DSS 2026 / Day 1 / Amber Hall
Ill Bloom
Joaquin Pereyra
Source: YouTube automatic caption track · Exported 2026-11-16. Timestamps link to the source video. Cue end times were not supplied.
Transcript
0:00security there. Um,
0:01hello.
0:03While I'll wait for the slides. Okay,
0:06quick. I was going to introduce myself,
0:08but I have slides for that. I'm Joaquin
0:09Pereira. I've been a researcher for more
0:11than 10 years and I work at Coinispect,
0:14which is a security firm that's been
0:16providing services
0:18in the blockchain space since 2014. So
0:21that's basically forever in blockchain
0:24times.
0:25Um,
0:27this talk
0:28we are
0:31we're going to talk about Earbloom.
0:33Does someone know what Earbloom was?
0:36Yes, you, because you read my yeah.
0:39That's that's actually surprising, but
0:44it speaks about the state of security
0:46today.
0:49The talk will have two objectives. One,
0:51it's going to be a very technical
0:53talk. I'm going to try to present
0:55a lot of details about what a
0:57pseudo-random number generator flow
0:59looks like in the real world.
1:01And
1:02it's also going to be a story about how
1:04to deal with an incident of that
1:06of that style. It's not a common
1:09incident response kind of
1:11kind of thing because it's very
1:13distributed. So I want you to imagine
1:15you're
1:16contacted to respond to an incident.
1:20You it's a normal project for you. I
1:22guess most people here work in security,
1:24so you've done something like that.
1:26And you realize the flow that you're
1:28looking at
1:29does not affect the single protocol that
1:31contacted you.
1:33It affects
1:34you don't know how many accounts, you
1:36don't know how many blockchains, you are
1:38not sure how many millions of dollars
1:40could be at stake here.
1:43Also, you see evidence that it's being
1:45exploited. It's
1:46continuously being exploited while
1:48you're researching
1:50after the the first incident was
1:51reported.
1:53And
1:54there's no easy way to actually know
1:56who's affected and who isn't
1:58because the
1:59the vulnerability in a library.
2:02It's actually,
2:04as we'll come to find out, it's in a
2:05library of libraries. So it's deep,
2:08deep, deeply nested in many, many, many
2:11applications.
2:13So that's basically the talk and we're
2:15going to try to
2:17um
2:19discuss how how we dealt with it so
2:21hopefully you can learn about it.
2:23And if you're you're faced with a
2:25similar problem ever in an incident
2:27response, you learn from our ideas and
2:31our mistakes and what we tried and what
2:33we
2:34uh did.
2:35So
2:37El Bloom, for those that don't know, was
2:40a problem in a pseudo random number
2:42generator in crypto JS, which is
2:46probably a library you are not aware.
2:48You don't know,
2:49but it's been uh live since 2014
2:53and it was really, really heavily used
2:56like from 2022 14
2:59maybe till 2020 2021.
3:03And uh it was really, really used before
3:07native
3:08um crypto was available in JavaScript
3:11because remember there was a time when
3:12the crypto module wasn't as available as
3:15it is now.
3:17And uh
3:18the peak exposure was $12 million.
3:21At least
3:23almost $6 million were stolen, which
3:26unfortunately in our industry that
3:28sounds like
3:30not a lot.
3:32Um
3:33but that's
3:35that speaks about other things in the
3:36industry.
3:37Um we ended up fearing that almost at
3:40least almost 3,000 accounts were
3:42vulnerable
3:44and uh
3:45we analyzed 14 chains for signs of
3:47exploitations and we found at least
3:51five chains that were affected. So as I
3:53said, this is all
3:55we figured all this out afterwards. At
3:57the beginning we didn't know if it was
3:58$5 million,
4:00$100k,
4:02$1 billion,
4:03you have
4:04no way to know.
4:06And um just so we understand the
4:08vulnerability and we
4:11can understand what we did to figure out
4:13who was affected, let's do a quick intro
4:16into BIP 39. Who is familiar with BIP
4:1939?
4:21Wow, almost. Okay, so the quick intro is
4:23worth it.
