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  "title": "Valid Signatures, Fragile Accounts: PQC on Ethereum",
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    {
      "index": 0,
      "start_seconds": 2,
      "source_timestamp": "0:02",
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      "text": "Hello everyone."
    },
    {
      "index": 1,
      "start_seconds": 6,
      "source_timestamp": "0:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": ">> Cool. So here to talk today about some"
    },
    {
      "index": 2,
      "start_seconds": 9,
      "source_timestamp": "0:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "postquantum crypto uh specifically"
    },
    {
      "index": 3,
      "start_seconds": 11,
      "source_timestamp": "0:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Ethereum's road map and some of the"
    },
    {
      "index": 4,
      "start_seconds": 13,
      "source_timestamp": "0:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "stuff involved there. Um yeah, I want to"
    },
    {
      "index": 5,
      "start_seconds": 15,
      "source_timestamp": "0:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "highlight that we're going to cover like"
    },
    {
      "index": 6,
      "start_seconds": 16,
      "source_timestamp": "0:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "a lot of different stuff. So this is"
    },
    {
      "index": 7,
      "start_seconds": 17,
      "source_timestamp": "0:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "kind of like a lay of the land rather"
    },
    {
      "index": 8,
      "start_seconds": 19,
      "source_timestamp": "0:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "than a deep dive into any specific"
    },
    {
      "index": 9,
      "start_seconds": 20,
      "source_timestamp": "0:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "topic. Um although we'll get into it. Uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 10,
      "start_seconds": 22,
      "source_timestamp": "0:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and yeah, the focus here is security"
    },
    {
      "index": 11,
      "start_seconds": 24,
      "source_timestamp": "0:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "practitioners. So, um, not necessarily"
    },
    {
      "index": 12,
      "start_seconds": 26,
      "source_timestamp": "0:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "cryptographers, but you guys, auditors,"
    },
    {
      "index": 13,
      "start_seconds": 28,
      "source_timestamp": "0:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "L1 devs, core devs, that sort of thing."
    },
    {
      "index": 14,
      "start_seconds": 31,
      "source_timestamp": "0:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. So, I'm Magnus Gate. I lead one of"
    },
    {
      "index": 15,
      "start_seconds": 33,
      "source_timestamp": "0:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the security engineering teams over at"
    },
    {
      "index": 16,
      "start_seconds": 34,
      "source_timestamp": "0:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Asymmetric. Uh, we do a ton of different"
    },
    {
      "index": 17,
      "start_seconds": 36,
      "source_timestamp": "0:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "stuff. Uh, I focus on kind of the white"
    },
    {
      "index": 18,
      "start_seconds": 38,
      "source_timestamp": "0:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "hat research and continuous security."
    },
    {
      "index": 19,
      "start_seconds": 40,
      "source_timestamp": "0:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Uh, yeah, Asymmetric, for those of you"
    },
    {
      "index": 20,
      "start_seconds": 43,
      "source_timestamp": "0:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "who don't know, I think a few people"
    },
    {
      "index": 21,
      "start_seconds": 44,
      "source_timestamp": "0:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "here do. Um, we work on a ton of"
    },
    {
      "index": 22,
      "start_seconds": 47,
      "source_timestamp": "0:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "different stuff, not just web 3. Uh, and"
    },
    {
      "index": 23,
      "start_seconds": 49,
      "source_timestamp": "0:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "we're included with the like embedded in"
    },
    {
      "index": 24,
      "start_seconds": 51,
      "source_timestamp": "0:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the protocol teams from the beginning"
    },
    {
      "index": 25,
      "start_seconds": 52,
      "source_timestamp": "0:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "ideally. uh and we we don't do audits,"
    },
    {
      "index": 26,
      "start_seconds": 54,
      "source_timestamp": "0:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "we do continuous security, but you can"
    },
    {
      "index": 27,
      "start_seconds": 56,
      "source_timestamp": "0:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "talk to me about that and check us out"
    },
    {
      "index": 28,
      "start_seconds": 57,
      "source_timestamp": "0:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "afterwards. Cool. So the you know today,"
    },
    {
      "index": 29,
      "start_seconds": 62,
      "source_timestamp": "1:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "like I said, I want to talk about"
    },
    {
      "index": 30,
      "start_seconds": 63,
      "source_timestamp": "1:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Ethereum's road map for postquantum"
    },
    {
      "index": 31,
      "start_seconds": 65,
      "source_timestamp": "1:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "migrations and specifically security"
    },
    {
      "index": 32,
      "start_seconds": 67,
      "source_timestamp": "1:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "practitioners. Um we're going to cover a"
    },
    {
      "index": 33,
      "start_seconds": 69,
      "source_timestamp": "1:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "lot of different stuff. So the aims here"
    },
    {
      "index": 34,
      "start_seconds": 71,
      "source_timestamp": "1:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is that you know some of the terms, some"
    },
    {
      "index": 35,
      "start_seconds": 73,
      "source_timestamp": "1:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of the terminologies that you can go"
    },
    {
      "index": 36,
      "start_seconds": 74,
      "source_timestamp": "1:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "away with and take a look and start"
    },
    {
      "index": 37,
      "start_seconds": 75,
      "source_timestamp": "1:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "digging."
    },
    {
      "index": 38,
      "start_seconds": 77,
      "source_timestamp": "1:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So brief outline of the talk. Um we're"
    },
    {
      "index": 39,
      "start_seconds": 80,
      "source_timestamp": "1:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "going to cover some building blocks and"
    },
    {
      "index": 40,
      "start_seconds": 81,
      "source_timestamp": "1:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "background and I want to focus here on"
    },
    {
      "index": 41,
      "start_seconds": 83,
      "source_timestamp": "1:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the implementation risks a brief note on"
    },
    {
      "index": 42,
      "start_seconds": 84,
      "source_timestamp": "1:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "assurance and limitations but we'll get"
    },
    {
      "index": 43,
      "start_seconds": 86,
      "source_timestamp": "1:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "into that. So the background one of the"
    },
    {
      "index": 44,
      "start_seconds": 90,
      "source_timestamp": "1:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "things I want to start with is is"
    },
    {
      "index": 45,
      "start_seconds": 91,
      "source_timestamp": "1:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "account abstraction specifically. Um so"
    },
    {
      "index": 46,
      "start_seconds": 94,
      "source_timestamp": "1:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the question you know that we're going"
    },
    {
      "index": 47,
      "start_seconds": 96,
      "source_timestamp": "1:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to be talking about today the most is"
    },
    {
      "index": 48,
      "start_seconds": 97,
      "source_timestamp": "1:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the valid signature part that you can"
    },
    {
      "index": 49,
      "start_seconds": 98,
      "source_timestamp": "1:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "see highlighted here in yellow. Uh the"
    },
    {
      "index": 50,
      "start_seconds": 100,
      "source_timestamp": "1:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "question is is the state safe to sign?"
    },
    {
      "index": 51,
      "start_seconds": 103,
      "source_timestamp": "1:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Do the bytes match? I mean these are all"
    },
    {
      "index": 52,
      "start_seconds": 105,
      "source_timestamp": "1:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "things that you see in classical crypto"
    },
    {
      "index": 53,
      "start_seconds": 106,
      "source_timestamp": "1:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "today that we have. Um, but there's some"
    },
    {
      "index": 54,
      "start_seconds": 108,
      "source_timestamp": "1:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "other parts that this kind of enables"
    },
    {
      "index": 55,
      "start_seconds": 110,
      "source_timestamp": "1:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that you might see an in ERC 4337"
    },
    {
      "index": 56,
      "start_seconds": 112,
      "source_timestamp": "1:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "mentioned there about the is the policy"
    },
    {
      "index": 57,
      "start_seconds": 114,
      "source_timestamp": "1:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "intended. Um, you know, can this account"
    },
    {
      "index": 58,
      "start_seconds": 117,
      "source_timestamp": "1:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "or user actually do the thing that you"
    },
    {
      "index": 59,
      "start_seconds": 119,
      "source_timestamp": "1:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "want it to do? And then does the account"
    },
    {
      "index": 60,
      "start_seconds": 120,
      "source_timestamp": "2:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "behavior actually behave as intended?"
    },
    {
      "index": 61,
      "start_seconds": 123,
      "source_timestamp": "2:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So, you know, does the thing change the"
    },
    {
      "index": 62,
      "start_seconds": 125,
      "source_timestamp": "2:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "state that you want it to?"
    },
    {
      "index": 63,
      "start_seconds": 127,
      "source_timestamp": "2:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So there's obviously a lot that changes,"
    },
    {
      "index": 64,
      "start_seconds": 130,
      "source_timestamp": "2:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "but I think I want to focus here on the"
    },
    {
      "index": 65,
      "start_seconds": 131,
      "source_timestamp": "2:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "stuff that stays the same because it's"
    },
    {
      "index": 66,
      "start_seconds": 132,
      "source_timestamp": "2:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it's it's, you know, the most relevant"
    },
    {
      "index": 67,
      "start_seconds": 134,
      "source_timestamp": "2:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "in terms of when you're reviewing this"
    },
    {
      "index": 68,
      "start_seconds": 136,
      "source_timestamp": "2:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "from a security perspective. So the"
    },
    {
      "index": 69,
      "start_seconds": 138,
      "source_timestamp": "2:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "existing obligations do not change. You"
    },
    {
      "index": 70,
      "start_seconds": 140,
      "source_timestamp": "2:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "still need to worry about intent, replay"
    },
    {
      "index": 71,
      "start_seconds": 141,
      "source_timestamp": "2:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "protection and whatnot. Um access"
    },
    {
      "index": 72,
      "start_seconds": 143,
      "source_timestamp": "2:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "control, all of that stuff. Uh the"
    },
    {
      "index": 73,
      "start_seconds": 145,
      "source_timestamp": "2:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "access policies say the same. The thing"
    },
    {
      "index": 74,
      "start_seconds": 147,
      "source_timestamp": "2:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that does change is the signature"
    },
    {
      "index": 75,
      "start_seconds": 148,
      "source_timestamp": "2:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "specific work. Um specifically around"
    },
    {
      "index": 76,
      "start_seconds": 150,
      "source_timestamp": "2:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "limited use state, but we'll get into"
    },
    {
      "index": 77,
      "start_seconds": 152,
      "source_timestamp": "2:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that. Uh and then I want to draw like"
    },
    {
      "index": 78,
      "start_seconds": 154,
      "source_timestamp": "2:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "last attention to this last point about"
    },
    {
      "index": 79,
      "start_seconds": 156,
      "source_timestamp": "2:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh retiring authorities because that's"
    },
    {
      "index": 80,
      "start_seconds": 158,
      "source_timestamp": "2:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "going to be a big one uh when it comes"
    },
    {
      "index": 81,
      "start_seconds": 160,
      "source_timestamp": "2:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "up and there's some EIPs around that."
