DSS

DSS 2026 / Day 2 / Amber Hall

Stateful Minefields: Post-Quantum Signatures for Ethereum Accounts

Magnus Woodgate

7:19 · Recording

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0:00Cool. Uh, some of you maybe saw my talk

0:02before. This is going to be a super

0:04quick run through uh with some maybe uh

0:07original thoughts, but to get everyone

0:08in too. So uh today we're going to be

0:10talking about post quantum signatures um

0:12specifically the concept of stateful

0:14mind fields. Um this is you know we

0:17introduce state uh into the post quantum

0:19signing process and this adds a ton of

0:21complexity to think about security

0:22practitioners. Uh so this talks for

0:24people building L1s, L2s, wallet devs,

0:27anyone who's going to work with

0:28signatures or think about how they're

0:29integrated or audit them.

0:31So asymmetric research for those of you

0:33who don't know uh we work with a ton of

0:35different protocol teams who are

0:36embedded for continuous security

0:38throughout software development life

0:39cycle and all of that. We also do a ton

0:41of other security instant response and

0:43that sort of thing. Um yeah.

0:45Cool. So to jump right in the idea of

0:48post quantum Ethereum accounts is you

0:50know we're going to migrate from this

0:51ECDSA signing process to hash based

0:54signatures. At least that's the current

0:56proposal. The Ethereum approach is

0:58actually to create account abstraction

1:00so that we can do programmable signature

1:01validation.

1:02That means that we're not locked into

1:04hash based signatures, but that's the

1:06current approach we're going with

1:07because it's you know it's very

1:08conservative uh compared to lattice

1:10based cryptography which we're not going

1:11to talk about today. So today we're

1:13specifically going to be looking at

1:14Sphinx minus or or Jardin uh for those

1:17of you who are familiar with it.

1:19So this is a very quick run through of

1:22SLHDSA uh

1:24which comes from the Sphinx plus

1:25proposal and is now standardized. The

1:28way it works is you have this hyper

1:29tree. You can just think of it as a

1:30really really complicated tree where the

1:32top layer you have a public root. You

1:34have these uh extended Merkel signature

1:36scheme layers as well. So they're just

1:38Merkel trees where the leaves are bound

1:40to WOTS signatures um in this case WOTS

1:43plus or WOTS plus C, a compressed

1:44version of that. And effectively you

1:46have these trees that bind to trees and

1:48you can do this composable layering

1:50depending on the security uh strength

1:52you want. And right at the bottom you

1:53have this false layer of uh forest of of

1:56random subsets uh where this is the

1:59thing you're going to to actually sign

2:00the transaction. The point to be aware

2:02of here is you have all these layers and

2:04you know you can already see that we've

2:05got XMSS and Falls as the two key

2:09defense

2:10you know membership that we have here.

2:13So you're going to have to verify all

2:14the way from the bottom up to the top to

2:17verify that an account is you know

2:19signature is valid for that account.

2:22Jardin on the other hand which is

2:23proposed has two approaches to basically

2:26overcome some of the limitations of

2:28SLHDSA or based on Sphinx minus. We have

2:31compact transactions and the and the

2:32fallback case. So the hyper tree that I

2:35just showed you guys was actually based

2:37on the fallback stateless signing and

2:40the idea there is that the

2:42basically whenever you you resign a new

2:44transaction you have the same problems

2:46as other hashing where you could have

2:48collisions.

2:49Ideally they're cryptographically secure

2:51so the collision risk is low but

2:52something you want to think about when

2:53you're auditing this code.

2:55Otherwise the compact transaction format

2:58actually requires using a stateful

3:00signing process. So you use the SPX or

3:04registration fallback to do the

3:05signature to register a new Falls

3:08instance or a subset of Falls

3:10and then basically you're going to use

3:12that instance

3:14X amount of time so you might have 128

3:16signatures registered. The way it works

3:18is you have a pool registered and then

3:20you can consume them and and use them.

3:22The difference here is that these

3:24compact transactions are significantly

3:25faster and smaller.

3:27Yeah one of the measurements here was

3:28about 43 seconds on a ledger Nano S to

3:31do the fallback just to sign the

3:32transaction.

