DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Amber Hall

Recovery Is the Attack

Michael Lewellen

10:39 · Recording

Watch on YouTube ↗Open recording viewerOriginal programme entry
Download plain textDownload timestamped JSON

Source: YouTube automatic caption track · Exported 2026-11-16. Timestamps link to the source video. Cue end times were not supplied.

Transcript

0:01All right. Hello everyone.

0:03Today I'm talking about

0:05how to harden your accounts and deal

0:07with the fact that recovery itself can

0:09be an exploit. So we will jump right in.

0:13All right.

0:15And why, you know, getting back into a

0:16wallet and recovering it for a user can

0:19also be the way that an attacker gets in

0:20themselves.

0:23So ideally every wallet should have a

0:25recovery path. Recovery is good because

0:27if people lose access to their wallet,

0:29then they've lost all of their money.

0:30For example, Bitcoin, which is the first

0:32crypto wallet

0:34effectively that came out in existence,

0:36had a really rough you know, early few

0:39years where a lot of people lost their

0:41funds. Even if we put aside Satoshi,

0:43you know, billions of dollars have

0:45effectively been lost. We've all heard

0:46the story of the guy digging his hard

0:49drive out of a landfill, never to find

0:51it because his girlfriend threw it out.

0:53So these are the scenarios that we want

0:54to prevent. We need to give consumers

0:56good way to recover their funds.

0:58However, on the flip side, if you make

0:59it too easy to recover access to an

1:01account, an attacker is going to use

1:03that as their

1:05mechanism for taking over the account

1:07and stealing the funds.

1:08So we need to find a middle ground here

1:11and we're going to do so in the talk

1:13just by going through like a lot of the

1:14scenarios that we might deal with and

1:16some principles that we could apply.

1:19So first of all, there is some good

1:20news, which is that login methods over

1:23the last 10 to 20 years have gotten a

1:24lot stronger. We've gotten far better

1:26methods both within the cryptocurrency

1:28industry, but also in the wider software

1:29industry for having harder

1:31authentication.

1:32You know, we have cases where initially

1:33we started out with username and

1:35password, which I think a lot of the

1:36people in the crowd will know are

1:38fundamentally insecure.

1:39You know, passwords can be stolen.

1:42They're often reused. Even if you're

1:43using a good password manager,

1:45you know, it just takes one flaw or one

1:48lucky guess by an attacker for

1:50potentially the entire account to be

1:51compromised. So then people came out

1:52with SMS codes, which was an

1:54improvement, but also

1:56has its own problems with SIM swapping,

1:58people being able to take over the

1:59through

2:00uh you know getting through the telecom

2:01provider. Uh and then but we've

2:03over time added better methods,

2:04authenticator apps, uh which are much

2:06more secure, pass keys, and then even

2:08hardware keys uh that you could have. So

2:10we have a lot better methods and if you

2:11have multi-factor authentication

2:13according to some uh uh research from

2:15CISA, you know you're you're probably

2:17seeing a 99% literal reduction in

2:19account compromise risk. Um you know so

2:22that's rough number but generally

2:23speaking you get the idea. MFA is going

2:25to be massively more secure. Um however

2:28um if you have greatly secured the front

2:31door, you now have to worry about the

2:32back door. And if the back door doesn't

2:33have the same number of locks, the

2:35attacker is going to have an easier time

2:36getting in nonetheless. Um so this is

2:38something that actually the UK National

2:40Cyber Security Research Center has has

2:42come out and said uh is clearly a

2:44pattern they're recognizing whenever

2:45pass keys are introduced to accounts. Uh

2:47potential attackers are now focusing on

2:49the weaknesses around account recovery

2:50and reset requests. You know how do you

2:52reach out by email or through email

2:53recovery, phone, maybe even reaching out

2:55to support and finding you know the

2:57amount of information or personal

2:58information you have to impersonate

3:00someone to try to recover the account in

3:01that way uh since the pass key itself is

3:04is very difficult and almost impossible

3:05for the attackers now. Um so we now have

3:08to deal with this this second metric and

3:09we have to consider okay how do we

3:11harden that recovery in such a way that

3:13it is still useful for the user to

3:15recover um but it's not going to be

3:17itself the attack vector.