    },
    {
      "index": 82,
      "start_seconds": 162,
      "source_timestamp": "2:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "But yeah, there's a lot of overlapping"
    },
    {
      "index": 83,
      "start_seconds": 163,
      "source_timestamp": "2:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "risks, but the things that are probably"
    },
    {
      "index": 84,
      "start_seconds": 165,
      "source_timestamp": "2:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "going to be interesting for you guys in"
    },
    {
      "index": 85,
      "start_seconds": 166,
      "source_timestamp": "2:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "an operational capacity is what you need"
    },
    {
      "index": 86,
      "start_seconds": 168,
      "source_timestamp": "2:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to recheck. So brief reminder here, um"
    },
    {
      "index": 87,
      "start_seconds": 172,
      "source_timestamp": "2:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "we're not going to go too much into"
    },
    {
      "index": 88,
      "start_seconds": 174,
      "source_timestamp": "2:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this, but effectively Shaw's algorithm"
    },
    {
      "index": 89,
      "start_seconds": 176,
      "source_timestamp": "2:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "lets you efficiently factoriize the"
    },
    {
      "index": 90,
      "start_seconds": 179,
      "source_timestamp": "2:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "discrete logarithm problem and you can"
    },
    {
      "index": 91,
      "start_seconds": 181,
      "source_timestamp": "3:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "recover the private key. uh given a"
    },
    {
      "index": 92,
      "start_seconds": 183,
      "source_timestamp": "3:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "public key point on the elliptical"
    },
    {
      "index": 93,
      "start_seconds": 184,
      "source_timestamp": "3:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "curve. Um yet you can take a look into"
    },
    {
      "index": 94,
      "start_seconds": 187,
      "source_timestamp": "3:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this, but this is kind of why we're"
    },
    {
      "index": 95,
      "start_seconds": 189,
      "source_timestamp": "3:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "looking to do the postquantum migration"
    },
    {
      "index": 96,
      "start_seconds": 190,
      "source_timestamp": "3:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "today. Um not there yet in theory."
    },
    {
      "index": 97,
      "start_seconds": 194,
      "source_timestamp": "3:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So yeah, some caveat here. Those of you"
    },
    {
      "index": 98,
      "start_seconds": 197,
      "source_timestamp": "3:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "who already know, um the public key"
    },
    {
      "index": 99,
      "start_seconds": 200,
      "source_timestamp": "3:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "isn't actually exposed until something"
    },
    {
      "index": 100,
      "start_seconds": 202,
      "source_timestamp": "3:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is signed. So that doesn't mean"
    },
    {
      "index": 101,
      "start_seconds": 203,
      "source_timestamp": "3:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "necessarily broadcast the Ethereum"
    },
    {
      "index": 102,
      "start_seconds": 205,
      "source_timestamp": "3:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "network. Um but that could also be an"
    },
    {
      "index": 103,
      "start_seconds": 207,
      "source_timestamp": "3:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "off-chain signature stored in like a web"
    },
    {
      "index": 104,
      "start_seconds": 209,
      "source_timestamp": "3:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "2 DB. Um, and it's important to be aware"
    },
    {
      "index": 105,
      "start_seconds": 211,
      "source_timestamp": "3:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of that because that DB could be leaked,"
    },
    {
      "index": 106,
      "start_seconds": 213,
      "source_timestamp": "3:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "for example, and you're still"
    },
    {
      "index": 107,
      "start_seconds": 214,
      "source_timestamp": "3:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "vulnerable. Um, the public key, if it"
    },
    {
      "index": 108,
      "start_seconds": 217,
      "source_timestamp": "3:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it's not actually exposed until"
    },
    {
      "index": 109,
      "start_seconds": 219,
      "source_timestamp": "3:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something's signed, um, which creates a"
    },
    {
      "index": 110,
      "start_seconds": 221,
      "source_timestamp": "3:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "slightly different problem. Um, it"
    },
    {
      "index": 111,
      "start_seconds": 222,
      "source_timestamp": "3:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "doesn't mean it's not exposed, but it"
    },
    {
      "index": 112,
      "start_seconds": 224,
      "source_timestamp": "3:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "requires an additional layer, uh, to"
    },
    {
      "index": 113,
      "start_seconds": 226,
      "source_timestamp": "3:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "shores when you're breaking it with a"
    },
    {
      "index": 114,
      "start_seconds": 228,
      "source_timestamp": "3:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "quantum computer. Um, but this is, yeah,"
    },
    {
      "index": 115,
      "start_seconds": 230,
      "source_timestamp": "3:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it doesn't mean you're safe, but there's"
    },
    {
      "index": 116,
      "start_seconds": 231,
      "source_timestamp": "3:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "a slight extra layer of protection"
    },
    {
      "index": 117,
      "start_seconds": 233,
      "source_timestamp": "3:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "there. So, you know, how do we kind of"
    },
    {
      "index": 118,
      "start_seconds": 237,
      "source_timestamp": "3:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "combat this in the long term? uh the"
    },
    {
      "index": 119,
      "start_seconds": 239,
      "source_timestamp": "3:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "programmable authentication here um"
    },
    {
      "index": 120,
      "start_seconds": 242,
      "source_timestamp": "4:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "enables the postquantum migration and I"
    },
    {
      "index": 121,
      "start_seconds": 244,
      "source_timestamp": "4:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "guess the point here is that Ethereum's"
    },
    {
      "index": 122,
      "start_seconds": 246,
      "source_timestamp": "4:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "road map is very generic uh and this"
    },
    {
      "index": 123,
      "start_seconds": 248,
      "source_timestamp": "4:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically allows us to pick different"
    },
    {
      "index": 124,
      "start_seconds": 250,
      "source_timestamp": "4:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "algorithms. You can see here ERC 4337"
    },
    {
      "index": 125,
      "start_seconds": 253,
      "source_timestamp": "4:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that you guys may be familiar with uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 126,
      "start_seconds": 255,
      "source_timestamp": "4:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically allows a user to do some"
    },
    {
      "index": 127,
      "start_seconds": 257,
      "source_timestamp": "4:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "intent or operation with agnostic"
    },
    {
      "index": 128,
      "start_seconds": 259,
      "source_timestamp": "4:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "account validation which may be"
    },
    {
      "index": 129,
      "start_seconds": 261,
      "source_timestamp": "4:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "different to what the L1 actually"
    },
    {
      "index": 130,
      "start_seconds": 262,
      "source_timestamp": "4:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "provides today and results in some"
    },
    {
      "index": 131,
      "start_seconds": 264,
      "source_timestamp": "4:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "execution. Those of you who haven't"
    },
    {
      "index": 132,
      "start_seconds": 266,
      "source_timestamp": "4:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "looked at the EIP8141, which is"
    },
    {
      "index": 133,
      "start_seconds": 268,
      "source_timestamp": "4:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "currently uh scheduled for native"
    },
    {
      "index": 134,
      "start_seconds": 270,
      "source_timestamp": "4:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "frames, basically starts to bake this"
    },
    {
      "index": 135,
      "start_seconds": 272,
      "source_timestamp": "4:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "intention into the L1 and then we can"
    },
    {
      "index": 136,
      "start_seconds": 274,
      "source_timestamp": "4:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "start to do programmable validation at"
    },
    {
      "index": 137,
      "start_seconds": 276,
      "source_timestamp": "4:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the L1 layer. Uh essentially allowing us"
    },
    {
      "index": 138,
      "start_seconds": 278,
      "source_timestamp": "4:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to switch out the cryptographic"
    },
    {
      "index": 139,
      "start_seconds": 279,
      "source_timestamp": "4:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "algorithm for signing and verification."
    },
    {
      "index": 140,
      "start_seconds": 281,
      "source_timestamp": "4:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Um there's also some other parts around"
    },
    {
      "index": 141,
      "start_seconds": 283,
      "source_timestamp": "4:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this in terms of you can choose who pays"
    },
    {
      "index": 142,
      "start_seconds": 284,
      "source_timestamp": "4:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "for gas. Uh but at the end of the day,"
    },
    {
      "index": 143,
      "start_seconds": 286,
      "source_timestamp": "4:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you still get the same result of"
    },
    {
      "index": 144,
      "start_seconds": 288,
      "source_timestamp": "4:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "execution, but this enable enables uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 145,
      "start_seconds": 290,
      "source_timestamp": "4:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "programmable validation."
    },
    {
      "index": 146,
      "start_seconds": 292,
      "source_timestamp": "4:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So yeah, back to 4337, we have a similar"
    },
    {
      "index": 147,
      "start_seconds": 296,
      "source_timestamp": "4:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "structure here where we have, you know,"
    },
    {
      "index": 148,
      "start_seconds": 298,
      "source_timestamp": "4:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is the execution authorized? Um, and"
    },
    {
      "index": 149,
      "start_seconds": 300,
      "source_timestamp": "5:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that's what we want to focus on today."
    },
    {
      "index": 150,
      "start_seconds": 302,
      "source_timestamp": "5:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "But then there's also the aspect of"
    },
    {
      "index": 151,
      "start_seconds": 303,
      "source_timestamp": "5:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "payment, which is something you want to"
    },
    {
      "index": 152,
      "start_seconds": 304,
      "source_timestamp": "5:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "be considering. Um, I recommend checking"
    },
    {
      "index": 153,
      "start_seconds": 306,
      "source_timestamp": "5:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "out 8141 if you haven't yet."
    },
    {
      "index": 154,
      "start_seconds": 311,
      "source_timestamp": "5:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. Resuming from there. Thank you"
    },
    {
      "index": 155,
      "start_seconds": 313,
      "source_timestamp": "5:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "guys. Um, yeah, I want to focus on"
    },
    {
      "index": 156,
      "start_seconds": 316,
      "source_timestamp": "5:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "existing migration risks. So this is"
    },
    {
      "index": 157,
      "start_seconds": 318,
      "source_timestamp": "5:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something that you know you guys should"
    },
    {
      "index": 158,
      "start_seconds": 319,
      "source_timestamp": "5:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "be aware of as we start to migrate"
    },
    {
      "index": 159,
      "start_seconds": 321,
      "source_timestamp": "5:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "towards these approaches. Um again"
    },
    {
      "index": 160,
      "start_seconds": 322,
      "source_timestamp": "5:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "highly experimental but you know I want"
    },
    {
      "index": 161,
      "start_seconds": 324,
      "source_timestamp": "5:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to give some takeaways that you can"
    },
    {
      "index": 162,
      "start_seconds": 325,
      "source_timestamp": "5:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "focus on uh more generally. So this is"
    },
    {
      "index": 163,
      "start_seconds": 328,
      "source_timestamp": "5:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "one interesting edge case that maybe you"
    },
    {
      "index": 164,
      "start_seconds": 330,
      "source_timestamp": "5:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "know is being discussed but maybe you"
    },
    {
      "index": 165,
      "start_seconds": 332,
      "source_timestamp": "5:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "haven't considered yet around 772"
    },
    {
      "index": 166,
      "start_seconds": 334,
      "source_timestamp": "5:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "delegations. So let's say that we have"
    },
    {
      "index": 167,
      "start_seconds": 335,
      "source_timestamp": "5:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "an account or a wallet in this case um"
    },
    {
      "index": 168,
      "start_seconds": 338,
      "source_timestamp": "5:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "with a postquantum signature scheme"
    },
    {
      "index": 169,
      "start_seconds": 339,
      "source_timestamp": "5:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "already in place. You may have delegated"
    },
    {
      "index": 170,
      "start_seconds": 341,
      "source_timestamp": "5:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that wallet beforehand and that"
    },
    {
      "index": 171,
      "start_seconds": 343,
      "source_timestamp": "5:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "delegation is controlled by an ECDSA"
    },
    {
      "index": 172,
      "start_seconds": 344,
      "source_timestamp": "5:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "key. So even though you have this"
    },
    {
      "index": 173,
      "start_seconds": 346,
      "source_timestamp": "5:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "postquantum uh signature in place, you"
    },
    {
      "index": 174,
      "start_seconds": 349,
      "source_timestamp": "5:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "are not safe. So you know all it takes"
    },
    {
      "index": 175,
      "start_seconds": 351,
      "source_timestamp": "5:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is u the recovering of the private key"
    },
    {
      "index": 176,
      "start_seconds": 354,
      "source_timestamp": "5:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of the ECDSA key and yeah the"
    },
    {
      "index": 177,
      "start_seconds": 358,
      "source_timestamp": "5:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "interesting thing here is like how are"
    },
    {
      "index": 178,
      "start_seconds": 359,
      "source_timestamp": "5:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you going to deal with this as a"
    },
    {
      "index": 179,
      "start_seconds": 360,
      "source_timestamp": "6:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "security practitioner? So one of the"
    },
    {
      "index": 180,
      "start_seconds": 362,
      "source_timestamp": "6:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "approaches you might think is okay well"
    },
    {
      "index": 181,
      "start_seconds": 364,
      "source_timestamp": "6:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "I'm just going to move every account uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 182,
      "start_seconds": 366,
      "source_timestamp": "6:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "over. So I'm going to move all my"
    },
    {
      "index": 183,
      "start_seconds": 367,
      "source_timestamp": "6:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "assets, all my positions, reassign all"
    },
    {
      "index": 184,
      "start_seconds": 369,
      "source_timestamp": "6:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the roles and update all the"
    },
    {
      "index": 185,
      "start_seconds": 370,
      "source_timestamp": "6:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "integrations. Maybe that works for you."