4:25BIP 39 is a way that um
4:28basically
4:30you can have the same seed
4:33to
4:34control all your accounts in uh in
4:37blockchains, right? It's a way that you
4:38have when you initiate your wallet, it
4:41tells you, hey, write down these 12 or
4:4314
4:4424 words
4:46and you can have accounts in Ethereum
4:48and blockchain and and Bitcoin and third
4:51chain and whatever you want and have
4:53multiple addresses with the same kind of
4:5612 or 24 words or 18 words, but no one
4:59ever used 18 words for some reason.
5:02The way that works is uh first your
5:04wallet will gather some entropy from
5:06somewhere that uh it will gather
5:09a random number.
5:11I will do the examples with 128 bits
5:13because it's easier, but there are
5:15several lengths available.
5:18And uh once your wallet has that
5:20entropy, it will use that random number
5:23to index into some words. So basically,
5:26let's do the worst version possible.
5:28Let's say the random number is 67
5:32and uh the the dictionary is food and
5:34potato.
5:36So your
5:37index number six is food, index number
5:39seven is potato, your words will be food
5:42potato.
5:43Something that not many people know
5:46and it's a weird quirk of BIP 39
5:50is that it supports many languages.
5:53Uh you can have your words in English
5:56or Chinese or Spanish or French and
6:00probably more. I don't know how many
6:02languages exactly are supported.
6:05And the weird part,
6:07if you see the whole process,
6:10is that
6:12the language you have
6:14will determine the master seed.
6:17So the same entropy, if you have the
6:20same random number
6:21but a different language,
6:24the words will be different and the
6:26words it's
6:29what the input for
6:31PBKDF2 is.
6:34So PBKDF2
6:36will have a different output if you have
6:37different languages,
6:39which is kind of surprising. Languages
6:41seems like a UX thing, not a
6:45master generating thing,
6:48detail kind of thing. But that's how it
6:50works.
6:51I will try not to say PBKDF2 never and
6:54again in my life if I can avoid it. It's
6:56a mouthful, so I will just say hash.
6:58It's not a hash really, but
7:00similar enough.
7:02And well, from there you have your
7:04master key and there's some process to
7:07derive infinite accounts from that
7:09master key.
7:10And the important part here is that the
7:12hash function is designed to be
7:14extremely slow and that's a feature.
7:16That's to avoid
7:18brute forcing even if you have a bad
7:20random number generator and that will
7:22also be very relevant.
7:24So that's B 39. Let's get situated in
7:28time here and there's something very
7:30interesting with the timeline.
7:32It's a very reduced timeline.
7:35The crypto JS
7:37issue was introduced in 2014, so very
7:39old.
7:40And it was
7:42fixed in 2020.
7:45And I realized
7:46just an hour ago when I was reviewing
7:48the slides that I kind of lied to you
7:52because the title of this talk is
7:54discovering Illum, but it was fixed in
7:572020, so we really didn't discover it.
7:59We rediscovered it. Or we were the first
8:02good guys to rediscover it after the
8:05hackers started draining funds.
8:07The
8:09weird part here
8:11is that the first people to realize the
8:13the flaw
8:15didn't realize the potential of the flaw
8:18or didn't realize how easy it was to
8:21actually
8:24crack the seeds
8:26from the seed or from the bad seed or
8:28random number generator. So
8:30the maintainers of the library kind of
8:32knew
8:33that their pseudo random number
8:35generator was bad.
8:37They just thought it wasn't
8:39as bad
8:40as it turned out to be.
8:42And that's
8:43a very interesting point. Sometimes you
8:46see this kind of phenomenon
8:48where people know there's a
8:49vulnerability and they will basically
8:53trust that it's not as bad as it looks.
8:56It ends up ends up being extremely bad.
8:59And uh on May 2026 we were made aware of
9:02a hack that was happening. We were
9:04contacted to find the root cause. We
9:07found it
9:08and uh
9:10all through the following months
9:12until we were able to
9:14basically warn as many people as as we
9:16could
9:17uh that hacker kept draining funds
9:19unfortunately.
