DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall

Onchain Security Markets in a World of Offensive AI

John Ennis

15:33 · Recording

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0:01Good.

0:02Tired.

0:04And before I start um on this next one,

0:08I'll press my road to see if my slides

0:09work. Yes, I do.

0:11Um can I get a show of hands here?

0:13Anyone who has a safe multisig just so I

0:15know

0:16kind of the rods. Okay, so we're looking

0:19at

0:19maybe half, maybe half.

0:21Um

0:22if anyone isn't aware of Safe is a

0:24multisig um and

0:27I work I've been working with Safe for

0:28about maybe six years. I originally

0:30joined Gnosis and we when I joined

0:33Gnosis, they were actually originally

0:35working on the

0:36prediction markets and

0:38I think there's still we we you're

0:40probably familiar now with Polymarket.

0:42Um they brought prediction markets to

0:43the main to the mainstream, I would say.

0:46But there's still a bit more innovation

0:47that could be done with regard to

0:48prediction markets, specifically in the

0:50security space, and I want to talk to

0:51you about kind of our insights that

0:53we've gotten from this and kind of our

0:55journey on where we're kind of releasing

0:56Safe Safe Net and uh putting together

0:59some on-chain security markets to tackle

1:01the

1:02the rising threat of offensive AI and

1:04the fact that yeah,

1:06existing threat actors are just more

1:07scalable now with AI than before and

1:11yeah, we need to level up as a result.

1:14This used to be 2.26 million so far in

1:16hacks, but by I mean by by Binance uh

1:19increased this significantly as well.

1:22Um this is so far we're looking at 8

1:24billion worth of losses. Everyone knows

1:26what we're facing here, uh but really

1:28we're looking at deep fakes as as a

1:31rising trend. There is autonomous

1:34agentic exploits happening, constantly

1:35reviewing patterns around your codebase

1:38and also assisted social engineering and

1:40most of all like social engineering is

1:42kind of the number one cause that we're

1:43seeing that is contributing to these

1:45numbers.

1:48Someone had a good talk yesterday around

1:50how you can

1:52kind of triage your agents to look at

1:54different areas of the codebase so they

1:55don't default to one when they're

1:56finding bugs.

1:58While you're doing that and taking those

2:00insights, can also kind of create other

2:02agent roles itself to simply recursively

2:05check what bugs that other agent your

2:08other agents are finding and

2:11chain attacks together, chain exploits

2:13and continuously run. And if you can't

2:15find an exploit in someone's protocol,

2:17be it on the front end, back end,

2:18contracts, or PC level, come back to the

2:21bug finder agents and the agents again

2:24recursively continue to find new bugs

2:26and eventually

2:27you'll get a successful exploit.

2:30Previously this was done by just

2:31security analysts alone, but now with AI

2:34it's just more scalable. You can just

2:36get hundreds of agents working on this.

2:39So the threat actors now just have yeah

2:41more scalable tools than previously. And

2:44what happens as a result of that is

2:47the common vulnerabilities and exposures

2:50available

2:51found in all stack, be it open source or

2:54closed source, just continuously

2:56increases. So we're looking at since

2:58like AI like LLMs kind of began to reach

3:01mainstream adoption, we just see

3:04doubling and doubling doubling in terms

3:05of common vulnerabilities. And

3:08we're already 72,000 in Q3

3:11in. So I'd say we'll hit 100,000 this

3:14year. And again that's doubling from

3:16last year. So as you can see this is

3:18just becoming

3:20you know just

3:22essentially exponentially

3:24increasing. And again it's

3:26agents have made these existing threat

3:29actors more scalable.

3:32So yeah we're kind of in a bad situation

3:34at the moment.

3:35We're basically like trying to kind of

3:37stack up some some defenses quite

3:40quickly.

3:42David had a good talk on that just just

3:44before around

3:46yeah how how they're doing that. But

3:48what since the since LLMs are

3:50essentially using crowd sourced

3:52knowledge

3:54and attack attackers are using AI to

3:56leverage the crowd to attack,

3:58we can leverage the crowd also to

3:59defend. And that's the kind of insight

4:01that we wanted to in into our next step

4:03product that we're building.