    },
    {
      "index": 186,
      "start_seconds": 372,
      "source_timestamp": "6:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it might not work for everyone if you"
    },
    {
      "index": 187,
      "start_seconds": 373,
      "source_timestamp": "6:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "have these big monolithic applications"
    },
    {
      "index": 188,
      "start_seconds": 374,
      "source_timestamp": "6:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and whatnot. Um, and I'm assume that"
    },
    {
      "index": 189,
      "start_seconds": 377,
      "source_timestamp": "6:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "some some of you guys are want to going"
    },
    {
      "index": 190,
      "start_seconds": 378,
      "source_timestamp": "6:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to keep the same uh addresses and things"
    },
    {
      "index": 191,
      "start_seconds": 380,
      "source_timestamp": "6:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "in place. Now, you have to be super"
    },
    {
      "index": 192,
      "start_seconds": 382,
      "source_timestamp": "6:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "careful around the relationships uh and"
    },
    {
      "index": 193,
      "start_seconds": 384,
      "source_timestamp": "6:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "authority there and importantly retiring"
    },
    {
      "index": 194,
      "start_seconds": 386,
      "source_timestamp": "6:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the old key. Um, so you want to be"
    },
    {
      "index": 195,
      "start_seconds": 388,
      "source_timestamp": "6:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "thinking about specifically what can the"
    },
    {
      "index": 196,
      "start_seconds": 389,
      "source_timestamp": "6:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "old key do? Can it do transaction"
    },
    {
      "index": 197,
      "start_seconds": 391,
      "source_timestamp": "6:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "delegation? Can it do upgrades and"
    },
    {
      "index": 198,
      "start_seconds": 393,
      "source_timestamp": "6:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "recovery? Could it overwrite all the"
    },
    {
      "index": 199,
      "start_seconds": 394,
      "source_timestamp": "6:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "code in your protocol? Uh, effectively"
    },
    {
      "index": 200,
      "start_seconds": 396,
      "source_timestamp": "6:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you want to be checking every single"
    },
    {
      "index": 201,
      "start_seconds": 397,
      "source_timestamp": "6:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "entry point and this is a serious"
    },
    {
      "index": 202,
      "start_seconds": 399,
      "source_timestamp": "6:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "migration risk. Um, yeah,"
    },
    {
      "index": 203,
      "start_seconds": 402,
      "source_timestamp": "6:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "cool. So, I'm going to skip over a bunch"
    },
    {
      "index": 204,
      "start_seconds": 404,
      "source_timestamp": "6:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of stuff very quickly, um, so that you"
    },
    {
      "index": 205,
      "start_seconds": 406,
      "source_timestamp": "6:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "guys basically get the the building"
    },
    {
      "index": 206,
      "start_seconds": 407,
      "source_timestamp": "6:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "blocks for this. Um, postquantum"
    },
    {
      "index": 207,
      "start_seconds": 410,
      "source_timestamp": "6:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "signatures, if you guys haven't seen the"
    },
    {
      "index": 208,
      "start_seconds": 411,
      "source_timestamp": "6:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the three big ones that you see people"
    },
    {
      "index": 209,
      "start_seconds": 413,
      "source_timestamp": "6:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "talk about, MLDDSA, FNDSA, and SHDSA."
    },
    {
      "index": 210,
      "start_seconds": 416,
      "source_timestamp": "6:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Uh, today we're going to be talking"
    },
    {
      "index": 211,
      "start_seconds": 417,
      "source_timestamp": "6:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "about SLHDSA or hashbased cryptography."
    },
    {
      "index": 212,
      "start_seconds": 420,
      "source_timestamp": "7:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Uh, specifically some of the uh,"
    },
    {
      "index": 213,
      "start_seconds": 422,
      "source_timestamp": "7:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Ethereum proposals. Um, although FNDSA"
    },
    {
      "index": 214,
      "start_seconds": 425,
      "source_timestamp": "7:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and MLDDSA you'll see on many other"
    },
    {
      "index": 215,
      "start_seconds": 426,
      "source_timestamp": "7:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "chains. uh or but yeah"
    },
    {
      "index": 216,
      "start_seconds": 430,
      "source_timestamp": "7:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to be be super clear here Ethereum"
    },
    {
      "index": 217,
      "start_seconds": 432,
      "source_timestamp": "7:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "doesn't have a universal postquantum"
    },
    {
      "index": 218,
      "start_seconds": 434,
      "source_timestamp": "7:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "signature mandate. So they're not going"
    },
    {
      "index": 219,
      "start_seconds": 436,
      "source_timestamp": "7:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to you know fully commit to one if"
    },
    {
      "index": 220,
      "start_seconds": 438,
      "source_timestamp": "7:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something comes out that you know if for"
    },
    {
      "index": 221,
      "start_seconds": 439,
      "source_timestamp": "7:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "example if SLHDSA gets broken uh through"
    },
    {
      "index": 222,
      "start_seconds": 441,
      "source_timestamp": "7:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "some new quantum algorithm then the"
    },
    {
      "index": 223,
      "start_seconds": 443,
      "source_timestamp": "7:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "benefit of programmable uh account"
    },
    {
      "index": 224,
      "start_seconds": 445,
      "source_timestamp": "7:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "validation is that we can change it"
    },
    {
      "index": 225,
      "start_seconds": 447,
      "source_timestamp": "7:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "whenever we want. Cool. So start"
    },
    {
      "index": 226,
      "start_seconds": 450,
      "source_timestamp": "7:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "starting with what's the winter's"
    },
    {
      "index": 227,
      "start_seconds": 451,
      "source_timestamp": "7:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "onetime signature scheme uh plus and"
    },
    {
      "index": 228,
      "start_seconds": 453,
      "source_timestamp": "7:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "plus c you may see a compressed variance"
    },
    {
      "index": 229,
      "start_seconds": 455,
      "source_timestamp": "7:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and more secure versions effectively"
    },
    {
      "index": 230,
      "start_seconds": 457,
      "source_timestamp": "7:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it's it's a a hash chain that provides a"
    },
    {
      "index": 231,
      "start_seconds": 460,
      "source_timestamp": "7:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "onetime signature uh this is a building"
    },
    {
      "index": 232,
      "start_seconds": 462,
      "source_timestamp": "7:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "block for SLXSA that we'll go into XMSS"
    },
    {
      "index": 233,
      "start_seconds": 466,
      "source_timestamp": "7:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh very easy to say extended Merkel"
    },
    {
      "index": 234,
      "start_seconds": 468,
      "source_timestamp": "7:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "signature scheme basically builds a"
    },
    {
      "index": 235,
      "start_seconds": 470,
      "source_timestamp": "7:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Merkel tree with watts keys as the root"
    },
    {
      "index": 236,
      "start_seconds": 472,
      "source_timestamp": "7:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "here uh and yeah you can basically do"
    },
    {
      "index": 237,
      "start_seconds": 475,
      "source_timestamp": "7:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "use this to combine trees where you have"
    },
    {
      "index": 238,
      "start_seconds": 477,
      "source_timestamp": "7:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "an XMSSS tree a watts key that signs the"
    },
    {
      "index": 239,
      "start_seconds": 479,
      "source_timestamp": "7:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "root of another tree and then that tree"
    },
    {
      "index": 240,
      "start_seconds": 481,
      "source_timestamp": "8:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is then basically bound and you can"
    },
    {
      "index": 241,
      "start_seconds": 482,
      "source_timestamp": "8:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "traverse the whole path."
    },
    {
      "index": 242,
      "start_seconds": 484,
      "source_timestamp": "8:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Falls the forest of random subsets is"
    },
    {
      "index": 243,
      "start_seconds": 486,
      "source_timestamp": "8:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "one of the final building blocks and"
    },
    {
      "index": 244,
      "start_seconds": 488,
      "source_timestamp": "8:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically sits at the bottom and these"
    },
    {
      "index": 245,
      "start_seconds": 491,
      "source_timestamp": "8:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh where the the the leaves are"
    },
    {
      "index": 246,
      "start_seconds": 492,
      "source_timestamp": "8:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "essentially secrets and you can reveal"
    },
    {
      "index": 247,
      "start_seconds": 494,
      "source_timestamp": "8:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "them bit by bit um and then they"
    },
    {
      "index": 248,
      "start_seconds": 496,
      "source_timestamp": "8:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "consider use but we'll go we'll go into"
    },
    {
      "index": 249,
      "start_seconds": 498,
      "source_timestamp": "8:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this."
