DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall
The Attestation Gap: Securing Private AI and TEE-Backed DeFi
Rahul Saxena
Source: YouTube automatic caption track · Exported 2026-11-16. Timestamps link to the source video. Cue end times were not supplied.
Transcript
0:02Hello.
0:03Hey everyone.
0:04So it was a great follow-up talk to
0:08start speaking at because
0:11privacy is the need of the hour and for
0:13privacy you can have a bunch of PETs,
0:17privacy enhancing technologies and the
0:19world is a efficient place. It will find
0:22the best solution
0:23between ZK, FHE, MPC, TEEs and what not.
0:28So
0:30let's talk about TEEs today.
0:31I'm Rahul Saxena.
0:33I'm the founder of Bluethroat Labs and
0:35we kind of specialize in TEE security
0:38amongst other things.
0:40So let's dive right in.
0:43The attestation gap, securing private AI
0:45and TEE backed DeFi.
0:47So this talk is necessary because I
0:52I feel that there is a huge
0:55education/awareness
0:58gap in the market around what TEEs offer
1:01and when people say that we use TEEs
1:04that they simply assume that it's
1:07completely private. Something is running
1:10in a computer where the computer itself
1:11doesn't know what is going on. So it's
1:14private and it can be inferred on chain
1:17as an oracle. So you know a complete
1:20privacy solution is up for grabs.
1:23But there is a huge amount of infra that
1:28needs to go to make this happen. There
1:31is a huge amount of steps that need to
1:34be taken to make sure that TEE usage is
1:36actually safe or not.
1:39And that is the attestation gap. Company
1:42A saying that they use TEEs and use
1:44attestations for privacy
1:46versus company B saying that they use
1:48TEEs for attestations
1:50for privacy
1:52can be two completely different claims
1:54and let's now figure out why.
1:56And right now private AI and TEE backed
1:59DeFi is
2:01privacy focused DeFi are the two main
2:03topics where T's are being used very
2:05heavily.
2:07So
2:09when you say that you are using T's,
2:11what are your users trusting?
2:13For private AI you are assuming that all
2:16the data that you are sending to the
2:18models, the inference that is private,
2:20right?
2:21And for T backed DeFi, what are your
2:24users assuming? For example, you cannot
2:26be copy traded. Like let's say you run a
2:29matching engine inside of a TE and
2:32settle things on chain on Hyperliquid,
2:34you get a
2:35private uh market uh
2:38private trading place in Hyperliquid.
2:41So
2:44we will now
2:45take a look at the bunch of research
2:47that we have done in Blue Throat Labs
2:50for writing our TE research T security
2:52handbook and figure out what exactly can
2:54go wrong when you're using T's.
2:57So the first thing,
2:59the attestation gap, the gap between
3:01what attestation proves and what your
3:03protocol promises.
3:04So
3:05when you get an attestation, that is
3:08simply a promise about the environment.
3:11Something ran in a TE,
3:14something was executed and you get a
3:18attestation certificate of that. That is
3:20it. That does not imply anything less,
3:23anything more. Your policy on how to
3:26handle that is the main blocker for how
3:29secure your applications are going to be
3:31because after your policy you do take a
3:34decision on who to give access, who to
3:36give money, who to send information,
3:38etc. etc. etc. So your software owns the
3:41decision to trust.
3:43The evidence, the attestation is simply
3:45an artifact on which you decide you want
3:48to trust further or not.
3:51So
3:52let's see. This is one of the first few
3:55bugs that we found in uh
3:58Fala/Dstack.
3:59So they had an offering for
4:02private AI, and of course in private AI,
4:05what you're assuming is that your
4:07attestations I mean
4:09your
4:10inputs are private. Nobody can read it
4:12and the output you get, nobody is
4:15reading them.
4:16So the software, the logic for that runs
4:20in the CPU and the models themselves run
4:22inside of the GPUs. So both the CPUs and
4:26GPUs need to provide attestations to
4:28prove that
4:29they're running privately. They are
4:30inside of TEs.
4:32And what we found that the CPUs were
4:35secure. They had their attestations.
4:36They were being checked correctly.
4:38But for the GPU report itself, it was
4:41simply getting passed. There was no
4:43checks against the kind of attestation
4:45being received from the GPU.