9:20And uh the CVE was published in August
9:232026. CVE publishing was
9:26quite challenging but very important
9:28because once you get the CVE
9:30and many applications get automatically
9:33warn that there's something wrong with
9:35their dependencies. So that was
9:37important for us.
9:39Why did people kept using a library that
9:41was
9:43known to be vulnerable? I mean there was
9:44a fix available and everything. This was
9:47a time uh where mobile wallets were
9:50being really popular and there were lots
9:52of mobile wallets.
9:53The market wasn't as concentrated as it
9:56is now.
9:57And it's very interesting because you
10:00can go and see the GitHub issues.
10:02You can go and read the discussions.
10:05And the discussions are basically hey I
10:07updated
10:08and it it stopped working. My app is not
10:10working anymore.
10:11And the fix that was popular was hey,
10:14just downgrade and it will work again.
10:16Uh so many applications
10:18just downgraded and uh were like okay,
10:21works again. I can build my app.
10:23Uh so everything's fine.
10:27Um the maintainer even
10:29kind of supported like uh
10:32kept the zero random generator
10:35in a new major version
10:37saying hey, yeah, well, I can't update
10:39the zero random number generator because
10:41it breaks people up.
10:43So here's a new version with other fixes
10:46and that still works with React Native.
10:49Uh so again,
10:51kind of interesting to see how
10:55if you don't put security first or if
10:56you don't
10:58try to prioritize security,
11:00the fixes can be available, the
11:01vulnerability can be known,
11:03everything can be basically spelled out
11:05for you.
11:06You will make mistakes still.
11:09So this this part was very surprising to
11:11find.
11:12And
11:13also another surprising part of the
11:14timeline,
11:192020 was the year the fix was posted.
11:222026 was the year
11:24the first identified drain happened.
11:27And um
11:29that's a long time.
11:31And that's actually actually a long time
11:33even after
11:34AI uh wasn't the scene. So it took
11:38quite long for someone to to actually
11:40start hacking
11:41with the problem.
11:43Now
11:44let's go
11:46to the problem at hand.
11:48In the first beta version of this talk,
11:50I was going to go by by line by line and
11:52read the code.
11:54Then I remembered that when a speaker
11:55does that, I usually sleep. I don't like
11:59it. I think it's very boring, very
12:00confusing. There's always someone that
12:02cannot read the lines because they're
12:04too far away.
12:05So what I encourage you to do,
12:08go to the GitHub and go with your agent
12:11through the code base. And in this talk,
12:14instead of doing that, let's go through
12:16a simplified conceptual
12:18um version of the flow instead of going
12:20line by line
12:22like nerds.
12:23Okay.
12:24So the problem is
12:26you want some randomness, as we said, to
12:28generate a seed, right? You're a wallet,
12:30you need to generate a seed, and your
12:31user comes to you, hey, I want to use
12:34blockchain.
12:35Uh okay, here are your 12 words. What
12:37you had to do was generate some
12:41random number.
12:42And this library promised you to give
12:44you a random number.
12:46What the library did was
12:48take some input
12:51and um
12:53take the input was simply the amount of
12:55randomness you wanted.
12:57I don't know if you know, but randomness
12:59is measured in
13:01bits. So we say one bit of randomness,
13:0418 bits, whatever.
13:06To be cryptographically safe, you need
13:07128 at the very least, at the very
13:10least. That's why during the 2010s
13:13um 12 words were very popular. Nowadays
13:16we use 24 words. 24 words are 256 bits.
13:2012 words was uh 128. Well, basically you
13:24told the library, hey, I want 28 uh 20
13:27128 bits of
13:29randomness, give them to me.
13:32And the library did some
13:35weird
13:36math.
13:37But basically, if you
13:39reduce it,
13:41you'll see that the library ended up
13:43doing one call to math.random,
13:45which is 32 bits of randomness,
13:48and then a coin flip basically
13:50every
13:52four-byte chunk. So for 128 bits, that's
13:56four bytes, four chunks. Yeah?
13:59So we end up and the last for reasons
14:02that are
14:03not really relevant,
14:05the last uh the last chunk had would
14:06only one one coin flip, not two.
