a

6:35an engineer laptop at layer zero to

6:37eventually deploy a pretty sophisticated

6:39exploit against layer zero

6:44server nodes.

6:47We'll come back to these guys more.

6:49But what I want to bring up is that

6:50around April time

6:53Frontier Models, Frontier Labs realized

6:55the security sells.

6:57And how are they going to monetize it?

7:00Well, through scarcity and guard rails.

7:03To protect us all from ourselves, the

7:05latest models like Mythos were now a

7:08gated product where you have to be on a

7:10special list and you have to know

7:11somebody in Anthropic and then you have

7:13to sign up for an extra expensive API

7:15plan to get access to a highly

7:17token-hungry

7:18model.

7:20For the rest of us, we were forced into

7:22this guarded garden to make sure that

7:25God forbid we do something security

7:27related.

7:29What was interesting on top of that as

7:30we learned from the Hugging Face

7:32incident is that those guard rails not

7:35only apply to

7:37potentially offensive

7:40security work, but also a completely

7:42legitimate work. When Hugging Face

7:44engineers tried to use the very same

7:46model that was attacking them to defend

7:48themselves, they were told, nah, you're

7:50doing something suspicious.

7:52Lesson learned.

7:57By July of this year, both the guard

7:59rails and also just going through all of

8:01the low-hanging fruit contracts that

8:03were out there was having some effect on

8:05the number of hacks. So we briefly

8:07dipped to around 51 hacks.

8:12But then what happened? The Chinese

8:14models arrived. Models like GLM 52 and

8:18DeepSeek V4 and all the Quens 36s and

8:2138s and Next and so on

8:23suddenly had very similar, not the same,

8:27but good enough cyber capabilities to

8:30bring all the attackers back into the

8:32game.

8:35Most importantly,

8:37the models did not have guard rails. And

8:39whatever guard rails were put in there

8:41were quickly removed through

8:43obliteration and uncensored

8:45versions of those same models.

8:47Even more interesting, a lot of the

8:48security researchers started publishing

8:50specially post-train models like

8:52Cantina's Apex that are specifically

8:54designed for doing security work.

8:58In the end result,

9:01by September of this year, we not only

9:03matched the numbers of Bloody April, we

9:05surpassed it.

9:07If you want to connect the dotted lines,

9:09unless something changes in the near

9:11future of how we do security,

9:13we should see around 95 plus hacks by

9:17March of next year.

9:21What's even more interesting

9:23are the type of hacks that are started

9:25happening.

9:26We started with the low hanging fruits,

9:28all those price oracles and just

9:30contracts don't know how to implement

9:31burn functions over and over again.

9:33There's the same bot that I keep

9:34watching. There's just

9:36pillaging the whole Binance chain.

9:39Once those were done, attackers started

9:41moving down the stack to more and more

9:43complicated targets. They started with

9:45bridges. They continued to whole chains.

9:49We had the Liquid Network hack, $320

9:51million.

9:52They later moved on to wallets where it

9:55seems

9:56every day we hear about a weak PRNG or

9:58some other cryptographic issue of how

10:00wallets are getting generating their

10:01seed.

10:03And they continue going down this phrase

10:04to down this the stack until they're

10:07hitting signing infrastructure and so

10:09on.

10:12So I think folks, as we gather here

10:15today, it's time for a reckoning of all

10:18the things that broke

10:20this year.

10:23On the one hand,

10:24we have the $8.7 billion number

10:29that was stolen so far this year.

10:32And the vast majority of that is North

10:35Koreans just pillaging our ecosystem,

10:39exploiting weak operational security,

10:43security programs that cannot withstand

10:45a single laptop compromise.

10:49On the other hand, we have 574 hacks

10:52this year so far. That's almost double

10:54to the same time period last year.

10:57And that's I call them the the swarm of

11:00AI hackers who are just exploiting

11:03anything that was not audited, did not

11:05have the right code coverage,

11:07and more interestingly, did not have the

11:09right incentives for security

11:10researchers to do the right thing before

11:12them.

11:14And when I say incentives,

11:16this is what bug hunting looks like

11:18today.

11:20A good number of you switched over to

11:23the dark side

11:25where it is now more preferred action to

11:28negotiate the bounty after the hack,

11:31where you name your own

11:34bounty percent, like 10%, 20%, whatever,

11:37arbitrary,

11:38instead of doing the right thing and

11:39falling the programs, paying the

11:41submission fees, maybe waiting a year,

11:44negotiating back and forth, and then

11:46eventually maybe getting something or

11:48more likely just downgraded to

11:49informational.

11:53And how do we get there?