4:48So without any checks, the users were
4:51getting their back their command. So
4:53technically there was no guarantee that
4:56the prompts that they were giving that
4:58the private AI they were using was
4:59actually private because without the GPU
5:02being
5:04proven to be in a secure enclave, you
5:06can never say that you are running a
5:07private DeFi
5:09private AI.
5:10So passed is not verified. Even if you
5:14get the attestation, the attestation
5:16needs to be checked against certain
5:17fields to make sure that the attestation
5:19is valid.
5:21So again, this was a public finding was
5:25remediated. Falla Security thanked us.
5:27Great.
5:29So this was another finding that we had
5:32in Falla again. So this was the library
5:35that they use called Dcap QVL.
5:38And
5:39here again, what happened was
5:42they were fetching a collateral from the
5:45Intel signatory
5:46and they did not check a bunch of fields
5:50that need to be checked. For like
5:51basically the
5:53coating enclave identity was not being
5:55matched. So even though the collateral
5:58was being fetched, even though a lot of
6:00data from the collateral
6:02I mean a lot of data from the
6:03attestation was being checked. It is the
6:05collateral.
6:07The main thing
6:08who has who is the quoting enclave
6:10identity, that was not being checked. So
6:12there are fields like MR signer, ISV
6:15ECN, etc. etc. that was not being
6:17checked. So again, even when you get the
6:20collateral and you are doing the checks,
6:22if you do insufficient checks, you do
6:25not even know which kind of T or even if
6:27it is a T
6:28that is giving you attestation
6:29certificates.
6:31So partial verification can still return
6:33valid and you can still be in a facade
6:35that
6:36your stuff is running inside a T, it is
6:39secure, it is private, but it is not.
6:41Again, a public finding, we got a CV for
6:43this.
6:44Thanks to part of the security team.
6:47Next.
6:49So this is a very interesting thing that
6:51I want to speak directly to the protocol
6:53owners in the room and
6:55on YouTube directly.
6:57So
6:59this is a KMS and app applied
7:02differential TCB gates. So what I want
7:04to focus on here is that
7:07when you think about TC when you think
7:09about
7:11T's, it's all about
7:14how many layers of security do you want
7:17to get it to? How much paranoia do you
7:19want to give into? And I think
7:21technically that should be defined by
7:23the kind of
7:25TVL that you're supporting or the kind
7:27of
7:29of service that you're offering.
7:30But
7:32there comes a time where you have to
7:34just
7:35stop digging because like it it it comes
7:37to a place like you just cannot
7:41simply just do everything by yourself.
7:43You have to trust at some places.
7:45But it's very important that you figure
7:48everything out like what are all the
7:51things that can go wrong? What are all
7:53the threat
7:54threat actors if they lie, if they
7:56behave maliciously,
7:58our protocol can fail.
8:00For example, here
8:02there was there's something called TCB,
8:04the trusted computing base, and Intel
8:07can sign a
8:08certificate, it can give an attestation,
8:10but also give your status that the TCB
8:13for this attestation is out of date.
8:15So the trusted computing base from which
8:17this attestation was generated was out
8:19of date. So it is now up to you whether
8:22you want to process this attestation,
8:25pass it through your status check, your
8:27policy and take actions or not or or not
8:30accept it.
8:31So
8:33why I want to bring this up is that
8:36in the ideal world you will be doing
8:38everything by yourself, you will be
8:39setting up your own infra, you will be
8:40setting up your own
8:42policies and whatnot, but in the
8:45beginning in the real world you would
8:47you will depend on some
8:49TE provider
8:51and then you have to figure out all
8:53these checks whether they are being done
8:54by the provider itself or they are being
8:57left to the app developer as your own
9:00policy advice as your own policy
9:04choice.
9:05So you have to figure out what are the
9:06decisions that are in your hand.
9:09Take it and do not assume that the TE
9:12provider is doing it for you.
9:14So again, this was not
9:16a bug per se, but
9:19the
9:20team at Dstack and Falu, they took care
9:22of it and
9:24it made it more secure.
9:28Now we come to the next level of TE
9:31bugs.
9:32So just because something is running
9:34inside of a TE does not mean that the
9:37software inside it is bulletproof.
9:39If the software inside the TE itself is
9:42buggy and those bugs can be triggered,
9:45then the TE does not protect you.