14:09So we end up with only two to the 39
14:13space.
14:14We wanted a space of two to a 128. We
14:17end up with two to the
14:2039. That's way smaller, way way smaller.
14:24Do the math.
14:26It's it's actually worse than that
14:27because for some reason there's a
14:29multiplication in the in the code that
14:31multiplies the high bits and the low
14:34bits of a number.
14:36If you do that, you'll get collisions
14:38because imagine you have the number
14:40bytes
14:41two and four
14:42that has the same output that if you
14:44multiply the high and low bits of four
14:46and two, which is kind of obvious when I
14:49say it like that, but it was missed for
14:51some reason. So after some math, you can
14:54see this leaves you with 37 bits of
14:57randomness. 37 bits of randomness is
15:00awful.
15:01By the way, I I do want to mention
15:03something about the codebase.
15:06I already have the slide, so why not?
15:09If you go through this, you will see
15:11math.random
15:13and if someone
15:16read the slide and saw that
15:18maybe they thought, oh, this talk is
15:20going to be math.random is bad.
15:22Don't use math.random. Talk is over.
15:25Great. Congrats.
15:26Well,
15:27the interesting part here is that
15:30math.random wasn't the bad the the the
15:32bad part.
15:33I I think it would have been even best
15:36to use
15:38just use math.random instead of doing
15:40all that they do because they introduced
15:42like collisions and they introduced
15:46one call to math.random no matter how
15:49many bytes you wanted. So in the end it
15:53was even worse
15:55than just calling math.random. So yeah,
15:57math.random is bad. Don't use it for
15:59cryptography, but it can be even worse.
16:02That's the good news. You're not the
16:04worst if you use math.random.
16:08So yeah, that's basically how you end up
16:10with only
16:1237 bits of randomness when you wanted
16:15128.
16:17For 256 bits, the math is the same. You
16:21end up with 49 bits of randomness.
16:24Um,
16:2547 if you end up
16:27taking into account the collisions.
16:30So,
16:33remember we were doing an incident
16:35response during this time. We found
16:37this. Uh, we wanted to confirm if this
16:39was actually what was causing the hacks.
16:43People were being drained while we
16:44researched this topic.
16:46And if you ever participated in an
16:48incident response,
16:49you know it's quite stressful. You're
16:52trying to tell it like logically, and
16:54yeah, we found this, and then we found
16:55that, and then we did that.
16:57But the reality is much more chaotic.
17:00So, we found this,
17:03and we wanted to make sure um
17:05that um
17:07that this was actually the issue that
17:08was
17:10um being leveraged by the attacker. And
17:12as I said,
17:14um
17:15sorry, yeah.
17:17And we
17:20kind of got lucky here
17:22because we were able to confirm the the
17:25issue because a user, a victim
17:27actually shared their seed with us.
17:30What's what was so important about this?
17:33If you remember the BIP 39 slides,
17:36the expensive part of the process
17:39is the
17:40PBKDF2 part. I said it again. Damn. Um,
17:47if you can skip that part,
17:50iterating over 2 to the 37 space is
17:54quite cheap. You can do it quite easily.
17:58So, once a user and
18:00again, if you remember the slides of BIP
18:0339,
18:05the hashing comes
18:07after the seed. So, if you have a seed
18:09like a raw seed, like the words, you can
18:12iterate over that without doing the
18:14hashing, the expensive hashing part, and
18:16you can do it much more quicker.
18:19So, once the user shared their seed with
18:21us,
18:23um the user was had already been
18:25drained, so they had nothing to lose.
18:28We found it matched
18:29our
18:31reproduction of the weak seed of random
18:32number generator,
18:34and we were quite happy because we found
18:36the the actual root cause. We were
18:37convinced at that point.
18:40So what to do now?
18:43Well, you have to find who is affected,
18:45and not all the users will share their
18:47seed, obviously.
18:49Uh you have to find
18:51what wallets were producing the
18:53vulnerable seeds,
18:55and you need to figure out if you can
18:57save the funds.