11:55Well, between bounty programs shutting

11:57down, uh platforms rather shutting down

11:59altogether like Code Arena, rest in

12:01peace,

12:02to

12:03remaining bounty programs simply

12:06becoming hostile to ethical security

12:08researchers.

12:10If you are a researcher today, you're

12:12doing this mental gymnastics where

12:15you're thinking, well,

12:17I could submit this critical that I

12:18discovered,

12:20but do I want to risk the submission fee

12:22and do I want to invest the next year

12:24dealing with all this back and forth,

12:27becoming a lawyer more so than a

12:28security professional?

12:31And I think a lot of them are just

12:32choosing not to submit.

12:34And I get it.

12:36A year ago,

12:38you you were overwhelmed

12:40by the AI slop. There were too many

12:42submissions, and I personally know so

12:44many of you triagers out there who just

12:46burnt out.

12:47But that was a year ago.

12:49You had a year

12:51to learn and use the same tools that are

12:53overwhelming you to improve the triage

12:56process because that is your only job to

12:58broker between ethical security

13:00researchers and vulnerable projects that

13:03also need that intelligence, and you're

13:05failing at this mission.

13:09We're experiencing a brain drain.

13:12The rooms I'm seeing are smaller and

13:14smaller. I'm seeing senior and junior

13:17talent leaving the industry for good.

13:20On the senior side, we heard Sam Zizane

13:22announcing that he's stepping back from

13:23Seal

13:25like Open Zeppelin getting acquired by

13:27S&P, the S&P 500 people. The trail of

13:31bids, the rumors they're negotiating

13:32with OpenAI, and I personally know so

13:35many of you

13:36who left the industry altogether to join

13:39the Anthropic and OpenAI's of this of of

13:41the other industries.

13:44And then on the junior side,

13:47all those little contests, all those

13:48little audit jobs and and bounties, that

13:53was our school. That was the pipeline

13:55that would bring the new junior talent

13:58into the industry to become the next

14:00senior security researchers.

14:03And that pipeline is now drained.

14:07As the market will turn around as it

14:09always does, who will audit all those

14:12contracts?

14:13AI. AI is going to write the test the

14:17code, audit the code. Do I need to spell

14:19it out exactly how this will end?

14:23Just ask Balancer that

14:26had the last day and closed the closed

14:28their doors for for good today.

14:30Ask dozens of other DeFi projects that

14:33already shut down this year.

14:38And then on top of it all, we have North

14:40Korea to deal with, who continue

14:42operating unimpeded.

14:45The government is not going to help you.

14:47They are a nuclear state. Law

14:49enforcement is not going to help you.

14:53They don't have jurisdiction and every

14:55sanction imaginable is already in there.

14:59In the meantime, they're setting new

15:01record year after year after year.

15:04This year alone, we just had that I had

15:06to update this slide two days ago. They

15:08just set a new record with $6.3 billion

15:10of a Binance hack.

15:13And they will continue doing so unless

15:15something changes.

15:19Worse, we as an industry are not doing

15:22nearly enough to stop them.

15:25On the one hand, we have something like

15:27Arbitrum Console who drew the line in

15:29the sand and said, we are decentralized,

15:32but that does not mean that you can

15:34abuse our chain and you can use it to

15:36transfer stolen funds.

15:39And on the other hand, we have projects

15:40like Thorchain who are like monks

15:43repeating this mantra of credible

15:45neutrality right up to the point they

15:47themselves get hacked and then they will

15:49shut down the chain.

15:51Or we have someone like Circle who are

15:53hiding behind court orders which take

15:55weeks to obtain when transactions take

15:57seconds or minutes to go through through

16:00their

16:01infrastructure.

16:07Defenders on the other hand,

16:09defense is so difficult. It's a

16:11political game even more so than

16:13technical, and they're still stuck

16:15operating at human speed just as we

16:18already transitioned into the machine

16:20world. They still don't have access to

16:22the latest models, and whatever models

16:23they have, they have guard rails all

16:25around them.

16:28The last but not least, I hope you all

16:30realize that the crypto cryptocurrency

16:33security is kind of a canary in a coal

16:35mine.

16:37What we see happening in our industry

16:40usually predates by six months or years

16:43what happens in traditional security.

16:45So when we had our bloody April, it was

16:48only the matter of time until the Black

16:49October was going to come, where

16:51everything is getting hacked, from DNS

16:53servers to certificate authorities, you

16:55name it.