3:19Um so there's three back doors that we

3:21can think about for this um or rather

3:24three example cases. Um the first one is

3:27the the help desk with Coinbase where in

3:292025 uh there was a massive incident

3:32where a a subcontractor of Coinbase

3:34doing support uh leaked a ton of

3:36customer information, uh details that

3:38allow them to run and reach out to those

3:40customers and essentially convince them

3:42uh to go through recovery method,

3:44essentially had a lot of fake recovery

3:45calls and led to a lot of customer funds

3:47essentially being sent um you know un-

3:50unknowingly to attacker wallets. So they

3:53basically were told you're locked out,

3:54they were told recover in this way, send

3:56the money to these wallets, and then it

3:58ended up actually being the attacker's

3:59wallets and they stole the the So not

4:01exactly a straightforward recovery story

4:02but like a good example of how like

4:04relying on something like a support desk

4:05can actually lead to the accounts

4:08themselves being compromised. Uh, and

4:09that had a massive impact. There was,

4:11you know, between roughly $180 and $400

4:13million that were likely lost uh to that

4:16alone. Um, so it's a good case where

4:18like also support desk having personal

4:19information about customers uh can also

4:22be a problem. So you have to be careful

4:23how much you trust humans in that mix.

4:25Um, another example of this is cloud

4:27backups. A lot of people who have used

4:29self-custodial wallets such as MetaMask

4:31are familiar with the fact that it

4:32usually gives you the option not just to

4:34write down a seed phrase, which some

4:35people maybe do insecurely because they,

4:37you know, instead of writing it down,

4:38they just copy paste it somewhere on

4:40their computer and then their computer

4:41gets compromised, they lose access to

4:43their account. Um, MetaMask did

4:45introduce the ability to essentially

4:46have an encrypted version of their

4:48backup that was placed in their iCloud

4:50account. Um, however, this now means

4:53that if the uh Apple account is

4:55compromised, the backup could also be

4:57exposed. Um, so this did happen in 2022.

5:00There was a case of a user who had their

5:01Apple ID phished through the normal

5:03phishing methods that you might expect,

5:05and through that uh the attacker was

5:06able to gain access to their seed backup

5:08in iCloud. Now, you might think, well,

5:10if that is encrypted, that shouldn't be

5:12a problem. However, you have to remember

5:13these are passwords that users are

5:15inputting into MetaMask every time,

5:16which means they're probably uh maybe

5:18creating a password that is not as

5:20secure as it ideally should be. So the

5:21hinge point is now on a user remembering

5:23a password. And again, we talked about

5:25email and password is not the most

5:27secure method. So just having one pass

5:29phrase the user has to remember or they

5:31lose access to the wallet, which is also

5:33something we don't want for recovery, is

5:35now a problem. And so that led to the

5:37fact that the password was easy enough

5:38for a computer to randomly generate uh

5:41and and guess um led to the wallet then

5:43being drained and and losing 655k in one

5:46specific instance, but there are other

5:48cases out there where you can find

5:49accounts being compromised, backups

5:51being leaked, and the encryption not

5:53being strong enough because the password

5:54had to be something the user remembered

5:56uh and and that led to a problem. And

5:57you know, then if you're like, well, you

5:59know, use a password manager or

6:00something else, yes, but again, the more

6:01complex the setup gets uh the harder it

6:04is to get users to do the recovery

6:06effectively and safely.

6:07And then the last case was Guardian, uh,

6:10a Guardian uh, essentially takeover

6:12attempt with Loopring, which was a

6:13wallet that was providing essentially a

6:16kind of Guardian recovery method. The

6:17idea being like if you lose access to

6:19your wallet, uh, there is a way for

6:21essentially Guardians to recover it for

6:23you, um, which would be kind of like

6:25trusted actors that could identify you.

6:27Um, and Loopring itself had set itself

6:28up as a default Guardian where you would

6:30use essentially a two-factor

6:31authentication uh, to authenticate the

6:33Guardian to recover your account. Well,

6:35that Guardian was then compromised. So

6:37Loopring had a big security incident

6:39where uh, essentially their Guardian

6:41account was compromised. So it as a

6:43recovery agent could then go to all

6:45these wallets and effectively recover

6:46them, uh, except recovering them for the

6:48attacker, not the users. And that led to

6:50$5 million being drained. Um, so these

6:52are all like different cases, but cases

6:54where recovery was the weak point and

6:56led to a large loss of funds uh, using a

6:58measure that was supposed to protect

6:59user funds because it's trying to

7:00prevent losses by forgetting passwords,

7:02authenticators, etc., instead leading

7:05attackers uh, in through the back door.