3:35So the way this works is basically you

3:37have this stateless SPX authorization

3:39SPX being that big hyper tree that we

3:41saw before with Sphinx minus or SLHDSA.

3:44You register a commitment to

3:47Falls random Forest of random subset and

3:50basically you then sign compactly so

3:53each time you use one of these forests

3:56you you consume Q. So Q is this is the

3:59index of the forest that you're using

4:01Um and then basically you do that until

4:04the capacity is exhausted and then you

4:05create a fresh pool and you try again.

4:07So the idea here is that now we're going

4:09to have to do this registration process

4:11semi-frequently depending on your

4:12transaction frequency. Um but the

4:14signing compactly uh is is going to add

4:16a ton of benefits so that you can

4:17actually sign things in meaningful time.

4:20The distinction here you want to make is

4:21that Q should never be rewound or

4:23resigned uh and we'll get into that.

4:26So

4:27this is like a hypothetical scenario

4:29where you have you know signature A um

4:31with some pseudo code where Q equals

4:32seven. You know the wallet might die uh

4:35there's a power outage, there's a race

4:36condition or something and something

4:37crashes uh and the wallet's gone. So

4:40then what you do is you restore the

4:41backup as you see in yellow and then you

4:43sign again which generates a new

4:45signature B. Now the signature you've

4:48used the in in this case you've used the

4:50same Q so you've used the same forest uh

4:52and you've revealed more information

4:54about that forest. So what ends up

4:56happening is you end up losing bit

4:58strength on that specific forest and

5:00then what an attacker can do is sit

5:02there, listen and then uh try to

5:05essentially forge a proof for that

5:07forest. Now the bit strength is only

5:09going to reduce a bit each time because

5:10force has its property of few time

5:12signatures. So if you do sign with the

5:14same forest twice it's not game over but

5:17it it's it's massively worse than you

5:18know you don't want to be doing it and

5:21when you think about these things we

5:22want to be thinking in the post-quantum

5:23era. So there may be new post-quantum

5:25algorithms that make the impact worse.

5:28Uh yeah and more openings always reduce

5:30the security margin.

5:32So you want to be thinking when you're

5:34reviewing this code um it's it you know

5:36it's a lot of it's in draft and

5:37experimental now but you'll be seeing

5:38stuff come out. The you want to be

5:40consuming these Q values uh durably. So

5:43this is kind of the ideal uh

5:46ideal signing policy. So basically even

5:48if the signature doesn't succeed you

5:51don't broadcast it to the network. You

5:53do want to actually consume Q um and the

5:56chance that it did you know it might not

5:58even be on the network but maybe it's on

5:59uh you know it was recorded uh being

6:03propagated but not finalized for an

6:04example. You you always want to

6:05increment Q and don't sign with it

6:07twice.

6:09Cool. So that's actually talking about,

6:11you know, um SLHDSA and Jarden, but the

6:14other part is account abstraction, which

6:16I mentioned. Account abstraction enables

6:18us to do programmable validation. The

6:20other thing that you really need to be

6:21thinking about, even though after a full

6:23migration to post-quantum, is what

6:25authorizes like what action.

6:27So post-quantum doesn't actually retire

6:29ECDSA. So even though you have all this

6:31new fancy tree-based signing signatures,

6:35verification, it doesn't actually retire

6:36what you've got authorized by ECDSA. So

6:38if you have something delegated to a

6:407702 account that you you know, you can

6:42overwrite the code, then the ECDSA key

6:44is still going to be in play. And when

6:46you're reviewing this code as an

6:47auditor, you really want to check this

6:48out.

6:50So if there's one takeaway that you

6:52should think about from this is that

6:53just because the signature is valid

6:55doesn't mean the account's secure. And

6:56if you're signing with multiple

6:57instances of the same Q, then that

7:00you're going to start leaking

7:00information about the key, and that's

7:02something that, you know, if you're

7:03managing billions in TVL, you don't want

7:05to be doing.

7:06Cool. So thanks for listening. Um yeah,

7:09you can check us out asymmetric.com

7:10there.

7:12Any questions?

7:18Thanks guys.

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