4:04So how exactly do we want to apply this?

4:06So like if they're using, you know, the

4:08crowdsourced knowledge, how can we

4:09defend a crowdsourced knowledge?

4:11Um and where we want to to actually

4:14address that is in specifically

4:16transaction security.

4:18Because the biggest thing causing these

4:20hacks and these exploits is that you

4:23don't really know what you're it's hard

4:25to actually match what you're signing

4:27with what you intend to do.

4:29And that's happened across the board for

4:31all the recent hacks that involve

4:33billions or millions and

4:36that is still a very it's I think it's

4:37what I think it is one of the biggest

4:39problems. It's a multifaceted um

4:41security space with a cat and mouse

4:42game, but I think this is one of the

4:43biggest challenges and one of the

4:45biggest problems we're all trying to

4:46solve.

4:47And the kind of scope today or the kind

4:49of gaps we see is

4:51we tell people, oh, verify what you're

4:52trying to sign with a third-party tool

4:54or use our company

4:56um to do this and we'll we'll review all

4:59your transactions and we'll tell you

5:01whether it's good or bad. And that's

5:03fine, but there's gaps in that as well.

5:06And the gaps that we see is that

5:09one, advisory warnings are structurally

5:11useless. So if you if you give someone a

5:13warning to say what you're signing is it

5:17might be malicious,

5:18people can just click sign and do it

5:20anyway. Structurally they can just

5:21bypass it or if your UI is compromised,

5:25that that warning's not coming through.

5:27You are going to essentially you you

5:30have no last line of defense. You

5:31misinterpret the UI, you sign, and

5:34you're you're wrecked.

5:35Um

5:36the second as well is that

5:38again, self-custody is irrevocable. I

5:40think we all know this as well, but

5:42again, the attacks are getting more and

5:43more sophisticated. So it's getting even

5:45more like the cost like the cost of

5:48attack is getting lower and yeah,

5:50obviously the honeypots are getting

5:51bigger.

5:52And

5:54we've we've noticed this as well.

5:55There's no real economic accountability

5:58really for these third-party tools or

6:01third-party companies that are um

6:03checking transactions. Like ultimately

6:05it's the that's using the wallet is

6:07going is the one that gets wrecked if

6:10someone didn't catch

6:12a threat. So if you have a company

6:14that's checking your transactions and

6:16says, oh, we didn't catch that, but

6:18you're the one that's facing the

6:19millions worth of hack millions worth of

6:22dollars worth of hacks, it's that's

6:24challenging, right? Like that's kind of

6:26in a way that's kind of unfair, but

6:28that's kind of how it exists right now.

6:30Of course, there's legal recourse, but

6:31really there's not as much skin in the

6:33game, and we found that ourselves as

6:35well.

6:38So what we have built now with what

6:40we're what we've released now actually

6:42with Safe Ness is what we want to do is

6:45multi-party security checks. So we want

6:47to leverage the crowd and not just

6:48select one single actor that is kind of

6:51doing the security checks for our

6:53wallets.

6:54We want to leverage multiple parties. We

6:56want them to be accountable. We want

6:57them to put up bonds as a result of each

7:00transaction that they want to

7:01participate in.

7:02And we want to enforce it on chain,

7:04which means it's not just a UI warning

7:06that you can just bypass, that it needs

7:08to be a transaction needs to be attested

7:10on chain in order for you to execute it

7:12as well.

7:13And we want to address specific risks

7:16that these multiple parties we call them

7:18sentinels. We have four sentinels right

7:20now. And we want the sentinels to be

7:22addressing specific risks.

7:24Address poisoning, unauthorized approval

7:27to your contracts or to your tokens,

7:29constantly checking malicious contracts

7:31and whether they are compromised at the

7:33time of the transaction,

7:35hidden ownership changes, so changing

7:36the actual ownership underneath without

7:38you realizing. This can be used through

7:40like unsupported delegate calls or or

7:42nasty like hidden delegate calls.