7:08Um, so what do we do about this? Um,

7:10what are what are some practical

7:11considerations taking away from this

7:12that we can actually implement? Um,

7:14well, obviously like yeah, email only

7:16and pass phrase backups are practical,

7:17but they they can increase uh, you know,

7:20make it easier effectively to attack. So

7:23uh, and MFA helps, but you know, you

7:25have to consider the fact that if you

7:26make MFA the requirement for recovery,

7:30um, they could make it difficult to

7:31effect recovery if you lose too many

7:32factors. Um, so you can see some

7:34examples here of just like you know,

7:36yeah, SMS reset, email code, support

7:38request resets. These are easy for the

7:40user, but they're also fairly easy for

7:42the attacker as well. Um, you know, and

7:44if you start to combine factors or you

7:46go with things like paper backups,

7:47again, assuming the user can uh, do the

7:50paper backup effectively, uh, then that

7:53is going to increase secure increase

7:55security ideally, um, but can still lead

7:58to some problems with the user actually

7:59being able to implement them

8:00effectively. So a few takeaways could be

8:03you know, factors in series. So instead

8:04of um,

8:06you you just being essentially

8:07encouraging the user to have many

8:08different authenticators and then being

8:09able to combine them in different ways.

8:11Um that can improve and then so you have

8:13factors of the threshold. You still have

8:14MFA, but if you lose one of the factors

8:17in MFA, uh you have other factors that

8:19you can bring in. So instead of an and,

8:20it's an or effectively.

8:22Um and then uh also you can introduce

8:25time delays. So if you are potentially

8:27providing someone the ability to recover

8:29uh using less factors than they normally

8:31would, uh then you can introduce a

8:33cooldown period along with a

8:34notification capability that tells the

8:36user, hey, someone's trying to recover

8:37your account. It'll be recovered in, you

8:40know, one day, two days, three days,

8:41however much time you think you can

8:43practically provide. Uh and that

8:45potentially gives them a way to stop an

8:46attacker that might be trying to use

8:47that recovery method as an attack.

8:51So what's the general rule here? Well,

8:53don't make your recovery uh you know uh

8:56less you know basically don't make it

8:58weaker than your login because then the

8:59recovery method is going to be targeted

9:01by attackers. Um and ideally make it as

9:03strong uh as the login if not stronger

9:05uh while still trying to preserve some

9:07accessibility for the user. Um so you

9:09don't want a single point of recovery.

9:10Ideally there's no like just SMS email

9:12only fallback. Uh it still requires some

9:14sort of multi-factor authentication to

9:16recover. Um you should assume backups

9:18can leak, so you need to make sure that

9:20they're secured with high entropy

9:21secrets or there's some second factor to

9:24decrypt. Um you should ideally have some

9:27step-up uh requirements. So if someone's

9:28about to do like a change of their auth,

9:30they should have to uh maybe do some

9:32step-up auth to do so. You want to

9:34notify in every recovery event and maybe

9:36give a time delay uh when you do that

9:38recovery so the users have a chance to

9:39catch it.

9:41Um so one other closure is, you know,

9:43I'm working turnkey. These are things

9:44we're trying to focus on there. Um these

9:45are principles you can apply to any

9:47setup, but we're trying to specifically

9:49focus on making it easy to have multiple

9:51authentication methods for a user uh

9:53using secure enclave so the key material

9:55itself is never exposed and then having

9:57an API that's fairly flexible so

9:58developers can implement this without

9:59being security experts themselves.

10:02Um so yeah, generally speaking. And one

10:04thing I will say like as a maybe nod to

10:06some of the people that we're also

10:07competing with is I like the Fireblocks

10:09and Fortify approach where they actually

10:10send backup methods to users, but they

10:12use seed phrases specifically as the

10:14encryption method, and you can even have

10:15threshold-based decryption of the

10:17backup. So you could say a two out of

10:19three seed phrase, or everyone has a

10:21different seed phrase, and then from

10:22there two out of those three people with

10:23their individual seed phrases can then

10:25decrypt the backup, which I I like uh as

10:27a method that is an independent recovery

10:29method, doesn't rely on a provider, uh

10:30but still has pretty strong security

10:32properties and and has a good chance of

10:33a successful recovery.

10:35Uh so that's it. Happy to talk more

10:36after the talk.

Source and accuracy details

Source export SHA256: 5b702f8c415240133df67873d4817ec3b37a43f0f8d2f33642ea5a0faf576b13