DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall
Sword vs. Shield: Navigating the AI Security Chaos in 2027
Davit Kobakhidze
Source: YouTube automatic caption track · Exported 2026-11-16. Timestamps link to the source video. Cue end times were not supplied.
Transcript
0:00So okay.
0:02Hey, my name is David.
0:04I'm a BD guy from Consensus Diligence.
0:06So not a security auditor.
0:08Sorry about that, but I do think that I
0:11can share some interesting perspective
0:14because I talk a lot with our clients
0:16and
0:17with our security researchers, which can
0:19help me to provide some interesting
0:21information for you guys.
0:22So the the topic of my presentation is
0:25Sword versus Shield. It's an ancient
0:27concept about the competition between
0:29offense and defense team. I believe
0:31originated in
0:33China
0:34thousand years ago. So I do think that
0:37what we have today
0:38on the market it
0:40this competition, who will outsmart who?
0:44The topic says navigating the AI
0:46security chaos in 2027, but also it
0:49backs down to how do you keep your
0:51protocol and funds secure in 2027?
0:55And honestly
0:57after last couple of weeks with all
0:59these bugs exploited, with all the
1:01protocols got hacked,
1:02with all the incident we have
1:05I think you already have an answer. Do
1:08you?
1:09Anyone?
1:11You simply can't.
1:14That's it. That's it for my talk. Thank
1:16you so much.
1:18Okay.
1:20The timer says I still have 14 minutes
1:22to go.
1:23So I perhaps should stop with bombing
1:25with dead jokes.
1:27And let's try to at least figure out how
1:29can we minimize exposure
1:31moving forward.
1:32Before that, let's just have a quick
1:34recap
1:35on what I've heard from the market
1:38throughout this last couple of years.
1:41So first
1:42actually in 2024 I already start hearing
1:45from protocols and security researchers
1:47themselves that oh
1:49AI promises like a lot of efficiency. I
1:52do think it will replace security
1:54researchers moving forward. Back then it
1:56was like
1:57vague timeline three to five years.
2:00But as early as 2026, actually during
2:03the Denver conference, I said here in a
2:05lot from different protocols that you
2:08know what?
2:09We think AI made security simple. We'll
2:12probably cut off our spending and do a
2:15lot of stuff in house.
2:16And throughout 2026 we see this idea
2:19manifested in actions.
2:21So you see like job market for security
2:23researchers in US dropped by 26%.
2:26Lots of security companies, both Web two
2:29and Web three start cutting off their
2:31security teams, auditing teams.
2:34And bug bounties have been paused or
2:36canceled or closed.
2:38But
2:39actually I do think that in reality
2:42right now in November 2026
2:45and moving forward to 2027
2:48AI actually created way more work for
2:50security researchers.
2:52It might be a bit different work. It
2:54probably evolved.
2:55But still there is a long
2:59way to go.
3:00So why did that happen? In my opinion
3:03there was a wrong perception of AI
3:05capabilities and the sword, meaning
3:07hackers and offense got sharper first.
3:10And the shield, meaning the capabilities
3:12like a silver bullet, magic pill, super
3:15app who closes all your security
3:17questions
3:19is still being built or potentially will
3:21not
3:22be built ever.
3:24So I do think that defenders should pick
3:26up the sword too.
3:28Because again, remember then when you
3:30are trying to
3:32hack the website or the app
3:34you can test one bag across multiple
3:36targets, but when you work as a defender
3:39in a defense team
3:41you have to test for every box in a
3:42single target. That's a bit different
3:45work.
3:46And I don't think that AI made offense
3:50or hackers smarter
3:52or way more powerful. But what I do
3:53think AI did, it made them faster and
3:57exploits way cheaper. So here are the
3:59like four examples.
4:01I won't go like deep into them, but just
4:04to give you a glimpse that, for example,
4:06for ConnectWise,
4:10hackers exploited by the way the
4:12security framework which was published
4:13by security researcher,
4:15and they managed to as quick as 2,900
4:19logins in a minute to try to steal
4:22ConnectWise clients data.
4:25Same similar stuff happened in South
4:26Korea, like in a matter of days, 16
4:28financial institutions, banks and
4:31crypto companies were exploited.
4:33Speaking about the
4:35ease and the like from resource
4:37perspective, the cheapness of hack.
4:39So
4:40Nord Forge VR routers created a great
4:44research and
4:46traced actually one hacker's job who
4:48left a lot of like footprints during his
4:51hacks and turned out that he hacked
4:55attempted to hack 1,200 websites and his
4:57budget was only about $5,000, which
5:00means that it was less than five bucks
5:03per attempt
5:04and
5:05$50 per successful hack actually,
5:09which is
5:10quite impressive. I do believe that
5:12maybe moving forward it will be even
5:13cheaper and we should consider that as
5:15well.