19:00How to find who is affected? Well,
19:02basically we downloaded the whole
19:04active blockchain address space of every
19:08blockchain we could think of that was
19:11more or less relevant.
19:13And
19:14uh you can see there are some stats, but
19:16all your usual suspects are on there.
19:18And the first idea is basically, well,
19:21we iterate.
19:22We go I equals 0 1 2
19:26and we generate every possible
19:28candidate, and we try to see if that's
19:32on the set of active blockchain spaces,
19:34and if it is, well, we have a victim, a
19:36potential victim, but they may not have
19:38been drained yet.
19:40There's an issue with that, which is uh
19:43it's too slow.
19:44Um
19:46a search space of 37 bits or
19:49even worse for to 256 bits of of
19:54um
19:55B 39 size.
19:57It's bad for cryptography, but it's
19:59still
20:00quite big for
20:02for
20:05easy and response times. We didn't want
20:07to take
20:08three years on brute forcing
20:12uh all the possible seeds.
20:14Our interest was being as quick as
20:15possible so we could be faster than the
20:18attacker.
20:19And I'll share some slides on how we
20:21were faster than the attacker, which I
20:23think it's very interesting at the end.
20:25But
20:26the important part for now is that uh
20:29we thought of an optimization to this
20:32process.
20:33And the optimization is
20:35quite obvious, which is use GPUs. The
20:37important part is how do we did that.
20:41GPUs are very good at computing PBKDF2
20:44again.
20:46And
20:47the problem was was how do we actually
20:50match against the active
20:54the active addresses on a blockchain,
20:55right? There are two alternatives.
20:58Either we compute everything on the GPU,
21:00we store it somewhere,
21:02and then we kind of see what the
21:06middle of the two circles is.
21:08And that's uh
21:11that's the the the space is too big.
21:13It's at least almost 20 terabytes.
21:17It was too big to do that.
21:20So we we what we ended up using was uh
21:23Bloom filters.
21:25Do you know who knows what Bloom filters
21:26are?
21:27Very few people. They are cool data
21:29structures, so you should know more many
21:31more people should know about Bloom
21:32filters. Um Bloom filters are basically
21:35a set.
21:36And
21:37the important part of this uh data
21:39structure
21:40is that it's able to tell you
21:43it's a Boolean data structure, let's
21:44say.
21:45It can tell you two things.
21:48You ask, hey, is this item on the set?
21:50And it tells you, no, it's not on the
21:52set.
21:53Or it can tell you, meh, it's probably
21:57on the set. Uh so you're not sure.
22:00But you get a probably. And probably is
22:03good enough for optimizations.
22:06So
22:07what do you gain because you lost like
22:10the certainty that the item is in the
22:11set
22:12compared to an actual set data
22:13structure?
22:14What do you gain? You gain uh that is a
22:16very compressed data structure. It uses
22:19much much less space. So by using a
22:21Bloom filter, we were able to put the
22:24whole
22:25the whole um
22:28number of active blockchain addresses on
22:31the GPU directly.
22:33And the final
22:36the final pipeline looked like this. For
22:38every blockchain we were interested in,
22:40we downloaded the set of active
22:42addresses, which
22:44by the way,
22:45defining active is an whole another
22:48ordeal, especially in chains like
22:50Bitcoin, but that's
22:53I could I could talk for that like for
22:54another hour, so let's not do that.
22:57Let's just say active.
22:59Um we Bloom filtered it. We put
23:02everything on the GPU
23:04only if the Bloom filter tells us that
23:06it's likely on the set of active
23:09blockchain
23:10addresses, then we leave the GPU
23:13and confirm on the actual set. So that
23:16allowed us to be quite quick
23:19and allowed us to find
23:21many many many many many vulnerable
23:23addresses
23:25quite quickly.
23:27So that was the key optimization.
23:30And it's also fun because of the name.
23:32The name includes Bloom
23:34uh and I'll share more about the name
23:35later.
23:37So once you get who is affected, you
23:40need to understand which wallets were
23:42the ones producing the vulnerable seeds.
23:46Very hard.
23:47Very hard.
23:48We tried three things.