    },
    {
      "index": 250,
      "start_seconds": 500,
      "source_timestamp": "8:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. So the I spoke about winets"
    },
    {
      "index": 251,
      "start_seconds": 502,
      "source_timestamp": "8:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "onetime signatures uh fors actually has"
    },
    {
      "index": 252,
      "start_seconds": 504,
      "source_timestamp": "8:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "a few time signature properties. So if"
    },
    {
      "index": 253,
      "start_seconds": 506,
      "source_timestamp": "8:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you do double sign uh if you do reveal"
    },
    {
      "index": 254,
      "start_seconds": 509,
      "source_timestamp": "8:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "multiple parts about the tree uh then"
    },
    {
      "index": 255,
      "start_seconds": 511,
      "source_timestamp": "8:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the it's not immediately game over"
    },
    {
      "index": 256,
      "start_seconds": 513,
      "source_timestamp": "8:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "unlike watts uh effectively you can see"
    },
    {
      "index": 257,
      "start_seconds": 515,
      "source_timestamp": "8:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the bit strength decreases and this is"
    },
    {
      "index": 258,
      "start_seconds": 517,
      "source_timestamp": "8:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something you want to be careful with uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 259,
      "start_seconds": 519,
      "source_timestamp": "8:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "as as you're you know reviewing this"
    },
    {
      "index": 260,
      "start_seconds": 521,
      "source_timestamp": "8:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "from a security perspective did"
    },
    {
      "index": 261,
      "start_seconds": 522,
      "source_timestamp": "8:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something get signed twice and we'll go"
    },
    {
      "index": 262,
      "start_seconds": 524,
      "source_timestamp": "8:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "into some of the instance and edge cases"
    },
    {
      "index": 263,
      "start_seconds": 525,
      "source_timestamp": "8:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "around that but it's not game over"
    },
    {
      "index": 264,
      "start_seconds": 527,
      "source_timestamp": "8:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "immediately unlike with watts cool so"
    },
    {
      "index": 265,
      "start_seconds": 530,
      "source_timestamp": "8:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "piecing those all together you can take"
    },
    {
      "index": 266,
      "start_seconds": 531,
      "source_timestamp": "8:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "a look at how SLHDSA works at a high"
    },
    {
      "index": 267,
      "start_seconds": 533,
      "source_timestamp": "8:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "level you have the fours uh forest"
    },
    {
      "index": 268,
      "start_seconds": 535,
      "source_timestamp": "8:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "random subsets at the bottom. You have"
    },
    {
      "index": 269,
      "start_seconds": 537,
      "source_timestamp": "8:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it connected with a W signature to the"
    },
    {
      "index": 270,
      "start_seconds": 539,
      "source_timestamp": "8:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "fors route uh to some bottom XMSSS layer"
    },
    {
      "index": 271,
      "start_seconds": 542,
      "source_timestamp": "9:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh and it goes up to an upper XM XSS"
    },
    {
      "index": 272,
      "start_seconds": 545,
      "source_timestamp": "9:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "layer uh all the way to the trusted"
    },
    {
      "index": 273,
      "start_seconds": 546,
      "source_timestamp": "9:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "public route. So you can think of like"
    },
    {
      "index": 274,
      "start_seconds": 548,
      "source_timestamp": "9:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this massive tree structure that's"
    },
    {
      "index": 275,
      "start_seconds": 550,
      "source_timestamp": "9:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "really complicated and you can choose"
    },
    {
      "index": 276,
      "start_seconds": 552,
      "source_timestamp": "9:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the number of layers and falls"
    },
    {
      "index": 277,
      "start_seconds": 556,
      "source_timestamp": "9:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "jardin which is you know you guys might"
    },
    {
      "index": 278,
      "start_seconds": 558,
      "source_timestamp": "9:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "have seen uh one of the proposals here"
    },
    {
      "index": 279,
      "start_seconds": 559,
      "source_timestamp": "9:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is to take ethereum's modifi modified"
    },
    {
      "index": 280,
      "start_seconds": 562,
      "source_timestamp": "9:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "version of SHDSA with a different hash"
    },
    {
      "index": 281,
      "start_seconds": 564,
      "source_timestamp": "9:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "function uh based off catch to be"
    },
    {
      "index": 282,
      "start_seconds": 566,
      "source_timestamp": "9:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "optimized for EVM um also known as in"
    },
    {
      "index": 283,
      "start_seconds": 569,
      "source_timestamp": "9:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the sphinx minus family and you"
    },
    {
      "index": 284,
      "start_seconds": 571,
      "source_timestamp": "9:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically get this two trade-offs so you"
    },
    {
      "index": 285,
      "start_seconds": 573,
      "source_timestamp": "9:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "have the stateless spx which is the"
    },
    {
      "index": 286,
      "start_seconds": 574,
      "source_timestamp": "9:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "hypertree structure you just saw for"
    },
    {
      "index": 287,
      "start_seconds": 576,
      "source_timestamp": "9:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "SHCSA And then you have compact jardin"
    },
    {
      "index": 288,
      "start_seconds": 578,
      "source_timestamp": "9:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "signing. Um the idea is that you know"
    },
    {
      "index": 289,
      "start_seconds": 581,
      "source_timestamp": "9:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the stateless one you can always fall"
    },
    {
      "index": 290,
      "start_seconds": 582,
      "source_timestamp": "9:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "back to if you need it but you want to"
    },
    {
      "index": 291,
      "start_seconds": 584,
      "source_timestamp": "9:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "use the jardin one for dayto-day because"
    },
    {
      "index": 292,
      "start_seconds": 586,
      "source_timestamp": "9:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the the proof is significantly smaller"
    },
    {
      "index": 293,
      "start_seconds": 587,
      "source_timestamp": "9:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and the signing is significantly faster."
    },
    {
      "index": 294,
      "start_seconds": 590,
      "source_timestamp": "9:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "The way it works is basically you use"
    },
    {
      "index": 295,
      "start_seconds": 592,
      "source_timestamp": "9:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this hypertree structure to sign uh like"
    },
    {
      "index": 296,
      "start_seconds": 595,
      "source_timestamp": "9:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "fours instances. So then you basically"
    },
    {
      "index": 297,
      "start_seconds": 597,
      "source_timestamp": "9:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "have like a pool of signing instances"
    },
    {
      "index": 298,
      "start_seconds": 599,
      "source_timestamp": "9:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and then you use you basically every"
    },
    {
      "index": 299,
      "start_seconds": 602,
      "source_timestamp": "10:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "time you use one of the instances you"
    },
    {
      "index": 300,
      "start_seconds": 603,
      "source_timestamp": "10:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you use it and throw it away. So because"
    },
    {
      "index": 301,
      "start_seconds": 605,
      "source_timestamp": "10:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of this property of fours uh you can"
    },
    {
      "index": 302,
      "start_seconds": 608,
      "source_timestamp": "10:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "sign you can reveal more information"
    },
    {
      "index": 303,
      "start_seconds": 610,
      "source_timestamp": "10:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "about it uh but then the bit strength"
    },
    {
      "index": 304,
      "start_seconds": 611,
      "source_timestamp": "10:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "lowers and you keep a track of this with"
    },
    {
      "index": 305,
      "start_seconds": 614,
      "source_timestamp": "10:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you know in this case q= 1= 2= 3 and so"
    },
    {
      "index": 306,
      "start_seconds": 616,
      "source_timestamp": "10:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "on um and once you've used the queue you"
    },
    {
      "index": 307,
      "start_seconds": 619,
      "source_timestamp": "10:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "need you need to get rid of it one of"
    },
    {
      "index": 308,
      "start_seconds": 620,
      "source_timestamp": "10:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the experiments here you can actually"
    },
    {
      "index": 309,
      "start_seconds": 622,
      "source_timestamp": "10:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "see an onchain implementation um with"
    },
    {
      "index": 310,
      "start_seconds": 625,
      "source_timestamp": "10:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "4337 and it combines the ECDSA and spx"
    },
    {
      "index": 311,
      "start_seconds": 628,
      "source_timestamp": "10:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "so you actually get both so uh in this"
    },
    {
      "index": 312,
      "start_seconds": 630,
      "source_timestamp": "10:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "case a quantum computer we need to get"
    },
    {
      "index": 313,
      "start_seconds": 632,
      "source_timestamp": "10:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to solve the discrete logarithm problem"
    },
    {
      "index": 314,
      "start_seconds": 634,
      "source_timestamp": "10:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and you'd have to find an SPX"
    },
    {
      "index": 315,
      "start_seconds": 635,
      "source_timestamp": "10:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "implementation breach or or"
    },
    {
      "index": 316,
      "start_seconds": 636,
      "source_timestamp": "10:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "cryptographic break."
    },
    {
      "index": 317,
      "start_seconds": 639,
      "source_timestamp": "10:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. So, the intended life cycle here"
    },
    {
      "index": 318,
      "start_seconds": 640,
      "source_timestamp": "10:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is that Q selects a fors instance under"
    },
    {
      "index": 319,
      "start_seconds": 642,
      "source_timestamp": "10:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the root. Um, you reserve it, you"
    },
    {
      "index": 320,
      "start_seconds": 644,
      "source_timestamp": "10:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "persist it, and then you sign. You might"
    },
    {
      "index": 321,
      "start_seconds": 646,
      "source_timestamp": "10:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "go, well, why do you need to do this?"
    },
    {
      "index": 322,
      "start_seconds": 648,
      "source_timestamp": "10:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Uh, it's very similar with atomic"
    },
    {
      "index": 323,
      "start_seconds": 649,
      "source_timestamp": "10:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "signing. You don't want to double sign."
    },
    {
      "index": 324,
      "start_seconds": 651,
      "source_timestamp": "10:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Uh, so you want to make sure that"
    },
    {
      "index": 325,
      "start_seconds": 653,
      "source_timestamp": "10:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "instance Q is always persisted even if"
    },
    {
      "index": 326,
      "start_seconds": 656,
      "source_timestamp": "10:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you didn't actually broadcast it. If you"
    },
    {
      "index": 327,
      "start_seconds": 657,
      "source_timestamp": "10:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "think there's a chance that it was"
    },
    {
      "index": 328,
      "start_seconds": 658,
      "source_timestamp": "10:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "broadcast anywhere, uh, you never want"
    },
    {
      "index": 329,
      "start_seconds": 660,
      "source_timestamp": "11:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to rewind Q, otherwise you risk losing"
    },
    {
      "index": 330,
      "start_seconds": 662,
      "source_timestamp": "11:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "some of the bit strength there."
    },
    {
      "index": 331,
      "start_seconds": 664,
      "source_timestamp": "11:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And to put this in perspective, uh the"
    },
    {
      "index": 332,
      "start_seconds": 667,
      "source_timestamp": "11:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "current implementation I believe took"
    },
    {
      "index": 333,
      "start_seconds": 668,
      "source_timestamp": "11:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "47.3 seconds on uh spx stateless signing"
    },
    {
      "index": 334,
      "start_seconds": 672,
      "source_timestamp": "11:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "on a legend. I know S+. So these"
    },
    {
      "index": 335,
      "start_seconds": 674,
      "source_timestamp": "11:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "signatures are massive. You don't want"
    },
    {
      "index": 336,
      "start_seconds": 676,
      "source_timestamp": "11:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to be using the stateless path uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 337,
      "start_seconds": 678,
      "source_timestamp": "11:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "unnecessarily. Um yeah, I don't know who"
    },
    {
      "index": 338,
      "start_seconds": 680,
      "source_timestamp": "11:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "wants to wait 47 seconds for signing,"
    },
    {
      "index": 339,
      "start_seconds": 682,
      "source_timestamp": "11:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "but hopefully that speeds up. Cool. So"
    },
    {
      "index": 340,
      "start_seconds": 684,
      "source_timestamp": "11:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the bulk of the talk uh is"
    },
    {
      "index": 341,
      "start_seconds": 686,
      "source_timestamp": "11:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "implementation risk. So what do security"
    },
    {
      "index": 342,
      "start_seconds": 687,
      "source_timestamp": "11:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "practitioners care about now that you"
    },
    {
      "index": 343,
      "start_seconds": 689,
      "source_timestamp": "11:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "understand some of the basic blocks as"
    },
    {
      "index": 344,
      "start_seconds": 690,
      "source_timestamp": "11:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "these things roll out?"