5:16And a bit more speculative stuff, but
5:18Palo Alto Unit 42 says that in PHP
5:22breakout like hackers used AI during
5:27their further trying to stealing data
5:29and exploiting
5:32targets.
5:34Interestingly enough, then I asked our
5:36security fellows
5:38what do they think about the AI usage.
5:43Don't read it as a study. It's not a
5:45formal study. It was just like a
5:47set of conversations
5:48with my buddies and with the network as
5:50well. But surprisingly so,
5:54I had like three almost equal groups of
5:57people
5:58saying that
6:00they have entirely different perspective
6:02or similar but different perspective on
6:04AI capabilities. Like the first group of
6:06people said that actually
6:08we don' think that AI can find anything
6:11that I wouldn't have been able to
6:12identify. Maybe zero to five percent
6:15additional
6:16highs and
6:17criticals. And I'm talking about highs
6:19and criticals, no about low and
6:20informational obviously.
6:22The second group was a bit more moderate
6:24and they said that
6:2510 to 20 percent of highs and criticals
6:28way faster identifiable with AI than
6:31without, but still you have to pay
6:33attention
6:35at least one out of three
6:37highs and creates are missed by AI and
6:38you have to go through the code base,
6:40especially if it's like a
6:42major update to the protocol or
6:45major feature.
6:47The third group was even more optimistic
6:49and they said that they've seen a huge
6:51development of AI capabilities
6:52throughout the year. If in the beginning
6:54it was 10 15 percent additional
6:57value for them, now they see it like 25
6:5935 percent on creates and majors across
7:01the board. It doesn't mean that they
7:03wouldn't be unable to find these bugs,
7:04but it means that they would spend a lot
7:07more time
7:08on it. By the way, I'm really curious to
7:11talk to you after the talk and
7:13see which group is
7:16resembles your view on the AI, so feel
7:18free to approach.
7:20On the first positive side of things, we
7:22have to admit that
7:23AI produces not only the the useful
7:27stuff, but also slope.
7:29And the the sort of on that is quite are
7:31quite interesting. So on first positive
7:33side of things, AI researchers told me
7:35that it's not necessarily bad stuff. If
7:38we get from 30 to 50 percent false
7:40positive rate and we know that we have
7:42to go through this findings manually,
7:44this is a part of the engagement, that's
7:46fine because we get a lot of
7:48interesting leads, interesting security
7:50cues and that will help us investigate
7:53further and understand protocol better.
7:55And maybe this particular issue is not
7:58real, but it will lead me to something
8:00interesting.
8:03On the client side of things regarding
8:05the false positive, Uh the answer was a
8:07bit different. So nice figure from
8:10Coinbase actually. So they reported only
8:134% of their submissions in the first
8:15half of 2026 were real, which is insane.
8:18So 96% of submissions is a complete
8:20fake,
8:21which is a pity, which is a pity. Uh but
8:24we have to understand that there are
8:25different types of noise for clients as
8:27well. So clients told me that if
8:30this report with lots of false positive
8:32stuff goes to the auditing team or to
8:35the security team and we know that
8:37they'll go through it and validate it
8:39and triage it, then it's fine. However,
8:42if
8:42false positive report report with like
8:45lots of false positives goes directed to
8:47dev team to patches and fixes, that's a
8:49real problem. And also uh some clients
8:52told me that they've seen like huge
8:54development in effectiveness of AI and
8:57they received around 50% false positive
8:59rate in the first half of 2026. Now it's
9:02way less, but still much more uh
9:05to analyze.
9:07We've talked about briefly about code
9:09bugs, but actually
9:11uh the majority of money we are losing
9:13right now is not through the code bugs.
9:15Although in quantity they're still
9:17number one.
9:18The majority of uh money lost during
9:22this year were through operational
9:23security, suppliers, partners,
9:26bugs through and not under your like
9:29code control. Let's put it that way.
9:32Couple of examples again.
9:34Like Bitget got exploded because there
9:36was a hole
9:38in the security product they purchased
9:40and they just drained almost $400
9:42million.
9:43Uh another um
9:45one more time for ConnectWise as well,
9:47like a reverse example. They were
9:49holding their clients' data and they got
9:51exposed and
9:532,250 clients got their data leaked.
9:57So it just
9:59matters that
10:01the threat is not only from your code
10:03base. There are multiple venues to got
10:05exposed.
10:07And that brings me to another thought
10:08that you have to treat your security not
10:11as a uh one layer. You have to treat it
10:14as a multiple like layered approach when
10:17in the center you have
10:18your protocol or your uh
10:21client's funds
10:22and you have to build as much layer as
10:24possible around it.
10:26Obviously, it starts off with a design.
10:28Bad architecture, bad design, you'll got
10:30exposed. Then obviously your code should
10:33be uh uh in a good shape. Audits, AI
10:36review, you name it, fuzzing, sometimes
10:39formal verification, everything is super
10:41important here.
