DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall

Your Governance Proposal is Clean. Your Laptop Isn't.

Elliot Friedman

5:12 · Recording

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Transcript

0:02Hello everyone. I am Elliot Friedman,

0:05the founder of Solidity Labs. And today,

0:09I'll be talking about

0:13operating in a new world where

0:15your computer is probably going to get

0:17compromised at some point and how you

0:19keep your governance proposals

0:22safe in that world.

0:25Okay, there we go.

0:27Okay, so the first thing is to assume

0:29that your computer has been compromised.

0:32We saw this with the recent Binance hack

0:35where

0:36an individual developer's laptop got

0:38compromised and that was enough to

0:41actually go and

0:43steal funds. And so

0:46yes, you will have malware on a machine

0:48you trust and threat models today

0:51absolutely have to include

0:53this in their threat model.

0:57So things are going a lot more local and

0:59social with spear phishing

1:02attacks. And so if you're running a DAO

1:05or you have some sort of on-chain system

1:08that you're trusting with significant

1:09amounts of funds, you need to have a

1:11system that

1:13if a single honest node gets compromised

1:16or if you only have one honest node

1:18remaining, your funds can still be safe.

1:23And so really what this boils down to is

1:26becoming a harder target. So if you have

1:29one laptop, one developer laptop that

1:31can propose to a DAO and propose

1:34actions,

1:35it's going to be really easy for a

1:37threat actor to

1:39compromise that system. But if you have

1:41you know

1:43multiple laptops and multiple developers

1:45or multiple tool chains to create your

1:49proposals and craft them, it's going to

1:51be a lot lot harder

1:53for attackers.

1:55And so here we have a call data

1:57evaluation maturity framework which

2:01how you can build a system that um even

2:05if one part is compromised as you're

2:07generating your call data, uh it's

2:09unlikely for an attacker to be able to

2:11get through.

2:12And so, you know, if you only have the

2:15bottom of this maturity, you only have

2:18one laptop with one framework, you work

2:20your way up, you build out a second uh

2:23toolchain, and so that way you have

2:27um

2:28you know, if there's some sort of supply

2:29chain attack in in the code that builds

2:32your call data, you're able to catch

2:34that issue.

2:36Um and then rung two, you know, now you

2:39have multiple reviewers and multiple

2:41toolchains, so you're not just

2:43generating the call data on your local

2:44machine, you're also generating it on

2:47another developer's machine with

2:48different um toolchains for that. And

2:52then, you know, if you want to continue

2:54stacking and making this more and more

2:56complicated for an attacker to

2:58compromise this uh vector, uh you can

3:01add, you know, additional reviewers, add

3:03CI, etc.

3:06And so this is what a typical, you know,

3:08governance proposal uh will look like

3:10from start to finish. You have it on

3:12your local machine, you broadcast it, it

3:14waits on chain, and then it executes.

3:17Um and really not a lot happens while

3:19it's on chain before execution. And

3:22we've built out uh the Forge proposal

3:24simulator, which is a open source

3:26toolchain

3:27which allows you to um combine your

3:30deployment scripts, your governance uh

3:33proposals into a single uh unit and then

3:36test it um as well as monitor it

3:39throughout the whole proposal lifecycle

3:41when it goes on chain. And so then even

3:44if you have a developer's machine that

3:47is compromised, you'll be able to go and

3:49check um what's on chain versus what you

3:52actually are supposed to have for that

3:54proposal.

3:56And so this is what uh an ideal

3:59governance proposal will look like. It

4:01will have um it will go from end to end

4:04on your local machine to on chain, but

4:07the the difference here is that you'll

4:09have, you know, a CI job that will

4:11verify or you'll have local developers

4:13that will

4:14um

4:15craft that same call data and check it

4:17versus what is on chain and expected,

4:20which makes it um

4:22much much harder for an attacker to add

4:25a back door.

4:27And this is this was an experience I had

4:30um on a previous project where

4:33we had to transition from uh old

4:36TypeScript tooling to um a Foundry

4:39Solidity tooling. We actually kept two

4:41different tool chains running at the

4:43same time while we tested out um

4:47you know, to make sure that

4:48we had call data that did the same thing

4:51on on both uh machines.

4:54So looks like my time is up here. Um

4:57thank you all and if you're interested

4:59in uh diving more in, you can find more

5:03um

5:04on our website and we have a whole page

5:06up for for this um

5:09tool. Thank you.

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