23:50Again, I'm telling this like it's
23:53chronologically. It wasn't
23:57chronologically.
23:58While we were attempting the the Bloom
24:00filter thing and researching that,
24:02other people were trying to find the
24:04vulnerable wallets and so on and so
24:05forth. So so keep that in mind.
24:08The first
24:11strategy maybe was we knew React Native
24:14was relevant.
24:16Uh React Native is very useful mobile
24:17applications.
24:18So let's try to reverse engineer APKs.
24:23Absolutely a waste of time. It's very
24:27hard not to reverse the IP case, but to
24:30find
24:31all the historical post all the history
24:35of APKs of every wallet forever
24:38was such a challenge.
24:40Uh then you have to decompile them like
24:43try to understand the code base
24:45too hard.
24:47Again, this is all with AI and and all
24:49the whistles and everything. Uh it's
24:51just
24:52uh it didn't produce any results and it
24:54took us a long time. So we quickly
24:56discarded that.
24:58In case it's not clear,
25:00we did have to find every historical
25:02release of every like
25:05suspicious wallet
25:07ever
25:08because once you produce a vulnerable
25:09seed, it doesn't matter if you produce
25:11it in 2015
25:14or yesterday. The seed is still
25:16vulnerable. So if you were vulnerable
25:18for like a week and then you fixed it,
25:21you still like had to warn your users.
25:24So that was why um historical research
25:27was very important.
25:28Then uh something that's maybe the most
25:31obvious idea,
25:33many wallets are open source. Go to
25:34GitHub, try to find if they're
25:35vulnerable. Again, quite hard, quite
25:38harder than it sounds. Even though this
25:40produced a couple of results, uh you
25:42again have to find all the historical
25:43data.
25:45And of course, only depending on the
25:46vulnerable library doesn't mean you
25:48actually used the vulnerable like code
25:51path, right? So it was hard to analyze.
25:54And maybe the most surprising strategy
25:57worked the best
25:59um which was
26:01well, we have the accounts that were
26:03vulnerable. Let's try to find what those
26:05accounts have in common, like what
26:07tokens do they trade, what country they
26:10are in,
26:11whatever, what NFTs do they have.
26:14And then you could figure out the
26:15community
26:17and by proxy many times you can find out
26:20like popular wallets among that
26:22community. And that actually worked the
26:24best, which
26:26wasn't my initial suspicion. I I didn't
26:28think that would work, but ended up
26:30working.
26:31Um,
26:33I already said this, but uh you cannot
26:35patch the seed. So,
26:38again, if you I hope that's clear. If
26:40you ever produce If a wallet ever
26:42produced
26:43um a vulnerable seed,
26:46the seed is going to be crackable.
26:48It It doesn't matter if the wallet fixed
26:50the vulnerability afterwards
26:52until the user creates a new seed on a
26:56safe like pseudo random number
26:58generator, that seed is going to live on
27:01the searchable space
27:03and basically be doomed forever. So,
27:06there's something also very interesting
27:07here.
27:09This was a problem since 2014, right?
27:122014 were different times for
27:15information security, for blockchain,
27:17for everything.
27:18Many people were were
27:20migrated after 2014. So, say you created
27:23your first seed on 2015 and then you
27:25migrated to
27:27top tier wallet in 2018 because you
27:30learned more about security and you
27:32said, no, I don't trust this wallet. I
27:34trust this other one. You bought maybe a
27:36hardware wallet, but you kept your seed.
27:40Um, you're doomed anyway. It doesn't
27:42matter. Your seed is already like
27:45vulnerable.
27:46So, it was a hard problem for for for
27:49wallets.
27:50Meanwhile, while we are doing all this
27:52research, the attacker is still
27:56draining accounts.
27:57The attacker first drained as I said
28:00$3 million.
28:01While we were we were doing the
28:02research, a second wave hit.
28:04That's almost $2 million. Well, more
28:06more $2.5 million. And there was a small
28:09very small drain, 40k
28:12at the end of July.
28:14So, this this whole research is being
28:16done
28:17kind of on a race with the attacker. We
28:19were
28:20trying to figure out what was happening
28:23and contacting wallets and contacting
28:25everyone
28:26as the attacker
28:28was exploiting stuff.