7:45And just generally trying to manipulate

7:48again what you're trying to do with what

7:50they want you to do as well.

7:53And we have this charter, which is

7:55essentially a dynamic rule book, let's

7:57say a court of law. Since there's always

7:59new laws coming through or there's

8:00always new attack patterns, so we'll

8:02always be updating this kind of charter,

8:03this court of law of what to you need to

8:06address or the sentinels need to

8:08address.

8:10So just to walk you through how this

8:12would work,

8:13um

8:14we have

8:16you propose a transaction and we'll walk

8:18through the happy case. We propose a

8:19transaction. There's sentinels. Right

8:21now we have four, but really we want

8:23more sentinels and we actively want

8:25anybody that's operating in this space

8:28to potentially evaluate running a

8:29sentinel.

8:30Um the sentinels check against the

8:32charter. Are there specific risks or

8:35specific rules that this transaction's

8:36breaking?

8:37If if it's unanimously secure, they all

8:40say thumbs up, it's good. The validators

8:42are more of an admin role. They'll

8:44attest the transaction on chain. They do

8:46this thing called a frost signature,

8:48which is just again they all participate

8:50in kind of generate a cryptographic

8:51signature. And once that is attested,

8:54it's broadcasted cross cross chain and

8:56then the guard can verify that yes, this

8:59user can actually execute this

9:00transaction because the validators have

9:02created the frost attestation and the

9:04sentinels say this is secure, we back

9:07this transaction.

9:09Um that's if you enable the guard. You

9:11don't have to enable the guard. You can

9:12just simply use warnings instead, but if

9:15you do enable the guard, you have to go

9:16through a delay and many people in the

9:18previous talks talked about having

9:20delays associate with critical

9:21operations or delays associate with

9:23critical like large-scale transactions

9:25that that's true and a lot of hacks

9:27could have been prevented or not

9:29prevented, let's say, but it could have

9:31added another layer of defense if there

9:33was delays incorporated as well.

9:36For the insecure case, if one sentinel

9:38says this is insecure and this is the

9:40reason based on the charter why this is

9:42insecure, that will be reported to the

9:44user. You will The validators will not

9:46attest and you have to go through delay

9:49if you have the guard enabled.

9:53Right now the validators who are

9:54performing the administrative role, this

9:56we have like Nosis Safe, we have

9:58Greenfield, we have core contributors

10:00running validators, they're generating

10:02frost signatures,

10:03and the sentinels they're putting up

10:05bonds per each transaction

10:07um that they want to participate in and

10:09we have the of Blocksec, OpenCover,

10:11Candide, and TenGard. Again, we want

10:13more validators and we want more

10:15sentinels to make this truly kind of

10:17permissionless system

10:19and build up because it's a permission

10:20system right now, but this is what we're

10:21working with right now. And yeah, happy

10:24to chat to anyone after if you're

10:25interested in looking into this deeper.

10:30Again, this is live right now in Safe

10:32Wallet. You have to subscribe to Safe

10:33Pro, but

10:35users simply, you know,

10:39either pay pay a subscription or they

10:40pay on a per transaction basis.

10:43The sentinels get that transaction, they

10:45get the fee as well. If the sentinels

10:46participate, they get they get a portion

10:48of the fee.

10:49And again, they're they have bonded

10:52verdicts. I don't have enough time, but

10:53if the sentinels disagree and one of the

10:55sentinels is wrong after the fact, they

10:57lose their bond and that bond is

10:59distributed to the other sentinels. So

11:01the game theory works that the sentinels

11:03want to find things that the other

11:06sentinels disagree with,

11:09which is actually hacks like because

11:11like malicious transactions tend to be

11:13the 0.00%

11:16of transactions. So you want the game

11:18theory to work that sentinels find

11:20specific things and get the bonds of the

11:23other sentinels as well and of course

11:26participate so they're getting the fees

11:28on a on a constant basis as well.