    },
    {
      "index": 345,
      "start_seconds": 693,
      "source_timestamp": "11:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "I've mentioned this already, but the"
    },
    {
      "index": 346,
      "start_seconds": 694,
      "source_timestamp": "11:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "existing uh obligations still apply. So"
    },
    {
      "index": 347,
      "start_seconds": 697,
      "source_timestamp": "11:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "if you have account author like"
    },
    {
      "index": 348,
      "start_seconds": 699,
      "source_timestamp": "11:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "authorization, you know, you have roles"
    },
    {
      "index": 349,
      "start_seconds": 701,
      "source_timestamp": "11:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh per dexes have keepers and things"
    },
    {
      "index": 350,
      "start_seconds": 703,
      "source_timestamp": "11:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "like that, you want to be checking the"
    },
    {
      "index": 351,
      "start_seconds": 704,
      "source_timestamp": "11:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "authorization route. How do you verify?"
    },
    {
      "index": 352,
      "start_seconds": 706,
      "source_timestamp": "11:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Uh is that route still active? Can some"
    },
    {
      "index": 353,
      "start_seconds": 709,
      "source_timestamp": "11:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "key somewhere control it? And it might"
    },
    {
      "index": 354,
      "start_seconds": 710,
      "source_timestamp": "11:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "be in super non-obvious ways. 7702"
    },
    {
      "index": 355,
      "start_seconds": 713,
      "source_timestamp": "11:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "delegations, permit 2's leaked,"
    },
    {
      "index": 356,
      "start_seconds": 715,
      "source_timestamp": "11:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "offchain, uh and and and the like. Um"
    },
    {
      "index": 357,
      "start_seconds": 718,
      "source_timestamp": "11:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "but yeah, all of the existing"
    },
    {
      "index": 358,
      "start_seconds": 719,
      "source_timestamp": "11:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "obligations still apply."
    },
    {
      "index": 359,
      "start_seconds": 722,
      "source_timestamp": "12:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And the thing I want to emphasize here"
    },
    {
      "index": 360,
      "start_seconds": 723,
      "source_timestamp": "12:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is all of the signature families have"
    },
    {
      "index": 361,
      "start_seconds": 725,
      "source_timestamp": "12:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "their own invariance. Here's some of the"
    },
    {
      "index": 362,
      "start_seconds": 726,
      "source_timestamp": "12:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "ones you probably already checked for"
    },
    {
      "index": 363,
      "start_seconds": 727,
      "source_timestamp": "12:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "ECSA and BLS. Uh hashbased, you know, is"
    },
    {
      "index": 364,
      "start_seconds": 730,
      "source_timestamp": "12:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is is no different. Um in this case,"
    },
    {
      "index": 365,
      "start_seconds": 732,
      "source_timestamp": "12:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "we're talking about the proof passing"
    },
    {
      "index": 366,
      "start_seconds": 734,
      "source_timestamp": "12:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and and and whether it's stateless or"
    },
    {
      "index": 367,
      "start_seconds": 736,
      "source_timestamp": "12:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "not. Latis cryptography as well has its"
    },
    {
      "index": 368,
      "start_seconds": 738,
      "source_timestamp": "12:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "own uh parameters. So you want to be"
    },
    {
      "index": 369,
      "start_seconds": 740,
      "source_timestamp": "12:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "checking this with whatever you're"
    },
    {
      "index": 370,
      "start_seconds": 741,
      "source_timestamp": "12:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "working with postquantum or pre-quantum"
    },
    {
      "index": 371,
      "start_seconds": 743,
      "source_timestamp": "12:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "crypto."
    },
    {
      "index": 372,
      "start_seconds": 745,
      "source_timestamp": "12:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And the thing to that I want to"
    },
    {
      "index": 373,
      "start_seconds": 748,
      "source_timestamp": "12:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "emphasize around the stateful signing."
    },
    {
      "index": 374,
      "start_seconds": 751,
      "source_timestamp": "12:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So using this Q instance that I spoke"
    },
    {
      "index": 375,
      "start_seconds": 753,
      "source_timestamp": "12:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "about is that just because the proof"
    },
    {
      "index": 376,
      "start_seconds": 755,
      "source_timestamp": "12:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "verifies doesn't show that the key was"
    },
    {
      "index": 377,
      "start_seconds": 756,
      "source_timestamp": "12:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "unused. So you could sign multiple times"
    },
    {
      "index": 378,
      "start_seconds": 759,
      "source_timestamp": "12:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "where Q equals 1 and it's going to leak"
    },
    {
      "index": 379,
      "start_seconds": 761,
      "source_timestamp": "12:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "key material and basically make it"
    },
    {
      "index": 380,
      "start_seconds": 763,
      "source_timestamp": "12:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "potentially easier uh to to forge some"
    },
    {
      "index": 381,
      "start_seconds": 766,
      "source_timestamp": "12:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "kind of proof. Um the wallet must"
    },
    {
      "index": 382,
      "start_seconds": 768,
      "source_timestamp": "12:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "preserve the signing history. In that"
    },
    {
      "index": 383,
      "start_seconds": 769,
      "source_timestamp": "12:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "case, that's the value Q."
    },
    {
      "index": 384,
      "start_seconds": 772,
      "source_timestamp": "12:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So, here's one instance that you may be"
    },
    {
      "index": 385,
      "start_seconds": 775,
      "source_timestamp": "12:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "thought of with pre uh quantum crypto."
    },
    {
      "index": 386,
      "start_seconds": 777,
      "source_timestamp": "12:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Basically, you have some, you know, uh a"
    },
    {
      "index": 387,
      "start_seconds": 780,
      "source_timestamp": "13:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "wallet on two devices, device A and"
    },
    {
      "index": 388,
      "start_seconds": 781,
      "source_timestamp": "13:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "device B. Device A signs with Q= 7. It"
    },
    {
      "index": 389,
      "start_seconds": 784,
      "source_timestamp": "13:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "has a a crash or a power outage. So,"
    },
    {
      "index": 390,
      "start_seconds": 787,
      "source_timestamp": "13:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "then you and you can't recover it. So,"
    },
    {
      "index": 391,
      "start_seconds": 788,
      "source_timestamp": "13:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you you clone it from device B or an"
    },
    {
      "index": 392,
      "start_seconds": 791,
      "source_timestamp": "13:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "attacker does uh and you sign with Q7"
    },
    {
      "index": 393,
      "start_seconds": 794,
      "source_timestamp": "13:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "again. So now you've got two signatures"
    },
    {
      "index": 394,
      "start_seconds": 795,
      "source_timestamp": "13:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "with Q equ= 7 and you've leaked more"
    },
    {
      "index": 395,
      "start_seconds": 797,
      "source_timestamp": "13:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "information about uh the four's uh trees"
    },
    {
      "index": 396,
      "start_seconds": 800,
      "source_timestamp": "13:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "than you wanted to."
    },
    {
      "index": 397,
      "start_seconds": 803,
      "source_timestamp": "13:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So what an attacker would do is they"
    },
    {
      "index": 398,
      "start_seconds": 804,
      "source_timestamp": "13:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "would sit there collecting all these"
    },
    {
      "index": 399,
      "start_seconds": 805,
      "source_timestamp": "13:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "openings uh and then basically they"
    },
    {
      "index": 400,
      "start_seconds": 807,
      "source_timestamp": "13:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "would start to do random offline"
    },
    {
      "index": 401,
      "start_seconds": 809,
      "source_timestamp": "13:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "searches where they would verify the"
    },
    {
      "index": 402,
      "start_seconds": 810,
      "source_timestamp": "13:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "randomizer um and they effectively need"
    },
    {
      "index": 403,
      "start_seconds": 813,
      "source_timestamp": "13:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to look for some proof that you know"
    },
    {
      "index": 404,
      "start_seconds": 816,
      "source_timestamp": "13:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "does an action that they want to do. So"
    },
    {
      "index": 405,
      "start_seconds": 817,
      "source_timestamp": "13:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that might be bypassing the frame uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 406,
      "start_seconds": 819,
      "source_timestamp": "13:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "validation layer to do a transfer or"
    },
    {
      "index": 407,
      "start_seconds": 821,
      "source_timestamp": "13:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "whatever. Uh this is why one of the"
    },
    {
      "index": 408,
      "start_seconds": 822,
      "source_timestamp": "13:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "reasons that if you are doing a"
    },
    {
      "index": 409,
      "start_seconds": 824,
      "source_timestamp": "13:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "migration today then maybe the hybrid"
    },
    {
      "index": 410,
      "start_seconds": 825,
      "source_timestamp": "13:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "ECDSA signature requiring both is a good"
    },
    {
      "index": 411,
      "start_seconds": 828,
      "source_timestamp": "13:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "approach but it's obviously going to"
    },
    {
      "index": 412,
      "start_seconds": 829,
      "source_timestamp": "13:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "cost more in gas."
    },
    {
      "index": 413,
      "start_seconds": 832,
      "source_timestamp": "13:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So moving on here's like a hypothetical"
    },
    {
      "index": 414,
      "start_seconds": 834,
      "source_timestamp": "13:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "other scenario that you want to be"
    },
    {
      "index": 415,
      "start_seconds": 836,
      "source_timestamp": "13:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "testing for. Um this is you know similar"
    },
    {
      "index": 416,
      "start_seconds": 838,
      "source_timestamp": "13:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to classical cryptography. You basically"
    },
    {
      "index": 417,
      "start_seconds": 840,
      "source_timestamp": "14:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "want to be checking that the you know"
    },
    {
      "index": 418,
      "start_seconds": 843,
      "source_timestamp": "14:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "mutating you you want to be checking for"
    },
    {
      "index": 419,
      "start_seconds": 845,
      "source_timestamp": "14:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "failed close cases specifically. So in"
    },
    {
      "index": 420,
      "start_seconds": 847,
      "source_timestamp": "14:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this case you want to be checking Q"
    },
    {
      "index": 421,
      "start_seconds": 849,
      "source_timestamp": "14:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "specifically. uh if you do a roundtrip"
    },
    {
      "index": 422,
      "start_seconds": 851,
      "source_timestamp": "14:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "signing test, so sign and then verify in"
    },
    {
      "index": 423,
      "start_seconds": 853,
      "source_timestamp": "14:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "your unit test for your code or"
    },
    {
      "index": 424,
      "start_seconds": 854,
      "source_timestamp": "14:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "whatever, you want to be checking that"
    },
    {
      "index": 425,
      "start_seconds": 856,
      "source_timestamp": "14:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "if you do vary Q um or or remove Q uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 426,
      "start_seconds": 859,
      "source_timestamp": "14:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that things fail closed instead of uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 427,
      "start_seconds": 862,
      "source_timestamp": "14:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "silently succeeding."
