DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Pearl Hall

Security Starts Before the Signature

Steffen Kux

15:27 · Recording

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0:12So

0:13this was this is just in Uniswap

0:15transaction. I did

0:18change one ether in another currency

0:22and what I'm supposed to sign is

0:26this data.

0:27And even if I use my

0:30wallet, my hardware wallet, it doesn't

0:33make it much better, ne? I I have a big

0:36display on my hardware wallet, but when

0:38I look at it, it's exactly the same

0:40information.

0:41So what can we really know when we have

0:46such information to make

0:49a educated education that oder educated

0:52decision that this is a transaction I

0:54want really to sign.

0:57A real problem.

1:01Let's go back one year.

1:03This time this was the biggest hack,

1:06but this changes quickly. We had some

1:09bigger hacks now,

1:11but last year in February there was a

1:13hack. It's

1:15a little bit

1:16not everything directly correlates to

1:19the topic we will discuss today, but at

1:21least we see the problem.

1:23So in the Babil hack the problem was

1:25there was a manipulated user interface.

1:29And when designers signed

1:33a very normal transaction moving

1:35something from the cold storage to the

1:37hot storage oder to the hot wallet,

1:41they signed something which was not the

1:43transaction they really

1:46intended to sign.

1:48And the result was

1:51there were 1.5 billion dollars in tokens

1:55lost because there was a transaction

1:58which did not do transaction as

2:01intended, but changed the logic of the

2:03smart contract oder auf der auf der

2:05Multisig.

2:07Now we can say okay, this is one special

2:09problem. There was a very direct attack

2:13to do this in in this application, but

2:17this is a problem we are confronted

2:19everywhere. So we have transactions

2:24and

2:25when we want to be sure what this

2:27transaction is doing, we need somehow to

2:31simulate it. So in the former version of

2:34the

2:35Gnosis Safe you had the possibility to

2:39simulate your transaction, ne? There was

2:41a connection to Tendely. You could

2:44simulate it. It was sent to their

2:45servers. They did the simulation,

2:47returned it to you.

2:49But actually this is also only a shift

2:52of trust, ne? When I ask someone else on

2:55an OBC again a centralized service, I

2:58have to trust that the simulation

3:00results is ja really what I'm intended

3:04to do.

3:05So and it's

3:07actually also a privacy issue because I

3:09ja

3:10reveal data before I do my transaction

3:13to another party. So

3:16I don't say that we cannot trust those

3:19companies, but we also know that even

3:22big companies sometimes are compromised.

3:24Na, even if I trust this company in

3:27person, but if the data is going there

3:29and if it happens that they are

3:31compromised, I would leak my data.

3:36So signing is not enough, ne? Today

3:39mostly we created transaction.

3:42For instance, I'm using a DeFi tool or

3:46exchange. Let's say we are using

3:47Uniswap. I want to change one Ether to

3:51USDC. Then I create a transaction. I see

3:54it on my screen and then in my wallet I

3:57have to sign something and I sign it and

4:00hope that the transaction is correct.

4:03What we need instead of doing it in this

4:06simple way, we need first to create a

4:09transaction of course, then we need to

4:11verify that every information which is

4:14used to create a transaction is really

4:17correct. We have to simulate it and

4:19analyze what are the

4:21results and then I have to explain the

4:23results so that I really understand

4:25these results belong to this transaction

4:28and then I really know what I'm going to

4:30sign and then I can do an educated

4:33decision what I really sign.

4:38So our topic from Colibri

4:41we are building a stateless client and

4:43we say don't trust any information you

4:45get, always verify before you use it.

4:49And now we want to use this this topic

4:53also to

4:55to validate transaction before we send

4:57them.

5:01When I prepare a transaction normally I

5:04need some data, I need some balances, I

5:06need some information from the contract,

5:08some state information.

