DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall

The Audit Gap: A Four-Year Empirical Study of 23,818 Findings and 218 Exploits

Christian Vari

4:29 · Recording

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0:01Do you guys like data? Because we do. My

0:04name is Christian Vari. I'm the head of

0:05audit operation at Ox Security. And we

0:08have prepared a report about the public

0:12data that we have found about the

0:14findings and exploit that have happened

0:16in the last four years.

0:18Uh very briefly, Ox Security is a

0:22security firm that is working on

0:24blockchain since 2017. We have done more

0:27than 600 engagements. We have more than

0:3050 senior security researcher.

0:32And

0:33we actually

0:35published this report that you can find

0:38on our website and that I will introduce

0:40here briefly. So actually we explored

0:43all 27,312

0:46public audit findings from 22 security

0:49firms and we

0:51also checked another population in this

0:53study. So the actual exploits that

0:55happened. We checked all the live

0:58ones from, you know, we we got the data

1:00from rec.news and the total amount of

1:04the losses is about 10 billion. But the

1:07important things here are how actually

1:10audits work and how

1:13and what is the root cause of the

1:15exploit losses. So as we can see here,

1:18we have two different columns and on the

1:20left we have the percentage of the with

1:23the category of the audit findings and

1:25we can see that the first one is logic

1:27errors. Then we have code quality, then

1:30we have access control and input

1:31validation. But if we check actually

1:34where the money is lost is very

1:36different because we have private key

1:38compromise, phishing and social

1:40engineering, bridge exploits and also

1:43access control. So the only thing that

1:44we found in both of them is access

1:46control.

1:48The interesting thing is that the

1:50remaining three categories that we have

1:51for audit findings just it's just about

1:55under 4% of the losses.

1:59And another important is that

2:02more than, you know, the 50 percent 51

2:05percent in our study of the losses is

2:07about what we call human vector attack.

2:10So private key compromises I said, but

2:12in general all related to not to the

2:14code quality, your code base and these

2:16kind of things, but to operational

2:17security. And you know,

2:19just last week we have we have

2:21experienced another another thing like

2:23that that will that will be accounted in

2:25the next version of the repo. We update

2:27it every quarter.

2:29Another important thing that we that we

2:31found is that obviously there is a big

2:33domination of

2:36big incidents. So we we see here that

2:38the largest incident is 15 percent of

2:41the world losses and the largest 20

2:43incidents account for 66 percent of the

2:46world losses. So actually there is a big

2:48domination of few incidents.

2:52So here

2:54this is what we learn about that and

2:56what we would like you to think about as

2:58you know protocol owners and people that

3:01manage protocols and their security. So

3:03you probably go through an audit and you

3:06got your design reviewed, the

3:08architecture, maybe you have done

3:10fuzzing, all this kind of stuff that is

3:12very very important for your code base.

3:14But also

3:16we need to work a lot more on the

3:18operational side of this and also on how

3:21to respond to that. So having really

3:23clear who have the keys, who are the

3:25operators that can do this kind of

3:27things, having clear workflow and

3:29processes for that and also what to do

3:31when something happened because thing

3:33will happen.

3:34And I have, you know, I I will leave you

3:37with a question to all the, you know,

3:39protocol owners and people that work on

3:41that. So is which part to a catastrophic

3:44event is outside the scope of your

3:47audit. So you have been audited, that's

3:49great, but is there a part outside of

3:51that that still can lead a catastrophic

3:54loss? If yes, probably you should think

3:56about that and do a threat modeling for

3:59that and work more on the operational

4:01security in your company.

4:04I leave you with this QR code. You can

4:06scan this actually and you can go or you

4:09can reach our website at

4:10research.iotsecurity.io

4:12where you can check the

4:15the full report. We also have

4:16dashboards, interactive, all these kind

4:18of things and also it's better explained

4:19the methodology that we used and this

4:22will be updated every quarter. So this

4:24is for you and this is the QR code.

4:26Thank you.

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