    },
    {
      "index": 428,
      "start_seconds": 865,
      "source_timestamp": "14:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Similarly, you know, I think it's"
    },
    {
      "index": 429,
      "start_seconds": 867,
      "source_timestamp": "14:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "happened before, but in in just general"
    },
    {
      "index": 430,
      "start_seconds": 868,
      "source_timestamp": "14:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Merkel uh tree implementations, you want"
    },
    {
      "index": 431,
      "start_seconds": 870,
      "source_timestamp": "14:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to be checking that the proof actually"
    },
    {
      "index": 432,
      "start_seconds": 873,
      "source_timestamp": "14:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "verifies the message or authenticates"
    },
    {
      "index": 433,
      "start_seconds": 874,
      "source_timestamp": "14:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "membership of the message. you want to"
    },
    {
      "index": 434,
      "start_seconds": 876,
      "source_timestamp": "14:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "be doing the full walk all the way up"
    },
    {
      "index": 435,
      "start_seconds": 878,
      "source_timestamp": "14:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the tree whatever you're doing stateless"
    },
    {
      "index": 436,
      "start_seconds": 879,
      "source_timestamp": "14:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "or stateful um and and checking that"
    },
    {
      "index": 437,
      "start_seconds": 882,
      "source_timestamp": "14:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that works. So effectively the thing I"
    },
    {
      "index": 438,
      "start_seconds": 884,
      "source_timestamp": "14:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "want to highlight here is you want to be"
    },
    {
      "index": 439,
      "start_seconds": 885,
      "source_timestamp": "14:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "mutating uh inputs and checking that"
    },
    {
      "index": 440,
      "start_seconds": 887,
      "source_timestamp": "14:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "everything fails closed under all"
    },
    {
      "index": 441,
      "start_seconds": 888,
      "source_timestamp": "14:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "circumstances"
    },
    {
      "index": 442,
      "start_seconds": 891,
      "source_timestamp": "14:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and the scenario here is basically an a"
    },
    {
      "index": 443,
      "start_seconds": 893,
      "source_timestamp": "14:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "attacker supplied root root um and yeah"
    },
    {
      "index": 444,
      "start_seconds": 896,
      "source_timestamp": "14:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "if you don't check the full path then"
    },
    {
      "index": 445,
      "start_seconds": 898,
      "source_timestamp": "14:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you may uh be vulnerable to this. It's"
    },
    {
      "index": 446,
      "start_seconds": 901,
      "source_timestamp": "15:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "very similar to existing Merkel tree"
    },
    {
      "index": 447,
      "start_seconds": 903,
      "source_timestamp": "15:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "implementations."
    },
    {
      "index": 448,
      "start_seconds": 905,
      "source_timestamp": "15:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. And this is similar. You want want"
    },
    {
      "index": 449,
      "start_seconds": 908,
      "source_timestamp": "15:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to be thinking about the this mutation"
    },
    {
      "index": 450,
      "start_seconds": 910,
      "source_timestamp": "15:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "approach when you're looking at frame"
    },
    {
      "index": 451,
      "start_seconds": 911,
      "source_timestamp": "15:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "transactions as well. Uh there's a"
    },
    {
      "index": 452,
      "start_seconds": 913,
      "source_timestamp": "15:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "concept where you you could accidentally"
    },
    {
      "index": 453,
      "start_seconds": 915,
      "source_timestamp": "15:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "approve a frame that you"
    },
    {
      "index": 454,
      "start_seconds": 918,
      "source_timestamp": "15:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "didn't mean to approve. Um and you want"
    },
    {
      "index": 455,
      "start_seconds": 920,
      "source_timestamp": "15:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to be mutating and and basically"
    },
    {
      "index": 456,
      "start_seconds": 921,
      "source_timestamp": "15:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "checking that you know later frames um"
    },
    {
      "index": 457,
      "start_seconds": 924,
      "source_timestamp": "15:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "don't don't have approvals that they"
    },
    {
      "index": 458,
      "start_seconds": 926,
      "source_timestamp": "15:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "they weren't authorized. Um just"
    },
    {
      "index": 459,
      "start_seconds": 928,
      "source_timestamp": "15:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something to think about when you're"
    },
    {
      "index": 460,
      "start_seconds": 928,
      "source_timestamp": "15:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "looking at EIP 8141."
    },
    {
      "index": 461,
      "start_seconds": 932,
      "source_timestamp": "15:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. So, we spoke about uh different"
    },
    {
      "index": 462,
      "start_seconds": 934,
      "source_timestamp": "15:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "things in your uh attacker model, mainly"
    },
    {
      "index": 463,
      "start_seconds": 937,
      "source_timestamp": "15:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "application logic that you'd be looking"
    },
    {
      "index": 464,
      "start_seconds": 938,
      "source_timestamp": "15:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "at. This one is a very interesting paper"
    },
    {
      "index": 465,
      "start_seconds": 940,
      "source_timestamp": "15:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "I thought I'd mention uh around the guys"
    },
    {
      "index": 466,
      "start_seconds": 942,
      "source_timestamp": "15:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "from Lurbec and Google. They did uh a"
    },
    {
      "index": 467,
      "start_seconds": 945,
      "source_timestamp": "15:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "row hammer attack uh for those of you"
    },
    {
      "index": 468,
      "start_seconds": 946,
      "source_timestamp": "15:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "who aren't familiar. It's where you take"
    },
    {
      "index": 469,
      "start_seconds": 948,
      "source_timestamp": "15:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "um an attackers controlled memory region"
    },
    {
      "index": 470,
      "start_seconds": 950,
      "source_timestamp": "15:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and a victim controlled memory region"
    },
    {
      "index": 471,
      "start_seconds": 951,
      "source_timestamp": "15:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and you just do a ton of writes to it to"
    },
    {
      "index": 472,
      "start_seconds": 953,
      "source_timestamp": "15:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "try flip the bits at a hardware level."
    },
    {
      "index": 473,
      "start_seconds": 955,
      "source_timestamp": "15:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Um, effectively they proved that this"
    },
    {
      "index": 474,
      "start_seconds": 957,
      "source_timestamp": "15:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "would work in OpenSSL's implementation"
    },
    {
      "index": 475,
      "start_seconds": 959,
      "source_timestamp": "15:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of SLHDSA. Um, they called it slashdsa"
    },
    {
      "index": 476,
      "start_seconds": 963,
      "source_timestamp": "16:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "where they would basically target the"
    },
    {
      "index": 477,
      "start_seconds": 965,
      "source_timestamp": "16:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the watts key signing. So this part when"
    },
    {
      "index": 478,
      "start_seconds": 968,
      "source_timestamp": "16:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you register another xss tree or falls"
    },
    {
      "index": 479,
      "start_seconds": 970,
      "source_timestamp": "16:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh in the in the hyper tree and"
    },
    {
      "index": 480,
      "start_seconds": 973,
      "source_timestamp": "16:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically that would mean that the watts"
    },
    {
      "index": 481,
      "start_seconds": 975,
      "source_timestamp": "16:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "key would sign a different tree. Um and"
    },
    {
      "index": 482,
      "start_seconds": 977,
      "source_timestamp": "16:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "then maybe you can if you know engineer"
    },
    {
      "index": 483,
      "start_seconds": 979,
      "source_timestamp": "16:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this so that it deterministically sign"
    },
    {
      "index": 484,
      "start_seconds": 981,
      "source_timestamp": "16:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "some attacker control tree or or a"
    },
    {
      "index": 485,
      "start_seconds": 983,
      "source_timestamp": "16:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "subset of it which would allow uh an"
    },
    {
      "index": 486,
      "start_seconds": 985,
      "source_timestamp": "16:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "attacker forge proof. Uh the thing is is"
    },
    {
      "index": 487,
      "start_seconds": 988,
      "source_timestamp": "16:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is really like is this in your threat"
    },
    {
      "index": 488,
      "start_seconds": 989,
      "source_timestamp": "16:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "model. So they reported this to OpenSSL"
    },
    {
      "index": 489,
      "start_seconds": 991,
      "source_timestamp": "16:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and OpenSSL said this isn't in our"
    },
    {
      "index": 490,
      "start_seconds": 993,
      "source_timestamp": "16:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "threat model. So um as a [clears throat]"
    },
    {
      "index": 491,
      "start_seconds": 995,
      "source_timestamp": "16:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "security researcher you want to be"
    },
    {
      "index": 492,
      "start_seconds": 996,
      "source_timestamp": "16:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "checking what what your application you"
    },
    {
      "index": 493,
      "start_seconds": 998,
      "source_timestamp": "16:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "know cares about. Is it remote signing?"
    },
    {
      "index": 494,
      "start_seconds": 1000,
      "source_timestamp": "16:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Is there RC access? Are you running in"
    },
    {
      "index": 495,
      "start_seconds": 1001,
      "source_timestamp": "16:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "in enclaves and whatnot?"
    },
    {
      "index": 496,
      "start_seconds": 1004,
      "source_timestamp": "16:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And the way this works is that basically"
    },
    {
      "index": 497,
      "start_seconds": 1007,
      "source_timestamp": "16:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "if the Watts instant get compromised"
    },
    {
      "index": 498,
      "start_seconds": 1009,
      "source_timestamp": "16:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "similar to the the one-time signing that"
    },
    {
      "index": 499,
      "start_seconds": 1011,
      "source_timestamp": "16:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "I mentioned before, uh you can sign"
    },
    {
      "index": 500,
      "start_seconds": 1013,
      "source_timestamp": "16:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something a route of a tree that's"
    },
    {
      "index": 501,
      "start_seconds": 1015,
      "source_timestamp": "16:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "untrusted and then an attacker can"
    },
    {
      "index": 502,
      "start_seconds": 1016,
      "source_timestamp": "16:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "provide that tree um and then initiate"
    },
    {
      "index": 503,
      "start_seconds": 1019,
      "source_timestamp": "16:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "some action similar to you know fund"
    },
    {
      "index": 504,
      "start_seconds": 1021,
      "source_timestamp": "17:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "transfer or or delegation or whatnot. Um"
    },
    {
      "index": 505,
      "start_seconds": 1023,
      "source_timestamp": "17:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and that works for XSS all fours."
    },
    {
      "index": 506,
      "start_seconds": 1028,
      "source_timestamp": "17:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. So the you know moving on"
    },
    {
      "index": 507,
      "start_seconds": 1033,
      "source_timestamp": "17:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "basically under this scenario you want"
    },
    {
      "index": 508,
      "start_seconds": 1035,
      "source_timestamp": "17:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to be checking that recovery always"
    },
    {
      "index": 509,
      "start_seconds": 1037,
      "source_timestamp": "17:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "preserves the security policy. So one"
    },
    {
      "index": 510,
      "start_seconds": 1040,
      "source_timestamp": "17:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "thing to talk about here is that we"
    },
    {
      "index": 511,
      "start_seconds": 1042,
      "source_timestamp": "17:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "spoke about the compact signing and"
    },
    {
      "index": 512,
      "start_seconds": 1044,
      "source_timestamp": "17:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "stateless signing. Basically you want to"
    },
    {
      "index": 513,
      "start_seconds": 1047,
      "source_timestamp": "17:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "check that the stateless signing always"
    },
    {
      "index": 514,
      "start_seconds": 1048,
      "source_timestamp": "17:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "works. And you know this this may be"
    },
    {
      "index": 515,
      "start_seconds": 1050,
      "source_timestamp": "17:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "because you've lost the device. You"
    },
    {
      "index": 516,
      "start_seconds": 1052,
      "source_timestamp": "17:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "don't know the the value of Q. um the"
    },
    {
      "index": 517,
      "start_seconds": 1054,
      "source_timestamp": "17:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "comp the keys being compromised and you"
    },
    {
      "index": 518,
      "start_seconds": 1056,
      "source_timestamp": "17:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you want to rotate um or you have some"
    },
    {
      "index": 519,
      "start_seconds": 1058,
      "source_timestamp": "17:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "ECDSA key uh and and basically you want"
    },
    {
      "index": 520,
      "start_seconds": 1060,
      "source_timestamp": "17:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to always be checking that the intended"
    },
    {
      "index": 521,
      "start_seconds": 1062,
      "source_timestamp": "17:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "policy matches uh what your organization"
    },
    {
      "index": 522,
      "start_seconds": 1064,
      "source_timestamp": "17:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "wants it to do."