11:31Again, the validators do they perform

11:33the frost signature, they create the

11:35attestation in the guard, and then yes,

11:37the user

11:38can execute a transaction if they have

11:41the guard enabled.

11:43And here you can just see right now this

11:45here just creating a safe transaction.

11:47Sorry, I don't know why I'm looking at

11:47this. I know these slides.

11:50You can see the you can see someone

11:52create a safe transaction. The sentinels

11:54found no issue

11:56with that transaction, so you can simply

11:59go ahead. That's the happy case execute.

12:01If the sentinels did find something,

12:03this would be reported. You would have

12:05one sentinel reporting something or

12:06many, and you can click on the explorer

12:09and here the explorer will tell you

12:12who said, who said this is actually

12:15insecure or not secure,

12:17and what's the rationale of why they

12:19said insecure. If So here you can see

12:23block six said secure. Candid and 10

12:25cards denied it and said insecure.

12:27And here this is on all on chain, so it

12:30has to be quite a rigorous explanation.

12:33But we will summarize this in the UI,

12:35but ultimately it fails because you have

12:39a wrapped ETH.

12:41You've created an unlimited approval to

12:43the wrapped ETH contract with that

12:44account. We don't want unlimited

12:46approvals in this day and age with

12:49with specific like, you know, basic user

12:51operations. So yeah, this is labeled

12:53insecure as per the charter.

12:57So why why why do we think this is

12:59different from the existing kind of

13:00state of play right now? It's the fact

13:02that we have multiple parties competing.

13:04Like right now in like the state like we

13:07have multiple attack

13:10like

13:12attack participants or let's say

13:13malicious actors all competing.

13:16Whereas it doesn't really have that

13:17same, you know, game theory for the

13:20people who are trying to defend. It's

13:22all kind of like you're on your own

13:25mentality. So we believe that like that

13:27the we want to leverage the crowd here

13:29and leverage the experts and the best is

13:31to actually have multi-party competition

13:33as a result of this.

13:35Again, no just warnings that you can

13:37bypass on chain enforcement. So if the

13:39UI is hacked, you can still actually,

13:42you know,

13:43have critical transactions blocked on an

13:46on chain level.

13:47We have a dynamic charter. Like the law,

13:49there's always new laws or new attacks

13:51arising. We'll also have We have a

13:52charter as well that's always being

13:54updated with new attacks that are being

13:56created because this is a cat and mouse

13:57game at the end of the day. There's no

13:59one solution. Not This This won't fix

14:01everything, but it will be another layer

14:03of defense.

14:05And again, making making people

14:06accountable actually, making people

14:08accountable for self for not finding

14:10things or finding things and reporting

14:12them wrong.

14:14And yeah, we believe this is in the

14:16direction of creating more

14:17accountability for uh yeah, defending

14:20against these threats.

14:23In the future, we want to create a more

14:24open

14:25sentinel market, open validator market.

14:28Um, and again, we want to make them

14:31specific with transaction security. We

14:33want to support multiple accounts, so

14:34this is not just a safe solution. I'd be

14:36happy to talk to any wallet providers or

14:38any security companies that would love

14:40for their for our charter to be updated

14:42to their um

14:45uh structure. And yeah, we can also

14:47create insurance products on top if the

14:49sentinels can guarantee that they will

14:51check these things as well.

14:54That's me done. Um, I would just say you

14:57can scan this QR to learn more. If you

14:59want to reach out to us directly about

15:02running a wallet, running a sentinel,

15:04running a validator, you can get this QR

15:06code. And also, we're in Mumbai Cricket

15:08Club uh on

15:10Wednesday.

15:11Um, and yeah, we have a we have an event

15:13there with the Ethereum Foundation um if

15:15you'd like to attend. So scan that QR

15:17code if you'd like to attend the event

15:18as well.

15:19And yeah, I think I'm all out of time.

15:22So um yeah,

15:23I don't chat to me if you have any

15:25questions after. I can't I don't think

15:27I'll I don't want to run into anyone

15:28else's time.

15:30Thank you.

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