28:31I will need to be quick because I only
28:32have two left. So, let's go.
28:35One important user had $2 million
28:37on their account. And the important part
28:39here is that
28:41this was the first time we actually
28:42considered rescuing the funds ourselves.
28:46Um, $2 million is not pocket money.
28:49And we wanted to be able to save the
28:52user's money if possible.
28:54Unfortunately unfortunately
28:57it was impossible. Basically, we
28:59consulted So, this is this is something
29:01important also to know if you ever are
29:03faced with a decision like this.
29:05We consulted several firms, like legal
29:07firms,
29:08and none of them
29:10had a clear path to move forward.
29:13Like none. Absolutely none of them.
29:17And we also contacted Seal 911 at the
29:19beginning of this investigation.
29:21And kind of
29:23the idea was to we focus on the research
29:26as much as possible.
29:28And Seal 911 tried to
29:30reach out to to they have lots of
29:32contacts and were very useful in that
29:33respect.
29:35Um, so basically we tried to keep
29:38kept things to to the research. But it
29:40was
29:42it was a hard night to sleep, so to say,
29:44knowing that there were $2 million
29:46for
29:47someone and they were probably about to
29:49be drained. And they ended up being
29:51drained and we we suspect they were
29:53drained. We can't know, of course. We we
29:56just saw a transaction on the
29:57blockchain. We we have no idea who they
29:58are.
29:59Um,
30:01how to warn the users very quickly.
30:04Again, the best way was through the
30:06community.
30:07And I
30:10yeah, this was so
30:13so hard for us, so frustrating to us
30:15that we couldn't warn users about this
30:18that we created Unlock Key.
30:20Unlock Key is basically have have I been
30:22puned for for keys.
30:24So, in a privacy preserving manner, you
30:26can go paste your address there and see
30:28if your address is in a known vulnerable
30:31set
30:32of
30:33addresses that are well in a set of
30:36vulnerable
30:37Uh and Unlucky is not only for E-Bloom,
30:39it also contains a cold card addresses.
30:42And we are sure that more pseudo random
30:45number generator problems will happen.
30:47So
30:50basically we we think efforts like
30:53Unlucky are very important.
30:55Red thing times up.
30:58Um
30:59these slides I think are very cool.
31:02There's a break now if you want to know
31:04why we think we were able to actually
31:06know about the addresses before the
31:08attacker because that's also very
31:09important. Like not to adopt a defeatist
31:12attitude when you find something like
31:14this.
31:15Don't do not think okay attacker already
31:16knows all is doomed.
31:18Let's you know do the post mortem and go
31:20to sleep.
31:22You can do stuff yet. You can be smarter
31:24than the attacker at least for a while.
31:26And uh
31:27times up.
31:29But again there's a break now. I'll be
31:31around if you want to discuss this. Uh
31:33I'll be happy to do so.
31:34Uh there's one part that's very
31:37interesting and very technical about
31:39pseudo random number generators that we
31:42figured out before the attacker that
31:44allowed us to crack even the 256 bits.
31:47Yes I'm finishing. Um
31:50but there's a success story for two
31:52wallets that were able to like warn
31:53their users and we
31:55hopefully save people's uh savings. So
32:00again we think Unlucky efforts like
32:02Unlucky are very important.
32:04Let's discuss if you have other idea
32:06besides Unlucky which by the way is not
32:07a product. We are not charging for
32:09Unlucky is an idea. Go and check out the
32:11site.
32:12And uh
32:14fun facts for the break.
32:16Thank you.
Source and accuracy details
- Names, organizations, technical terms, code and numbers may be misrecognized.
- Source wording and disfluencies are preserved; no editorial corrections were applied.
- Export contains whole-second cue starts only; cue ends and subsecond timing are unavailable.
- A full caption-track export does not establish that every spoken word is represented.
- Automatic YouTube captions; not human-verified against the audio.
Source export SHA256: e5aab74893af58b3cf2b10e2cb5b156c121f9e95cd19de36213b70c3a34abe24