9:47For example, this is one of the bugs
9:50that we found in an audit of Secret
9:52Network. Secret Network is an L one and
9:55it uses Intel SGX TEs in its nodes.
9:59[snorts] So [clears throat]
10:02an active validator during its proposal
10:04slot can use that particular byte, just
10:080 x FF, that single value
10:10and its proposal slot send propagate it
10:13during its proposal slot and then when
10:16all the honest validators try to decode
10:19it
10:20they would hit a panic and then they hit
10:21a panic they cannot reach final T
10:23leading to a chain halt.
10:25The T attestation were completely fine
10:28that attestations were being checked the
10:30policies were correctly implemented the
10:32trust model was completely fine but the
10:34code itself was not able to handle
10:37malicious input so this is what
10:39happened.
10:41The enclave passed bytes before normal
10:43decoding so in in in the time of the
10:46proposal
10:47the active validator set one of the
10:51Byzantine validators
10:52can put the 0x ff value there
10:56it can reach the consensus and the
10:58consensus software typically does not
11:00care about the payload that you have it
11:02wants to take care of
11:04the consensus guarantees consensus
11:05property so it does not read it
11:07and it forwards it to the SGX parser
11:09directly SGX parsers
11:12tries to parse 0x ff
11:15protobuf cannot figure out what to do
11:17and it panics which leads to
11:20a chain halt.
11:22So this was a chain halt bug that we
11:24reported in secret network and this is
11:26all just to point out that we use T's do
11:30not make you secure T's is just a part
11:33of the equation and there is a lot of
11:35surrounding work that you have to do to
11:37make it actually secure.
11:41Yeah and also this is a very cool
11:44way to tell you that
11:47the boundaries of T's and some other
11:50systems is a place where a lot of bugs
11:53are found typically
11:55because
11:56any boundary should be treated as an
11:58oracle no matter how trusted that
11:59boundary is and if you do not trust it
12:02I mean if you trust it and you just you
12:06let your T's get any inputs you kind of
12:08get end up getting wrecked.
12:13Cool so
12:14we had a lot of findings. You can
12:17find them at bluetoothlabs.com/releases.
12:20But from these four main findings, what
12:22I can tell you are the four checks for
12:25your T [snorts] integration in your
12:26protocol. Okay?
12:28So,
12:29it's pretty simple. Alter or remove
12:31required evidence, which is rejected
12:34invalid or missing evidence.
12:36Basically, if the evidence coming in is
12:38not actually coming in, it's not
12:41correctly coming in, it's not
12:43fresh, it's not by the correct entity,
12:46reject it.
12:48Present a disallowed entity or status.
12:50Now, check the status of the signature
12:53itself. Like the attestation might be
12:54valid, but what are the values inside of
12:57the attestation? What is the collateral
12:59in the attestation? Check all of them.
13:01If they are correct, let it through.
13:04And it's not always going to be binary.
13:06You have to make decisions based on your
13:08protocol requirements, whether you want
13:10to
13:11let a certain attestation do a certain
13:14state change in your protocol or not.
13:16So, again, do it.
13:18Third is no acceptable evidence
13:20available, [snorts] which is
13:22if nothing is present that authorizes
13:25something from a T, do not process it.
13:27And
13:29send hostile enclave input, which is
13:32always be mindful of all the inputs that
13:34are coming into your T's from any
13:36boundaries whatsoever. Nothing is
13:38trusted for a T.
13:40So,
13:41apart from this, like for the T itself,
13:43there are a bunch of other things. For
13:45example,
13:47how do you make sure that the code that
13:49you audited is the actual code running
13:50inside of a T? How do you make sure that
13:53the
13:54clock that the T software is is relying
13:57on is actually correct because the time
14:00can be supplied by the hypervisor, which
14:02is not trusted in the T model, etc.,
14:04etc. But overall, in a general sense,
14:06for T integrations, this is a pretty
14:09cool checklist.
14:13And finally, I would say that we have
14:15written a really cool T security
14:17handbook,
14:18which covers all the bugs that we have
14:21found, all the knowledge that we have
14:23gained around T's. You can scan this QR
14:26code if you want to read it. This is the
14:29URL and we have also applied for
14:32a grant and in the DAO fund
14:35Ethereum funding. So if you like the
14:37book, please donate anything that you
14:40can.
14:41Thank you. Have a nice day.
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