10:42But then you have to understand that the
10:45current state of protocols, current
10:47state of market is interconnectivity
10:49between like multiple partners and
10:51vendors. You have to treat all the
10:53integration with your partners almost as
10:55rigorously as your own codebase.
10:57Obviously then goes separation, security
10:59keys and access. Don't forget about
11:01that. On top of that is monitoring. And
11:04uh you have to understand that just
11:06having some monitoring system uh
11:09embedded is not enough. Have you tested?
11:13Did the right person receive uh the
11:14notification when it should? Uh did you
11:18cover the whole potential incidents you
11:20have with your monitoring system? That
11:22the question you have to ask. But on top
11:24of that
11:25you have to have a plan.
11:27Unfortunately as it sound
11:29stuff will break
11:31and in first hours, even days, uh your
11:33brain will not work as efficiently if
11:36something goes sideways. So you need to
11:38have a plan which outlines first steps
11:41you have to do in first minutes, first
11:42hours, first days.
11:44How to stop the drain? How to stop the
11:46leakage? How to notify your partners?
11:48How to make a communication to the
11:50community? Whether you should uh or
11:52should not engage with uh law
11:54enforcement in one capacity. All these
11:56questions should be decided beforehand
11:58before hack happened and every
12:00responsible person should have
12:02this plan
12:03I would say printed out on his desk.
12:07Uh another uh important stuff we as a
12:10security researchers we have to pick up
12:12the
12:13I know it might sound like just use my
12:15AI.
12:16Actually, it's not.
12:18Yes and not.
12:19So, first of all, you have to understand
12:21how attackers are viewing your codebase
12:24and how do they use your
12:26AI to hack you.
12:28And then you have to build upon that.
12:31First of all, you have to build a
12:31process inside the company. How do you
12:34collect the context for your models? How
12:37what standards do you have for teams to
12:39use AI tools?
12:41What happens if you identify issue,
12:42where it goes?
12:44Simple stuff like that, but believe me,
12:46when you have it processed out, then you
12:47can go to the next stage.
12:49What
12:50what is triage for you? How do you do
12:52your triage
12:54in your company? What tools do you use?
12:56Speaking about tools,
12:58how many tools do you use? Do you have
13:00only one in-house tool or you have
13:02multiple tools like third-party tools,
13:04your in-house tools?
13:06How often do you rotate the models you
13:09use? Because we heard multiple times
13:11with our customers that even though one
13:14model could be prominent and one
13:15framework could work well,
13:17the combination always beats it. So, if
13:19you combine this several models, several
13:22tools, several approaches, it will
13:24always
13:26be more efficient than only one
13:28brilliant model you might have.
13:30And remember,
13:32AI alone does not replace an audit or a
13:34security researcher, but
13:37done right, it can show you the way the
13:39attackers will view your codebase
13:41because they will not audit you, they
13:43will try to break you.
13:45And in
13:47the last thought I would like to share
13:49is like security should not be stamp, it
13:51should be a habit, it should be a
13:53routine
13:54you perform every day within your
13:57company.
13:58And obviously,
14:00you don't always have to engage with
14:02third parties and pay a lot of money for
14:04audits and
14:06third-party tools. There are stuff you
14:08can do yourself within your company.
14:10Everyone has access to AI. You can come
14:12up with your own tooling within the AI.
14:14Operational security basics
14:16as simple as sometimes killing your old
14:18accounts as well.
14:20Uh, monitoring, setting up your
14:21monitoring. No one will set up processes
14:23and monitoring for you. Even if you have
14:25like a brilliant report around
14:27operational security from third party,
14:29if you do not engage within your
14:31company, if your leadership is not
14:33interested in implementing this stuff,
14:35nothing will work.
14:37And obviously there is a period of time
14:39when you have to bring the heavy guns,
14:41when you have to engage
14:42with third party companies. I would say
14:45every feature or every change which
14:47involves money moving uh, operations,
14:50new core logic, new features, new bigger
14:52integrations,
14:54or if you want to build like a
14:55operational security playbook for the
14:56first time,
14:58this is the time you have to engage uh,
15:00with third parties because that would be
15:02way more efficient. And
15:05remember like not every change need an
15:07audit, a full audit, but every change
15:09needs someone to look on it.
15:13Uh,
15:14yeah. So getting back to the initial
15:16question, uh, how do you navigate AI
15:18security uh, chaos in 2027?
15:22So the answer is simple. You can't if
15:24you wait uh, for the shield to be built.
15:27But if you lower your defense and pick
15:28up the sword, you have much better
15:30chances uh, to survive and move forward.
15:33That's it for my time. Thank you so
15:35much.
15:36And please
15:37please come to me, talk to me in case
15:39you think I got something wrong. I would
15:41curious to
15:43hear your perspective as well. Thank you
15:44so much.
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