5:10So if I don't validate this information

5:13I'm even if I have

5:15verified everything else I'm still in a

5:18trust system. So York other colleague

5:20from my from me today mentioned this in

5:23his presentation is that even if we have

5:26an ordered the system with unordered

5:28data it's an unordered system.

5:32So how are we doing this?

5:35So Colibri a stateless client is

5:39a layer in between the RPC and my

5:42application. That means I read data from

5:44whatever source I want, let's say an RPC

5:47or any other source and I also get the

5:51proofs

5:52so that I then I can verify that this

5:55information is correct and we are using

5:56two type of proofs.

5:59So the first is the execution layer

6:00proof, so I proof that let's say a

6:02transaction is part of a block.

6:12a belongs to a this block hash. And then

6:15I know this block contains this

6:17information and now I need also to prove

6:20that this information belongs to the

6:23canonical chain. And here I need the

6:25consensus layer proofs. I need to prove

6:27that the validators, the signatures of

6:29the validators are valid signatures. And

6:32this I can do starting from a checkpoint

6:34in the past, verify all the transitions

6:37of the validator committee up to the

6:39block where I'm now so that I know I

6:42have the correct signature. Or I can it

6:44more efficiently have a zero knowledge

6:46proof which proves this whole chain of

6:51of

6:52of transitions of the validator set. And

6:54with these two proofs I can produce

6:58verified state. So I don't need to trust

7:01the information provider anymore. I just

7:03get data, I get proofs and then I have

7:06verified state.

7:08So and based on this verified state I

7:11can use an EVM. And of course also this

7:14EVM should not be somewhere in the

7:16cloud. I should have it in my

7:18application. So Colibri also brings a

7:21very small EVM in included so that we

7:24now can the verified information,

7:26execute the transaction in the EVM and

7:29then have all the information which are

7:32the results of my transaction.

7:35What calls are done,

7:37what is transferred,

7:39how what are the state changes, which

7:42events are

7:44given and so on.

7:46So we we do it directly in the

7:48application.

7:51But here we have another problem. So

7:52when we list this to the user,

7:55that is the same when I look into a the

7:58report from Tenderly. So by the way, I

8:00really love Tenderly. So as developer

8:03it's a great tool to analyze when I do

8:06an transaction with complex smart

8:09contract interactions

10:10Und hier kommt ein AI Model

11:45So, ja.

11:57We celebrity has been doing some years

12:01before or explain us what what is a

12:03elephant. We are not interested in our

12:06wallet to to get this information. We

12:08just want to have a model which is very

12:11quick, very small and very smart in one

12:14topic. And here we are using domain

12:18small language models. These are small

12:21LLMs which are trained with information

12:25only relating to this topic.

12:28And then we get very

12:31good models which we can use and our

12:34models are

12:36about 2 GB and we also try to make them

12:41even smaller and they give answers as

12:44good as these frontier models because

12:47they are trained with them and can

12:50ja produce this good this good

12:53information.

12:55So what

12:57is our

12:58and what are the limits

13:00we can verify all information we get

13:02from the

13:05from the blockchain. We

13:07we can see if anything in this

13:10transaction is something which might not

13:13fit to our intent

13:15but of course

13:17we cannot solve everything. If the state

13:19is changing before we included there

13:22might be a different things.

13:25Ja and we also need to understand what

13:29my intent is. Now this is also something

13:32we are researching right now not to make

13:35a clear definition to see this is the

13:38intent so that it is easy for the people

13:40to understand that the intent is really

13:43fitted.

13:44So and with this we have a full workflow

13:47from the data making the data trustless

13:50with Colibri the the core module then

13:53simulated in the local EVM analyze it

13:56and extract all the information now for

13:59instance to give the model the right

14:02information we need also the code

14:04the which is really affected from this

14:06call.

14:08And in this point it's not feasible to

14:11give him all the code we find for

14:13instance if you do a Uniswap transaction

14:16the whole Uniswap

15:01Thank you very much.

15:24Thank you very much.

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