16:57And before we pat ourselves on the back

16:58saying that we're so far ahead and we

17:00had a time to prepare for it, realize

17:03that all of those decentralized

17:05projects, they actually sit on very much

17:07centralized infrastructure. And now all

17:10of that Black October mess is coming

17:12right back to us. Did you notice the

17:14sudden increase in front-end

17:16compromises? Yeah.

17:19That's what's happening.

17:20So if you are a chain operator or

17:22bridge or or CeFi or DeFi and you have

17:25some kind of back-end infrastructure,

17:27pay attention to that, please.

17:32So just to give you an idea of what

17:33trajectory we are in right now,

17:35it doesn't look so good.

17:37Uh I had the first item written before

17:39the Binance hack where I'm waiting for

17:41DPRK's favorite time of the year to

17:44break things, which is winter holidays

17:46when people are distracted. So that

17:48already happened. That's that's a that's

17:50a thing.

17:52Um we're going to see multiple 100

17:54million plus chain chain killer events.

17:5895 plus compromises a month,

18:01overwhelming. I have to track every

18:03single one of them every week, so it's

18:05it's brutal.

18:07DeFi projects will more and more so will

18:10be compromised through their centralized

18:12dependencies.

18:14And the last but the one that worries me

18:16so much is the unholy birth of gray

18:19market bounty brokers that already

18:21exists in traditional security,

18:24where vulnerabilities are not reported

18:26to the projects, but in a reported to a

18:28gray market where they're sold to the

18:30highest bidder who are not necessarily

18:33the the projects themselves.

18:36We don't want to see that here.

18:41So is there hope for redemption to all

18:43of this?

18:45I think so.

18:47All the things that I'm going to share

18:48with you, they already exist. They've

18:49been tried this year and the past year

18:51and they work. We just have to choose to

18:54adopt them.

18:58On AI and defense,

19:02if you are a defender and your idea for

19:04what you're going to do this year and

19:06next year is to just throw AI at what

19:08you're already doing, you will lose.

19:11You will fall behind the race.

19:14Instead, I want you to step back and

19:17realize that as a defender, you are the

19:19ones that are setting the terrain for

19:22the attackers and AI and their bots or

19:24whatever to operate it.

19:27So why can't you design a terrain

19:30that is so difficult to operate in, so

19:32difficult to navigate that it drains

19:35even the most well-funded attackers? How

19:38can you burn their tokens to the ground?

19:42And before we even start talking about

19:44AI, I want to reintroduce some basics.

19:48How can you lock down what you already

19:51have? How can you set hard rules with

19:54invariance, setting hard privileges,

19:57allow lists?

19:59If you can't lock it down, cap it.

20:02There is no reason, I've been saying

20:03that for years, for your vault to be

20:05drained in a single transaction.

20:09Set the outflow limits, time locks,

20:11multisigs. Last but not least, add a

20:15human element, which is the most

20:17difficult part for automation to bypass.

20:21Cheapen your mistakes. Realize that you

20:23will mess up and that's okay.

20:25So what can you do

20:27to make your mistakes not existential.

20:31Set your guardian accounts that will

20:32save you at the last moment.

20:34Set automatic circuit breakers if you

20:36are if you are an exchange and one of

20:39your chains was already drained maybe a

20:41good idea to automatically shut down

20:43everything else or drain it.

20:47Last but not least

20:49with the Black October especially

20:51just operate under the assumption that

20:53you are already hacked. Your laptop is

20:56hacked.

20:57Your developer is already hacked.

21:00So how can we build a resilient security

21:03program that can survive not one or two

21:06but more compromises of your machines,

21:08of your keys

21:10and still survive.

21:13Then and only then can we start talking

21:15about AI. And I'm not talking about

21:18saying

21:19Claude hack me do not do not fail.

21:22That's not going to work.

21:24Build a threat model. No one else

21:26understand

21:27the weak points and the most critical

21:29parts of your protocol and your project

21:32than you.

21:33And once you identify those sensitive

21:36points then apply AI to it.

21:39Run models 24/7 against it. When a new

21:42model gets released update your harness,

21:45run it again. Do that before someone

21:48else does it for you.

21:52And speaking of models

21:55a reminder from the hugging face

21:56interface you cannot rely on commercial

21:59models for security work. Even the most

22:02expensive and permissive models that you

22:04can obtain today will still have guard

22:07rails. Worse those guard rails may be

22:10applied to you at a moment's notice just

22:12at the time when you most need it in the

22:14middle of the incident.

22:16You must practice self-reliance. Either

22:18run your own infrastructure or rent a

22:21redundant one. Practice with it, build

22:23the harnesses so you know exactly what

22:25do to analyze the locks, to reverse

22:27engineer contracts.