    },
    {
      "index": 523,
      "start_seconds": 1066,
      "source_timestamp": "17:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "One of the reasons I mentioned this is"
    },
    {
      "index": 524,
      "start_seconds": 1067,
      "source_timestamp": "17:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "because for example the SPX verification"
    },
    {
      "index": 525,
      "start_seconds": 1070,
      "source_timestamp": "17:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh gas implementation today I believe is"
    },
    {
      "index": 526,
      "start_seconds": 1072,
      "source_timestamp": "17:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "2676,000"
    },
    {
      "index": 527,
      "start_seconds": 1075,
      "source_timestamp": "17:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "um whereas the draft frame transaction"
    },
    {
      "index": 528,
      "start_seconds": 1077,
      "source_timestamp": "17:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh is only going to allow 100,000 gas uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 529,
      "start_seconds": 1080,
      "source_timestamp": "18:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "for validation. So as a security"
    },
    {
      "index": 530,
      "start_seconds": 1082,
      "source_timestamp": "18:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "researcher you might be thinking well if"
    },
    {
      "index": 531,
      "start_seconds": 1085,
      "source_timestamp": "18:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "it takes 276,000 gas how am I going to"
    },
    {
      "index": 532,
      "start_seconds": 1087,
      "source_timestamp": "18:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "fit this into a frame transaction. Uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 533,
      "start_seconds": 1089,
      "source_timestamp": "18:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "this is all up for discussion still so"
    },
    {
      "index": 534,
      "start_seconds": 1091,
      "source_timestamp": "18:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you can or contribute today. The"
    },
    {
      "index": 535,
      "start_seconds": 1094,
      "source_timestamp": "18:14",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "question here is more about the"
    },
    {
      "index": 536,
      "start_seconds": 1095,
      "source_timestamp": "18:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "integration challenge but you might be"
    },
    {
      "index": 537,
      "start_seconds": 1096,
      "source_timestamp": "18:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "thinking okay how how can I exploit this"
    },
    {
      "index": 538,
      "start_seconds": 1098,
      "source_timestamp": "18:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you know as as a as a red team. So you"
    },
    {
      "index": 539,
      "start_seconds": 1102,
      "source_timestamp": "18:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "want to be thinking about bridges you"
    },
    {
      "index": 540,
      "start_seconds": 1103,
      "source_timestamp": "18:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "want to be thinking about uh external"
    },
    {
      "index": 541,
      "start_seconds": 1104,
      "source_timestamp": "18:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "edge cases. Okay. And you know, assume"
    },
    {
      "index": 542,
      "start_seconds": 1107,
      "source_timestamp": "18:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that they've uh an institution finds out"
    },
    {
      "index": 543,
      "start_seconds": 1109,
      "source_timestamp": "18:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that they've signed three times with the"
    },
    {
      "index": 544,
      "start_seconds": 1111,
      "source_timestamp": "18:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "same queue due to some faulty um"
    },
    {
      "index": 545,
      "start_seconds": 1113,
      "source_timestamp": "18:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "operating system or hardware. You now"
    },
    {
      "index": 546,
      "start_seconds": 1115,
      "source_timestamp": "18:35",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "immediately want to do an SPX stateless"
    },
    {
      "index": 547,
      "start_seconds": 1117,
      "source_timestamp": "18:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "transaction to register a new route uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 548,
      "start_seconds": 1119,
      "source_timestamp": "18:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "or send to a a new account. But you the"
    },
    {
      "index": 549,
      "start_seconds": 1121,
      "source_timestamp": "18:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "question is can you fit it in the relay"
    },
    {
      "index": 550,
      "start_seconds": 1123,
      "source_timestamp": "18:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "or or pay master system that you want?"
    },
    {
      "index": 551,
      "start_seconds": 1125,
      "source_timestamp": "18:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Um and the reason I'm bringing this up"
    },
    {
      "index": 552,
      "start_seconds": 1128,
      "source_timestamp": "18:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "is you want to be forcing the hard path"
    },
    {
      "index": 553,
      "start_seconds": 1130,
      "source_timestamp": "18:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "uh and the and the easy path. So you"
    },
    {
      "index": 554,
      "start_seconds": 1132,
      "source_timestamp": "18:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "might be using a stateless state full"
    },
    {
      "index": 555,
      "start_seconds": 1134,
      "source_timestamp": "18:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "signing uh for day-to-day, but you and"
    },
    {
      "index": 556,
      "start_seconds": 1137,
      "source_timestamp": "18:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and stateless signing may come up"
    },
    {
      "index": 557,
      "start_seconds": 1139,
      "source_timestamp": "18:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "relatively rarely. Imagine like an ETF"
    },
    {
      "index": 558,
      "start_seconds": 1141,
      "source_timestamp": "19:01",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that doesn't move their funds uh at all."
    },
    {
      "index": 559,
      "start_seconds": 1143,
      "source_timestamp": "19:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "You want to be checking that the SPX"
    },
    {
      "index": 560,
      "start_seconds": 1145,
      "source_timestamp": "19:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "stateless path does does always work."
    },
    {
      "index": 561,
      "start_seconds": 1146,
      "source_timestamp": "19:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Maybe you want to run periodic SIMs and"
    },
    {
      "index": 562,
      "start_seconds": 1148,
      "source_timestamp": "19:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "whatnot. Um and and checking that under"
    },
    {
      "index": 563,
      "start_seconds": 1150,
      "source_timestamp": "19:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "all current relay conditions, maybe"
    },
    {
      "index": 564,
      "start_seconds": 1152,
      "source_timestamp": "19:12",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you're doing crosschain bridging or"
    },
    {
      "index": 565,
      "start_seconds": 1153,
      "source_timestamp": "19:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "something that this is going to work."
    },
    {
      "index": 566,
      "start_seconds": 1157,
      "source_timestamp": "19:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. Um I wanted to mention here some"
    },
    {
      "index": 567,
      "start_seconds": 1160,
      "source_timestamp": "19:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "briefly about assurance and some of the"
    },
    {
      "index": 568,
      "start_seconds": 1162,
      "source_timestamp": "19:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "limitations around that as well as some"
    },
    {
      "index": 569,
      "start_seconds": 1164,
      "source_timestamp": "19:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of the art in the space. Uh the and and"
    },
    {
      "index": 570,
      "start_seconds": 1167,
      "source_timestamp": "19:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "yeah just so that you guys are aware of"
    },
    {
      "index": 571,
      "start_seconds": 1168,
      "source_timestamp": "19:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "what you can take a look at. There's a"
    },
    {
      "index": 572,
      "start_seconds": 1171,
      "source_timestamp": "19:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "really cool implementation in Jasmine."
    },
    {
      "index": 573,
      "start_seconds": 1173,
      "source_timestamp": "19:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Um those of you who aren't familiar with"
    },
    {
      "index": 574,
      "start_seconds": 1174,
      "source_timestamp": "19:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Jasmine lets you do uh low-level"
    },
    {
      "index": 575,
      "start_seconds": 1176,
      "source_timestamp": "19:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "cryptographic implementations uh in"
    },
    {
      "index": 576,
      "start_seconds": 1178,
      "source_timestamp": "19:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "assembly and it has constant time"
    },
    {
      "index": 577,
      "start_seconds": 1180,
      "source_timestamp": "19:40",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "checkers so you can check that the"
    },
    {
      "index": 578,
      "start_seconds": 1182,
      "source_timestamp": "19:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "implementation is constant time um and"
    },
    {
      "index": 579,
      "start_seconds": 1185,
      "source_timestamp": "19:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you can uh with formal verification. So"
    },
    {
      "index": 580,
      "start_seconds": 1187,
      "source_timestamp": "19:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the implementation here uh actually has"
    },
    {
      "index": 581,
      "start_seconds": 1189,
      "source_timestamp": "19:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "an XMSS an XMSS MT so that's multi-ree"
    },
    {
      "index": 582,
      "start_seconds": 1193,
      "source_timestamp": "19:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "um and you can prove that it links to"
    },
    {
      "index": 583,
      "start_seconds": 1195,
      "source_timestamp": "19:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the security theorem. So this is like an"
    },
    {
      "index": 584,
      "start_seconds": 1197,
      "source_timestamp": "19:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "active area of research uh also in in"
    },
    {
      "index": 585,
      "start_seconds": 1200,
      "source_timestamp": "20:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the web 2 space uh just classical cryp"
    },
    {
      "index": 586,
      "start_seconds": 1202,
      "source_timestamp": "20:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "cryptography um but these these models"
    },
    {
      "index": 587,
      "start_seconds": 1205,
      "source_timestamp": "20:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "are available so you can start comparing"
    },
    {
      "index": 588,
      "start_seconds": 1206,
      "source_timestamp": "20:06",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "them. So if you're implementing you know"
    },
    {
      "index": 589,
      "start_seconds": 1208,
      "source_timestamp": "20:08",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "a new GU fork or something um with a"
    },
    {
      "index": 590,
      "start_seconds": 1211,
      "source_timestamp": "20:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "custom XMSS implementation then you can"
    },
    {
      "index": 591,
      "start_seconds": 1213,
      "source_timestamp": "20:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "be uh diff fuzzing and and you know"
    },
    {
      "index": 592,
      "start_seconds": 1215,
      "source_timestamp": "20:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "checking against some of these"
    },
    {
      "index": 593,
      "start_seconds": 1216,
      "source_timestamp": "20:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "implementations."
    },
    {
      "index": 594,
      "start_seconds": 1218,
      "source_timestamp": "20:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Similarly um they actually used as well"
    },
    {
      "index": 595,
      "start_seconds": 1220,
      "source_timestamp": "20:20",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "before but uh there's also a sphinx plus"
    },
    {
      "index": 596,
      "start_seconds": 1222,
      "source_timestamp": "20:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "model that's type bound checked in easy."
    },
    {
      "index": 597,
      "start_seconds": 1224,
      "source_timestamp": "20:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "This is more for the model itself but uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 598,
      "start_seconds": 1227,
      "source_timestamp": "20:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you know if you are changing your uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 599,
      "start_seconds": 1229,
      "source_timestamp": "20:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "tree structure and things like that like"
    },
    {
      "index": 600,
      "start_seconds": 1231,
      "source_timestamp": "20:31",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the number of layers and and whatnot um"
    },
    {
      "index": 601,
      "start_seconds": 1233,
      "source_timestamp": "20:33",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you can actually test that model in easy"
    },
    {
      "index": 602,
      "start_seconds": 1234,
      "source_timestamp": "20:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "crypt and formally verify that as well."