22:29Have that infrastructure on the ready,

22:31so when the worst hits,

22:34you will be ready for it.

22:39And of course, what do we do about North

22:41Korea?

22:42Well, for that, I invite you to look

22:45back in history at traditional finance

22:48that we so like to make fun of.

22:50The thing is, exactly 10 years ago, they

22:53were in the exact same spot we are right

22:56now.

22:57In 2016, North Korea attempted to steal

23:00$1 billion from the Bank of Bangladesh.

23:03How many of you are familiar with that

23:05incident?

23:06Right?

23:08The hack was unsuccessful by sheer luck.

23:12They made a typo. They made a typo in

23:14the Swift transfer form. Someone in the

23:17Federal Reserve Bank of New York caught

23:18it. Great.

23:20There were a few more attempts following

23:22the hack.

23:23So what happened next?

23:25The Swift network sat down all of the

23:28member banks

23:29and instituted a stringent security

23:32controls that all member banks must

23:35apply.

23:36Secure enclaves,

23:3824/7 hotline and incident response,

23:42shared threat intelligence.

23:45And what happened within 4 years? There

23:47were a few more attempts, but by 2020,

23:50North Korea had no more successful hits

23:53against traditional banking

23:54infrastructure where they actually stole

23:56some assets.

23:59And by then, North Korea moved on to a

24:01much

24:02easier target, which is us.

24:06So can we have our very own Swift

24:09moment?

24:11Can we finally decide to self-regulate

24:15before the regulation is forced upon us?

24:19If you saw the FBI notice this morning

24:23telling various projects,

24:25such as Store Chain, such as node

24:28to do something about funds.

24:31That was your first warning, that

24:33something is coming.

24:35And I have a feeling that this industry

24:36and people in this room much prefer to

24:39self-regulate instead of someone telling

24:40them what to do.

24:42So can we adopt an industry-wide

24:45security controls? Think seal

24:48certificates,

24:50but with teeth, with incentives.

24:53Apply security controls, secure

24:56yourself,

24:57and enable us to invest in you, to

24:59integrate with you, to provide liquidity

25:01and insurance, or stay away in your own

25:04walled garden.

25:07Can we agree on the security first

25:10neutrality?

25:12I get it, we want to be decentralized,

25:15but that is not an excuse for letting

25:17stolen funds and abuse of your platform.

25:21All you have to do is to publish

25:24an intervention policy, define the exact

25:27times and boundaries when you will apply

25:29it,

25:30be accountable to it and set realistic

25:32timelines measured in minutes to hours,

25:35not days or weeks.

25:38Last but not least, shared intelligence

25:40and coordination is critical.

25:43Again, I'll keep on using seal because

25:45this is this is our best hope right now.

25:48We have seal 911 and seal intelligence,

25:50but these are perpetually underfunded,

25:53overwhelmed projects. How can we support

25:56this and more

25:58in our ecosystem?

26:02We must bring security researchers back.

26:06And it's not hard. It's not some magic

26:08trickery. We just need to align the

26:10incentives and make it worth their time,

26:13not just financially, but even morally,

26:15not treat them like they're doing

26:16something criminal by telling us of the

26:18vulnerabilities we're trying to fix.

26:24Last but not least,

26:26to all of you security researchers,

26:28defenders,

26:30bounty hunters,

26:31who keep again and again and again that

26:34AI is going to replace us.

26:37It is not.

26:40AI is an excellent tool, but that's all

26:43it is, a tool in the hands of security

26:45researchers.

26:47Even if the whole world is trying to

26:49tell you otherwise, and even sometimes

26:51you yourselves, it is not a replacement

26:53for human creativity,

26:55for the grit and desire to learn and

26:59explore.

27:01And if you need any evidence of that,

27:03just look at the talks at this very

27:05conference written by the creative

27:09minds

27:10that are exploring this world together.

27:17Folks,

27:19it's always darkest before the dawn.

27:23And it was a very dark year, the darkest

27:26I've seen in the eight years I've been

27:27following the space.

27:29But I am optimistic

27:32that we will bring the light

27:34to our industry once more.

27:39We have the tools,

27:42the technology, and most importantly,

27:44the people. They're all already here. We

27:46just need to choose to use them,

27:49choose to win.

27:51We can choose to bring security

27:52researchers back.

27:54We can choose to use the same offensive

27:57tech as the best defensive tools we've

28:00ever had.

28:02We can choose to unite and protect this

28:05ecosystem together instead of protecting

28:08our little kingdoms.

28:11So let's light this fire together

28:14because this time around the power to do

28:17so is in our hands.

28:20Thank you.

Source and accuracy details

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