    },
    {
      "index": 603,
      "start_seconds": 1238,
      "source_timestamp": "20:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. So, as a security practitioner,"
    },
    {
      "index": 604,
      "start_seconds": 1241,
      "source_timestamp": "20:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "what what are you looking at? I think um"
    },
    {
      "index": 605,
      "start_seconds": 1242,
      "source_timestamp": "20:42",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "formal verification always has a place."
    },
    {
      "index": 606,
      "start_seconds": 1244,
      "source_timestamp": "20:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Um and so does some of the other tools."
    },
    {
      "index": 607,
      "start_seconds": 1246,
      "source_timestamp": "20:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "You want to be layering these wherever"
    },
    {
      "index": 608,
      "start_seconds": 1247,
      "source_timestamp": "20:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you can. The proof boundary definitely"
    },
    {
      "index": 609,
      "start_seconds": 1249,
      "source_timestamp": "20:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "becomes the review boundary. So the you"
    },
    {
      "index": 610,
      "start_seconds": 1252,
      "source_timestamp": "20:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "know, as much as this as it's great at"
    },
    {
      "index": 611,
      "start_seconds": 1254,
      "source_timestamp": "20:54",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "verifying some of the implementation,"
    },
    {
      "index": 612,
      "start_seconds": 1255,
      "source_timestamp": "20:55",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you want to be checking the full stack,"
    },
    {
      "index": 613,
      "start_seconds": 1257,
      "source_timestamp": "20:57",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "especially with this uh stateful"
    },
    {
      "index": 614,
      "start_seconds": 1259,
      "source_timestamp": "20:59",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "stateless risk. So you want to be"
    },
    {
      "index": 615,
      "start_seconds": 1260,
      "source_timestamp": "21:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "checking do the inputs where do the"
    },
    {
      "index": 616,
      "start_seconds": 1262,
      "source_timestamp": "21:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "inputs come from? What are the edge case"
    },
    {
      "index": 617,
      "start_seconds": 1264,
      "source_timestamp": "21:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "scenarios that you maybe never thought"
    },
    {
      "index": 618,
      "start_seconds": 1265,
      "source_timestamp": "21:05",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "about with weird race conditions or"
    },
    {
      "index": 619,
      "start_seconds": 1267,
      "source_timestamp": "21:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "hardware corruption? Um, and is that"
    },
    {
      "index": 620,
      "start_seconds": 1269,
      "source_timestamp": "21:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "modeled by formal verification? If it's"
    },
    {
      "index": 621,
      "start_seconds": 1271,
      "source_timestamp": "21:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "not, can you can you model it some other"
    },
    {
      "index": 622,
      "start_seconds": 1273,
      "source_timestamp": "21:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "way through fuzzing or even hardware"
    },
    {
      "index": 623,
      "start_seconds": 1275,
      "source_timestamp": "21:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "testing and things like that?"
    },
    {
      "index": 624,
      "start_seconds": 1278,
      "source_timestamp": "21:18",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. So, I want to leave you guys with"
    },
    {
      "index": 625,
      "start_seconds": 1279,
      "source_timestamp": "21:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "some key takeaways from this talk. Um,"
    },
    {
      "index": 626,
      "start_seconds": 1282,
      "source_timestamp": "21:22",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "the most important one during the"
    },
    {
      "index": 627,
      "start_seconds": 1284,
      "source_timestamp": "21:24",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "migration, I think, is that the just"
    },
    {
      "index": 628,
      "start_seconds": 1286,
      "source_timestamp": "21:26",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "because we have postquantum crypto, it"
    },
    {
      "index": 629,
      "start_seconds": 1288,
      "source_timestamp": "21:28",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "does not retire the old authority. So"
    },
    {
      "index": 630,
      "start_seconds": 1290,
      "source_timestamp": "21:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you need to be checking ECDSA keys and"
    },
    {
      "index": 631,
      "start_seconds": 1292,
      "source_timestamp": "21:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "and what they control at the L1 layer."
    },
    {
      "index": 632,
      "start_seconds": 1294,
      "source_timestamp": "21:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Uh um and yet you may have leaked"
    },
    {
      "index": 633,
      "start_seconds": 1296,
      "source_timestamp": "21:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "signatures that you you are not aware"
    },
    {
      "index": 634,
      "start_seconds": 1297,
      "source_timestamp": "21:37",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "of. Maybe you want to you know some"
    },
    {
      "index": 635,
      "start_seconds": 1299,
      "source_timestamp": "21:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "teams here want to build some automation"
    },
    {
      "index": 636,
      "start_seconds": 1301,
      "source_timestamp": "21:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "around tracing all these roots and that"
    },
    {
      "index": 637,
      "start_seconds": 1303,
      "source_timestamp": "21:43",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "recovery always works. You can always"
    },
    {
      "index": 638,
      "start_seconds": 1304,
      "source_timestamp": "21:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "upgrade your protocol and but you can"
    },
    {
      "index": 639,
      "start_seconds": 1306,
      "source_timestamp": "21:46",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "never do it with the old keys."
    },
    {
      "index": 640,
      "start_seconds": 1309,
      "source_timestamp": "21:49",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "The compact proofs um we spoke about"
    },
    {
      "index": 641,
      "start_seconds": 1311,
      "source_timestamp": "21:51",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Jardin. There are also some other ones"
    },
    {
      "index": 642,
      "start_seconds": 1313,
      "source_timestamp": "21:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "on the uh sphinx flam family um that"
    },
    {
      "index": 643,
      "start_seconds": 1316,
      "source_timestamp": "21:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "also stateful. they do depend on durable"
    },
    {
      "index": 644,
      "start_seconds": 1318,
      "source_timestamp": "21:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "signing history. So that that value Q"
    },
    {
      "index": 645,
      "start_seconds": 1320,
      "source_timestamp": "22:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that we spoke about, you need to be"
    },
    {
      "index": 646,
      "start_seconds": 1322,
      "source_timestamp": "22:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "keeping a track of that and making sure"
    },
    {
      "index": 647,
      "start_seconds": 1323,
      "source_timestamp": "22:03",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "that uh is very closely um you know"
    },
    {
      "index": 648,
      "start_seconds": 1327,
      "source_timestamp": "22:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "durable and used. Um and you want to be"
    },
    {
      "index": 649,
      "start_seconds": 1330,
      "source_timestamp": "22:10",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "testing all of the edge cases. I mean"
    },
    {
      "index": 650,
      "start_seconds": 1331,
      "source_timestamp": "22:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "I've just mentioned a few here, but"
    },
    {
      "index": 651,
      "start_seconds": 1333,
      "source_timestamp": "22:13",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "always be looking at whether you're"
    },
    {
      "index": 652,
      "start_seconds": 1335,
      "source_timestamp": "22:15",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "leaking key material, which would be"
    },
    {
      "index": 653,
      "start_seconds": 1336,
      "source_timestamp": "22:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "super important if you're regarding"
    },
    {
      "index": 654,
      "start_seconds": 1337,
      "source_timestamp": "22:17",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "billions of TVL."
    },
    {
      "index": 655,
      "start_seconds": 1339,
      "source_timestamp": "22:19",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "And finally, you want to check that"
    },
    {
      "index": 656,
      "start_seconds": 1341,
      "source_timestamp": "22:21",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "obviously everything uh agrees. This is"
    },
    {
      "index": 657,
      "start_seconds": 1343,
      "source_timestamp": "22:23",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "more at the integration layer. Does the"
    },
    {
      "index": 658,
      "start_seconds": 1345,
      "source_timestamp": "22:25",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "renewal and recovery work through real"
    },
    {
      "index": 659,
      "start_seconds": 1347,
      "source_timestamp": "22:27",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "relay mechanisms which may be bridging,"
    },
    {
      "index": 660,
      "start_seconds": 1349,
      "source_timestamp": "22:29",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "maybe gas relays, maybe pay masters? Um"
    },
    {
      "index": 661,
      "start_seconds": 1352,
      "source_timestamp": "22:32",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "maybe as some EVM fork works differently"
    },
    {
      "index": 662,
      "start_seconds": 1354,
      "source_timestamp": "22:34",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "to another one and that your spx uh"
    },
    {
      "index": 663,
      "start_seconds": 1356,
      "source_timestamp": "22:36",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "stateless one, you know, the gas might"
    },
    {
      "index": 664,
      "start_seconds": 1358,
      "source_timestamp": "22:38",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "be too expensive for you to actually"
    },
    {
      "index": 665,
      "start_seconds": 1359,
      "source_timestamp": "22:39",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "include it in any real block. Um but"
    },
    {
      "index": 666,
      "start_seconds": 1361,
      "source_timestamp": "22:41",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "we'll see where we end up. And to"
    },
    {
      "index": 667,
      "start_seconds": 1364,
      "source_timestamp": "22:44",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "emphasize this, we're still super early."
    },
    {
      "index": 668,
      "start_seconds": 1365,
      "source_timestamp": "22:45",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So these are just some things to be"
    },
    {
      "index": 669,
      "start_seconds": 1367,
      "source_timestamp": "22:47",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "thinking about and some keywords you"
    },
    {
      "index": 670,
      "start_seconds": 1368,
      "source_timestamp": "22:48",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "guys can go and Google afterwards. Um"
    },
    {
      "index": 671,
      "start_seconds": 1370,
      "source_timestamp": "22:50",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "but yeah, a lot of this stuff is"
    },
    {
      "index": 672,
      "start_seconds": 1372,
      "source_timestamp": "22:52",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "scheduled, not deployed. A lot of it's"
    },
    {
      "index": 673,
      "start_seconds": 1373,
      "source_timestamp": "22:53",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "in prototypes. Um, and yeah, the"
    },
    {
      "index": 674,
      "start_seconds": 1376,
      "source_timestamp": "22:56",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "engineering effort really remains here."
    },
    {
      "index": 675,
      "start_seconds": 1378,
      "source_timestamp": "22:58",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So, uh, yeah, if you're doing wallets,"
    },
    {
      "index": 676,
      "start_seconds": 1380,
      "source_timestamp": "23:00",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "L1's, L2s, um, application layer, you"
    },
    {
      "index": 677,
      "start_seconds": 1382,
      "source_timestamp": "23:02",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "want to be starting to have a think"
    },
    {
      "index": 678,
      "start_seconds": 1384,
      "source_timestamp": "23:04",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "about this, uh, today."
    },
    {
      "index": 679,
      "start_seconds": 1387,
      "source_timestamp": "23:07",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "So, thank you for listening. Um, yeah,"
    },
    {
      "index": 680,
      "start_seconds": 1389,
      "source_timestamp": "23:09",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "you can check out asymmetric.com on the"
    },
    {
      "index": 681,
      "start_seconds": 1391,
      "source_timestamp": "23:11",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "QR code. Um, and yeah, any questions?"
    },
    {
      "index": 682,
      "start_seconds": 1396,
      "source_timestamp": "23:16",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "[applause]"
    },
    {
      "index": 683,
      "start_seconds": 1410,
      "source_timestamp": "23:30",
      "end_seconds": null,
      "text": "Cool. Thanks everyone."
    }
  ]
}
